The special properties of the Y chromosome stem form the fact that it is a non‐recombining degenerate derivative of the X chromosome. The absence of homologous recombination between the X and the Y chromosome leads to gradual degeneration of various Y chromosome genes on an evolutionary timescale. The absence of recombination, however, also favors the accumulation of transposable elements on the Y chromosome during its evolution, as seen with both Drosophila and mammalian Y chromosomes. Alongside these processes, the acquisition and (...) amplification of autosomal male benefit genes occur. This review will focus on recent studies that reveal the autosome‐acquired genes on the Y chromosome of both Drosophila and humans. The evolution of the acquired and amplified genes on the Y chromosome is also discussed. Molecular and comparative analyses of Y‐linked repeats in the Drosophila melanogaster genome demonstrate that there was a period of their degeneration followed by a period of their integration into RNAi silencing, which was beneficial for male fertility. Finally, the function of non‐coding RNA produced by amplified Y chromosome genetic elements will be discussed. BioEssays 27:1256–1262, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms.

The tablet ARET 13, 15 was published in 2003 by Pelio Fronzaroli among other Eblaite “testi di cancelleria,” providing a basis for studying the document. This edition was the first step toward understanding the text, establishing that it describes several episodes pertaining to Ebla’s relations with Mari, its principal rival in eastern Syria, at the time of Yibbi-zikir, the last vizier of Early Dynastic Ebla. However, a number of difficulties remained unresolved. In a new edition, Walther Sallaberger (2008) made significant (...) progress in the interpretation of the structure, genre, and historical setting of the text, as well as of several problematic passages. In particular, he showed that the document describes offenses suffered by Eblaites visiting the Mari kingdom, related to a war between Ebla and Mari. We believe, however, that there is still room for a better understanding of the text. Here we suggest several new interpretations for a number of passages, revealing previously unnoticed lexemes and historical facts. We also provide the first English translation of the document. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science; Ukraine; Polysytemic nature of theories; Practical theories; Subsystems of a theory.

Traditionalists affirm that in self-deception I intend to deceive myself; but, on the standard account of interpersonal deception, according to which deceiver intend to make their target believe a falsehood, traditionalism generates paradoxes, arising from the fact that I will surely know that I want to make myself believe a falsehood. In this thesis, I argue that these well-known paradoxes need not arise under my manipulativist account of deception. In particular, I defend traditionalism about self-deception by showing that what causes (...) paradoxes is not the idea that self-deception is an intrapersonal analogue of interpersonal deception but rather our incorrect conceptions of deception, interpersonal deception, and lying. I show, by way of counterexamples, that the essence of deception is not ending up epistemically worse off but rather being intentionally manipulated into forming or retaining a certain truth-evaluable mental state. Vitally, contra the standard view, the deceiver need not hold that the mental state he intends to produce in the deceived involves a falsehood; in fact, the targeted effect may involve a proposition believed by the deceiver to be true or about whose truth the deceiver suspends belief. Any phenomenon rightly called self-deception, I argue, involves an action in which the person intentionally manipulates (by way of a trick) her own way of forming or retaining some truth-evaluable mental state of her own (belief or a belief-like thought). Thus, on the manipulativist view, a self-deceiver may non-paradoxically intend to deceive himself: the relevant intention is to affect a particular truth-evaluable thought by way of non-deviantly manipulating his agential use of his own cognitive capacities. While all cases of self-deception involve intentional manipulation of the self by the self, how this manipulative trick works out varies in different kinds of cases. In some cases, the self-deceptive manipulative trick is not intentional under that description, a description that captures the so-called deflationary view. Although the manipulativist account allows for numerous different strategies of self-deception, and is consistent with both traditionalism and deflationism, it cannot, by itself, vindicate the idea of lying to oneself. On the standard conception, lying to myself is practically impossible (if the mind is not partitioned) and this is because the very forming the intention to lie to myself – as including the intention to make myself believe my own lie – seems very unlikely. Arguably, people will not φ if they think that φ-ing is impossible. I argue that some kinds of behaviour typically understood as self-deception are actually cases in which the person is lying to herself without the intention to deceive herself; rather, she avoids legitimising an unfavourable state of affairs by openly affirming its contrary. It may also be the case, however, that some lies to oneself are aimed at deceiving – this is because, as I argue, liars need not assert what they believe is false; hence, by lying to myself, I may intend to increase my confidence in the belief I already hold. Finally, the motive for self-deception is always a matter of preserving the person’s endorsed idealised picture of reality. This account allows me to explain all possible cases of self-deception. In the last chapter, I apply my theory to some paradigmatic cases first outlined in my introduction. (shrink)

The paper has three objectives: to expound a set-theoretical triplet model of concepts; to introduce some triplet relations (symbolic, logical, and mathematical formalization; equivalence, intersection, disjointness) between object concepts, and to instantiate them by relations between certain physical object concepts.

The article deals with some current pioneering formal reconstructions and interpretations of the problem well known in antiquity as The Master Argument. This problem is concerning with enrichment of formal logical systems with modal and temporal notions. The opening topic is devoted to reconstruction of Arthur Prior. while the other here included approach to the problem arc mostly reactions. revisions or additions to this one.

One of the main and currently dominating attempt in theories of philosophical psychology is the way of describing psychological facts as cognitive state of affairs or mental events which could be individuated by the same means as it were natural species. This idea resulted from incapability of the " folk" psychology to give complete and satisfactory scientific explanation by the intentionality approach. The author claims that many certain advantages of the cognitive theories could be disputable if we try to consistently (...) analyze the ways of describing and individuation of entities in such "deeper" theories. And, especially if we can recognize them as spatiotemporally restricted (i .e. historical) entities. This alternative case could be, as it seems, theoretically more appropriate to their subjects: particular thoughts, believes, desires, representations and other mental events would be individuated as genealogically reconstructed subjects which forms potentially stronger explanatory power than in the case of explanations given by covering laws and in accordance with the presupposition of nomological necessity. (shrink)

Cílem studie je zodpovědět otázku, co znamená v interpretujících humanitních či sociálních vědách zkoumat narativně. Interpretace je pojata jako explikace utváření významu. V návaznosti na toto pojetí je identifikována řada interpretačních dilemat. V tomto kontextu je uveden narativní přístup jako řešení těchto dilemat. Je pojednáno o povaze narativní perspektivy, o vztahu narativity a zkušenosti a o povaze narativních dat. Narativní výzkum je chápán jako rekonstrukce způsobů, jakými je utvářen význam narativními prostředky. Narativní interpretace umožňuje pohybovat se pružně a efektivně: 1) (...) mezi explicitními daty a exemplifikačními schématy, 2) mezi jedincem a kulturou, 3) mezi hermeneutikou podezření a hermeneutikou důvěry, 4) mezi částmi a celkem, 5) mezi obsahem a formou, 6) mezi strukturou a funkcí. (shrink)

David Miller v pracích Critical Rationalism a Out of Error se jako jeden z mála Popperových žáků snaží nejen o vysvětlení a obhájení Popperova kritického racionalismu, ale zároveň i o jeho další rozvinutí. Millerovo znovunastolení kritického racionalismu ovšem předpokládá, že k racionálnímu jednání není třeba žádných „dobrých důvodů“, ale jen argumentů. Uvedená stať se zaměřuje právě na tuto otázku existence tzv. „dobrých důvodů“ ve spojení s racionalitou a racionálním rozhodováním a ukazuje, že Millerův požadavek neexistence „dobrých důvodů“ je nejen příliš (...) radikální, ale i nepřijatelný z hlediska Popperova nebo Musgravova pojetí kritického racionalismu. (shrink)

In the opening lines of this article it is claimed that history is a discipline taking role as part of unique body of science. The concept of scientific rationality is presented as the criterion of demarcation between science and pseudoscience. From this statement as a starting point, it follows that the methodological grounds for scientific predictions are common for all scientific disciplines. Different aspects of scientific predicting are critically examined: thesis of symmetry, determinism and predictability, indeterminism and predictability, reflexivity of (...) predictions, prediction of novelty and progress, predictions in relation to the time of their uttering, the prediction sketch, truthfulness and regularity in implying prediction, and predictability of human actions. In the concluding section, the author admits of the possibility of constructing the theory of history, opposed to eschatological philosophy of history, as a predictive theory with a scientific basis and a theory whose specifications limit its misuse in practice. (shrink)

The article deals with some items of Gödelian time travel problem well-known as an illustration of a specific kind of causality paradox. Its first part presents “the travel into the past” according to several recent physical hypotheses, which, from theoretical standpoint, seem to make such an idea possible. The familiar concept of backward causation is also discussed; we need to accept and develop it, if we wish to escape this type of time-travel paradoxes. The second part of the contribution is (...) devoted to philosophical interpretations of the precedence in order of cause and effect, and of the relation between temporal and causal order. The author claims, that if we wish to save coherent picture of nature, it is necessary to revise the concept of causality to make it compatible with the concept of backward causation. (shrink)

There are no universally adopted answers to the natural questions about scientific concepts: What are they? What is their structure? What are their functions? How many kinds of them are there? Do they change? Ironically, most if not all scientific monographs or articles mention concepts, but the scientific studies of scientific concepts are rare in occurrence. It is well known that the necessary stage of any scientific study is constructing the model of objects in question. Many years logical modeling was (...) dominant in the concept studies. Last decades, concepts came to be regarded as the subject of mathematical modeling. However, different authors take different features of concepts as independent variables of their models. Our objective is to characterize informally the spectra of relevant variables for the modeling of scientific concepts. (shrink)

This article examines Xenophon’s suggestion for conducting cavalry displays in Eq. mag. 3 and develops the argument that the text is a significant document of Xenophon’s thought about political performativity as well as of 4th century Athenian political culture. I argue that one of Xenophon’s strategies to reform the relationship between the Athenian demos and the ideologically fraught elite institution of the cavalry was to conduct public displays that draw on the aesthetics and formal features of New Dithyramb. On the (...) basis of my analysis, I argue that understanding political performances requires closer attention to specific audience expectations, aesthetic norms, and cultural power, and suggest that Xenophon was a political thinker and actor who was highly attentive to such issues in the Athenian context. (shrink)

In his (several times reprinted) article How Wide Is the Gap Between Facts and Values? N. Rescher aspires to clarify the long-lasting discussion on the ‘is-ought’ (‘fact-value’) gap by providing a framework in which the related arguments can be perspicuously articulated. He then argues that even if the logical gap may bereal, the transition from factual premises to value conclusions is smoothly mediated by trivially true value statements. We scrutinize Rescher’s argumentation and show defects in the presented lines of reasoning. (...) In particular, we argue that his tripartite division of statements (factual, evaluative, hybrid), as well as his emphasis on the role of evaluative truisms, introduce serious problems that escape Rescher’s attention. We thus conclude that he failed to achieve his goals. (shrink)

The paper discusses various aspects of the concept of “cultural memory” coined by Jan Assmann and related both to the problem of determining the categories of culture that became the first objects of philosophical reflection in the era of the Axial Age and to the issues of the modern crisis of the ideology of globalism and multiculturalism. Using the example of some categories of an archaic myth that have not lost their cultural and social relevance at present, the variability of (...) the genesis of philosophy in various civilizations of the epoch of the “Axial Age” is demonstrated - both those in which it arises as an independent form of worldview and those where this process stops at the stage of a highly speculative myth. Special attention is paid to the cultural and social aspects of memory and recollection of the past as forms of spiritual “resistance” to external cultural influences and the preservation of religious and ethnic identity, which is equally relevant both during the genesis of philosophy and in modern post-industrial society during the crisis of globalist ideology and the philosophy of multiculturalism. (shrink)

This article analyzes Nikolai Berdyaev’s ideas concerning the spiritual origins of the 1917 Russian revolution. The philosopher believed that its sources were “demons” living in the Russian national spirit, discovered and awakened in the works of the Russian classics, such as Nikolai Gogol, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Leo Tolstoy. The main reason these demons were able to take hold of the Russian national consciousness was the collapse of everyday life, and the false orientation of this consciousness toward a violent establishment of (...) a new social order. This order attempted to create a moral of equality and fair distribution of property, while lacking a religious-metaphysical foundation. Berdyaev’s views are compared with the contemporary realities in Russia at the time and the search for a resolution to the deep sociopolitical and moral contradictions inherent in these realities. (shrink)

The keynote idea of the theses is contained in the author’s assumption that modern philosophy doesn’t meet its claiming pretensions: to be universal form of knowledge. First of all philosophy is connected not with knowledge but with ideas and secondly being authentic it “exists only in everyday life”.1 In orderthat philosophy could realize its innate essence corresponding conditions of social being should exist but they are still absent and therefore philosophy is absent as well. Its place is occupied by metaphysics (...) which is free movement of thinking that has no definiteness as the condition of being of any form of thought. That iswhy we watch crisis state of “philosophy” which becomes apparent in vagueness of its subject: “philosophy is not only one, there are many of them”. The author supposes that philosophy as the highest relation of mankind to objective reality is the only one. Philosophy lowered down from the heaven (Platon, Ciceron) in the field of human being must raise people not only to purity of thought, but mainly to purity of their activity both with each other and with nature. Then real interaction of men and nature will take place. This will be the beginning of spiritualization of the Universe. It may exist only under the conditions of social uniformity as historical form of Weltanschauung (world outlook) that removes religious form. Realization of its being supposes fundamental change of social life. It is necessary that private property should be replaced with social property in the sphere of social production. Only under these conditions philosophy may appear and exist as historical form of Weltanschauung. (shrink)

This article discusses the connection between the ideas of Fyodor M. Dostoevsky and Vladimir S. Solovyov on the need for cultural and moral transformation of those who would claim to participate in...

My dear Aleksandr!I have finally found some quiet time for a slow and attentive read of your article “The Beginning of the Black Notebooks.”1 I very much liked the article, especially for your trul...

Thirty years after the appearance of Wolf Leslau’s Comparative Dictionary of Geʿez, the present study aims at correcting and updating some of the entries of this major tool of Semitic etymology. New data from Ugaritic, Akkadian, and especially Modern South Arabian are prominent among the additions.

We present a review of part of the results obtained by the authors for the statistics of coherent radiation propagating in a random medium both in the framework of diagrammatic techniques and random matrix theory. Distribution functions for the total transmission coefficient and the angular transmission coefficient for the diffusive transport and the crossover between the diffusive and ballistic regimes are obtained.

The aim of this book is to present the fundamental theoretical results concerning inference rules in deductive formal systems. Primary attention is focused on: admissible or permissible inference rules the derivability of the admissible inference rules the structural completeness of logics the bases for admissible and valid inference rules. There is particular emphasis on propositional non-standard logics (primary, superintuitionistic and modal logics) but general logical consequence relations and classical first-order theories are also considered. The book is basically self-contained and special (...) attention has been made to present the material in a convenient manner for the reader. Proofs of results, many of which are not readily available elsewhere, are also included. The book is written at a level appropriate for first-year graduate students in mathematics or computer science. Although some knowledge of elementary logic and universal algebra are necessary, the first chapter includes all the results from universal algebra and logic that the reader needs. For graduate students in mathematics and computer science the book is an excellent textbook. (shrink)

"This personification of wisdom with golden hair and a radiant aura echoes both the eternal feminine and the world soul. Rooted in Christian and Jewish mysticism, Eastern Orthodox iconography, Greek philosophy, and European romanticism, the Sophiology that suffuses Solovyov's philosophical and artistic works is both intellectually sophisticated and profoundly inspiring. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt brings together key texts from Solovyov's writings about Sophia: poetry, fiction, drama, and philosophy, all extensively annotated and some available in English for the first time (with assistance (...) from the translators Boris Jakim and Laury Magnus)."--Amazon website. (shrink)

People are remarkably smart: They use language, possess complex motor skills, make nontrivial inferences, develop and use scientific theories, make laws, and adapt to complex dynamic environments. Much of this knowledge requires concepts and this study focuses on how people acquire concepts. It is argued that conceptual development progresses from simple perceptual grouping to highly abstract scientific concepts. This proposal of conceptual development has four parts. First, it is argued that categories in the world have different structure. Second, there might (...) be different learning systems that evolved to learn categories of differing structures. Third, these systems exhibit differential maturational course, which affects how categories of different structures are learned in the course of development. And finally, an interaction of these components may result in the developmental transition from perceptual groupings to more abstract concepts. This study reviews a large body of empirical evidence supporting this proposal. (shrink)

Recalling the banishment of Russian philosophers in 1921, Boris Zaitsev remarked "only Shpet is forgotten." But Gustav Gustavovich Shpet was not "forgotten" and he was not the only one who succeeded in avoiding expulsion at that time. Among the humanists of prerevolutionary-stamp who continued to work in Soviet Russia after 1922, we can list P.P. Blonskii, A. A. Bogdanov, A.N. Giliarov, S.A. Zhebelev , A.F. Losev, V.N. Ivanovskii, R.V. Ivanov-Razumnik, N.I. Kareev, A.O. Makovel'skii, V.N. Murav'ev, E.L. Radlov, B.G. Stolpner, P.A. (...) Florenskii, B.A. Fokht, G.I. Chelpanov, PS. Iushkevich: almost all of them were philosophers. (shrink)