The aim of this study is to clarify the meaning of the term saṁketa, which is usually translated as ‘ convention’, in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, the first and the most authoritative commentary to the Yogasūtras. This paper is a contribution to the reconstruction of the classical Yoga view on the relation between word and its meaning, for saṁketa is a key term used by this darśana in discussing this relation. The textual analysis of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya has led me to (...) the conclusion that its author’s understanding of the linguistic convention is different from the notion of the linguistic convention of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas and similar to the notion of the linguistic convention of the Grammarians. These are interpretations of the term saṁketa which reflect Yogasūtrabhāṣya’s understanding of the linguistic convention: the tradition of the usage of words, established usage of words. Saṁketa of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, unlike saṁketa/samaya of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, is not an agreement established by anyone, but an agreement in the sense of tradition, established practice, or established custom. Unlike the saṁketa/samaya of these philosophers, the saṁketa of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, having neither beginning nor end, is not re-created, but only made known at the beginning of each cycle of existence of the world. (shrink)

본 논문에서는 Yogavivaraṇa(7-8C)와 Vācaspati Miśra(9-10C)의 Tattvavaiśāradi, Vijñānabhikṣu(15-16C)의 Yogavārttika와 같은 복주들을 참조하면서, Yogasūtrabhāṣya 1.11에서 다루는 기억의 이론을 분석하고자 한다. “기억(smṛti)이란 경험한 대상을 잃지 않는 것이다.”라는 Yogasūtra 1.11의 내용에 대해서 Yogasūtrabhāṣya에서는 대상을 기억하는 것이 아니라 인식대상과 인식작용의 양쪽 모습을 지닌 관념이 잠세력(saṃskāra)을 개시하고 그 잠세력이 현현하는 것이 기억이라고 재정의한다. 이에 대한 세 가지 복주들은 이와 같이 Yogasūtrabhāṣya에서 설명하는 기억의 과정에 대해서, 모호한 내용들을 보충하면서 Yogasūtra와 Yogasūtrabhāṣya의 내용에서 드러난 간극을 메우기 위해서 각기 다른 방식의 해석을 시도하였다. 여기서 Yogasūtrabhāṣya의 저자가 보인 태도는 Yogasūtra의 (...) 표현을 부정하는 것이 아니라, 다른 논리를 추가하여 종합하는 것이었다. Tattvavaiśāradi나 Yogavārttika와 같은 비교적 후대의 복주들이 기억에 관하여 전혀 다른 용어를 사용하는 Yogasūtra와 Yogasūtrabhāṣya 사이의 간극을 합리적으로 설명하려는 시도를 하는 것도 그런 태도의 범주에 들어갈 것이다. (shrink)

. Besides a philosophical exposition of the tenets of a form of Śaiva Siddhānta, the Dharma Pātañjala contains a long presentation of the yoga system that apparently follows the first three chapters of Patañjal’s Yogasūtra , either interweaving Sanskrit excerpts from an untraced versified version of the latter text with an Old Javanese commentary, or directly rendering into Old Javanese what appears to be an original Sanskrit commentary. Although the Old Javanese prose often bears a strong resemblance with the arrangement (...) and formulation of the topics treated in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya , it diverges from that commentary in several respects. The Dharma Pātañjala often presents specific doctrinal details that are found in other (sub)commentaries or in the Arabic rendering of the sūtra s-cum-commentary composed by al-Bīrūnī before 1030 AD , or adds original elements that are unattested elsewhere. The testimony of the Dharma Pātañjala turns out to be useful in order to solve some of the dilemmas posed by the selected sūtra s. It may also help us to better understand the textual cultural transmission and cultural reception of Patañjali’s work in both South and Southeast Asia, for its author, rather than freely borrowing from different Sanskrit commentaries, appear to have drawn upon an as yet unidentified, and possibly lost, ‘common source’. (shrink)

Linguistic convention is one of the central notions of Indian philosophy of language. The well-known view of samaya/saṃketa is its conception as the agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. However, in Indian philosophy of language, we also encounter two other important but little-researched interpretations of samaya/saṃketa, which consider it as the established usage of words. I present a new classification of traditions of Indian thought based on their view of linguistic convention. This classification is to (...) be verified and expanded in further studies. As far as I know, such a classification has never been undertaken before. 1) Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, and later classical Yoga of the Tattvavaiśāradī accept samaya/saṃketa as an agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. 2) Bhartṛhari the Grammarian and the continuators of his thought acknowledge samaya/saṃketa as the established usage of words that is rooted in the natural relationship between words and their meanings; the convention manifests the relationship. This view was probably also shared by Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins. 3) Classical Yoga of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya and probably also earlier Grammar thought of the Mahābhāṣya accept linguistic convention as the established usage of words, but this usage, though having neither a beginning nor an end, is not based on any natural and necessary word–meaning relationship. In this view, linguistic convention not only manifests the word–meaning relationship but also keeps it in existence. Another new contribution of this research is my explanation for why the same Sanskrit term samaya/saṃketa was applied to the different ways of understanding linguistic convention. I explain this through the common aspects of all three kinds of samaya/saṃketa. The first aspect is the content of all these kinds of samaya/saṃketa. Irrespective of how linguistic convention is understood, its content is the same: “such and such a word has such and such a meaning”. The second aspect is the crucial role of linguistic convention in language acquisition, communication, and transmission. (shrink)