Özet Dini bilginin temel kaynağı olan Kur’an ve Sünnet’in Peygamberimizden bize haber yoluyla intikal ettiği hususu izahtan vârestedir. Rasûlullâh demek, Allah’tan aldığı bilgiyi insanlara ileten elçi, haberci demektir. Bu nedenle Peygamberlerden bize ulaşan dini bilgiye de haber ya da haber-i resûl denilmiştir. Rasûlullâh’tan teşrî’ ile ilgili gelen her haber, duyanlar ve tevâtür yoluyla ulaşılanlar için bila şek vela ihtilâf, kesinkes doğru ve bağlayıcıdır. Ancak bazı haberlerin Rasûlullâh’a nisbeti kesin olmadığı için ya da nisbeti kesin olsa da delâleti kesin olmadığı için (...) o haberlerin ifade ettiği bilgi de kesin değil, zannîdir. Kimi güdümlü veya meselenin mâhiyetinden bihaber bazı kişilerin; dinde zanla amel edilmez gibi temelsiz iddialarını bir tarafa bırakacak olursak, zannî bilgi, kesin bilgi mucibince bağlayıcıdır. Zannî bilginin, birden çok ihtimal barındırıp ictihad alanı olması bu durumu değiştirmez. Nitekim furû-i fıkhın çoğu zannî bilgi ifade eden haber-i vâhid ve ictihada mebnidir. İctihad, İslam hukukunun çok geniş bir alanını kapsamaktadır. Âmil durumda olduğu kıyas başta olmak üzere mesâlih-i mürsele, istihsan, sedd-i zerayi, sahâbe kavlinin delil değeri, istıshab, istıslah ve örfü de göz önüne aldığımızda karşımıza devasa bir alan çıkmaktadır. Bu kadar büyük bir alanı kapsayan ve böylesine ehemmiyetli bir konunun her türlü ilgi, alaka ve araştırmayı hak ettiğini düşünüyoruz. Sınırlı naslarla, sınırsız ihtiyaç ve sorunlara çözüm bulabilmenin yegâne yolu ictihattır. Aynı zamanda ictihat, İslam’ın kıyamete kadar her çağda ve her toplumda yaşanabilmesinin de temelidir. Dolayısıyla Zannî bilgiyi ve ictihadı reddetmek, İslam hukukunu sosyal yaşamdan çekmek demektir. Bu çalışmada, zannî bilginin tanımına, kapsamına, delil değerine, ictihadın tanımına, zanniyâtlarda ictihad edebilmenin delillerine, ictihad edebilme ehliyetine, zannî bilginin ve ictihadın reddi durumunda ortaya çıkacak sonuçlara yer verilmiştir. (shrink)

Sünnî usulcülere göre sahih olan haber-i vahid zan ifade etmekle birlikte, böyle bir haberle amel etmek naklî ve kat’î delillerin bir gereği olarak vaciptir. Şiî-Usûlî geleneğin temsilcilerinden Şerif Murtazâ ise haber-i vâhidle amel etmenin aklen caiz olduğunu, ancak bunun dinî açıdan vacip olmadığını iddia etmiştir. Ona göre Kur’an, mütevâtir haber ve masum imamın dâhil olduğu icmâ kesin bilgi kaynağı olduğundan bağlayıcıdır. Haber-i vâhid ise zann ifade etmektedir. Böyle bir haberle amel etmeyi gerektiren naklî kat’î bir delil ise bulunmamaktadır. Bu nedenle (...) haber-i vâhid amelî konularda hüccet değildir. Şerif Murtazâ, Sünnî usulcülerin haber-i vâhidin hüccet olduğuna dair naklî kat’î delillerini eleştirmiş, usulcüler ise bu eleştirilere cevap vermişlerdir. Araştırmamız Şiî-Usûlî geleneğin haber-i vâhide yaklaşım evreninden Şerif Murtazâ örneğini ele almayı ve Sünnî usulcülerin görüşleriyle mukayese etmek suretiyle değerlendirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Şerif Murtazâ’nın âhâd haber konusundaki yaklaşımı özü itibarıyla masum imam teolojisine dayanmakta-dır. Araştırmada masum imam teolojisinin ve haber-i vâhidle amel etmeyi gerektiren kat’î bir delilin bulunmadığı iddiasının nas, icmâ, tevâtür ve makul açısından vakıaya aykırı tutarsız bir görüş olduğu tespit edilmiştir. (shrink)

Fıkıh literatüründe sünnet önemli bir yere sahiptir. Çünkü fıkhın temeli Hz. Peygamber tarafından atılmış ve fıkhın gayesini en iyi bilen ve uygulayan kendisi olmuştur. Bu sebeple şer’î amelî konularda hüküm istinbatı için müctehid imamlar, Kur’an’dan sonra sünnete başvurmuşlardır. Bununla birlikte müctehid imamlar, Hz. Peygamber’den gelen rivayetlerin bazılarını kabul ve onlarla amel etmede görüş ayrılıkları yaşamışlardır. Görüş ayrılıklarının temelinde ise sünnetin ekseriyetini teşkil eden haber-i vâhid vardır. Çünkü haber-i vâhid yapısal açıdan yalan, yanlışlık ve vehm ihtimali bulundurması yanında doğruluğu zan ile (...) sabit olması sebebiyle özellikle Hanefî usûlcülerine göre bilgi ifade etmez. Bu yönüyle haberi vâhid, mütevâtir haber kadar kuvvetli ve bağlayıcı olmayıp zannî bir bilgi ifade eder. Bu doğrultuda haber-i vâhid, “bilgi gerektirmez, zan gerektirir” şeklinde ifade edilmiştir. Bu ifade bağlamında şöyle bir soru ortaya çıkmaktadır: Haber-i vâhid, bilgi ifade etmediği halde, onunla amel edilmesi mümkün müdür? Bu sorudan hareketle zan ifade eden haber-i vâhidin hücceti ve onunla amel edilmesinin mümkün olup olmadığını, mezheplerin haber-i vâhide yaklaşımlarının nasıl olduğunu ve bu durumun cenaze bahsine ilişkin hükümlere nasıl yansıdığını ortaya koymak amacıyla bu çalışma ele alınmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmanın konusu, haber-i vâhidin hücceti için mezheplerin ileri sürdüğü farklı şartlar ve bu şartların hükümlere -cenaze namazı özelinde- etkisi ile sınırlıdır. Yöntem olarak öncelikle kavramsal çerçevede haber-i vâhidi tanımlamak, bilgi değerini ortaya koymak ve mezheplerin onunla hücceti noktasında benimsedikleri şartları tespit etmek amacıyla ilgili mezheplerin usûl eserleri incelenmiştir. Daha sonra mezheplerin benimsediği bu usûlî yöntem, cenaze bahsindeki yerini belirlemek üzere ilgili mezheplerin fürû kitapları taranmıştır. Bu metottan hareketle mezheplerin usûlde benimsediği ilkenin fürû meselelerine nasıl yansıdığı, haber-î vâhidin zannî bilgi ifade etmesine rağmen onunla amel etmenin gerekçesi ve cenazeye ilişkin bazı hükümlerde mezheplerin farklı hüküm benimsemelerinin nedeni ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

Bu makale, Kur’an’ın ȃ mm lafızlarının delaleti bağlamında tefsir ilmi ile fıkıh usulünün ilişkisini araştırmaktadır Esasen İslami ilimler bağlamında ȃ mm lafızların delaleti, İslam’ın temel metinlerindeki lafızlarla ilgili olduğu için sadece fıkıh usulü veya tefsir ilminin özel konusu değil, tüm İslami ilimlerin ortak konusudur. İslami ilimlerin üzerinde çalıştığı temel dini metinlerin aynılığı, bu ilimler arasında disiplinlerarası ilişkileri zorunlu hale getirmektedir. Tefsir ilmi ile fıkıh usulü arasındaki ilişkinin ȃ mm lafızlar bağlamında işlenmesinin nedeni de budur. Fıkıh usulü, bu konuyu Kur’an’ın lafızlarından (...) ve ibarelerinden hukuki normlar çıkarmak için incelemektedir. Yani lafızların vaz‘ ȋ delaleti, fıkıh usulünün hukuki normlar çıkarmak için müracaat ettiği temel istidlal yöntemlerinden biridir. Tefsir ilmi ise Arap dilinin kaide ve teamüllerine dayanan bu istidlal yöntemini, ilgili lafızlarla Allah’ın neyi murad ettiğini belirleyebilmek için konu edinmektedir. Lafızların vaz‘ ȋ delaleti konusunda tefsir ilmi ile fıkıh usulünün birbirinden ayrıldığı esas nokta da budur. Ayrıca lafızların delaletleri, İslam bilginlerine ilahi hitabı, farklı zamanlar ve mekânlardaki muhataplarının vakıalarıyla ilişkilendirme imkânını vermektedir. (shrink)

Such questions that may it be essential, necessary, recommended, or free to believe in some matters will be addressed in the article. It is concluded that such an approach is possible for Māturīdis and Ash'arīs. In the study, it was thought that the following two problems should be solved first. The first problem is how can a definitive confirmation be made with speculative information (zannī). Second, if it is a contradiction that the ulema of the relevant school construct the subject (...) of belief with an āḥād report (khabar) even though they explain the true report as mutawātir in the works of Kalām? In the article, three different solutions are proposed for the first problem, and the second problem is tried to be solved with the proposition that tawātur is compulsory for the universal or essential subjects of theology. Then, by giving two examples for each decree (hukm), it was tried to determine what this idea means in practice. It has been determined that the main controversial issues between the Ahl al-sunnah and the Mu'tazila arise in the category of wājib to be believed. It has been determined that the scholars of the aforementioned sects fall into dispute among themselves in matters presented as sunnah to be believed. As a result, in terms of the principles set forth by the Ahl al-Sunnah, it has been deemed possible to implement ʾafʿālu al-mukallafīn (deeds of those obligated) to theological issues. (shrink)

Muhyiddin ibn Arabî, İslam'daki tartışmasız en etkili sufi teorisyendir. Kalıcı şekilde en popüler çalışması olan Fusûsül-hikem'de, Kur'an'da bir peygamber hakkında algımız ne olursa olsun, onunla ilişkilendirilen ve ondan türetilen hikmetin çok farklı olduğunu açıkça ve ısrarla göstermektedir. Bu, İbn Arabî'nin Kur'an'ın literal metnini inkar ettiği anlamına gelmez. Tam tersine, O sadece Kur'an'ı farklı algılama ve alımlama düzeylerinin olduğunu iddia eder: Kur'an'ın dış gerçekliği (zâhir) kitlesel tüketim içindir ve İbn Arabî'ye göre kişinin Kur'an'ın yüzeysel bir anlayışından elde ettiği bilgidir. Bununla birlikte, (...) Kuran'ın, ariflerin (arifûn) korumasında olan daha derin bir anlayışı vardır. İbn Arabî, dış gerçeğin ötesine geçen, ancak ona (dış gerçekliğe) ayrılmaz bir şekilde bağlı olan Kur’an’ı bu şekilde okumasıyla, Kur'an'ın tasavvufi tefsir geleneğini kendi tarzında sürdürür ve birincil amacını Fusûs’un her bölümünde uygular: Her ikisinin de meşruiyetini korurken, Kur'an'ın zâhir ve bâṭını arasındaki antitezi vurgulamak ve hatta bâṭına ancak ẓâhir yoluyla erişilebileceğini iddia edecek kadar ileri gitmek. Bu makale, bu karşılıklı bağımlı bilgi ('ilm)/hikmet (hikma) antitezinin en açık örneklerini bulduğumuz ve belirli nedenlerle seçilmiş Fusûs'un dört bölümünü detaylı şekilde incelemektedir: Adem bölümü, Fusûs'un ilk bölümü olduğu için seçilmiştir ve bu bölümde İbn Arabî'nin eserin tamamına yönelik amacı ve yaklaşımı net şekilde belirginleşir. Lût ve Hârûn bölümleri, Endülüs'ün ikili hermenötik ilkesinin en bariz örneklerini oluşturdukları için seçilmiştir. Son olarak, İbn Arabî metnin tahiriyle çelişiyor gibi görünse bile, aslında birincil zahiri modele dayanan daha gelişmiş bir yorum modelini açıkladığı için Nûh bölümü seçilmiştir. Âdem bölümünde İbn Arabi, Adem ile ilişkilendirilen en tutarlı Kur'anî betimlemenin insanlığın babası olduğu için onun insanlığının olduğunu öne sürer. Oysa onun hikmeti ilahi vasfıdır. Bunun nedeni, İlahi en katıksız ve tam ifadesini ancak insanda bulabilmesidir. Diğer taraftan, Nuh'un Kuranî sembolü ise kavminin büyük çoğunluğunun boğulduğu tufandır. Sufî’ye göre (İbn Arabî) onun hikmeti, şeyleri yüzdürmesidir- subbūḥiyya/sebūḥiyya hikmeti. İbn Arabî için boğulma bir ölüm nedeni olmaktan çok bir yaşam kaynağı olmuştur. Lut'un Kur'an'daki en kalıcı imgesi, kavminin günahını dizginlemedeki yetersizliğinden dolayı güçsüzlüğüdür. İbn Arabî, ama yine de onun hikmetinin güç olduğunu söylüyor. Son olarak, Hârûn, Kuran'da Mûsâ'ya itaat eden biri olarak tasvir edilir. Kardeşine yardım etmesi, yükünü taşımasına yardım etmesi için kendisine peygamberlik verildi. Mûsâ, Sina'ya gidip onu sorumlu bıraktığında bile, o sadece Mûsâ'nın yardımcısı rolünü yerine getirir ve ona tabidir. Oysa onun hikmeti itaatin, liderliğin antitezidir. (shrink)

İslam’ın bilgi kaynakları Kur’ân, Sünnet ve icmâ’dır. Bunların tamamı aynı zamanda "haber" kategorisinde yer almaktadır. İslam âlimlerinin ittifakıyla bilgi kaynağı olarak kabul edilen haber kısmı ise "mütevâtir haber"dir. İlk dönemlerinden itibaren haberi bilgi kaynağı olarak kabul etmeyen ve bu konuda Müslüman âlimlerle çeşitli polemiklere giren bazı kesimler olmuştur. Bunların başında es-Sümeniyye fırkası gelmektedir. Bu fırkanın hangi kavim veya millet/milletler olduğu yönünde bazı araştırmalar yapılmıştır. Ancak bu çalışmaların söz konusu fırkanın hüviyeti ve bilgi kaynaklarına dair görüşleri hakkında yeterli düzeyde olduğu söylenemez. (...) İslam âlimlerince bilgi kaynağı olarak kabul edilen mütevâtir haber karşıtlığının kimlik ve düşüncelerinin aydınlatılması, bilgi değeri açısından haber konusunun daha iyi anlaşılmasına katkı sağlayacaktır. Bu vesileyle çalışmamızda farklı şekillerde telaffuz edilen Sümeniyye, Şümeniyye veya Şemeniyye’nin hüviyetine dair tartışmalar ile bilginin kaynaklarına yönelik yaklaşımı incelenmiştir. Özellikle de Sümeniyye’nin İslam âlimlerinin ittifakıyla bilgi kaynağı olarak kabul edilen mütevâtir habere yönelik yaklaşımları üzerinde durulmuştur. Bununla birlikte Müslüman âlimler ile Sümeniyye arasında geçen konuyla alakalı tartışmalara da yer verilmiştir. (shrink)

Press coverage on rationalist movement in India.

The study of Kant’s anthropology, proposed by Viktor Kozlovskyi in its original and thorough monograph, is an entirely new interpretation of Kant’s answer to the fundamental question “What is man?”. On the basis of the philosopher’s heritage and taking into account the large body of research lit-erature, Kozlovskyi reconstructs five conceptual “human models” in Kant’s anthropological discourse. However, this study contains a number of problematic statements and conclusions. I argue first, that there is some inconsistency between Kant’s understanding of the (...) concept of “anthropology” and Ko-zlovskyi’s explanation. Second, the model of man as intelligible being, made explicit through the con-cepts of “freedom” and “spontaneity”, is a justified construction within the limits of criticism, but not quite correct with regard to the place and function of “anthropology” in it. Third, we can see a disso-nance between Kozlovskyi’s explanation of the constellations as “chronotopes-events” and interpreta-tion of this concept by Dieter Henrich’s school, where the methodology of “research constellations” was used to elucidate the early phase of German idealism. However, this leads to the cardinal question of how far this methodology is applicable for the analysis of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

The ways in which the Aristotelian sciences are related to each other has been discussed in the literature, with some focus on the subalternate sciences. While it is acknowledged that Aristotle, and Plato as well, was concerned as well with how the arts were related to one another, less attention has been paid to Aristotle's views on relationships among the arts. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle's account of the subalternate sciences helps shed light on how Aristotle saw the (...) art of rhetoric relating to dialectic and politics. Initial motivation for comparing rhetoric with the subalternate sciences is Aristotle's use of the language of boundary transgression, germane to the Posterior Analytics, when discussing rhetoric’s boundaries, as well as the language of "over" and "under" found in APo. First, I discuss three passages in Rhetoric Book I and argue that Garver's (1988) account cannot be correct. Second, I look to the subalternate sciences, especially focusing on optics and the distinction between "unqualified" optics and mathematical optics. Third, I discuss rhetoric's dependence on both dialectic and politics. (shrink)

The Umayyad State is widely criticized in the West as well as in its own region. Actually, this is normal situation. Because Hijaz Arabs who had no state experience, built a multinational state in short period of time. Yet, this caused serious matters. The fundamental point of the criticism is the payment of tax, also called jizya, which is taken from residents (mawālī) of Khorasan and Transoxania. However, in most studies on this subject, it is understood that the jizya taken (...) from mawālī is combined jizya and kharja, which is different type of tax. Although mawālī was tested for whether it passes religious criteria in critic periods or not, this situation did not last throughout the entire Umayyad history. It was continued for fifteen and twenty years. In this period, it was understood that the jizya tax taken from the mawālī, was caused by the unlawful practices of some regional governors, most of them were non-Muslim local tax officials and all their purpose was to collect the amount of combined jizya. It cannot be said that the Umayyad caliphs officially ordered written instructions in order to take the conceptual sense from the mawālī part. But some Khorasan governors, who detected that taxes were decreasing, blinked at the collection of the jizya from the mawālī.Summary: The tax policies of a state are of great importance for the political, social, and economic stability. A regular tax system minimizes the problems that the state mechanism might face. The establishment of a fair and just tax scheme is undoubtedly possible with a deep-rooted state experience. It is known that the Umayyad state which is the subject of this research has no state experience. Furthermore, ruling to the area which is on 13 million square kilometers and reaching to Kashgar in the East and to South France in the West and governing this multinational structure who are living on these regions, put the Umayyad government in a very difficult condition. With the vast borders and the stoppage of the conquests, some political, social and economic problems were experienced and these problems deeply affected the government. The groups which had argued with Shiites and Khārijites because of some various reasons led the country into collapsing. It is also known that many plague epidemics in the region of Damascus affected the society in a negative way, changing the capital and changing some of the border cities in favor of the Eastern Roman Empire.All these negativities certainly shaken the Umayyad state economically. It is understood from the data that the instability and political uncertainties in the country led to a decrease in the tax rates. For example, the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik İbn Marwān period, only half of the tax was collected at the time of Hazrat ‘Umar could be collected. It can be said that the public who avoided the general policies of the state avoided giving tax, in other words, the tax evasion. Also, the increasing migration from village to city and due to that, the vacancy of tribute tax collected land, failure to obtain expected yield because of rent fights on fertile lands, and conversion process in non-Muslim community are included in other reasons of reduction of taxes.In the Umayyad period, the issue of taking the jizya from the mawālī can be considered in this context. We do not have an independent work or research article on how this practice was initiated, how it was and how it was taken from mawālī, and how it was a state policy, and how long it was sustained. The studies that touch on this subject are far from being holistic. Even in the main sources it is seen that the concepts of kharāj and jizya are not fully understood and therefore used interchangeably. This may be considered normal for the first period in which the concepts are not in place. However, in the following centuries, the works that were copyrighted and, except for a few, instead of understanding and explaining this confusion, chose to use the word jizya from these two words which can be used interchangeably in texts. Therefore, this approach has led to the widespread conviction that the Umayyad state has taken jizya from the mawālī in the conceptual sense.Al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf is claimed to have started the application of taken jizya from mawālī. However, Haccac aimed to provide the regularity of both agricultural products and the kharāj which is taken from farmers because of the status of the soil by sending Sawad villagers who migrated to the big cities and became Muslims by changing their religions. The status of the lands seized was decisive in taxation. According to this, the conquest and the territorial lands were taxed differently, but in some cases the same tax (kharāj) was taken. Non-Muslims who living in the territory of conquest were demanded jizya per capita. The jizya and kharāj tax collected from this category can be expressed as “joint jizya”. Regardless of whether the person is a Muslim or not, the fact that he was demanded from him due to the status of the land was interpreted by some researchers as juristic. However, in times of political instability, it is also a fact that mawālī is demanding jury in addition to the tribute tax. The point that is misunderstood or interpreted is that this practice was carried out throughout the entire Umayyad territory and the history. When examined, this distorted tax concept is actually concentrated in the area of Transoxania. Although some attempts were made to take the jizya from the mawālī to the country, the Umayyad caliphs have not allowed it. The practice of taking the jizya from the mawālī is actually followed by the killing Qutayba ibn Muslim al-Bāhilī (d. 96/715). This started political instability in the Transoxania and continued by some Khurāsān governors. These governors act according to the provocations of the Turkish governors and tax collectors of the region in order to be able to send their taxes completely. They claimed that the region in the region was not a sincere Muslim and, they continued to take the jizya from them.It can be said that jizya is not demanded as it is taken from non-Muslims in the common meaning from mawālī. Because any Umayyad caliph wrote no written instructions regarding this issue in the sources. It is understood that until the caliphate of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azîz, the Umayyad caliphs were not even aware of this distorted tax policy in the area of Transoxania. To put it once again, this practice was initiated by some Khurāsān governors with the concern that tax revenues might decrease. However, it should not be forgotten that this unfair practice after 96/715 is limited to certain governors. For example, during the tenure of Naṣr b. Seyyâr, the last governor of Khurāsān (120-131 / 738-748), the jizya tax was completely removed from the mawālī. Another activity that shows this action is regional and that was ordered by some governors of Khurāsān. Therefore, this practice does not reflect the Umayyad state policy. This is also apparent in the fact that the Shiites, Kharijites, and those who carried out the Abbasid Revolution for thirty-two years, did not make an anti-Umayyad propaganda with provoking the slave by the way of wrong application. (shrink)

Qutayba ibn Muslim al-Bāhilī is one of the leading soldier-bureaucrats of the Umayyads period. During the time he served as the governor of Khurāsān, he consolidated the Umayyad’s rule in Tokharistan and Transoxiana provinces, and expanded the borders of the state to China by conquering the Kashgar region. His activities for conversion of the people of the conquered regions have great importance in the history of Islam since the intense relations of the Turkish people with Islam fell upon the time (...) of his governorship. It is possible to argue that by introducing the religion to these people Qutayba had played an important role in their conversion to Islam. It is also known that he had sent a delegation to the emperor of China for the same purpose. However, despite all his achievements, it is seen that the academic studies about Qutayba in our country are very rare. Besides, some of the recent studies about him claim that he was a fraud, a trickster, and an untrustworthy person in his military activities; and had committed mass murders and massacres, persecuted innocent people, destroyed and burned the cities of conquered lands. In this article, it is examined that whether these claims and accusations have their justifications or not by consulting the main sources. In fact, what is expected from constructive criticism in this subject and every other area is to clarify the matter and make it more comprehensible of its context. However, it should not be forgotten that some conclusions over Qutayba in these studies might have been drawn to quickly in order to manipulate the conquest movements of the Umayyad period.Summary: The religious interaction and change taken place in the Arabian Peninsula with the emergence of Islam and with the political, military and cultural activities of the Muslims performed during the periods of Prophet Muhammad and the Rāshidūn (rightly guided) Caliphs had significant effects upon the lands of Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Khurāsān where the ancient civilizations located.The success made by the Muslim-Arabs in such a short time is accepted of course as one of the important events of world history. The message of Islam spread rapidly with their extraordinary efforts, and reached quickly in the early days of Islam to the Amu Darya/Oxus River, which is considered to be the natural border between the Iranians and the Turks (Iran and Turan).Although the Turks who had been struggling to dominate the region for centuries gained an opportunity with the disappearance of the Sasanian Empire from history, they could not take advantage of this new situation because of their lack of political unity and a strong state, and the power held by the regional Turkish Sultans were not enough to make their dominance happen. In this conjuncture, the Muslim-Arabs who appeared in the stage of history in a relatively late period but had the ideal of being a regional and a global power had rapidly realised their political and military activities called “conquest” in the Islamic historical sources. When it comes to the period of Caliph ʿUthmān, it is seen that the conditions were very suitable for passing to the east of the Oxus River where the Turkish elements lived intensively. At the time, the absence of a strong Turkish state in the region, and China’s occupation with its own internal problems made an important contribution for the Muslim-Arab capture of the region. In this region, which is called as “Transoxiana” in the Arabic sources, it is seen that the Turks organized their political structures as city-states and regional sultanates. In the north-eastern parts of this region, there was a strong Turkish State called the Turgish State and it provided political and military support to the people of the region who rebelled occasionally the Umayyads.After solving the internal problems of the state largely and suppressing some dangerous revolts, the Umayyad Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān became capable of initiating military activities beyond the borders of the state. Nevertheless, the period when the actual conquests were made was the period of his son Walīd (86/705-96/715). It is seen that the conquests made in his time were permanent, and the people who lived in the conquered lands accepted Islam to a large extent. The conquest made during Walīd’s time which extended from Kashgar to the Pyrenees, realised at an unprecedented pace. The most important name for the eastern side of the conquests is undoubtedly Al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf. Ḥajjāj (75/694-95/714) who acted as the supreme governor of Iraq for nearly twenty years, had achieved important successes in the regions of Transoxiana and Sindh located in the eastern part of the country by the hands of his appointed governors. However, many governors appointed by him to Khurāsān from 75/694 to 86/705 with the hope of reaching his goals in the east could not meet his expectations because of the political, social and economic problems that existed throughout the country, and because of the resulting rebellions in the regions that these problems caused.These unwanted conditions continued to be seen in the region until he appointed Qutayba ibn Muslim as the governor of Khurāsān (86 / 705-96 / 715) who was one of the young commanders and administrators educated by Ḥajjāj personally. Qutayba known as having a close relationship with Ḥajjāj and consulting him when taking important decisions acted in this direction throughout the time he stayed in this position.It is known that the internal conflicts in the region continued during the time when Qutayba was appointed as the governor of Khurāsān. However, he had brought together northern and southern Arabian tribes living in the region with religious, political and economical suggestions and had succeeded in persuading them for military activities that he decided to operate beyond the Oxus. For the Umayyads, these military operations were justified, because the regional sultans who ruled in the western and eastern sides of the Oxus repeatedly violated the agreements they had made before. The tendency of the people of Turkic, Iranian, and Tajik origin who were the real owner of these lands and lived in both sides of the rich Oxus basin for many centuries to violate these agreements was in fact result of a great concern. They now realized that the Muslim-Arabs who followed a systematic settlement policy in the region came to their lands this time without any intention of going back. Even though Qutayba followed a fair and reasonable policy towards them, they violated their agreements with him, formed alliances among themselves and waged military campaigns against Qutayba not to be the subjects of any change in their religion, worldview, and perception of existence.Qutayba, who is believed to have spent his its utmost efforts to make the religion of Islam and the Umayyad political cause permanent in the region under these unfavourable conditions, has been recently criticized by some researchers. The criticisms intensify around the claims that he persecuted people, committed massacres, and behaved unfaithfully by breaking his promises that he made with people. From the perspective of our own times, it is possible to think that sometimes he had taken extreme measures in punishing the sultans and the persons who raised armed struggles against him and caused riots by violating the agreements. However, when the period is compared with the others, it can be easily said that the Umayyads showed in these and other remote areas a considerable amount of tolerance that they had never shown it in their internal conflicts. It is a known fact that he generally clashed with the ones who disrupted agreements, sought help from external forces, established alliances against them, and refused to pay taxes. Based on historical sources, it does not seem to be possible to say that while doing these activities in the region, Qutabya did not behave entirely in a way that his behaviour could be classified as massacres committed against innocent civilians. On the contrary, it is known that Qutayba had given many chances to the people of the region in administrative and military affairs. As a matter of fact, he ruled the city of Bukhara for 20 years with a Turkish ruler whom he appointed and supported, and he included in his army a union of twenty thousand cosmopolitan soldiers assembled from the people of Bukhara, Baykend, Chach and Samarkand and paid a regular salary to them.The fact that his grave known as the “Imam Shaykh Qutayba Tomb” was turned later into a shrine and visited by the people even today despite the passage of long centuries after his death shows that he has been loved by the people of the region and that they have always considered him as a conqueror-bureaucrat who spent his life for the ideals of his religion. (shrink)

The generation of companions who played a key part in writing the revelation continued this responsibility in maintaining the Sunnah and translating it to some extent. Since the Sunnah is the secondary source of religion, this activity of theirs is of great importance. In this regard, the fact that some of the companions documented the Sunnah when the Prophet was still alive or after his death yielded favorable outcomes in terms of Sirah science, which attempts to properly transmit his life (...) from birth to death. In the research, the location of the written material, which was penned by the companions and identified as “codex” or “kitāb”, in the formation process of the science of Sirah will be tried to be revealed. Because the codexes, which include the majority of the narrations relating to the ghazwa and seriyyas, are among the most important sources used by Tabi'un era Sirah scholars. In the research, the principal sources of Sirah and Islamic History were taken as a basis, recent literature was scanned and academic works on the subject were benefited from. It is seen that the offspring of the companions developed the codex, who inherited from their dads or grandfathers, with the narrations they received from third parties. This is why the research briefly mentions these important contributions they made. (shrink)

In her recent book, Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore argues that, when evaluated epistemically, “a democratic decision procedure is likely to be a better decision procedure than any non-democratic decision procedures, such as a council of experts or a benevolent dictator” (p. 3). Landemore's argument rests heavily on studies of collective intelligence done by Lu Hong and Scott Page. These studies purport to show that cognitive diversity – differences in how people solve problems – is actually more important to overall group (...) performance than average individual ability – how smart the individual members are. Landemore's argument aims to extrapolate from these results to the conclusion that democracy is epistemically better than any non-democratic rival. I argue here that Hong and Page's results actually undermine, rather than support, this conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the results do not show that democracy is better than any non-democratic alternative, and that in fact, they suggest the opposite – that at least some non-democratic alternatives are likely to epistemically outperform democracy. (shrink)

The article discusses the theoretical and analytical relevance of spontaneity, the basis of creativity, considered as a central aspect of the semiotic model of C. S. Peirce, through the study of its incidence on human identity, on the self. To do so, I work with a series of technical concepts ..

Translation of Aristotle's Parts of Animals Book I into Portuguese, with full commentaries.

In this article, I trouble the pedagogical practice of comforting discomfort in the social-justice classroom. Is it possible to support white students, for instance, and not comfort them? Is it possible to support white students without recentering the emotional crisis of white students, without disregarding the needs and interests of students of color, and without reproducing the violence that students of color endure? First I address the dangers of comforting discomfort and discuss Robin DiAngelo's notion of white fragility, which has (...) been used to explain the tendency of white people to flee discomfort rather than tarry with it. Employing Erinn Gilson's work on vulnerability, I argue that white fragility is not a weakness but an active performance of invulnerability. I conclude by arguing that developing vulnerability is a counter to white fragility, and that one way such vulnerability can be encouraged is through offering critical hope, which I maintain is a type of support that does not comfort. (shrink)

In his classic text, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the structural principles of a society are just when they issue from a procedure that is fair. One crucial feature that makes the procedure fair is that the persons who will be subjected to these principles choose them after they have deliberated together in a condition marked by a certain balance of knowledge and ignorance. In particular, these people know enough to consider principles that are workable, yet converse (...) behind a “veil of ignorance,” unable to predict what their place in society will be and hence discouraged from slanting the principles toward any preferential interests. My paper questions whether this attempt to ensure the disinterestedness of the conversation of justice is feasible. I worry that when we approach this question practically, we discover that the education that furnishes us with the knowledge necessary to choose viable principles must at the same time preclude genuine ignorance about our social position and interests. As an alternative, I suggest that we convene the conversation of justice behind a “veil of existence.” In this condition, people possess knowledge about how their society works and even about their places in it; however, this knowledge does not foster preferential interests because all interests are subjected to the question of their existential meaning. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” for our interests to be truly meaningful, they must be affirmed as free responses to our thrownness into existence. Yet how do we find the wherewithal to make such responsible choices rather than lapse into paralysis before their essentially arbitrary differences? My positive thesis is that we may do so by acknowledging how all of us in this existential predicament critically and mutually provoke each to commit oneself to depart from the others in specific ways. This process of provocation is thus educational. It broaches a conception of non-instrumental, non-mimetic, liberal study, one which I try to enact in a writing that employs direct address, regular returns to questions that put discourse at a loss, and expanding webs of association. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that liberal study may deepen our appreciation of our communal nature, our camaraderie, and thus motivate us to participate unselfishly in the conversation of justice. (shrink)

It is a recognizable feature of commonsense morality that some actions are beyond the call of duty or supererogatory. Acts of supererogation raise a number of interesting philosophical questions and debates. This article will provide an overview of three of these debates. First, I will provide an overview of the debate about whether or not acts of supererogation exist. Next, I will investigate the issue of how to define the supererogatory. I will finish by examining a problem known as the (...) Paradox of Supererogation. (shrink)

The thought that acts of supererogation exist presents a challenge to all normative ethical theories. This chapter will provide an overview of the consequentialist responses to this challenge. I will begin by explaining the problem that supererogation presents for consequentialism. I will then explore consequentialist attempts to deny the existence of acts of supererogation. Next, I will examine a range of act consequentialist attempts to accommodate supererogation: including satisficing consequentialism, dual-ranking act consequentialism and an anti-rationalist form of consequentialism. Finally, I (...) will explore how indirect consequentialists have responded to this problem. Throughout the chapter, I will argue that in responding to the challenge of supererogation, consequentialists must choose between a more theoretically satisfying version of consequentialism and a form of consequentialism that is better able to accommodate our everyday moral intuitions and concepts. (shrink)

It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two (...) people act in the same way but with only the person who acted with altruistic intent counting as having performed an act of supererogation. In such cases Heyd’s intention requirement plays an important role in ruling out acts that intuitively are not supererogatory. Despite this, I will argue that we should reject Heyd’s requirement and replace it with a moral intention requirement. I will then investigate how to formulate this requirement and respond to two objections that might be raised against it. (shrink)

By considering the irreducible representations of the Lorentz group, an analysis of the different spin-2 waves is presented. In particular, the question of the helicity is discussed. It is concluded that, although from the point of view of representation theory there are no compelling reasons to choose between spin-2 waves with helicity σ=±1 or σ=±2, consistency arguments of the ensuing field theories favor waves with helicity σ=±1.

A commonly accepted feature of commonsense morality is that there are some acts that are supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. Recently, philosophers have begun to ask whether something like supererogation might exist in other normative domains such as epistemology and esthetics. In this paper, I will argue that there is good reason to think that sporting supererogation exists. I will then argue that recognizing the existence of sporting supererogation is important because it highlights the value of sport as (...) a mutual pursuit of excellence and reinforces the value of sportsmanship. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses (...) about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q. (shrink)

Imagination is widely thought to come in two varieties: perception-like and belief-like imagination. What precisely sets them apart, however, is not settled. More needs to be said about the features that make one variety perception-like and the other belief-like. One common, although typically implicit, view is that they mimic their counterparts along the conceptuality dimension: while the content of belief-like imagination is fully conceptual, the content of perception-like imagination is fully non-conceptual. Such a view, however, is not sufficiently motivated in (...) the literature. I will show that there are good reasons to reject it and I will argue that both varieties of imagination involve fully conceptual contents. I will suggest an alternative way to draw the distinction between perception-like and belief-like imagination along the conceptuality dimension, according to which only perception-like imagination requires observational concepts. (shrink)

Ethnomethodology has been torn between scientific and "radical" aspirations insofar as it moves discoursive practices from resources to the topic of the study. Scientific ethnomethodology, such as conversation analysis, studies discoursive praxis as its topic and resource. Standard scientific criteria are accepted to assess the merits of its findings. "Radical" ethnomethodology addresses mundane reasoning exclusively as its topic without recourse to standardized science. I will show that insofar as "radical" ethnomethodology succeeds in bracketing everyday resources, it loses its phenomenon with (...) the very technical skills it uses for this task. This reconsideration enables the development of ethnomethodological social science. Key Words: conversation analysis • discoursive praxis • ethnomethodology • radical ethnomethodology • social studies of science. (shrink)

Aristotle’s categorical syllogistic is the first formal deductive system in the history of formal sciences. Most parts or elements of the system are validated by modern (first-order) mathematical logic, but the system is quite limited in scope, as it is incapable of analyzing inferences other than the ‘figure syllogisms’ consisting of a couple of_ a-e-i-o_ premises and an _a-e-i-o_ conclusion, containing three ‘moderately’ universal terms – terms that express neither a highest genus nor a lowest species – each of which (...) is common to a different couple of propositions out of the three. Logicians in the following ages dealt with various questions concerning the addition of various (novel) logical forms into this limited system, among which are singular predications, i.e. categorical propositions with a singular term as subject, and the most common choice has been interpreting singular predications as _universal _predications. This paper tries to take a strictly formal perspective on the system of categorical syllogisms, and argues in detail for a much simpler and fairly effective assimilation or translation scheme for singular predications. The key to the proposed scheme is the preservation of the supposed inferential relation between opposite singular predications, namely _contradiction_. It is argued that the resulting _singularized _syllogistic moods, which are also validated by first-order logic (under its standard renderings of _a-e-i-o_ and singular predications), promote in turn the mentioned type of treatment, since they call for the employment of two of the four subaltern moods of the system, disregarded by Aristotle, which are _formally _there. (shrink)

Dozens of countries have established Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) in the last decade or so, in the majority of cases employing those funds to manage the large revenues gained from selling resources such as oil and gas on a tide of rapidly rising commodity prices. These funds have raised a series of ethical questions, including just how the money contained in such funds should eventually be spent. This article engages with that question, and specifically seeks to connect debates on SWFs (...) with debates onglobaljustice. Just how good are national claims to the great wealth contained in SWFs in the first place? Using the example of Norway's very large SWF – derived from selling North-Sea petroleum – I show that national claims are at least sometimes very weak, with the implication that the wealth in many such funds is ripe for redistribution in the interests of global justice. I conclude by offering some guidance for how the money contained in such funds could best be spent, with the goal of advancing global justice. (shrink)

Our ordinary assertions are often imprecise, insofar as the way we represent things as being only approximates how things are in the actual world. The phenomenon of assertoric imprecision raises a challenge to standard accounts of both the norm of assertion and the connection between semantics and the objects of assertion. After clarifying these problems in detail, I develop a framework for resolving them. Specifically, I argue that the phenomenon of assertoric imprecision motivates a rejection of the widely held belief (...) that a semantic theory for a language associates a single semantic value with each of the simple and complex expressions of that language, relative to the contexts in which they occur. Instead, I propose that we adopt a framework I call semantic pluralism. (shrink)

1. Die Hymnen des Rigveda, herausgegeben Oldenberg von Hermann. Band.I. Metrische und Textgeschichtliche Prolegomena. Berlin, 1888. 14 Mk.2. Vedische Studien, Pischel von Richard und Karl F. Geldner. Stuttgart, 1888–1889. 12 Mk.

In her target article, Petitmengin calls for us to return to our own lived experience as an “act of resistance.” In my commentary, I suggest that this call comes too late: in the age of ….

Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: Why has the neurophenomenological approach not been adopted as a common and even obligatory tool in the study of consciousness? I suggest that the problem with the neurophenomenological approach is its effectiveness on the one hand and its almost impossible demands from the scientist on the other: One cannot accept the neurophenomenological approach without rejecting not only the paradigm of cognitive science, (...) but the scientific paradigm as a whole. (shrink)

In this article I will address the critical question of the constitution of global systems and the part played in such processes by what is often summarized as culture. I examine the important distinction between culture and globalization and culture as constitutive of global social relations. The need to cleave to a systemic treatment of globality is put, while noting the dangers that lie in one-dimensional accounts of global system constitution. To offset any such tendency I explore the constitution of (...) global systemness from a structurationist perspective. I outline the nature and significance of culture in the study of global systems, drawing attention to different literatures. Finally I underscore the importance of the cultural turn in the study of global systems and what has to be done to take full advantage of it.In what follows I will address the critical question of the constitution of global systems and the part played in such processes by what is conveniently – if sometimes unhelpfully – summarized as “culture”. By global systems I mean networks of interaction and meaning that transcend both societal and national frames of reference. I want to shift the emphasis away from an under-theorized focus on cultural globalization to a consideration of global systems as enacted in part through cultural processes. In other words, I do not want to conflate the conjunctional features of contemporary (cultural) globalization with culture as the realm of lived experience integral to the enactment of all social-systemic relations. In some respects this approach may be seen as part of a shift – perhaps a paradigm shift – in how we understand the space of the social, and in how, or whether, we construe the global as the constitutive of all social relations (Beck 2003; Shaw 2003). I will begin with a mild polemic against a well-known systemic account of world-making forces that highlights some of these issues. (shrink)

Any artefact – a hammer, a telescope, an artificial hip – may malfunction. Conceptually speaking, artefacts have an inherent normative aspect. I argue that the normativity of artefacts should be understood as part of reality, and not just “in our concepts.” I first set out Deflationary Views of artefacts, according to which there are no artefactual properties, just artefactual concepts. According to my contrasting view – the Constitution View – there are artefactual properties that things in the world really have. (...) For example, there is a property of being a telephone per se; we apply our concept telephone to things that have that property. Things that have the property of being a telephone are constituted by, but not identical to, aggregates of particles. To be an artefact, an object must have an intended function, among other things. Telephones – in virtue of being the kind of objects that they are – are always subject to malfunction. And malfunctions, when they occur, are just as much part of the world as telephones are. The example of artefacts shows that what is in the world – what really exists – need not be “mind-independent” nor independent of our concepts. (shrink)

This collection brings together eleven of Fodor's recent essays about mental content and cognitive processing. All of them have been previously published, save for the title-essays "A Theory of Content I" and "A Theory of Content II.".