In recent years, the issue of the determinants of human gender identity has been lively discussed. In such discussions, there are numerous supporters of the belief that a person’s gender identity does not depend directly on a given individual’s biological endowment with sex, but is the result of various socio-cultural circumstances in which a given person lives. This view began to gain popularity in the scientific community in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is now considered paradigmatic in the (...) rapidly evolving interdisciplinary study of cultural gender development, which is commonly referred to as gender studies. Representatives of gender studies often present the findings obtained in the course of their research as brilliant and modern. However, when viewed through the concept of philosophical superstition, authored by the Polish logician Józef Maria Bocheński, it can be concluded that the proponents of gender studies significantly exaggerate the intellectual momentum of their conclusions and postulates. Furthermore, one can even say that according to Bocheński’s concept of philosophical superstition, gender studies is a discipline which only creates a semblance of rationality. This is because gender studies fail all six criteria which, as Bocheński maintains, distinguish beliefs, views, and theories which are manifestly irrational from those which are not philosophical superstitions. The article consists of three parts. In the first part, Bocheński’s concept of philosophical superstition is discussed and, in particular, the criteria are outlined which, in Bocheński’s opinion, allow one to identify philosophically superstitious thinking. This section also provides examples of philosophically superstitious beliefs, views and theories that fall under each of the criteria. In the second part, gender studies are characterized in terms of the basic assumptions adopted within this trend, as well as its theses and postulates. The third part of the article is devoted to the assessment of gender studies with the use of criteria which, according to Bocheński, make it possible to distinguish theories, beliefs and views without the hallmarks of rationality from those that are not philosophically superstitious. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is the author of the project of “perpetual peace” as a concept for a global federation of states remaining in peaceful relations towards each other. According to the philosopher, in order for such a federation to be possible at some time in the future, individual states need to be institutions which respect their citizens’ right of self-determination. An additional necessary condition for the future implementation of “perpetual peace” is the appearance of at least one state with a republican (...) system of government. The German thinker saw that as the first step towards realising “perpetual peace”. According to Kant, “perpetual peace” is not only limited to the existence of a certain set of institutions, appropriate laws, or external relations among states and individual people. “Perpetual peace” chiefly demands that people internalise the following obligations: 1. peaceful conduct towards others; 2. hospitality; 3. fairness; 4. respect towards the self-determination of others; 5. self-sufficiency; 6. respecting the freedom of others; 7. refraining from actions which might raise distrust in others. Based on those requirements, the philosopher suggests that the fundamental condition for a future existence of “perpetual peace” is the proper moral education of people. (shrink)

The paper entitled “Future Conflicts Are Inevitable: Causes of Interpersonal Conflicts According to Immanuel Kant and Thomas R. Malthus” is composed of four parts. The first part outlines the validity and importance of the issue of interpersonal conflicts, as well as the need to unveil their deepest causes. The second fragment is devoted to the vision of discord between people, developed by Immanuel Kant. The author emphasizes that, in the opinion of the German philosopher, due to the “unsociable sociability” of (...) people, one has to take into account the impossibility of eliminating conflicts from interpersonal relations. The next part presents the concept proposed by Thomas R. Malthus concerning the causes of conflicts. The author observes that the Anglican cleric, supplementing Kant’s reflections, identifies non-human conflict-generating factors, among which the key factor is an indelible shortage in the environment of goods and values desired by people. To summarize the reflections made, in the last part of the paper, the author emphasizes that in the light of Kant’s and Malthus’ observations, it seems easier to understand why the dream of building a world entirely free of interpersonal conflicts is a utopian idea. (shrink)

The question concerning the ontic nature of space-time points and of space-time itself - is the question: are these objects set-theoretic sets or individuals, i.e. nonsets? Two classifications of the standpoints concerning the nature of these objects are formulated and then they are intersected. In concequence three standpoints appear: mereological substantivalism, set-theoretic substantivalism and set-theoretical relationism; it is showed that mereological relationism is not real. It is proved that set-theoretic standpoints logically imply so called set-theoretic realism which accepts the existence (...) of sets (if Quine's conception of existence is assumed). (shrink)

A logical-philosophical approach to the meaning-carriers or meaning-processes is juxtaposed with the anthropological-biological concepts of subjective significance uniting both for the semiotics of culture and the semiotics of nature. It is assumed that certain objects, which are identifiable in the universe of man and in the world surrounding all living organisms as significant from the perspective of meaning-receivers, meaning-creators and meaning-utilizers, can be determined as signs when they represent other objects, perform certain tasks or satisfy certain needs of subjects. Hence, (...) the meaning of signifying objects may be found in the relation between the expression of a signifier and (I) a signified content, or (2) a signified function, or (3) a signified value of the cultural and natural objects subsumed by the interpreting subjects under the semiotic ones. (shrink)

A report on the conference “Ecosemiotic Paradigm for Nature and Culture”.

Stanisław Głąbiński (1862–1941) professor at the Lvov University, the author of a two volume work entitled „National economics” is a representative of the historical-national trend in Polish economics. The subject matter of his concept of national economics is the national economy which is a higher rank entity, encompassing all economic entities in the country that are related materially and spiritually. Bonds that link individuals into a higher rank entity, i.e. a nation, are reflected in the term ‘social resources’. Głąbiński understands (...) them as moral and material heritage of past generations that influences attitudes of the contemporary generation. He divides them into moral and material resources, and especially emphasizes the importance of the former ones. In the concept of moral resources, Głąbiński included his claims concerning the whole socio-ethical conditions of economic processes. He appreciated the influence exerted by the changes in the ethical viewpoint of the society on the economic activity as well as on the shaping of the sense of duty towards the whole society. Special emphasis placed in Głąbiński’s economic theory on the role of ethical motives undoubtedly springs from the influence exerted by the German historical school and, in particular, by Bruno Hildebrand. It also is a result of the effect of Polish economic thought including in particular the views of Fryderyk Skarbek and Józef Supiński. According to Głąbiński, the most important constituent element of material resources was finance, understood by him as stocks of economic goods. (shrink)

Some scientists believe that although evolutionary theory is explanatory, it does not have, in contrast to the theories of physics, any predictive power. This raises the question of its testability. The analysis given shows that there are good reasons to claim the unpredictability of evolutionary events; nevertheless, the evolutionary theory has potential predictive power. It is argued that the difference between biology and physics lies not in the predictive power of the theories involved, but in the different weight which is (...) lent to the forecasting of particular events in these sciences. A second source of confusion derives from the ambiguity of the term 'prediction'. In order to define 'prediction' for cases in which the term is used to refer to a part of testing procedure, the reference to the time-point "now" is quite irrelevant. Prediction of unknown observational data is sufficient for testing a hypothesis, but such prediction may or may not be identical with forecasting of future events. Different factors that may cause particular difficulties met by biologists in forecasting future events are analyzed subsequently in the second part of the paper. The conclusion is drawn that although particular cognitive situations limiting the ability of forecasting are very frequent in biological sciences, the claim about the peculiar logical status of biological theories is not thereby justified. (shrink)

Stanisław Głąbiński (1862-1941), professor of Lviv University and the author of the two-volume ‘National Economics (‘Ekonomika narodowa’), was one of the main representatives of the historical-national approach in Polish economics. The study of national economics which he created was divided into general economics, i.e. economic theory, and practical economics, referred to as economic and social policies. Głąbiński emphasizes that there is a close relationship between the latter and ethics. Before the development of economic theory, economic thought was normative, because of (...) its close relationship to ethics. However, it was not the history of economic theory, but the history of the notion of economic politics and of its practical application. Due to the social nature of ethics, there are also specific relations between it and theoretical economics. In modern countries finding a solution to the so-called social question has become a common task of economics and ethics. Ethical topics are also contained in the content of the category ‘social resources’, in which the social determinants of human economic activity find their fullest reflection. This applies in particular to the category of moral resources, which illustrates the functioning of state bodies and public institutions, the state of education, the prevailing habits and the customs and the character of the nation. (shrink)

The domain of contemporary physics consists of two different classes of objects: a) of physical objects - events, particles (and their aggregates) and fields; b) spatio-temporal objects - space-time points, moments, space points and their corresponding sets: space-time, time and space. If objects of some kind (physical or spatio-temporal) are treated as individuals (= nonsets), then it is possible to define (equivalently) all remaining kinds of objects belonging to both classes which were mentioned above. This way we can construct two (...) monistic ontologies of physics: eventism founded on events, and the pointism founded on space-time points. It is also possible to construct a dualistic ontology of physics, based on events and space-time points. The paper presents these three ontologies. (shrink)

The domain of contemporary physics consists of two different classes of objects: a) physical objects — point events (shortly — events), elementary particles (and their aggregates), and fields; b) spatio-temporal objects — space-time points (shortly — points), moments, space points, and their corresponding sets: space-time, time and physical space. If objects of some kind (physical or spatio-temporal) are treated as individuals, i.e. nonsets, then it is possible to define the remaining kinds of objects from both above-mentioned classes. In this way (...) one can construct two alternative monistic ontologies of physics: eventism founded on events, and pointism founded on points. It is also possible to establish a dualistic ontology of physics, based both on events and points treated as individuals. In this paper these three ontologies are presented with particular emphasis on some extreme versions of monistic ontologies. I shall compare them considering both their respective advantages and difficulties and trying to justify my own choice of eventistic ontology. (shrink)

The paper presents an outline of two related space-time notions: the notion of location and the notion of extension. The first notion concerns only physical objects, the second notion referrs also to space-time objects. The approach to both notions is here non-metric of - strictly speaking - topological. The construction is carried out within the ontology of point-eventism. Hence two problems appear immediately: the problem of location of certain sets and the problem of their extension. The reason is that according (...) to the ontology of point-eventism all the physical as well as space-time objects - only point events excepted - are sets founded in such events. The author analyzes also the very relation between location and extension. (shrink)

This paper tries to prove two statements. Firstly, that set-theoretic positions in the controversy on the ontic nature of space-time logically imply set-theoretic realism. Secondly, thatmereological positions in this controversy give set-theoretic nominalism an appearance of verisimilitude.

The paper presents an analysis of two basic notions of the ontology of physics: the notion of physical entity; and the notion of spatio-temporal entity. The author claims that there are three types of physical as well as spatio-temporal entites: (i) objects; (ii) propertes; and (iii) relations. The philosophical background of the author's considerations is his conception of point-eventism.

The author compares and evaluates four characterizations of spatio-temporal points, proposed by various modern ontologies of space-time, namely by set-theoretical substantivism and relationism on one hand, and by mereological substantivism in causal (exemplified by H. Field) or acauasal (exemplified by J. Jadacki) version, on the other hand. It is the question of properties (extension, localisation, causality, and individuality), and contexts (relation to moments or spatial points, and status in the theory of relativity), ascribed to spatio-temporal points in these ontologies. The (...) detailed discussion of these solutions leads to the conclusion that the only ontology consistent with the modern physics as well as with some essential philosophical intuitions, is the ontology of relationism. (shrink)

Conceptual realism acknowledges the existence of abstract objects: theoretical realism acknowledges the existence of non-observable objects; whereas classical realism acknowledges the existence of observable objects. Similarly, temporal realism accepts the existence of future and past events along with present ones, and spatial realism accepts the events which occur there (else-where) as well as those that occur here. We dealt earlier with the three former kinds of realism and their opposites: nominalism, instrumentalism and (ontological) idealism [2]. This paper contains an examination (...) of the two latter forms of realism: temporal and spatial, and their counterparts: temporal and spatial irrealisms. Analogies and connections between these standpoints will be the focus of the paper. (shrink)

The conceptual framework of the article consists of three basic terms: „quasi-simultaneity”, „co-location” and „genidentity” (with their negations). Within this framework the author formulates and discusses his main thesis: if two events are not genidentical, then they are either spatially or temporally separated. This thesis expresses the fact, that, loosely speaking, time and space have their common basis in difference of things.

The paper investigates Jan Srzednicki’s epistemological conception with its main Kantian problem on the very possibility of cognition. Investigating Srzednicki’s conception the paper refers to its interpretation elaborated by Grażyna Żurkowska.