En este artículo se entremezclan las construcciones clásicas de la analogía con estructuras jurídico-positivas que se hacen hoy presentes en la interpretación y aplicación del derecho. El marco de referencia de estos vínculos no puede ser otro que el de una ontología de la relación. Una vez esclarecidas las diferentes elaboraciones doctrinales, se pretende justificar, en primer lugar, que la “analogía de proporcionalidad intrínseca”, cuyo origen se encuentra en la tradición tomista, constituye el fundamento filosófico de la “analogia iuris”, (...) tal como hoy se concibe esta figura en el ámbito de la Teoría del derecho. En segundo lugar, en este trabajo se sostiene que la “analogía de atribución intrínseca”, cuyo origen se encuentra en el genio creador del pensamiento de Suárez, constituye el fundamento filosófico de la analogía legis, tal como se encuentra actualmente regulada esta figura en el Código Civil español. (shrink)

El trabajo presenta un caso civil donde se muestra la necesidad de aclarar la ratio legis de una regulación legislativa para determinar la legitimidad de su aplicación analógica. Esto significa que el argumento analógico requiere una interpretación teleológica de los textos normativos pertinentes, para determinar la ratio de una regulación y luego proceder a una posible integración analógica del derecho. En la medida en que la interpretación teleológica no sólo sirve para determinar el contenido de un texto a la (...) luz de su razón subyacente, sino también para determinar la razón misma, la interpretación teleológica es necesaria para la analogía. Al mismo tiempo, el trabajo muestra cómo el uso de la ratio es controvertido y que los argumentos jurídicos de segundo grado pueden resolver los casos más problemáticos. (shrink)

The paper discusses some logical problems concerning analogy. The traditional understanding of analogy as _proportion_ (proportion) is inadequate, at least if proportionality is taken in mathematical sense. This situation is clear if we considered various special cases of analogy for instance _analogia legis_ and _analogia juris._ Since analogy assumes a similarity of analogata (items being or investigated) as analogical, a general analysis of analogical relation must begin with the concept of similarity. It can be defined as possessing a common property. (...) This idea is formalized by devices borrowed from logic and set theory. (shrink)

En el presente artículo analizaremos las patenas de vidrio y vidriadas decoradas con la imagen de Cristo, san Pedro y san Pablo, así como el programa iconográfico de la Traditio Legis. A pesar de que no son muy numerosas en España, sí contamos con el importante testimonio de Cástulo o de la Almoina. El análisis de sus formas intrínsecas nos aporta una valiosa información iconográfica, que sería el ante sala del Pantocrator representado en el arte Románico en siglos posteriores.

The book is dedicated to the theoretical problems concerning ratio legis. In the contexts of legal interpretation and legal reasoning, the two most important intellectual tools employed by lawyers, ratio legis would seem to offer an extremely powerful argument. Declaring the ratio legis of a statute can lead to a u-turn argumentation throughout the lifespan of the statute itself – in parliament, or in practice during court sessions, when it is tested against the constitution. Though the ratio (...) legis argument is widely used, much about it warrants further investigation. On the general philosophical map there are many overlapping areas that concern different approaches to human rationality and to the problems of practical reasoning. Particular problems with ratio legis arise in connection with different perspectives on legal philosophy and theory, especially in terms of the methods that lawyers use for legal interpretation and argumentation. These problems can be further subdivided into particular aspects of activities undertaken by lawyers and officials who use the ratio legis in their work, and the underlying theories. In short, this book examines what ratio legis is, what it could be, and its practical implications. (shrink)

Nowadays, there is a quite considerable amount of literature on the use of analogy or more generally of inferences by parallel reasoning in contemporary legal reasoning, and particularly so within Common Law. These studies are often motivated by researches in artificial intelligence seeking to develop suitable software-support for legal reasoning. Recently; Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020) developed a dialogical approach in the framework of Constructive Type Theory to what in Islamic Jurisprudence was called qiyās or correlational inferences. In their last chapter the authors (...) suggested that such an approach contributes to the study of patterns of reasoning by precedent cases within contemporary common Law. In the present paper we will further motivate the deployment within Civil and Common Law of the dialogical framework developed in Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020). After a presentation of Scott Brewer's take on analogy within Common Law, that has striking structural similarities to reasoning by precedent case rooted in ratio legis (known in Islamic Jurisprudence as qiyās al-'illa or correlational inference by the occasioning factor), we will illustrate the implementation of the framework with a brief discussion of some cases of legal reasoning based in Spanish Civil Law but where the accent is put in the emerging ruling rather than in the existing of a case as in Common Law. Moreover; quite surprisingly, the case under study suggests that even cases of Law-interpretation fit the argumentation pattern of qiyās al-'illa. A caveat: in the present paper we will focus mainly in discussing the dynamics of the meaning constitution involved rather than in setting the rules of the underlying dialogical framework, the latter is the subject of a follow-up paper. (shrink)

Many irreconcilable accounts of ratio legis in legal science, often concerned with legal interpretation, suffer from being disconnected from practical reasoning. Different theories of legal interpretation which result in one-sided views of ratio legis are by-products of one-sided semantics. The first part of the chapter diagnoses this problem by providing a model of three types of one-sided semantics—upstream, midstream and downstream—and explaining how they translate into respective accounts of legal interpretation and ratio legis. The second part of (...) the chapter presents an alternative to one-sided semantics in legal theory. The alternative account which combines semantics and practical reasoning in legal theory is based on Brandom’s inferential pragmatism. The usefulness of inferential pragmatism in legal theory with regard to the problem of ratio legis is tested and followed by extending an inferentialist account of ratio legis provided by Canale and Tuzet. A model of agent’s actions and reasons, and their impact on the reasoning of interpreters and decision-makers is the essential part of this extension. (shrink)

"Der Beitrag reevaluiert die «dogmatische Funktion», eine soziale Funktion, die mit biologischer und kultureller Reproduktion und folglich der Reproduktion des industriellen Systems zusammenhängt. Indem sie sich auf der Grenze zwischen Anthropologie und Rechtsgeschichte des Westens situiert, nimmt die Studie die psychoanalytische Frage nach der Rolle des Rechts im Verhalten des modernen Menschen erneut in den Blick. This article reappraises the dogmatic function, a social function related to biological and cultural reproduction and consequently to the reproduction of the industrial system itself. (...) On the borderline of anthropology and of the history of law – applied to the West – this study takes a new look at the question raised by psychoanalysis concerning the role of law in modern human behaviour. ". (shrink)

Several legal arguments use the notion of ratio legis in order to sustain a normative conclusion, in particular the argument from analogy and some forms of teleological argumentation. However, determining the ratio is often a difficult and controversial task. In this paper we look firstly at the speech acts typically performed by legal practitioners in order to determine the ratio and, secondly, we take into account the argumentative commitments they undertake in so doing and the argumentative constraints put on (...) them. This will lead us to distinguish different uses of the notion of ratio legis and to ask on what conditions each of them is justified. (shrink)

The study seeks to contribute to the concept of semiotic causation by building a nomenclature of effects (interpretants) produced by signs. As a starting point, the suggested approach uses Charles Peirce’s idea that the interpretant itself is a sign that is produced by another sign. From this, the study suggests that Peirce’s ten-fold division of signs can be used as a basis for the division of interpretants and, thus, proposes a nomenclature that distinguishes poti-interpretants (interpretants that are quali-signs), sin-interpretants (interpretants (...) that are sin-signs), and legi-interpretants (interpretants that are legi-signs), also differentiating between iconic, indexical, and symbolic interpretants, as well as rhematic, dicent, and argumentive interpretants. The article uses Peirce’s famous whistle example (EP 2:4–5) to illustrate how the proposed systematics of interpretants works and demonstrates that it aligns well with Peirce’s distinction of feeling, reaction, and thinking, as feeling corresponds to the production of iconic poti-interpretants and iconic sin-interpretants, reaction corresponds to the production of indexical sin-interpretants, and thinking corresponds to the production of legi-interpretants. The article also suggests how the proposed ten-fold systematics of interpretants can be reconciled with Peirce’s original classifications of interpretants, as immediate-dynamical-final interpretants correspond to the triad of poti-, sin-, and legi-interpretants, while emotional-energetic-logical interpretants correspond to the three sub-classes of sin-interpretants, i.e. iconic sin-interpretants, rhematic indexical sin-interpretants, and dicent indexical sin-interpretants. The study then explores how the suggested classification of interpretants can be used to draw distinctions between different kinds of semiosis in different agents. In particular, the study shows how the proposed ten-fold classification can be applied to analyze diverse biosemiotic and anthroposemiotic processes. It also tests how different capacities to produce interpretants can be used to distinguish full-fledged signs from quasi-signs and demonstrates that in some cases of zoösemiosis, as well as in proto-semiosis and tardo-semiosis, the production of symbolic interpretants is diminished. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 11 Heft: 1 Seiten: 101-120.

Maas hat einfach den von Heinrich Kirn im Jahr 1880 edierten Text („Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten. Nebst einer kritischen Textausgabe von des letzteren Instituta regularia divinae legis“, Freiburg i. B.) ohne jede eigene Bearbeitung und weitere Aufbereitung abgedruckt (S. 118–234; S. 266–269 Kirns Zitatenregister übernommen; doch keine Berücksichtigung des Textes im Sach-und Autorenregister S. 275–280). Selbst die seit 1947 bekannten zusätzlichen neun Handschriften (M. L. W. Laistner: Harv. Theol. Rev. 40, 1947, 19–31), hat Maas nicht (...) auf ihre Qualität und Bedeutung geprüft, sondern sie S. 116f. nur aufgezählt. Nützlich ist die beigefügte englische Übersetzung, doch hatte bereits J. F. Collins im Jahr 1998 eine solche Übersetzung im Internet zugängig gemacht (ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/texts/junillus.trans.html). Rückverweise vom Text auf die Einleitung oder erläuternde Sachanmerkungen zu Text und Übersetzung finden sich nicht. Und auch die Bezüge der Einleitung auf den Text sind nicht präzis. Der Schwerpunkt der vorliegenden Untersuchung liegt also nicht auf Text und Übersetzung der Instituta, sondern auf der Einleitung zum Text (S. 1–115), was ja schon die Titelgestaltung des Buches vermuten läßt. (shrink)

In Protestant theology, the law of the Old Testament still has two functions for Christians: as God’s containment of the chaos in the form of political order and as confronting self-righteous humans in their inability to comply and pointing them to the necessity of grace. For Reformed Protestants however, there is a third use of the law, directed to the renatus, the ‘born again’ Christian, to the iustus and not to the peccator in order for him to keep growing in (...) insight and the practice of God’s will. Different from the Lutheran usus politicus, it is not limited to being God’s containment of evil through the orders of creation, but the realisation of and the public responsibility for those possibilities of life that were disclosed for men/women as partners in God’s covenant by God’s law. Those possibilities are perceived and realised by living in the spirit of God. (shrink)

In this foundational study, originally published in 1880, Heinrich Kihn, professor of theology at Würzburg, compared the exegetical work of two significant figures in late antiquity. Theodore, born at Antioch and a friend of John Chrysostom, was an influential bishop of Mopsuestia from 392 to 428. His work was widely regarded as heretical in the centuries following his death. A century later Junillus Africanus served as chief legal minister to the Byzantine emperor Justinian and wrote a handbook of biblical exegesis (...) that became important in the medieval Latin West. Kihn argued that Junillus' Instituta, the text of which he included in this study, showed the direct influence of Theodore's writings. All subsequent scholarly work on Junillus, and much on Theodore, depends on Kihn's edition and analysis, even when disagreeing with important aspects of his interpretation. This indispensable but hard-to-find work is now reissued in its entirety. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito explicar cómo puede darse el pasaje del mundo de la percepción al mundo de la expresión en la filosofía de M. Merleau-Ponty. Para llevar a cabo este objetivo intentaremos exponer las dos vías que nos permitirán esbozar una respuesta al problema y que pueden advertirse en la obra del autor. La primera de ellas consiste en establecer la analogía que existe entre la estructuración del sentido perceptivo y el del lenguaje, en ambos se dará (...) de modo diacrítico. La segunda es aquella de la sublimación que posibilita la palabra como elemento carnal que es parte del mundo visible pero prolonga en lo invisible. Finalmente apelaremos a la noción de fe expresiva para sustentar la relación entre palabra y realidad. (shrink)

I tentativi attuati all'interno della tradizione tomista per individuare la dottrina ufficiale dell’analogia elaborata da Tommaso d’Aquino si sono dovuti confrontare con la varietà di distinzioni tracciate dall’Aquinate nei suoi scritti. In particolare, l’importanza inedita assegnata alla convenienza di proporzionalità nelle Quaestiones disputatae de veritate ha suscitato un dibattito secolare, che oppone quanti riconoscono in questa soluzione la dottrina autentica a coloro che la valutano meramente come uno stadio provvisorio all’interno di un’evoluzione riscontrabile nelle opere di Tommaso. Nel presente (...) contributo si intende segnalare alcuni dati testuali che aiutano a chiarire il passaggio dalla concezione dell’analogia presentata nello Scriptum super sententiis a quella del De veritate, un passaggio strettamente legato alla funzione euristica svolta dall’analogia. The attempts made within the Thomist tradition to identify the official doctrine of analogy elaborated by Thomas Aquinas had to deal with the various distinctions drawn by Aquinas in his writings. In particular, the great importance given to the agreement of proportionality in the Quaestiones disputatae de veritate has elicited a long debate, in which those who consider such a solution as the authentic doctrine are opposed to those who see it merely as a temporary stage of an evolution which could be observed in Thomas’s works. The aim of this essay is to present some textual data that contribute to clarify the transition from the analogy as conceived in the Scriptum super Sententiis to that of the De veritate, a transition closely related to the heuristic function of analogy. (shrink)

Il sistema speculativo di Giovanni Scoto Eriugena è tra i più complessi del panorama medievale. Nel _Periphyseon_, la grande opera sistematica dell’Irlandese, l’analogia occupa un ruolo centrale. Seguendo il neoplatonismo, Eriugena utilizza l’analogia come legge cosmica che governa la processione del molteplice dall’Uno e organizza la relazione tra natura e Principio. Nel procedere delle nature dall’Uno, invece, si articola come partecipazione; in ultima istanza soggiace come fondamento della dialettica in quanto arte del ragionare aprendo a un complesso discorso (...) sulla relazione tra dialettica e retorica. Questo articolo vuole analizzare due questioni: quali siano le basi testuali attraverso cui i medievali hanno potuto utilizzare l’analogia come strumento argomentativo e filosofico; in che misura, nell’opera eriugeniana, l’analogia divenga da un lato metodo della rappresentazione del mondo, dall’altro strumento cognitivo. _The speculative system of Giovanni Scoto Eriugena is one of the most complexes in the medieval panorama. In the _Periphyseon_, his greatest systematic work, analogy occupies a central role. Following Neoplatonism, Eriugena uses analogy as a cosmic law that governs the procession of natures from the One and organizes the relationship between reality and its origin. In the proceeding of natures from One, however, the analogy is articulated as participation. The analogy is underlain as the foundation of dialectics as the art of reasoning, leading to a complex discourse on the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric._ _This article aims to analyze two issues in particular: what are the textual bases through which the medieval thinkers were able to use analogy as an argumentative and philosophical device; to investigate how, in the Eriugenian work, the analogy becomes both a method of representing the world and a cognitive device._. (shrink)

La storia medievale della teologia e della metafisica è attraversata da una rilevante discussione a proposito della predicazione della nozione di ente. I modelli più spesso evocati a tal fine sono stati, com’è noto, l’analogia e l’univocità. Rispetto a questa alternativa, la tendenza generale degli interpreti è stata quella di intendere l’univocità e l’analogia come regimi predicativi opposti o contraddittori. Questa tesi ha dato vita a una sorta di opinione comune e diffusamente condivisa. La verità di questa tesi, (...) tuttavia, non si è mai imposta in maniera definitiva: il primo dibattito sulla compatibilità dell’univocità e dell’analogia risale proprio al Medioevo. A tal proposito appare decisivo il contributo di Pietro di Tommaso (Pere Tomàs, Pietro Tomàs, Petrus Thomae): la settima delle sue Quaestiones de ente (ca. 1325) chiede infatti Utrum vera analogia et vera univocatio possint se compati in eodem conceptu. Il presente contributo cerca di riscostruire gli snodi principali dell’argomentazione che Pietro di Tommaso elabora in questo testo con la duplice finalità di valorizzare il contributo di questo autore nel quadro del dibattito teologico medievale e di giustificare l’opportunità delle ricerche che tentano oggi di ripensare il rapporto tra l’univocità e l’analogia nel pensiero scotista. The history of medieval theology and metaphysics is marked by a relevant discussion about the predication of being. The semantic devices most frequently referred to in this regard were, as is well known, analogy and univocity. With respect to this alternative, the general tendency of scholars has been to understand univocity and analogy as opposite and contradictory modes of predication. This view has led to a kind of common and widely shared opinion. This thesis, however, has never prevailed conclusively: a debate on whether univocity and analogy were compatible dates back to the Middle Ages. In this respect, the contribution of Petrus Thomae is decisive: the seventh of his Quaestiones de ente (ca. 1325) asks in fact Utrum vera analogia et vera univocatio possint se compati in eodem conceptu. This contribution tries to reconstruct the main points of Petrus Thomae’s argumentation with the twofold purpose of enhancing the contribution of this author in the framework of the medieval theological debate and of justifying the opportunity of the current research that tries to rethink the relationship between univocity and analogy in the context of Duns Scotus’ thought. (shrink)

Il seguente saggio è un'interpretazione speculativa di Padri, scolastici e noi stessi di Hans Urs von Balthasar. L'articolo propone che l'analogia possa essere usata per comprendere le somiglianze e le differenze tra stili teologici in epoche diverse. L'analogia può essere uno strumento euristico per riconoscere la forma strutturale che rimane coerente attraverso i secoli, nonostante le espressioni singole di questa forma secondo la situazione concreta e storica delle persone a cui si rivolge il messaggio del Vangelo. Per affermare (...) ciò, questo saggio traccia un confronto tra il modo in cui si sviluppano la teologia e la dottrina Cattolica. In entrambi i casi, troviamo un paradigma di omogeneità sostanziale all'interno di una differenza proposizionale o stilistica. La differenza non esclude l'unità in un ordine superiore. Diversi stili in teologia sono analogicamente uniti nella forma strutturale generale e immutabile della verità rivelata in Cristo. The following essay is a tentative interpretation of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Fathers, Scholastics and Ourselves. It proposes that analogy can be used to understand the similarities and differences between theological styles in different epochs. It can be a heuristic tool to recognize the structural form that remains consistent throughout the ages, despite the unique expressions of this form according to the concrete and historical situation of the people being addressed by the message of the Gospel. This essay draws a comparison between the way Catholic theology and doctrine develop. In both cases, we find a paradigm of substantial homogeneity within a propositional or stylistic difference. The difference does not rule out a unity in a higher order. Different styles in theology are analogically united in an overarching and unchanging form of the truth revealed in Christ. (shrink)

L’articolo si concentra sull’analisi dell’estesa comparazione tra filosofia e amicizia proposta da Dante in Convivio III, xi, interpretandola come una consapevole analogia. A partire da un’attenta esegesi del capitolo, letto come un peculiare accessus ad philosophiam dantesco, l’articolo ripercorre le tappe dell’analogia evidenziandone i principali contenuti teorici. In questo modo, diventa possibile mostrare la rilevanza del tema dell’amicizia (in particolare di quella tra maestro e allievo) per una corretta comprensione di uno degli aspetti fondamentali (e anche più dibattuti) (...) della pratica filosofica così come concepita da Dante, ovvero il suo carattere intrinsecamente collettivo. Inoltre, l’articolo sottolinea come l’amicizia costituisca per Dante uno degli strumenti essenziali per l’allargamento del sapere filosofico al di fuori dei circoli universitari, obiettivo a cui il Convivio dichiaratamente mira. The article focuses on the analysis of the extended comparison between philosophy and friendship advanced by Dante in Convivio III, xi, interpreting it as a conscious analogy. Starting from a careful exegesis of the chapter, read as Dante’s peculiar accessus ad philosophiam, the article goes through the stages of the analogy, and it highlights its main theoretical contents. In this way, it becomes possible to show the relevance of the topic of friendship (especially that between master and student) for a correct understanding of one of the fundamental (and most debated) aspects of philosophical practice as conceived by Dante, i.e., its intrinsically collective character. Moreover, the article underlines that friendship constitutes for Dante one of the essential instruments in order to broaden philosophical knowledge outside of university circles, something that the Convivio explicitly purports to do. (shrink)

L’articolo analizza il problema dei nessi predicativi analogici nella teoria della dimostrazione di Aristotele, dove essi sono marginali, e i suoi sviluppi nella tradizione esegetica medievale latina del XIII secolo. Grossatesta sostiene che la dimostrazione può provare predicati detti analogicamente di soggetti diversi; Kilwardby e dopo di lui ancor più Egidio Romano mostrano che tale scopo è da raggiungere anche attraverso un termine medio connesso analogicamente ai termini estremi. Inoltre, Egidio sostiene in un passo l’esistenza di un ordinamento gerarchico tra (...) le proprietà dimostrate per analogia, ma altrove mostra invece che esse si configurano più variamente. Nel XIV secolo, Giovanni Buridano riprende i tratti fondamentali di queste interpretazioni, nel quadro di un generale allargamento dei caratteri della scienza aristotelica del quale, forse, le idee sull’analogia potrebbero rappresentare uno stadio iniziale. The paper deals with the problem of predicative analogical connections in the Aristotelian theory of demonstration, where they are marginal, and with its developments in the thirteenth-century medieval latin exegetical tradition. Grosseteste claims that demonstration can prove predicates that are said analogically of different subjects; Kilwardby and, after him, even more Giles of Rome show that this aim can be reached also through a medium analogically connected to the extreme terms. Giles upholds in a passage the existence of a gerarchical order among properties analogically demonstrated; somewhere else, however, he shows that they can configure more variously. In the following century, John Buridan resumes the basic lines of those interpretations, in the framework of a general widening of the features of Aristotelian science; maybe, his ideas on analogy could represent an initial stage of this tendence. (shrink)

En este artículo se comparan los análisis hechos por Aristóteles y Peirce dela inferencia analógica desde un punto de vista formal, es decir, sin prestaratención a su uso retórico o argumentativo. Desde este punto de vista formal,ambos filósofos coinciden en que la analogía es una inferencia compuesta,pero no concuerdan en los elementos simples que la componen. Aristótelesafirma que la analogía es compuesta sólo por la inducción y la deducción,en cambio Peirce, en su última explicación, incluye como tercer elementoa la abducción. (...) El autor de este artículo defiende que la explicación deAristóteles es la correcta debido a que es clara y suficiente; en cambio lade Peirce es confusa e insatisfactoria. (shrink)

La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être (analogia entis) doit-elle être considérée comme la tentative, la plus fidèle à l'esprit aristotélicien, pour ordonner unitairement la polysémie de l'être et parer au risque de dissémination du ...

Reseña del libro Analogía y fuerza argumentativa, por Corina Yoris.

First principles and the challenge of Parmenidean monism -- St. Thomas on analogia entis in the Scriptum super sententiis and in De veritate -- Consideration of objections to the view that the analogia entis is the analogy of proper proportionality -- The analogy of being and the transcendence and analogical intelligibility of the act of faith.

Univocità o equivocità del linguaggio umano applicato alle realtà divine. Analogia di attribuzione e analogia di proporzionalità: fondamento metafisico e valore conoscitivo.

This paper describes Stein’s process for establishing the relationship between finite and temporal beings and infinite and eternal beings. Although she contextualized her research in the fields of phenomenology and ontology, Stein surpasses these domains. Following Aquinas, Stein uses the analogy to trace the ascension towards the sense of Being. However, this process ends up being closest to the position of St. Augustine. In fact, the author first draws up a temporal analogy and then a personal analogy starting from two (...) pieces of evidence: the certainty of “I am”, from Augustine, Descartes, and Husserl, and the divine “I am”, according to the name that God reveals of himself: “I am who I am”. Through personal analogy, the author goes beyond phenomenology and ontology, while the category “person” includes both being and an attributed fullness. (shrink)

La tesis central de este artículo es que la argumentación por analogía consiste en la transferencia de un argumento de un dominio a otro con la pretensión de que el argumento término será bueno si lo es el argumento fuente. El examen de algunos argumentos filosóficos tradicionalmente considerados analógicos lleva a distinguir dos tipos de transferencia analógica. Cuando la transferencia se justifica con un principio abductivo como a casos similares, explicaciones similares, el argumento término es más débil que el argumento (...) fuente, pero cuando se aduce que en los dos dominios valen las mismas razones, la fuerza de los dos argu-mentos es proporcional.I contend that analogical argumentations transfer an argument from one domain to another, intending that the target argument will be good if the source argument is good. After analysis of some philosophical arguments traditionally taken to be analogical, I conclude that there are two kinds of analogical transfer. When some abductive principle like similar cases should have similar explanations is used, the target argument is weaker than the source argument; when it is claimed that the same reasons hold in both domains the strength of both arguments is proportional. (shrink)

En este trabajo intento sostener que ciertas herramientas metodológicascomo metáforas, analogías y experimentos mentales forman una estructuraanillada en la que el condicional contrafáctico sería la categoría más generalque subsume a todas las anteriores.Posteriormente intento mostrar que la pregunta por el poder epistémico dedichas herramientas descansa en la fiabilidad de las capacidades cognitivasque intervienen en el razonamiento contrafáctico. Analizo la propuesta deWilliamson según la cual, es la imaginación la capacidad que sustenta elrazonamiento contrafáctico y concluyo con tres objeciones a esta teoría.

Se ha sostenido tradicionalmente que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas son análogos. Pero, ¿qué es la analogía? Varios filósofos han pensado que la analogía debe ser considerada como una forma de ambigüedad. Argumentamos aquí que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas no son ambiguos o vagos. Siguiendo algunas sugerencias de McDaniel, proponemos una concepción de la analogía donde el fenómeno semántico está asociado con el carácter más o menos natural de la propiedad o (...) propiedades que instancian las entidades que satisfacen el predicado análogo. Un predicado "θ" es análogo si y sólo si, la propiedad Θ, que algo instancia, si y sólo si es θ, es menos natural que cualquier propiedad Ξ tal que todo lo que instancie Ξ, instancia Θ. Además, se requiere que las entidades de las cuales el término análogo es predicado deban ser ontológica o epistémicamente dependientes unas de otras. || It has been traditionally sustained that predicates attributed to God and to the creatures are analogical predicates. But, what is analogy? Several philosophers have thought that analogy should be taken as a form of ambiguity. Here we argue that predicates attributed to God and to creatures are neither ambiguous nor vague. Following some suggestions given by McDaniel, we propose a view of analogy in which the semantic phenomenon is associated with the more or less natural character of the property or properties that the entities that satisfy the analogous predicate instantiate. A predicate "θ" is analogous if and only if the property Θ, which something instantiates, if and only if it is θ, is less natural that any property Ξ so that anything that instantiates Ξ, instantiates Θ. Furthermore, it is required that the entities of which the analogous term is predicated should be either ontologically or epistemically dependent on each other. (shrink)

Il volume contiene i testi più significativi relativamente alla nascita e allo sviluppo della dottrina dell'analogia dell'essere. I passi sono riportati a fronte con traduzioni originali annotate e sono raccolti in due sezioni: quella di filosofia antica e tardoantica e quella di filosofia medievale araba e latina. La prima sezione comprende i principali testi aristotelici che della dottrina dell'analogia dell'essere hanno costituito l'origine, e i passi fra i più rilevanti della tradizione commentaristica antica e tardoantica, da Alessandro di (...) Afrodisia (II-III sec. d.C) a Simplicio di Cilicia (VI sec. d.C.), nei quali è possibile individuare le prime fasi dello sviluppo di tale dottrina. La sezione di filosofia medievale araba e latina comprende passi scelti dei filosofi che rappresentano le tappe essenziali dello sviluppo della dottrina dell'analogia dell'essere nel medioevo arabo e latino, da al-Fārābī (m. 950 c.) a Tommaso d'Aquino (XIII sec.) a Tommaso de Vio, il “Gaetano” (XV-XVI sec.)--Back cover. (shrink)

En la filosofía de Aristóteles, enérgeia aparece como fundamento de mimesis, analogía y semejanza. Desde este ángulo es posible apreciar una suerte de corriente continua que permite superar la escisión radical entre ciencias prácticas, factivas y teóricas. Superada la escisión cabe visualizar el vínculo de unión entre la existencia humana y la divina. Esto no puede darse mediante una "nivelación desde abajo", como ocurre con la antropomorfización. En cambio, esa aspiración que cada ser manifiesta por aproximarse, en la medida de (...) lo posible, a lo que 'es', en su perfección última y acabada, tiene la vida propia de la divinidad por expresión arquetípica. Aristóteles intenta un nuevo rumbo para explicar la relación entre el hombre y Dios. El ser es aquello que la mente ama, y el ser es para todos objeto de amor. En la substancia primera, ser y mente (Noús) se identifican, haciendo de Dios un ser nobilísimo y continuamente amado por el universo. El amor humano, el gozo de pensar que pensamos y que estamos vivos, nos permite contemplar al Primer Principio. Su separación, por tanto, no es una mera abstracción, sino la distancia reverente que impone la belleza, perfección y bondad, de la única substancia que es pensamiento de pensamiento y vida. Los entes, por su parte, participan (koinonei) (cf. Met. 1075 a, 24-25) todos para el todo. Se trata, pues, de una afirmación que nos remite indirectamente a Platón y la idea de methexis. El hombre, al poseer un lugar privilegiado en la naturaleza, está llamado a contemplar incluso aquellas cosas que parecieran estar sobre su capacidad (hyperanthropon) y, para lograrlo, debe esforzarse por hacerse semejante (homóioma) a lo divino, en lo que respecta a su actividad. Sólo en el desarrollo permanente de la virtud, considerada como enérgeia, puede llegar a ser el más amado por los dioses ( cf. E.N. 11 79 a,25-30). (shrink)