Is the reference to the Book of Job sufficient to explain why Hobbes gave the name ‘Leviathan’ to the state he advocated? Had he not been aware of how maligned this name had been for centuries: that it not only referred to a monster, but soon became synonymous with the devil himself? - The “long shadow” that, according to Carl Schmitt, the name ‘Leviathan’ alone had cast on Hobbes’s work from the very beginning was first cleared (...) somewhat in 2007 by Noel Malcolm’s reference to Jacques Boulduc’s Job- commentary of 1619/37. As far as the “extraneous influence” in question is concerned, however, reference could also be made to the Job-commentary of a certain Joseph Caryl of 1643, which in turn took away some of the scandalous connotation of the biblical Leviathan. The real key to Hobbes’s naming, however, may lie with Jean Bodin, with whom Hobbes shares everything that the name ‘Leviathan’ stands for in his political philosophy. (shrink)

Die Serie "Meisterwerke der Literatur" beinhaltet die Klassiker der deutschen und weltweiten Literatur in einer einzigartigen Sammlung für Ihren eBook Reader. Lesen Sie die besten Werke großer Schriftsteller,Poeten, Autoren und Philosophen auf Ihrem Reader. Dieses Werk bietet zusätzlich * Eine Biografie/Bibliografie des Autors. Vorländer Werk gehört auch heute noch zu den Referenzbüchern. Inhalt: Karl Vorländer – Biografie und Bibliografie Geschichte der Philosophie Vorwort zur 1. Auflage. Aus dem Vorwort zur 2. Auflage. Vorwort zur 3. Auflage. Zur fünften Auflage. Einleitung. 1. (...) Philosophie. Ihr Name und Begriff. 2. Die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ihre Methode, Quellen und Hilfsmittel. Einteilung des Stoffes. 3. Verhältnis der orientalischen Völker zur Philosophie. 4. Selbständigkeit der griechischen Philosophie. Quellen und Hilfsmittel zu ihrer Geschichte. Die Philosophie des Altertums Erste Periode. Vorsokratische Philosophie. Kapitel I. Anfänge der Reflexion über den Kosmos. Kapitel II. Anfänge der Reflexion über das Denken vom Kosmos. Sein und Werden (die Eleaten und Heraklit). Kapitel III. Die jüngeren Naturphilosophen: Empedokles, Anaxagoras u. a. Kapitel IV. Zweite Periode. Sokrates und die Sophisten. Kapitel V. Die sophistische Aufklärung. Kapitel VI. Sokrates. Kapitel VII. Die sokratischen Schulen. Dritte Periode. Die klassische Philosophie der Griechen: Plato und Aristoteles. Kapitel VIII. Plato. Kapitel IX. Aristoteles. Vierte Periode. Die hellenistisch-römische Philosophie. A. Hellenistische Periode. Kapitel X. Die Stoiker. Kapitel XI. Die Epikureer. Kapitel XII. Die Skeptiker. B. Die Philosophie auf dem Boden des römischen Weltreichs. Kapitel XIII. Die Philosophie bei den Römern. Kapitel XIV. Vorläufer des Neuplatonismus. Kapitel XV. Die Neuplatoniker. Die Philosophie des Mittelalters. Erster Abschnitt. Die Philosophie der Kirchenväter (Patristik). Kapitel I. Ältere Patristik. Kapitel II. Jüngere Patristik Zweiter Abschnitt. Die Scholastik. Kapitel III. Die Anfänge der Scholastik. Kapitel IV. Die Glanzzeit der Scholastik. Kapitel V. Ausgang der Scholastik. Zunehmender Zwiespalt zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Blüte der deutschen Mystik. Die Philosophie der Neuzeit Übergangsperiode. Kapitel I. Die Philosophie der Renaissance. Kapitel II. Die Begründung der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Erste Periode. Die Zeit der grossen Systeme. Kapitel I. Descartes (1596-1650). Kapitel II. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Kapitel III. Spinoza (1632-1677). Kapitel IV. Leibniz (1646-1716). Zweite Periode. Die Philosophie der Aufklärung. A. England und Schottland. Kapitel V. Locke (1632-1704). Kapitel VI. Weitere Entwicklung der Aufklärungsphilosophie in England. B. In Frankreich. Kapitel VII. Die französische Aufklärungsphilosophie von Bayle bis Rousseau. C. In Deutschland. Kapitel VIII. Die deutsche Aufklärungsphilosophie. Dritte Periode.Die Neubegründung der Philosophie durch Immanuel Kant Kapitel IX. Einleitung. Kapitel X. Kants Neubegründung der Wissenschaft. Kapitel XI. Die regulativen Prinzipien der Erfahrung oder die Ideen. Kapitel XII. Kants Neubegründung der Ethik. Kapitel XIII. Die Begründung der Ästhetik. Vierte Periode. Die Systeme der nachkantischen Philosophie von Fichte bis Schopenhauer. Kapitel XIV. Einleitung: Von Kant zu Fichte. Kapitel XV. Fichte. Kapitel XVI. Schelling. Kapitel XVII. Hegel. Kapitel XVIII. Kritische Nebenströmungen. Schleiermacher, Herbart, Beneke. Kapitel XIX. Schopenhauer. Fünfte Periode. Die Philosophie der Gegenwart. Kapitel XX. Der Positivismus. Kapitel XXI. Materialismus und Spiritualismus. Kapitel XXII. Die moderne Entwicklungsphilosophie: Darwin, Spencer. Kapitel XXIII. Idealistische Systembildungen auf naturwissenschaftlicher Grundlage. Kapitel XXIV. Die Erneuerung des Kritizismus. Kapitel XXV. Sozialismus und Individualismus. Kapitel XXVI. Sonstige philosophische Erscheinungen der Gegenwart. Zeittafel zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Fußnoten. (shrink)

Die Serie "Meisterwerke der Literatur" beinhaltet die Klassiker der deutschen und weltweiten Literatur in einer einzigartigen Sammlung für Ihren eBook Reader. Lesen Sie die besten Werke großer Schriftsteller,Poeten, Autoren und Philosophen auf Ihrem Reader. Dieses Werk bietet zusätzlich * Eine Biografie/Bibliografie des Autors. Vorländer Werk gehört auch heute noch zu den Referenzbüchern. Inhalt: Karl Vorländer – Biografie und Bibliografie Geschichte der Philosophie Vorwort zur 1. Auflage. Aus dem Vorwort zur 2. Auflage. Vorwort zur 3. Auflage. Zur fünften Auflage. Einleitung. 1. (...) Philosophie. Ihr Name und Begriff. 2. Die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ihre Methode, Quellen und Hilfsmittel. Einteilung des Stoffes. 3. Verhältnis der orientalischen Völker zur Philosophie. 4. Selbständigkeit der griechischen Philosophie. Quellen und Hilfsmittel zu ihrer Geschichte. Die Philosophie des Altertums Erste Periode. Vorsokratische Philosophie. Kapitel I. Anfänge der Reflexion über den Kosmos. Kapitel II. Anfänge der Reflexion über das Denken vom Kosmos. Sein und Werden (die Eleaten und Heraklit). Kapitel III. Die jüngeren Naturphilosophen: Empedokles, Anaxagoras u. a. Kapitel IV. Zweite Periode. Sokrates und die Sophisten. Kapitel V. Die sophistische Aufklärung. Kapitel VI. Sokrates. Kapitel VII. Die sokratischen Schulen. Dritte Periode. Die klassische Philosophie der Griechen: Plato und Aristoteles. Kapitel VIII. Plato. Kapitel IX. Aristoteles. Vierte Periode. Die hellenistisch-römische Philosophie. A. Hellenistische Periode. Kapitel X. Die Stoiker. Kapitel XI. Die Epikureer. Kapitel XII. Die Skeptiker. B. Die Philosophie auf dem Boden des römischen Weltreichs. Kapitel XIII. Die Philosophie bei den Römern. Kapitel XIV. Vorläufer des Neuplatonismus. Kapitel XV. Die Neuplatoniker. Die Philosophie des Mittelalters. Erster Abschnitt. Die Philosophie der Kirchenväter (Patristik). Kapitel I. Ältere Patristik. Kapitel II. Jüngere Patristik Zweiter Abschnitt. Die Scholastik. Kapitel III. Die Anfänge der Scholastik. Kapitel IV. Die Glanzzeit der Scholastik. Kapitel V. Ausgang der Scholastik. Zunehmender Zwiespalt zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Blüte der deutschen Mystik. Die Philosophie der Neuzeit Übergangsperiode. Kapitel I. Die Philosophie der Renaissance. Kapitel II. Die Begründung der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Erste Periode. Die Zeit der grossen Systeme. Kapitel I. Descartes (1596-1650). Kapitel II. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Kapitel III. Spinoza (1632-1677). Kapitel IV. Leibniz (1646-1716). Zweite Periode. Die Philosophie der Aufklärung. A. England und Schottland. Kapitel V. Locke (1632-1704). Kapitel VI. Weitere Entwicklung der Aufklärungsphilosophie in England. B. In Frankreich. Kapitel VII. Die französische Aufklärungsphilosophie von Bayle bis Rousseau. C. In Deutschland. Kapitel VIII. Die deutsche Aufklärungsphilosophie. Dritte Periode.Die Neubegründung der Philosophie durch Immanuel Kant Kapitel IX. Einleitung. Kapitel X. Kants Neubegründung der Wissenschaft. Kapitel XI. Die regulativen Prinzipien der Erfahrung oder die Ideen. Kapitel XII. Kants Neubegründung der Ethik. Kapitel XIII. Die Begründung der Ästhetik. Vierte Periode. Die Systeme der nachkantischen Philosophie von Fichte bis Schopenhauer. Kapitel XIV. Einleitung: Von Kant zu Fichte. Kapitel XV. Fichte. Kapitel XVI. Schelling. Kapitel XVII. Hegel. Kapitel XVIII. Kritische Nebenströmungen. Schleiermacher, Herbart, Beneke. Kapitel XIX. Schopenhauer. Fünfte Periode. Die Philosophie der Gegenwart. Kapitel XX. Der Positivismus. Kapitel XXI. Materialismus und Spiritualismus. Kapitel XXII. Die moderne Entwicklungsphilosophie: Darwin, Spencer. Kapitel XXIII. Idealistische Systembildungen auf naturwissenschaftlicher Grundlage. Kapitel XXIV. Die Erneuerung des Kritizismus. Kapitel XXV. Sozialismus und Individualismus. Kapitel XXVI. Sonstige philosophische Erscheinungen der Gegenwart. Zeittafel zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Fußnoten. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore Thomas Hobbes’ renunciation of a prominent concept of the social contract that distinguishes between two different contracts, namely, “pactum associationis” and “pactum subiectionis”.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy by John DeweyCharles A. HobbsJohn Dewey. Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012, 351 pp., index.John Dewey’s latest publication marks a watershed moment for scholarship in American philosophy, and, in addition to Dewey himself, we have editor Phillip Deen to thank for discovering it (among the Dewey papers in Special Collections at Morris Library of Southern Illinois (...) University) and editing it. We see Dewey late in life (early 1940s) engaged mainly in a critique of the modern, ancient, and (fragmentarily) medieval philosophical periods, which Dewey argues, are eras not nearly as distinct as traditional understanding admits. In the Introduction, Deen helpfully explains how we are now bequeathed incomplete but in most [End Page 122] cases quite robust chapter drafts that amount to another substantial work by Dewey. While published by Southern Illinois University Press, this volume is not itself part of The Collected Works of John Dewey. Still, the careful editing (of what are actually a number of manuscripts) is comparable in its excellence. There is also a well-done Index.The scope is twofold: retrospective and prospective. Chapters one through seven trace the development of so-called modern philosophy along with its central epistemological problem, with the aim being to demonstrate how thoroughly “unmodern” such philosophy has been. Then, chapters eight through fourteen constitute a genuinely modern approach that naturalistically and functionally undercuts the epistemic problem of subject/object and points to a revolution in the process of knowing.We turn to the retrospective, beginning in the first chapter with the acknowledgement that Dewey comes to philosophy itself as a kind of anthropologist, something we note as consistent with the influence of Franz Boas on Dewey (with whom Dewey was a colleague and intellectual ally at Columbia for about thirty-five years). This is further underscored by a lengthy quotation of anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski on the meaning of culture (p. 290). The ongoing history of philosophy is itself a cultural activity. Indeed, citing James, Dewey declares that “The sickliest way in which a student of philosophy can approach his subject-matter is that of a search for ultimate impersonal revelation of truth.” (p. 16) Rather, let the philosopher have the pragmatic attitude of openness “... to truth from whatever source it comes” (ibid).With that, Dewey once again turns to the Greeks, who initiated “The Discovery of Rational Discourse” (Ch. III) as underscored by the Socratic means of cooperative discourse, with the dialogues—not lectures—being evidence of the Athenian philosophical revolution in turning “from discussing nature and giving an account of it to the examination of the nature and procedure of discussion and report” (p. 38). Yet this project, despite its initial promise, failed for lack of a genuine logic of experimentation or inquiry. Then philosophy focused on going beyond the natural, beginning with the medieval “Search for Salvation” (Ch. IV, a significantly less developed and unified chapter draft). “Modern” philosophers then rightly replaced grand cosmic schemes with a focus on human nature (Ch. V), but they went too far with their introspective methods, gradually resulting in the same consequence supernaturalism had produced: a dualism of mind and nature, as if human nature is somehow not a part of nature. As we recall from Human Nature and Conduct (1922), human nature is not independent of but rather interdependent (or, using Dewey’s later term, transactional) with the rest of nature. The key is to avoid hypostatizing mind and better to talk of culture as nature. [End Page 123]With the Renaissance onward, humans have been “Wandering between Two Worlds” (Ch. VI), and endless arguments between “rationalists” and “empiricists” overlook what these camps share, namely a psychology assuming a fundamental split between subjective/objective and assumptions about certainty as founded upon various first principles or substances. The result is the stagnation of philosophy while science flourishes. Dewey cites Bertrand Russell as an example of continued insistence on such a priori principles (p. 106).We find ourselves in an epoch split between scientism and moral and religious fundamentalism, the result of a lingering tenacious investment in bad elements from ancient and medieval... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject by Denis DŽANIĆD. J. HobbsDŽANIĆ, Denis. Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject. Cham: Springer, 2023. x + 236 pp. Cloth, $119.99Denis Džanić’s Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility, despite its superficially historical focus on a specific period of collaboration between Edmund Husserl and his somewhat wayward protégé Eugen Fink, addresses key (...) systematic issues in transcendental phenomenology, namely, how the act of phenomenologizing should be understood in connection with the specific human beings who aim to become phenomenologists, and what the answer to this question tells us about both the genuine subject of phenomenology and the motivation for phenomenologizing. These questions are important for our understanding of not only the historical development of phenomenology but also the practice and goals of phenomenology—specifically, for a conception of phenomenologizing as a project in which we, as particular, historical, empirical figures, might want to engage.Much of the book focuses on laying the groundwork for understanding these complicated issues both historically and systematically. Džanić does an admirable job of tracing the rapidly evolving interactions between Husserl and Fink, both as intellectual collaborators on this philosophical project and as a pair of very human figures who ultimately found themselves pursuing quite different solutions to the problems of the subject and origin of phenomenology. He focuses particularly on the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, Fink’s attempt to extend Husserl’s famous text to include a phenomenology of the act of phenomenologizing itself (including Husserl’s marginal comments on the text), although he draws on a number of other significant texts and manuscripts (mostly Husserl’s, albeit with an extended aside on Heidegger) wherever they are helpful for explicating the complex evolution of Husserl’s thought on the subject. Admittedly, the book thus takes on a challenging task—both because of the difficult nature of this topic and because of the obscurity of the technical terms required to discuss it. However, despite the necessarily enigmatic character of the relevant language, Džanić’s attempts to explore the main outlines of this issue are worthwhile, particularly due to his ability to resist the temptation to view Husserl’s thought here as monolithic.In the early chapters, Džanić explicates in detail the rather complicated solution that Fink proposed to this difficulty, namely, the abandonment (to some extent) of the ultimately human origin of phenomenology in favor of a fundamentally nonhuman (and eventually meontic) conception of the transcendental ego, which generated a great deal of elaborate and (at least in the Sixth Meditation) inadequately supported speculation. For Fink, both the motivation to phenomenologize and the act of phenomenologizing itself ultimately stem from a source that is fundamentally prior to—in a(n onto)logical rather than temporal sense—any empirical ego or empirical act of phenomenologizing, a source that merely “enworlds” itself (in various complicated senses that Džanić does [End Page 145] an admirable job of clarifying) in the apparently anthropologistic, everyday world of individual phenomenologists. Džanić calls this interpretation of phenomenology Fink’s “epistemological anti-humanism,” and it serves as the basis for one potential (radically anti-Heideggerian but nevertheless somewhat disappointing) solution to the question of why we should phenomenologize at all. As Džanić notes, this solution was at least briefly taken up by Fink’s mentor Husserl himself, although the degree to which Husserl actually endorsed this path beyond the level of a fleeting flirtation remains questionable. Ultimately, as Džanić rightly highlights and as becomes abundantly clear in Husserl’s (often rather scathing) notes on Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, he abandoned this interpretation.Accordingly, in the later chapters of the book, Džanić traces Husserl’s ultimate development of a quite different solution to the problems of the origin and motivation of phenomenology—a solution that, unlike his brief foray into Finkian grandeur, views the act of phenomenologizing as essentially rooted in human possibility (that is, as part of the famous lifeworld that features so prominently in Husserl’s work, especially in the Crisis and other late texts). After his collaboration with and... (shrink)

It is still a popular philosophical position to call for a strict “separationism” concerning the private and the public sphere when it comes to religious convictions. Richard Rorty is one prominent supporter of this claim. The traditional critique against this division is mostly built on a particular characterization of religion that is at odds with Rortian assumptions. In this article, however, Rorty is criticized on his own terms turning pragmatically the objection to a fully internal one. What Rorty values most, (...) namely a tolerant and ironic liberalism as the capacity to describe oneself in new and interesting ways is precisely the role, I argue, that religious faith could play under “neo-liberal” conditions. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 279-282.

In The Origins of Totalitarianism Hannah Arendt reads Hobbes’ Leviathan as a prefiguration of totalitarian politics. She does so in a unique manner, criticising not his overbearing sovereignty, but the incessant accumulation of power, which turns into an unstoppable process of destruction. Arendt claims that the ultimately self-annihilating accumulation of power is necessitated by bourgeois societies’ pursuit to increase property. This paper first clarifies the methodological assumptions which allow Arendt to read Hobbes’ theory as a clue to bourgeois history in (...) general. It then reconstructs her portrait of the “power-hungry individual” as a result rather than starting point of Hobbes’ political model, and examines her verdict that the Hobbesian sovereign is inherently unstable. With the help of passages contained only in the expanded German version of Origins, Arendt’s more familiar Luxemburgian critique of territorial expansiveness is completed by a Benjaminian analysis of the temporality of accumulation: colonial catastrophe.Dieser Aufsatz ist im Rahmen des durch Horizon 2020 finanzierten MSCA-Projekts PhantomAiD, EU-Fördernummer 896973, entstanden. (shrink)

Now you can learn from the original, most important source for magic in the Western world that has ever been published, when you get Agrippa'sThree Books of Occult Philosophy. This massive volume was originally published in 1531, and occultists have been drawing on it ever since. Now, Llewellyn is proud to produce the first complete reprint of the original English translation in the last 500 years. Donald Tyson edited this work and removed the hundreds of errors that appeared in the (...) original translation. He also fully annotated the work, to make it understandableand usableby people today. ·Discover what the Renaissance scholar knew about astrology, medicine, history, herbs, geography, animals, angels, devils, Witches, charms, the weather, and a host of other subjects ·Gain immediate reference to a vast amount of arcane, but completely annotated, magical material ·Find corrected drawings of seals, sigils, and magic squares, and correctly represented geomantic figures ·Explore the practical Kabbalah, geomancy, the magic squares, the elements, the humors, and the Soul of the World ·Consult the new Biographical dictionary for background on each of the hundreds of writers and historical figures referred to by Agrippa ·Consult the new Geographical Dictionary for data on referenced rivers, mountains, nations, citiesmany of which now carry different names. The Three Books of Occult Philosophy is the most complete repository of pagan and Neoplatonic magic ever compiled. This book is packed with material you will not find elsewhere, including copious extracts on magic from obscure or lost works by Pythagoras, Ptolemy, Plato, Aristotle, and many others. Tyson's detailed annotations clarify difficult references and provide origins of quotations, even expanding upon them in many cases, in order to make Agrippa's work more accessible to the modern reader. The Three Books of Occult Philosophy is the ultimate "how-to" for magical workings. It describes how to work all manner of divinations and natural and ceremonial magic in such clear and useful detail that it is stillthe guide for modern techniques. The extensive new supplementary material makes this wisdom practical for use today. The Three Books of Occult Philosophy is an essential reference tool for all students of the occult. Get your copy today. (shrink)

The proponents of strong lexicalism hold the view that “words” are formed in the lexicon and are opaque for the syntax ((Dowty 1979), (DiSciullo and Williams 1987), (Jackendoff 1990) and many others). Modular morphology, on the other hand, offers the possibility that at least some words are partially formed in the syntax ((Baker 1988), (Borer 1988), (Hale and Keyser 1994), (Chomsky 1995) and many others). In (Stechow 1995) and (Stechow 1996) it has been argued that facts observed with German wieder (...) “again” cannot be accounted for within the framework of strong lexicalism and therefore favour the second position. The authors of this paper want to check these claims by investigating the behaviour of the German adverb fast “ almost”, the other classical adverb to which the method of decomposition has been applied in the linguistic literature (cf. (McCawley 1971)). Most adverbs cannot look into lexical decomposition structures, but some can. In order to have a suitable name, let us call these D-adverbs. Again and almost are the prototypical representatives of this class. The method adopted is to investigate whether fast has access to different aspects of verbal meaning depending on its position. Following (Dowty 1979), resultative verbs and prepositions are decomposed into BECOME + XP, where XP is the result state. Agentive verbs contain an additional AGENT part. Other thematic relations connecting the subject and the event are HOLDER and cause. If the syntax tells us that an adverb like wieder or fast must have wide scope with respect to BECOME, then we expect other readings than in a configuration where fast can have narrow scope with respect to BECOME. In other words, the motivation for decomposition is syntactic and semantic. The idea is that certain function projections in the classical VP have a meaning and hence scopally interact with adverbs. (shrink)

The awareness of educators in the health sciences with respect to promoting ethical conduct when instructing dental students is reflected in the undergraduate curriculum. This study is intended to discover the different ways these subjects are taught. A manual review of the literature published in databases indexed in SciELO during the years from 1999 to 2014 was done to that end, under the heading health sciences, humanities, applied social sciences, specifically literature that can be accessed in full, free of charge (...) and anonymously. Also reviewed was the literature in two specialized journals in the area of health education; namely, the Journal of Dental Education and the Journal of Medical Education, with the same titles, during the same period, and through the PubMed search engine, via Medline. The results show 43 articles of thematic relevance. The conclusion is that education in bioethics, as part of the undergraduate curriculum at dental schools, is increasing and differs according to the educational and cultural environment where it is imparted. Case-based learning and problem-based learning are mentioned as being the most efficient methods of instruction. Training dentists to be well-rounded professionals requires these subjects to be taught by interdisciplinary teams that are sufficiently prepared to do so. (shrink)

Gentzen writes in the published version of his doctoral thesis Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen that he was able to prove the normalization theorem only for intuitionistic natural deduction, but not for classical. To cover the latter, he developed classical sequent calculus and proved a corresponding theorem, the famous cut elimination result. Its proof was organized so that a cut elimination result for an intuitionistic sequent calculus came out as a special case, namely the one in which the sequents have (...) at most one formula in the right, succedent part. Thus, there was no need for a direct proof of normalization for intuitionistic natural deduction. The only traces of such a proof in the published thesis are some convertibilities, such as when an implication introduction is followed by an implication elimination [1934–35, II.5.13]. It remained to Dag Prawitz in 1965 to work out a proof of normalization. Another, less known proof was given also in 1965 by Andres Raggio.We found in February 2005 an early handwritten version of Gentzen's thesis, with exactly the above title, but with rather different contents: Most remarkably, it contains a detailed proof of normalization for what became the standard system of natural deduction. The manuscript is located in the Paul Bernays collection at the ETH-Zurichwith the signum Hs. 974: 271. Bernays must have gotten it well before the time of his being expelled from Göttingen on the basis of the racial laws in April 1933. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn der Antike wie in der zeitgenassischen Philosophie wird die Frage diskutiert, ob sprachli‐che Bedeutungen auf Übereinkunft beruhen. In unserer Zeit heisst die Frage, inwieweit sprachliche Verständigung durch Konventionen bestimmt ist. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass in den Regelbrauch, der sprachliches Verhalten teitet, zwar übereinkünfte eingehen können, ihn aber nicht wesentlich auszeichnen. Von da her erhält auch die Behandlung der Frage im Kratylos neue Aspekte: Der Regelbrauch, in den die ursprüngliche Übereinkunft zwar einge‐gangen ist, garantiert den Bezug der Narnen, aber (...) nicht auch die Bedeutung der Wörter.SummaryIn Antiquity, just as in contemporary philosophy, it was asked whether linguistic meaning is a matter of convention. Nowadays the question takes the following form: “to what extent is linguistic communication determined by convention?” I attempt to show that although there may be conventions among the rules governing linguistic behavior, they are not in any essential way distinctive of those rules. As a result of this view there are also new aspects to be considered in the treatment of the question in the Cratylus: the rules, which the initial convention indeed concerns, guarantee the reference of names but not the meaning of other kinds of words.RésuméDans ľAntiquité tout comme dans la philosophie contemporaine, on s'est demandé si Ies significations linguistiques reposent sur une convention. Aujourd'hui, la question se pose sous la forme suivante: dans quelle mesure la communication linguistique est‐elle déterminée par convention? J'essaye de montrer que, parmi les régies qui gouvernent le comportement linguistique, il peut y avoir des conventions, mais que le caractère conventionnel n'en est pas un critère distinctif. De ce point de vue, le traitement de la question dans le Cratyle révèle de nouveaux aspects: les règies, qui tiennent certes compte de la convention primitive, garantissent la référence des noms mais ne garantis‐sent pas celle des autres mots. (shrink)

The Hermotimus is Lucian’s longest piece of writing, surpassing even the two books of the True Tales, and at the same time his most successful effort to recreate the style and atmosphere of a Platonic dialogue, filled with a new—and for Lucian uncharacteristically serious—content, namely a sustained attack on “dogmatic” philosophical schools (the “haireseis” of its subtitle) and, inversely, a ringing endorsement of the tenets of Pyrrhonian Scepticism.... (review at BMCR).

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

According to the Market Failures Approach to business ethics, beyond-compliance duties can be derived by employing the same rationale and arguments that justify state regulation of economic conduct. Very roughly the idea is that managers have a duty to behave as if they were complying with an ideal regulatory regime ensuring Pareto-optimal market outcomes. Proponents of the approach argue that managers have a professional duty not to undermine the institutional setting that defines their role, namely the competitive market. This answer (...) is inadequate, however, for it is the hierarchical firm, rather than the competitive market, that defines the role of corporate managers and shapes their professional obligations. Thus, if the obligations that the market failures approach generates are to apply to managers, they must do so in an indirect way. I suggest that the obligations the market failures approach generates directly apply to shareholders. Managers, in turn, inherit these obligations as part of their duties as loyal agents. (shrink)

In the summer of 1928, Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) embarked on his logical journey that would bring him world fame in a mere three years. By early 1929, he had solved an outstanding problem in logic, namely the question of the completeness of the axioms and rules of quantificational logic. He then went on to extend the result to the axiom system of arithmetic but found, instead of completeness, his famous incompleteness theorem that got published in 1931. It belongs to the (...) most iconic achievements of 20th century science and has been instrumental in the development of theories of formal languages and algorithmic computability – two essential components in the birth of the information society. This book explores Gödel’s way from an exceptional high-school student to a firmly established young logician. Essays in Gödel’s hand from the high school show that his central philosophical and scientific convictions were formed early on, before his university studies. Particular emphasis is laid on the course that made Gödel one of the foremost logicians of all times. The scientific biography of young Gödel is followed by English translations from Gödel’s German Gabelsberger shorthand of all his early preserved notebooks on logic and related topics. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Neuübersetzung konstituiert unter Heranziehung sämtlicher Ausgaben sowie der einschlägigen Manuskripte und anderer zeitgenössischer Textquellen für jeden einzelnen Textabschnitt textkritisch die jeweils maßgebliche Fassung letzter Hand, welche der Übersetzung zugrunde gelegt wird. In seiner Einleitung zeichnet der Herausgeber erstmals anhand zeitgenössischer Dokumente ein zuverlässiges Bild von der komplizierten Entstehungsgeschichte des Werkes. Alle inhaltlich bedeutsamen Textvarianten sind im textkritischen Apparat übersetzt. In diesem Apparat werden zusätzlich Anspielungen auf antike oder zeitgenössische Werke entschlüsselt sowie gegebenenfalls Realerklärungen geboten.

Sociologists usually conceive of emotions as individual, episodic, and categorical phenomena while emphasizing their social and cultural construction. At the same time, the term emotion refers to a wide range of conceptually and ontologically distinct components and is therefore best thought of as a relatively unspecific umbrella term. This article argues that the routes leading to the social and cultural construction of emotion, for example, norms, rules, values, and discourse, are unlikely to be applicable to each of these components in (...) the same way. This is particularly true for an element of emotion that is often portrayed as being most essential and basic and therefore to some extent avoiding the formative forces of culture and society, namely, affect. Although affect is an established notion in sociology, it has remained conceptually underdeveloped. The article therefore discusses different perspectives on affect from cultural studies that emphasize its relational and bodily character. In a second step, it contrasts and reconciles these views with existing theories of affect in sociology and social psychology and considers a number of essential characteristics that can be used to circumscribe affect and its social and cultural correlates. Finally, concepts from relational sociology are introduced and concrete examples to specify the relational character of affect and to develop an understanding of affect, that is both theoretically fruitful and conducive to empirical research, are discussed. (shrink)

The state of nature is a fundamental concept of modern political philosophy. As such, it is particularly associated with Thomas Hobbes’ and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work. As the following article shows, the state of nature is not simply an auxiliary construction [Hilfskonstruktion] for a theory that aims to clarify the relation between the political order and its origins and normative principles. It is also a figure of thought that introduces colonial images into political philosophy. The following reading of Hobbes and Rousseau, (...) which also draws on image analysis, traces how their conceptions of the state of nature are constitutively linked to imaginations of the savage that emanate from contemporary colonial discourses. Moreover, by comparing the writings of Hobbes and Rousseau it becomes apparent that the colonial difference increasingly takes on a systematic relevance. This development further contains significant similarities with the changing use of gender differences in political philosophy. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 24 Heft: 1 Seiten: 211-218.

From Einstein's point of view, his General Relativity Theory had strengths as well as failings. For him, its shortcoming mainly was that it did not unify gravitation and electromagnetism and did not provide solutions to field equations which can be interpreted as particle models with discrete mass and charge spectra, As a consequence, General Relativity did not solve the quantum problem, either. Einstein tried to get rid of the shortcomings without losing the achievements of General Relativity Theory. Stimulated by papers (...) of Weyl 465) and Eddington 194), from 1923 onward, he believed that, to reach this goal, one has to transit to space–times which possess more comprehensive geometrical structures than the Riemann space–time. This was the beginning of a decade's lasting search for a unitary field theory. We describe this exciting part of the history of physics, discuss achievements and failures of this development, and ask how these early attempts of a unified theory strike us today. Taking into account the fact that the Equivalence Principle only speaks for a geometrization of gravitation, we consider an alternative way to give those non-Riemannian structures which were introduced by the unitary field approach a physical meaning, namely the meaning of a generalized gravitational field. This is interesting since there are arguments in favor of such a generalization of General Relativity Theory, e.g., the problems the latter theory meets with if one tries to quantize it and to unify gravitation with other interactions. (shrink)

The proponents of strong lexicalism hold the view that “words” are formed in the lexicon and are opaque for the syntax ((Dowty 1979), (DiSciullo and Williams 1987), (Jackendoff 1990) and many others). Modular morphology, on the other hand, offers the possibility that at least some words are partially formed in the syntax ((Baker 1988), (Borer 1988), (Hale and Keyser 1994), (Chomsky 1995) and many others). In (Stechow 1995) and (Stechow 1996) it has been argued that facts observed with German wieder (...) “again” cannot be accounted for within the framework of strong lexicalism and therefore favour the second position. The authors of this paper want to check these claims by investigating the behaviour of the German adverb fast “ almost”, the other classical adverb to which the method of decomposition has been applied in the linguistic literature (cf. (McCawley 1971)). Most adverbs cannot look into lexical decomposition structures, but some can. In order to have a suitable name, let us call these D-adverbs. Again and almost are the prototypical representatives of this class. The method adopted is to investigate whether fast has access to different aspects of verbal meaning depending on its position. Following (Dowty 1979), resultative verbs and prepositions are decomposed into BECOME + XP, where XP is the result state. Agentive verbs contain an additional AGENT part. Other thematic relations connecting the subject and the event are HOLDER and cause. If the syntax tells us that an adverb like wieder or fast must have wide scope with respect to BECOME, then we expect other readings than in a configuration where fast can have narrow scope with respect to BECOME. In other words, the motivation for decomposition is syntactic and semantic. The idea is that certain function projections in the classical VP have a meaning and hence scopally interact with adverbs. (shrink)

This article examines how Plato uses mythological symbolisms in the Lysis, specifically those of Hermes, to show how our experience of the good makes possible our capacity to love our friend as an individual, and in so doing overturns the static dualities usually associated with Plato’s ‘metaphysics’. Instead of appealing to allegedly impersonal ideas, Plato refigures Greek mythological understandings of Hermes to signal, first, that friendship is a movement of divine love in which human beings participate and to which they (...) are reoriented so that they may behold their friend as an individual, as a person, and second, that this reorientation is needed to place the dialectical inquiry into friendship upon proper starting points. Instead of eclipsing the individual in the shadow of impersonal ideas, Plato appeals to Hermes, the most human, most creative and thus most political, of Olympians, whose name means windfall [hermaion], to show how we must open ourselves up to the divine in order fully to love our friend as an individual person. (shrink)

Sharing economy platforms mediate exchanges between service providers and consumers. The experiences of service providers in the sharing economy have been extensively studied. Nevertheless, our knowledge in regard to the extent to which providers’ participation influences their wellbeing remains incomplete. This study focuses on the peer-to-peer accommodation platform Airbnb and explores why and how different aspects involved in hosting can contribute to or hinder hosts’ hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing. To that end, I conducted a netnography and depth interviews with Airbnb (...) hosts. Based on a qualitative analysis of the overall dataset, I identify three sources of positive affect associated with hosting, namely, the sociability involved in the host-guest interaction, the act of providing hospitality, and positive feedback from guests. However, I also identify four conditions, which can turn hosting into a source of negative affect, namely, customer misbehavior, high volumes of guests, negative reviews, and income dependency. In addition, I elaborate on the relationship between hosting and life satisfaction in regard to the income that hosts generate through hosting and the working conditions of Airbnb hosts. Last but not least, I show that being a provider on Airbnb can contribute to eudaimonic wellbeing, focusing on four dimensions of eudaimonia, namely, self-realization, personal growth, a sense of purpose and meaning, and relationships. Theoretical and managerial implications for service providers and sharing economy platforms are discussed. (shrink)

The article reassesses the renown ‘critical iconology’ practiced by Aby Warburg and confronts it with recent theories regarding metadata and the curatorship of information. A close examination of Robert Kitaj’s portrait Warburg as a Maenad (1961–62) affirms Warburg’s ‘combinatory experiments’ (Christopher D. Johnson) to be a main characteristic of his practice. Warburg seems to have operated by applying what can now be described as metadata to the processes of transmission of culture he was accessing in form of migrating images. Further, (...) the insights he was able to gain, namely his famous notion of the ‘Pathosformel’, may have to be considered as a specific form of metadata too. This is of particular interest acknowledging that in the digital world the migration of images takes mainly place in the realm of metadata. Hence ideas put forward by Warburg are able contribute to a deeper understanding of such phenomena. (shrink)

Eine Analyse der Politischen Philosophie der Neuzeit kann – soll sie nicht lediglich einzelne Autoren oder Werke reihen – zwei methodische Wege einschlagen. Sie kann zum einen mit einer detaillierten Werkinterpretation wichtiger Denker wie Hobbes, Locke oder Kant beginnen und quasiinduktiv den historischen Fortgang der Hauptdiskussionen zu rekonstruieren suchen. Sie kann aber auch wesentliche abstrakte Verlaufskategorien vorschlagen, mit deren Hilfe dann umgekehrt in einem quasideduktiven Konkretionsschritt die Beiträge eminenter Denker möglichst gut verstanden, eingeordnet und gewürdigt werden.Der vorliegende Text wird zum (...) Zweck der Beurteilung dieser beiden großen Alternativen zunächst einige Anforderungen vorschlagen, die derartige abstrakte begriffliche Kategorien erfüllen sollten, um zum Verständnis der Ideengeschichte der neuzeitlichen Politischen Philosophie beitragen zu können . In einem zweiten Schritt werden die beiden soeben genannten Gegensatzpaare an Hand dieser Anforderungen beurteilt . Diese Beurteilung wird zu dem Ergebnis führen, daß beide Gegensatzpaare zwar unabdingbar notwendig sind, um wesentliche Autoren der Politischen Philosophie der Neuzeit würdigen zu können. Für die Erfassung des Verlaufs der grundlegenden Auseinandersetzung in der neuzeitlichen Politischen Philosophie reichen sie aber nicht aus. Deshalb wird drittens das schon im Titel dieses Beitrags genannte Kategorienpaar „Normativer Individualismus versus normativer Kollektivismus" vorgeschlagen . Mit Hilfe dieses Gegensatzpaares und einiger Ergänzungen wird dann viertens die Grundlinie der Auseinandersetzung in der neuzeitlichen Politischen Philosophie skizziert werden . Diese Skizze soll schließlich zu einem besseren Verständnis der gegenwärtigen Diskussionslage führen. (shrink)

Zeitgenössische Positionen in der Debatte über fiktionale Namen lassen sich in zwei Lager aufteilen: deskriptivistische und Millsche Ansätze. Deskriptivisten nehmen an, dass der semantische Inhalt eines Namens synonym mit einer Kennzeichnung sei, während Millianerinnen, behaupten, dass der semantische Inhalt eines Namens sein Bezugsobjekt sei. Da es sich bei diesen Ansätzen um Theorien handelt, die sich nicht auf fiktionale Namen beschränken, sondern Eigennamen generell behandeln, müssen sie sich auch Einwänden stellen, die nicht nur auf fiktionale Namen zutreffen. Dieses Kapitel konzentriert sich (...) weniger auf die Darstellung allgemeiner Probleme, sondern auf solche, die sich besonders im Zusammenhang mit fiktionalen Namen stellen. (shrink)

A Hobbesian Model. If ever possible the modelling of the abstract pattern of the item of a philosophical theory belongs, alas!, to its interpretation. In the case of the Hobbesian theory of the natural right and the natural laws (Lev c. XIV, XV) the mathematics of the covenant-model and of its interpretation by an model of preferences and utilities is a neglect task till now. Its performance shows certain shortcomings of the Hobbesian theory.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 224 Seiten: 19-44.