Mi propósito central es evidenciar el rol fundamental de la noción de posibilidad en la consolidación y formulación del Pragmaticismo de Ch. S. Peirce. Ciertamente el Pragmaticismo es un intento de Peirce por establecer la diferencia específica de su propia concepción del pragmatismo y un esfuerzo por ofrecer una adecuada interpretación de su formulación inicial de la máxima pragmática. Los intentos de Peirce por caracterizar su concepción pragmática y sus reformulaciones e interpretaciones de la máxima pragmática se (...) desarrollaron en el tiempo durante un periodo de más de cuatro décadas y presentan una serie de variaciones. Intentaré ofrecer evidencia que permita ampliar la comprensión sobre el llamado “Peirce’s modal shift”, a fin de mostrar en qué sentido la noción de posibilidad real desarrollada por Peirce produjo una transformación en su concepción modal y cómo éste cambio se refleja en la formulación definitiva del Pragmaticismo. (shrink)

Peirce algebras combine sets, relations and various operations linking the two in a unifying setting. This paper offers a modal perspective on Peirce algebras. Using modal logic a characterization of the full Peirce algebras is given, as well as a finite axiomatization of their equational theory that uses so-called unorthodox derivation rules. In addition, the expressive power of Peirce algebras is analyzed through their connection with first-order logic, and the fragment of first-order logic corresponding (...) to Peirce algebras is described in terms of bisimulations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Peirce on Realism and Idealism by Robert LaneAaron B. WilsonPeirce on Realism and Idealism Robert Lane. Cambridge UP, 2018.Robert Lane's Peirce on Realism and Idealism is the ultimate secondary source for those who wish to engage the forms of realism and idealism that Peirce develops over the course of his writings. Lane could not have given his monograph a more concise and descriptive title. He (...) never strays from the topics of realism and idealism, and it is remarkably complete. It includes extensive discussion on Peirce's basic realism (Lane's term) as well as his extreme scholastic realism (Peirce's term), his basic idealism (Lane's term), and his objective idealism (Peirce's term). It might not be the best resource for those interested in the historical influences on Peirce's forms of realism and idealism. For instance, if one is interested mainly in Peirce's extreme scholastic realism and its roots in scholastic philosophy, Mayorga (2007)1 might still be a more useful resource. Also, Lane leaves much to be said about the epistemological underpinnings of Peirce's forms of realism and idealism. Peirce's theory of perception and his critical common-sensism do not get much attention. Also, there is much in Peirce's later semeiotic writings that could have been brought to bear on the issues.However, I do not see any of these omissions as failures of Lane's work. As I read it, the book's central aims are to determine the following: (1) what metaphysical views did Peirce hold, (2) when did he hold them, (3) are they consistent with one another, and (4) what is the textual evidence that he held them as such. With respect to these aims, Peirce on Realism and Idealism exhibits the gold standard of Peirce scholarship: it is remarkably sensitive to dates, different writings, and contexts of writings, and the reader gets a strong impression that Lane has not left any stone unturned—that he had at least skimmed every word in every lecture, published writing, letter, and unpublished manuscript that Peirce produced.Although the book contains some interpretations about which I have some reservations, which I describe further on, I agree with most of its central claims. This includes the claim that, despite various developments, Peirce had always subscribed to "basic realism": the thesis that there are things independent of what anyone thinks about them. A whole chapter is dedicated to showing that Peirce's 1868–1869 "anti-Cartesian" papers are consistent with basic realism, and I found that chapter very helpful. Another thesis that Lane defends, and that I strongly agree with, is that Peirce held a representationalist view of truth. Truth as "correspondence" with reality is one of two [End Page 107] key aspects of Peirce's account of truth (the other being, as Lane calls it, an "investigative aspect"). After works by Christopher Hookway, Cheryl Misak, and others that attempt to de-emphasize or obscure Peirce's representationalism, perhaps to make him more appealing to contemporary analytic "neopragmatists," it is absolutely refreshing to read a book that embraces Peirce's representationalism without apology.However, in the remainder of this review, I will focus on parts that I found troubling. Some of this trouble is probably due more to Peirce himself than to Lane's interpretation of Peirce. But some of it directly concerns Lane's interpretation. In particular, the parts of chapter 6 concerning Peirce's modal realism, while stimulating and enlightening, are also problematic. Further, I do not think that Lane's account of Peirce's idealism appropriately recognizes its similarity to Hegelian or Absolute idealism.To begin with Peirce's modal realism, Lane's discussion of it sets out by addressing the fact that, as Peirce recognizes, the conditionals comprising "pragmatic clarifications," or what result from applying the "pragmatic maxim" to a concept, must be in the hypothetical or subjunctive mood. This is in order to make sense of the truth of even indicative non-conditional propositions such as, to use Peirce's and Lane's example, "the diamond is hard." If the conditionals into which a concept is pragmatically clarified are in the indicative mood... (shrink)

En este artículo se comparan los análisis hechos por Aristóteles y Peirce dela inferencia analógica desde un punto de vista formal, es decir, sin prestaratención a su uso retórico o argumentativo. Desde este punto de vista formal,ambos filósofos coinciden en que la analogía es una inferencia compuesta,pero no concuerdan en los elementos simples que la componen. Aristótelesafirma que la analogía es compuesta sólo por la inducción y la deducción,en cambio Peirce, en su última explicación, incluye como tercer (...) elementoa la abducción. El autor de este artículo defiende que la explicación deAristóteles es la correcta debido a que es clara y suficiente; en cambio lade Peirce es confusa e insatisfactoria. (shrink)

Peirce claims that there is but one primary logical relation, that of illation or logical consequence. The present paper is devoted to show the influence of this viewpoint in Peirce's conception of logic. After a brief presentation of Peirce's membership in the tradition of language as calculus, it examines his pioneering work in modal logic and other systems of logic. The last section attemps to summarize his doctrine of logic as a normative science.

Le philosophe Charles Peirce a accordé un rôle prépondérant à la communauté des enquêteurs, à la fois comme groupe de chercheurs et comme idéal conduisant vers la vérité. Si Peirce parlait pour sa part de « théorie sociale de la réalité », les trois textes qui suivent – inédits en français, et en anglais pour le dernier – justifient d’y voir une véritable épistémologie sociale. Ils montrent dans quelle mesure la connaissance scientifique, et même commune, trouve son fondement (...) dans une composante nécessairement sociale. La rationalité probable n’a pas de sens à l’échelle individuelle (premier texte) ; la science est une entreprise collective (deuxième texte) ; et la vérité se définit en fonction de la communauté (troisième texte). (shrink)

Charles Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science is an early work in the philosophy of science and the official birthplace of pragmatism. It contains Peirce’s two most influential papers: “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” as well as discussions on the theory of probability, the ground of induction, the relation between science and religion, and the logic of abduction. Unsatisfied with the result and driven by a constant, almost feverish urge to improve (...) his work, Peirce spent considerable time and effort revising these papers. After the turn of the century these efforts gained significant momentum when Peirce sought to establish his role in the development of pragmatism while distancing himself from the more popular versions that had become current. The present edition brings together the original series as it appeared in Popular Science Monthly and a selection of Peirce’s later revisions, many of which remained hidden in the mass of messy manuscripts that were left behind after his death in 1914. (shrink)

Os Grafos Existenciais de Peirce oferecem uma compreensão geométrica de uma variedade de lógicas (clássica, intuicionista, modal, de primeira ordem). A sua interpretação geométrica é dada por transformações topológicas de curvas fechadas (Jordan) no plano, mas pode ser estendida a outras superfícies (esfera, cilindro, toro etc.). Além disso, é possível desenhar grafos existenciais sobre superfícies de Riemann gerais e, introduzindo ferramentas da geometria algébrica (Feixes, Toposes de Grothendieck, Toposes Elementares), é possível tentar capturar as lógicas nas formas geométricas (...) por meio de um novo Topos de Grafos Existenciais sobre Superfícies de Riemann e por meio do subobjeto classificador do topos. Oferecemos novas perspectivas (conceitos, definições, exemplos, conjecturas) ao longo desse caminho. (shrink)

El texto de Peirce que en las páginas siguientes se publica por primera vez en castellano, forma parte de sus Notebook I de 1905, correspondiente a las Adirondack Summer School Lectures. Fue catalo-gado como MS 1334 en el catálogo de Richard R. Robin. En 1986 Kenneth L. Ketner eligió este sugestivo fragmento -hasta entonces prácticamente desconocido- dándole el título "The Nature of Science" para dar a conocer en el volumen de John J. Stuhr Classical American Philosophy. Essential Readings and (...) Interpretative Essays (Oxford University Press, 1987), la concepción que Peirce tenía de la actividad científica. La inclusión de la traducción al castellano de Sara F. Barrena de aquel sugestivo texto resulta un magnífico colofón para este número monográfico sobre las claves del pensamiento de Peirce para la filosofía, la ciencia y la cultura del nuevo siglo (J. N.). (shrink)

Peirce' Religionsphilosophische Schriften dokumentieren eine wissenschaftsmethodisch neue Begründung von Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie. Die Edition ist chronologisch am Gesamtwerk orientiert und enthält Texte, die erstmals aus dem Nachlaßwerk publiziert werden bzw. Haupttexte von Peirce' systematischer Philosophie, erstmals in deutscher Übersetzung, z.B. Kritik des Positivismus (1867/1868); Eine Vermutung über das Rätsel [der Sphinx] (1887/1888); Die Idee eines Naturgesetzes (1901); Ein vernachlässigtes Argument für die Realität Gottes (1908).

À la fin de sa carrière théologique, E.L. Mascall a exprimé dans Theology and the Gospel of Christ (1977) ses doutes quant à la direction que prenait la théologie universitaire. Il considérait la théologie comme étant en état de crise, affirmant que les théologiens, soucieux d’être acceptés dans l’université moderne sécularisée, ont négligé la pratique de la théologie au sens propre du terme. Le résultat de cette négligence de l’objet propre de la théologie est une perte de cohérence et d’unité (...) entre les diverses disciplines théologiques, ce qui menace de manière cruciale la pertinence de l’effort théologique. L’article présente et développe la critique de Mascall en dialogue avec d’autres théologiens (entre autres Joseph Ratzinger et Stanley Hauerwas) et tente d’esquisser une voie à suivre. (shrink)

Peirce, Ch. S. Die Festlegung einer Überzeugung.--Peirce, Ch. S. Was heisst Pragmatismus?--James, W. Der Wille zum Glauben.--James, W. Der Wahrheitsbegriff des Pragmatismus.--Schiller, F. C. S. Humanismus.--Dewey, J. Pragmatismus und Pädagogik.

Peirce’s Existential Graphs provide a geometrical understanding of a variety of logics (classical, intuitionistic, modal, fi rst-order). The geometrical interpretation is given by topological transformations of closed (Jordan) curves on the plane, but it can be extended to other surfaces (sphere, cylinder, torus, etc.) The result provides the appearance of new logics related to the shapes of the surfaces. Going beyond, one can draw existential graphs over general Riemann Surfaces, and, introducing tools from algebraic geometry (Sheaves, Grothendieck Toposes, (...) Elementary Toposes), one can try to capture both the logics and the geometrical shapes through a new Topos of Existential Graphs over Riemann Surfaces, and through the classifi er subobject of the topos. We off er new perspectives (concepts, defi nitions, examples, conjectures) along this road. -/- Os Grafos Existenciais de Peirce oferecem uma compreensão geométrica de uma variedade de lógicas (clássica, intuicionista, modal, de primeira ordem). A sua interpretação geométrica é dada por transformações topológicas de curvas fechadas (Jordan) no plano, mas pode ser estendida a outras superfícies (esfera, cilindro, toro etc.). Além disso, é possível desenhar grafos existenciais sobre superfícies de Riemann gerais e, introduzindo ferramentas da geometria algébrica (Feixes, Toposes de Grothendieck, Toposes Elementares), é possível tentar capturar as lógicas nas formas geométricas por meio de um novo Topos de Grafos Existenciais sobre Superfícies de Riemann e por meio do subobjeto classifi cador do topos. Oferecemos novas perspectivas (conceitos, defi nições, exemplos, conjecturas) ao longo desse caminho. (shrink)

In diesen Vorlesungen des Begründers des amerikanischen Pragmatismus, Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), werden die Verknüpfungen von Logik und Praxis, Denken und Handeln in der Philosophie des "größten amerikanischen Denkers" (K. O. Apel) deutlich. Aus dem Inhalt: Pragmatismus: Die normativen Wissenschaften; Die universalen Kategorien; Weiteres über Kategorien; Die Realität der Drittheit; Die drei Arten des Guten; Drei Typen des Schließens; Pragmatismus und Abduktion; Anmerkungen von Peirce. - Anmerkungen der Herausgeberin; Bibliographie, Namen- und Sachregister.

Argumenta-se aqui que a melhor interpretação da estética de Peirce é como uma ciência normativa de fins ideais. As influências de Peirce neste particular incluem a noção de kalos de Platão, A educação estética do homem de Friedrich Schiller, e a arquitetônica kantiana. Baseada principalmente nos rascunhos de Minute Logic em 1902 e as Palestras de Harvard em 1903, as características essenciais de uma ciência normativa são discutidas e a relação da estética às outras duas ciências normativas da (...) lógica e da ética é analisada. O conceito de Peirce de bondade estética é desenvolvido, e os critérios para o que ele considera como um summum bonum são examinados. As próprias formulações de Peirce do summum bonum são examinados, inclusive sua noção de razoabilidade concreta, como também uma explicação interessante dos ideais fundamentais encontrada em um fragmento de manuscrito de 1903. O artigo conclui com uma discussão entre o que é chamado de estética positiva e negativa de Peirce, entendido como duas abordagens diferentes à formulação de fins ideais. (shrink)

Peirce’s idea of an unlimited community has been usually analyzed from its role in science and the normative ideal of truth. However, it is essential to understand the role of the community of inquiry in light of the other normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics, since according to Peirce, any endeavor to know that is not guided by the esthetical ideal of admirable per se should not be considered as proper science, but as a power tool to benefit some (...) elite. This article aims to analyze Peirce’s idea of community of inquiry in light of sentimentalism and the normative sciences in order to evidence that such community is not elitist, but open, insofar as it is also lured by the summum bonum and the admirable per se. Finally, we provide a more organic reading of Peirce’s work, opening the way to consider possible consequences of this position from an ethical and political perspective. (shrink)

Neste artigo analisaremos como a filosofia de Charles Sanders Peirce influencia o pensamento de Karl-Otto Apel na elaboração da sua ética do discurso. Pretendemos mostrar que Apel compreende que Peirce elabora uma transformação da filosofia transcendental kantiana, substituindo o “eu penso” por um “eu argumento”, neste viés Peirce demonstrou a existência de um acordo mútuo intersubjetivo dentro da comunidade científica. Sendo que, este acordo é mediado pela linguagem, e se dá em função da garantia da verdade das (...) proposições. Conclui-se que Apel ver em Peirce a introdução de uma ética mínima que supera o solipsismo metódico, e se baseia na intersubjetividade, tornando possível um acordo mútuo, que mais tarde será a base para a fundamentação pragmático-transcendental da ética do discurso. (shrink)

Peirce’s analyses of the concept of information begin in the period from 1865 to 1869 and continue until the last years of his life. In fact, the successive phases that the scholars distinguish about Peirce’s approaches to information, roughly match Fisch’s periodization of Peirce’s philosophical development. In the first phase his approach is restricted to the proposition and the terms that knock it into shape; the forms of inference prevail. In the second phase the concept of information (...) is enriched with the development of Peirce’s semiotic theory and his typology of signs. By last, his concept of information receives a more decidedly metaphysical stamp. In this paper we will just expose Peirce’s conception of information during the first of these phases, foregrounding his papers Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension (W2 [1867]: 70-86) and Questions on Reality (W2 [1868]: 162-87). Here, individuals explore and actualize possibilities in thought, once they articulate their experience through a social system of signs. That’s why, in inferring, “we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us” (EP 1 [1868]: 42). (shrink)

Charles Peirce incorporates modality into his Existential Graphs by introducing the broken cut for possible falsity. Although it can be adapted to various modern modal logics, Zeman demonstrates that making no other changes results in a version that he calls Gamma-MR, an implementation of Jan Łukasiewicz's four-valued Ł-modal system. It disallows the assertion of necessity, reflecting a denial of determinism, and has theorems involving possibility that seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, the latter is a misconception that (...) arises from overlooking the distinction between the intermediate truth values that are assigned to possibly true propositions as either X-contingent or Y-contingent. Any two propositions having the same ITV are possible together, while any two propositions having different ITVs, including those that are each other's negation, are possible individually yet not possible together. Porte shows that Ł-modal can be translated into classical logic by defining a constant for each ITV such that its implication of another proposition asserts the latter's possibility, while its conjunction with another proposition asserts the latter's necessity. These are expressed in the Alpha part of EG without broken cuts, simplifying derivations and shedding further light on Łukasiewicz's system, as long as graphs including either of the constants are properly interpreted. Ł-modal and Gamma-MR thus capture the two-sided nature of possibility as the limit between truth and falsity in Peirce's triadic conception. (shrink)

Las reflexiones en torno al concepto de abducción de Peirce no han estado exentas de controversias, debido a la dificultad para determinar con claridad la naturaleza y la función epistémica de esta inferencia. Se examinan tres formas de acceso a la comprensión del concepto de abducción que el propio..

Les Premiers Analytiques sont pour Lukasiewicz un livre de logique et non de philosophie. Il dit meme que cet ouvrage de pure logique ne contient aucune contamination philosophique. Mais cela ne veut pas dire qu'il n'a rien a apprendre aux philosophes et aux metaphysiciens sur les formalismes et sur les modalites. Comme le dit Lukasiewicz: Il reste encore des philosophes en activite auxquels il ne serait peut-etre pas impossible de suggerer qu'ils devraient acquerir une bonne connaissance de la logique dite (...) mathematique avant de traiter de la logique et de son histoire; ils eviteraient ainsi de perdre leur temps, leurs lecteurs de meme, ce qui n'est peut-etre pas denue d'importance pratique. Lukasiewicz est l'un des philosophes de l'Ecole de Lvov-Varsovie, courant philosophique majeur du XXe siecle. Son premier livre portait sur le principe de contradiction chez Aristote. Il en montrait l'importance, mais aussi la fragilite logique. Son dernier livre, consacre a la syllogistique, une partie de la logique, porte de nouveau sur Aristote. Pour peu qu'elle n'ignore pas Frege, les matrices logiques de Peirce, les Principia Mathematica de Russell et Whitehead ainsi que les apports considerables des logiciens polonais, comme Lesniewski, Sfupecki, et Lukasiewicz lui-meme, l'histoire de la logique, et en l'occurrence l'etude des Premiers Analytiques, constitue une voie d'acces privilegiee pour comprendre ce que sont les formalismes. (shrink)

Le pragmatisme de Peirce vise à réaliser le salut de l'homme par la connaissance. La connaissance des choses est déjà adaptée, par les signes qui l'expriment, au but de l'univers et de l'homme : la rationalisation conjointe de l'homme et de l'univers. Les différents stades de rationalisation sont : le tychisme, le synéchisme, l'agapusme. Mais Peirce finit par mettre hors de portée de la connaissance humaine la seule connaissance qu'il ait lui-même de l'homme, c'est-à-dire le savoir de la (...) façon dont l'homme est signe. In his pragmatism, Peirce wants to realize the salvation of mankind, with the help of knowledge. Through the signs, the knowledge of things is already adapted to the goal of the universe and of mankind, i.e. to the joined rationalization of mankind and of the universe. There are three stages of rationalization : tychism, synechism and agapeism. But finally Peirce is putting out of the reach of human knowledge the unique knowledge he is having of man, i.e. the knowledge of the manner in which man is sign. (shrink)