In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 280-281 [Access article in PDF] Maria Dimova-Cookson. T. H. Green's Moral and Political Philosophy: A Phenomenological Perspective. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. xiii + 175. Cloth, $60.00 Like most today who study Green's idealism, Dimova-Cookson finds only his ethics to be still relevant. She rejects his metaphysical epistemology and consequently his teleology, but offers an alternative. Dimova-Cookson proposes a Husserlian analysis (...) of Green's positions on goodness and a critical defense that attempts to rectify his apparently inconsistent formulations of that concept. Provided we recall that Husserl's method is not unproblematic and resist the tendency to adjust the doctrine analyzed for the sake of methodological fidelity, there is reason to be open to the author's proposal. Several of Husserl's ideas seem relevant to Green's thought: intentionality; "noematic content of the determinable X" and "horizon" developed in Ideas; intersubjectivity; and Husserl's teleological descriptions of phenomenological consciousness. But Dimova-Cookson pursues none of these. She employs Husserl's problematic "epoche" and a "necessary feature of human practice" she calls "the phenomenological circle" (69, hereafter, PC).Dimova-Cookson uses PC to resolve certain confusions imputed to Green. Green himself anticipates the charge of vicious circularity concerning the moral ideal when he reasons that "the unconditional good for man" is the good will and that the good will is to will the unconditional good. He subsequently explains that the circularity is not logically vicious for the two terms describe different states of one teleological process of a will actualizing its potential for perfection, and are distinguished "as the complete from the incomplete." According to Dimova-Cookson, Green hasn't escaped the charge and needn't try. Rather, he has unwittingly stumbled upon PC, but confused matters by carelessly conflating perspectives on the senses of "good" which she believes are two different definitions of two different things, elements in PC. "Circularity in explaining morality can be legitimized," she says, provided one rigorously clarifies the shift in perspective between the two elements in PC (70ff.). This move, she holds, can resolve certain contemporary criticisms. But note that if Green hasn't escaped the charge, and it is a genuine logical circle, then, as Husserl recognized, it cannot be avoided simply by making a rigorously clear shift in perspective. That would be a psychologistic response to a logical problem. Moreover, even if clarity of perspectival shift is useful here, it fails to capture the continuity in the moral progress of the self-actualization of moral agent to moral citizen. Finally, had Green represented his distinction in such dichotomous fashion, this would have compromised the teleological component of his explanations and made it more difficult to keep his theory from being conflated with utilitarianism. Green is far-sighted here, given recent tendencies to confuse utilitarianism and teleology on the basis that both can be represented as versions of consequentialism, a confusion based on the fallacy of undistributed middle.Most of Dimova-Cookson's connections are highly suggestive and many of her distinctions useful. She teases out several possible meanings of Green's conception of good, and is to be commended for having tried to answer some of his critics and calling attention to the valuable content of Green's doctrine. Her attempt at a phenomenological approach is novel.It is troubling, though, that Dimova-Cookson thinks it is also transcendental, for her words reveal a grave confusion about what this means. When discussing what she thinks is either transcendental or phenomenological, she uses the language of contingent psychological experience; e.g., "storing experience" (44), and projecting and relating to one's self-image (65). The process of learning she describes is more reminiscent of Piaget's "assimilation-accommodation" model than anything Husserlian or transcendental. Yet the author considers this an "advanced transcendentalism" wherein "our experience is preconditioned—that is, made possible—by the conceptual baggage that has accumulated and is always present at the back of our minds" (27). If one holds that we accumulate... (shrink)

Gary L. Cesarz - Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.1 166-167 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Gary L. Cesarz Southeast Missouri State University Eric Watkins. Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 451. Cloth, $75.00. Paper, $32.99. Eric Watkins' book is a substantial contribution to Kant scholarship, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. (...) It could change the debate on the nature of causality, for it illuminates the advantages of Kant's critical conception of causality over the Humean theories favored today and outlines how Kant's analysis clarifies certain contemporary issues clustered around the notion of causality. Watkins' interpretation of Kant on.. (shrink)

Gary L. Cesarz - Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the Ethics - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 361-362 Steven B. Smith. Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the Ethics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Pp. xxvi + 230. Cloth, $35.00. Smith's well-crafted narrative contributes substantially to revealing the moral and political intentions "at the core" of the Ethics . Its focus is the role and (...) possibility of freedom in Spinoza's metaphysics, based on Smith's thesis that a version of teleological eudaemonism and democratic politics are the principal themes of the Ethics. Indeed, Smith considers the Ethics a "founding document of . . . democratic individualism" . He places Spinoza in his Enlightenment context, building on known.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2003) 297-299 [Access article in PDF] Pappas, George S. Berkeley's Thought. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 261. Cloth, $39.95. Pappas' work is a judicious interpretation of three major themes in Berkeley's thought: his denial of abstract general ideas, theory of immediate perception, and appeal to common sense. Pappas modestly characterizes his aim to illuminate how these themes are connected (...) as one of many ways to approach Berkeley's philosophy. This book, though, is no modest accomplishment. Given the fundamental character of the first two themes and the skill with which he explores them, Pappas does more than connect three themes. He illuminates Berkeley's positions on matter, existence, essepercipi, and the Luce-Jessop thesis that Berkeley is a common sense realist (CSR). The book is broader in scope than its modest beginning suggests. It is a first-rate commentary, meticulous yet highly readable.Chapter I outlines Pappas' thesis and the hermeneutical distinctions he applies in his analysis and evaluation of Berkeley's arguments. He distinguishes two ways of evaluating theories: in light of the assumptions and standards operative when it originally appeared, and in light of those operative in our time. Judged either way, Pappas defends Berkeley's modern temper and continuing relevance, for his arguments fare better than commonly supposed.The next three chapters cover Berkeley's opposition to abstract ideas; Locke's [End Page 297] version mainly, but Malebranche, Leibniz and others are mentioned. Pappas convincingly argues that the denial of abstract ideas is fundamental to Berkeley's position on existence, perception and other central tenets of immaterialism. He opens by criticizing the thesis that Berkeley's rejection of the doctrine is "localized;" textually to the "Introduction" to the Principles, and philosophically to Berkeley's defense of nominalism and his views on language. This thesis, Pappas proves, is too narrow. He marshals textual evidence from the body of the Principles and other works to show the breadth of Berkeley's concern over the problems the doctrine engenders. He then examines the impact of the doctrine, if unchecked, on Berkeley's positive views.Pappas shows how such concepts as material substratum, primary and secondary qualities, existence as a predicate, and representationalism involve abstract ideas. This makes Berkeley's plan of attack plain: if abstract ideas can be undermined, the negation of the related concepts follows. The arguments required to accomplish this, however, are more sophisticated than many realize. To show this, Pappas distinguishes four types of abstract ideas. He then sorts out which of Berkeley's arguments go with which type of abstract idea, which arguments do and do not work, and how they might be repaired. Though Pappas admits that some modified versions of the concepts might survive Berkeley's criticisms, he holds that Berkeley's arguments are largely successful especially against Locke's versions of these doctrines.Pappas also ties Berkeley's denial of abstract ideas to his heterogeneity thesis (HT) defended in New Theory of Vision. This thesis maintains that what is perceived by one sense is numerically and specifically distinct from what is perceived by another; round as seen is distinct in both senses from round as touched. Berkeley considered HT an advance in perception theory andsaw abstract ideas as a threat. To admit an abstract idea of round would imply that there is an idea of the same kind common to sight and touch. Since this would undo HT, Berkeley had to combat abstract ideas. Berkeley's independent arguments against abstract ideas do not entail the truth of HT, Pappas holds, but they remove one source of evidence an opponent might use against it.New Theory of Vision also introduces Berkeley's concept of immediate perception. On the basis of this and the broader concept used in Berkeley's later works, Pappas establishes that "physical objects" (collections of sensible qualities) are the objects of immediate perception. This allows Pappas to make some sense of the claim that Berkeley can be read as a CSR. To do this, Pappas distills ten commitments of CSR and demonstrates... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic DenominationsGary L. CesarzDennis Plaisted. Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2002. Pp. viii + 128 Cloth, $70.00.Interpreting Leibniz is like trying to flatten a balloon without deflating it; press it here and it bulges there. Press one of his controversial principles and problems result for another. Leibniz on contingent and necessary truths exemplifies this difficulty. So does Leibniz's denial that (...) there are "extrinsic denominations which have no foundationin the denominated thing" (NPE).Plaisted questions the meaning and challenges the current interpretations of this principle. Does "foundation" mean "included in a thing," or "reducible to an intrinsic denomination"? Furthermore, what is the thing denominated? Is it the individual concept of a substance, or an intrinsic denomination in the concept of the substance? Leibniz holds, "for all truths the predicate is contained in the subject" (PS) which, in some sense, includes both denominations (Leroy E. Loemker, ed., Gottfried Wilhelm Liebniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976], 268). This suggests that both denominations have the same status as predicates. However, such statements as, "there is no denomination so extrinsic that it does not have an intrinsic denomination as its basis" (Loemker, 527) and "all extrinsic denominations are founded in intrinsic denominations" (Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language [New York: Oxford University Press, 1989], 225) suggest that the former reduce to the latter. The last two quotes seem to trump all hands. But textual citations are seldom enough to settle disputes of this sort.This has inspired two approaches to the question, one reductionistic, the other non-reductionistic. Plaisted adopts a non-reductionistic approach but regards those prior to his as implausible and unsatisfactory (1, 113 n.34). As for reductionism, he claims to "stand [End Page 494] [it] on its head" (1) and denies its "textual merit" (14). Given Plaisted's broad grasp of Leibniz's writings, this is not an oversight of the passages quoted above. Rather, his case depends on reinterpreting the same passages in light of his version of NPE.A reduction, according to some, requires that a relational proposition be logically equivalent (or at least truth-functionallyequivalent) to a set of non-relational propositions. For others, implication is sufficient, i.e., for a given relational proposition z, and two non-relational propositions x and y, it is impossible that (x & y) is true but z false (Mates, 218). In response, Plaisted examines NPE from four angles, including Leibniz's predicate-in-subject notion of truth, the identity of indiscernibles, and two others. However, since all that follows rides on his understanding of PS, let us focus on it.Plaisted's interprets NPE to mean "There are no extrinsic denominations of an individual... that are not included in that individual's concept" (11). To support this, he observes that Leibniz applies PS to all truths and often derives NPE from PS. But to justify substituting "included in" for Leibniz's use of "foundation in," Plaisted elects to interpret PS in a troubling way. Now, Leibniz insists that necessary truths state an identity between a subject and predicate, either explicit or implicit, and that the latter are reducible to the former by an a priori proof of finite length. Leibniz further says that identity, as explained above, is the reason that PS holds for necessary truths. Thus, Plaisted infers that "identity" and "having a reason" are equivalent, that this sense of PS generalizes to all truths (24-25), and claims support for his version of NPE. This is a positive result for Plaisted, for from it he infers that extrinsic denominations are included in the individual's concept as directly as intrinsic denominations, hence the latter cannot serve as the foundation for the former (25ff.). But this is problematic.First, it leads him to affirm that some denominations are both extrinsic and intrinsic (75). This is a strange conclusion to consider positive, for it implies that there are two types of intrinsic plus extrinsic denominations. Surely this strains the boundaries of "textual merit" at least as much as Plaisted charges against reductionists. More importantly, even if the equivalence Plaisted presses holds for necessary... (shrink)

The collection presents a variety of promising new directions in Royce scholarship from an international group of scholars, including historical reinterpretations, explorations of Royce's ethics of loyalty and religious philosophy, and contemporary applications of his ideas in psychology, the problem of reference, neo-pragmatism, and literary aesthetics.

이 논문은 유가문화의 관계 맺음의 삶의 방식에는 어떠한 이념이 있는지를 추출해 보고, 나아가 이 이념의 주관적 근거를 맹자의 인성론을 중심으로 살펴보고, 객관적 근거를 순자의 예에서 살펴봄으로써 유가의 삶의 질에 대해 전체적으로 조명한다.유가의 삶의 방식이 결코 폐쇄된 체계가 아니라 세계와의 관계 맺음을 통해서 끊임없이 자신을 창조해나가는 개방적 형태임을 살펴보고, 그 이념은 구분과 조화, 차이와 동일성에 있음을 살펴보았다. 그리고 이런 삶의 이념은 천도론에서 음과 양의 관계로 설명될 수 있으며, 정감적 근거로는 ‘親親’과 ‘尊尊’임을 밝히고 있다. 맹자사상에서 관계맺음의 특징은 자신의 직분, 역할에 대한 관심보다는 (...) 상대방과 어떻게 관계를 맺느냐 에서 찾아 질 수 있다. 맹자는 사랑의 원리를 仁으로 보고 있으며, 구분의 원리를 義로 보고 있다. 즉 仁이 타인에 대한 ‘사랑’이라면, 義는 타인에 대한 ‘구분’을 의미한다. 또한 心에는 자아실현의 욕구와 타인과의 관계 욕구가 있으며 이것이 실현되어질 때 즐거움을 얻을 수 있음을 밝히고 있다.유학의 삶의 질에 대한 객관적 조건의 이해를 위해 순자를 중심으로 탐색해 보았다. 순자철학의 특징은 관계주체의 직분을 강조하고 있으며, 또한 예의 근거를 자연과 역사, 성인과 임금에서 찾고 있으며, 삶의 주체가 가치를 실현시킬 수 있는 사회제도의 기본원리를 살펴보았다. (shrink)