A study is made of the history of the type and related concepts, from Greek Antiquity up to the present. It is demonstrated that the type-concept of eighteenth century biology was based on Leibniz's concept of substantial form, and was not related to a Platonic Idea, whilst it is now generally understood in the sense of model or norm. In the present paper, a type-concept is developed which includes ontogenetic and phylogenetic time and various evolutionary mechanisms. This type (an (...) archetype) can serve as a model of the evolutionary potentialities of a taxon, and as a standard of higher classification. All classifications based on the same archetype, whether typological, numerical or phylogenetic, will be comparable, although not necessarily identical. (shrink)

Scientists represent their world, grouping and organizing phenomena into classes by means of concepts. Philosophers of science have historically been interested in the nature of these concepts, the criteria that inform their application and the nature of the kinds that the concepts individuate. They also have sought to understand whether and how different systems of classification are related and more recently, how investigative practices shape conceptual development and change. Our aim in this paper is to provide (...) a critical overview of some of the key developments in this philosophical literature and identify some interesting issues it raises about the prospects of the so-called “special sciences”, including psychiatry, psychology, and the mind-brain sciences more generally, to discover natural kinds. (shrink)

We investigate how the Basic Concepts Classification can best incorporate schedules addressing musical form, genre, and type. We show that the synthetic possibilities within the BCC facilitate the classification of form/genre/type. In particular, many challenges identified in the literature on musical classification are addressed. The BCC also serves to make evident various connections between music and other schedules in BCC.

Avec le développement chez Platon d’une conception de l’être commme système de relations hiérarchisées, se développe aussi la méthode de classification, propre à la fois à représenter les essences et à exercer l’esprit à en définir le contenu. La classification des sciences dans le Philèbe est significative : un savoir, ou proprement scientifique ou technique, est d’autant plus élevé qu’il met en oeuvre une représentation plus rigoureuse du contenu des essences.

In this paper we analyze the uses and misuses of argumentation schemes from verbal classification, and show how argument from definition supports argumentation based on argument from verbal classification. The inquiry has inevitably included the broader study of the concept of definition. The paper presents the schemes for argument from classification and for argument from definition, and shows how the latter type of argument so typically supports the former. The problem of analyzing arguments based on classification (...) is framed in a structure that reveals the crucial role it plays in the persuasion process. The survey of the literature includes the work of Hastings, Perelman, Kienpointner and Schiappa, but still finds much of value in Aristotle. Lessons drawn from Aristotle’s Topics are shown to be useful for developing new tools for assessing definitions and arguments from definition. (shrink)

The nature and functions of classifications are first discussed and the differences between natural and artificial classifications are explicated. It is shown that borderline-case type problems result not from classifications, but from extending them to wider domains. Some methods of solving such problems are considered. The differences between monothetic and polythetic classifications are also taken up. A new treatment of trees as relations and their levels is developed. Certain kinds of hierarchies such as the classificatory, the inclusional, and the structural (...) are then characterized by means of the tree concept. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to experimentally investigate whether folk conceptions of explanation are psychologistic. In particular, are people more likely to classify speech acts as explanations when they cause understanding in their recipient? The empirical evidence that we present suggests this is so. Using the side-effect effect as a marker of mental state ascriptions, we argue that lay judgments of explanatory status are mediated by judgments of a speaker’s and/or audience’s mental states. First, we show that attributions of (...) both understanding and explanation exhibit a side-effect effect. Next, we show that when the speaker’s and audience’s level of understanding is stipulated, the explanation side-effect effect goes away entirely. These results not only extend the side-effect effect to attributions of understanding, they also suggest that attributions of explanation exhibit a side-effect effect because they depend upon attributions of understanding, supporting the idea that folk conceptions of explanation are psychologistic. (shrink)

I adopt a cladistic view of species, and explore the possibility that there exists an equally valuable cladistic view of organismic traits. This suggestion seems to run counter to the stress on functional views of biological traits in recent work in philosophy and psychology. I show how the tension between these two views can be defused with a multilevel view of biological explanation. Despite the attractions of this compromise, I conclude that we must reject it, and adopt an essentially cladistic (...) conception of biological traits. (shrink)

During the twentieth century, bibliographic classification theory underwent a structural revolution. The first modern bibliographic classifications were top-down systems that started at the universe of knowledge and subdivided that universe downward to minute subclasses. After the invention of faceted classification by S.R. Ranganathan, the ideal was to build bottom-up classifications that started with the universe of concepts and built upward to larger and larger faceted classes. This ideal has not been achieved, and the two kinds of (...) class='Hi'>classification systems are not mutually exclusive. This paper examines the process by which this structural revolution was accomplished by looking at the spread of facet theory after 1924 when Ranganathan attended the School of Librarianship, London, through selected classification textbooks that were published after that date. To this end, the paper examines the role of W.C.B. Sayers as a teacher and author of three editions of The Manual of Classification for Librarians and Bibliographers. Sayers influenced both Ranganathan and the various members of the Classification Research Group (CRG) who were his students. Further, the paper contrasts the methods of evaluating classification systems that arose between Sayers’s Canons of Classification in 1915–1916 and J. Mills’s A Modern Outline of Library Classification in 1960 in order to demonstrate the speed with which one kind of classificatory structure was overtaken by another. (shrink)

Duhem is known for his criticism of induction and especially of the way Ampère pretends founding electrodynamics. Despite this criticism, they share philosophical commitments: an attempt to destroy essentialism, a renewal of the link between metaphysics and physics, the use of the concept of “natural classification”. Thanks to this concept of “natural classification”, they are both led to a similar structural realism. In their opinion, if metaphysics should not determine physics, there is still room for it. Actually, the (...) hope of a progress toward a natural classification expressing truth may imply – in Duhem’s and Ampère’s works – a kind of providentialism. (shrink)

Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic (...) conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative ideas of interest. (shrink)

The articles comprising this dissertation concern classification and concept formation in the social and behavioral sciences. In particular, the emphasis in the study is on the philosophical analysis of interdisciplinary settings created by the recent intellectual developments on the interfaces between the social sciences, psychology, and neuroscience. The need for a systematic examination of the problems of conceptual coordination and integration across disciplinary boundaries is illustrated by focusing on phenomena whose satisfactory explanation requires drawing together the theoretical resources from (...) a variety of disciplines. In philosophy, questions regarding the nature of scientific concepts have often been framed in terms of theories of natural kinds. For this reason, analysis of the notion of natural kind as well as examination of how theories of natural kinds should be connected to recent philosophical accounts of scientific explanation and mechanisms form the core of the study. Building on contemporary discussions on these topics in the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of cognitive science, and the philosophy of the social sciences, the articles develop a mechanistic theory of natural kinds in the social and behavioral sciences, and scrutinize its applicability and usefulness as a theory of conceptual change in interdisciplinary settings. The study suggests that, although the mechanistic theory cannot account for the functioning of the whole range of scientific concepts, interweaving biological, cognitive, and social mechanisms in the manner suggested by the mechanistic theory offers a naturalistic and non-reductionist basis for conceptualizing epistemic coordination across disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

Purpose Recently, manipulative techniques, such as dark patterns, are widely applied. However, there is a need for clarification regarding these techniques and related phenomena. In particular, there is still no clarity about the terminology and conceptual basis of consumer manipulation. This paper aims to address this shortcoming by introducing a definition and classification of consumer manipulation. Design/methodology/approach This paper takes a conceptual approach, drawing on existing literature and established theories to comprehend the phenomenon of consumer manipulation. Findings The paper (...) proposes that consumer manipulation comprises three dimensions: limited transparency, perceived restriction of autonomy and the feeling of being tricked. This paper presents a classification of different types of consumer manipulation and demonstrates how these types can lead to varying outcomes based on the source of manipulation, changeability, reasons for perception and perception timing. Based on this classification, research propositions informed by established theories and concepts are presented. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this work represents a first attempt to address the concept of consumer manipulation through a clear definition and classification. It is relevant for academics, policymakers and practitioners since it facilitates informed discussions and analyses of this concept. It benefits companies by raising awareness of potentially overlooked consequences of manipulative tactics, while also benefiting consumers by reducing their exposure to manipulation. (shrink)

The volume presents phenomena of classification and categorisation in ancient and modern cultures and provides an overview of how cultural practices and cognitive systems interact when individuals or larger groups conceptually organize their world. Scientists of antiquity studies, anthropologists, linguists etc. will find methods to reconstruct early concepts of men and nature from a synchronic and diachronic comparative perspective.

Processing data streams arriving at high speed requires the development of models that can provide fast and accurate predictions. Although deep neural networks are the state-of-the-art for many machine learning tasks, their performance in real-time data streaming scenarios is a research area that has not yet been fully addressed. Nevertheless, much effort has been put into the adaption of complex deep learning (DL) models to streaming tasks by reducing the processing time. The design of the asynchronous dual-pipeline DL framework allows (...) making predictions of incoming instances and updating the model simultaneously, using two separate layers. The aim of this work is to assess the performance of different types of DL architectures for data streaming classification using this framework. We evaluate models such as multi-layer perceptrons, recurrent, convolutional and temporal convolutional neural networks over several time series datasets that are simulated as streams at different speeds. In addition, we evaluate how the different architectures react to concept drifts typically found in evolving data streams. The obtained results indicate that convolutional architectures achieve a higher performance in terms of accuracy and efficiency, but are also the most sensitive to concept drifts. (shrink)

A Kuhnian reformulation of the recent debate in psychiatric nosography suggested that the current psychiatric classification system (the DSM) is in crisis and that a sort of paradigm shift is awaited (Aragona, 2009). Among possible revolutionary alternatives, the proposed fi ve-axes etiopathogenetic taxonomy (Charney et al., 2002) emphasizes the primacy of the genotype over the phenomenological level as the relevant basis for psychiatric nosography. Such a position is along the lines of the micro-reductionist perspective of E. Kandel (1998, 1999), (...) which sees mental disorders reducible to explanations at a fundamental epistemic level of genes and neurotransmitters. This form of micro-reductionism has been criticized as a form of genetic-molecular fundamentalism (e.g. Murphy, 2006) and a multi-level approach, in the form of the burgeoning Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, was proposed. This article focuses on multi-level mechanistic explanations, coming from Cognitive Science, as a possible alternative etiopathogenetic basis for psychiatric classification. The idea of a mechanistic approach to psychiatric taxonomy is here defended on the basis of a better conception of levels and causality. Nevertheless some critical remarks of Mechanism as a psychiatric general view are also offered. (shrink)

This paper argues that conceptual engineering comes in many guises, often depending on what type of concept is being engineered. Engineering a classical concept, one that stems from Plato and Frege, is very different from engineering, e.g., a prototype concept or an exemplar concept. The former are abstract and have necessary and sufficient satisfaction conditions. The latter, on the other hand, can and do differ from one person to the next and thus have the earmarks of conceptions. While it is (...) tempting to argue that classical concepts are of natural kinds while prototype and/or exemplar concepts are of socially constructed kinds, the paper argues that such classification is not tenable. Many of our concepts of natural kinds are prototype concepts, and many socially constructed kinds are specified with necessary and sufficient conditions and so are have the earmarks of classical concepts. While the discussion of conceptual engineering has mostly focused on classical concepts and how scholars can, do, and perhaps should ameliorate them, the paper emphasizes the importance of other types of concepts and how they can be engineered. (shrink)

Six experiments investigated variables predicted to influence subjects’ tendency to classify items by a single property instead of overall similarity, following the paradigm of Norenzayan et al., who found that European Americans tended to give more “logical” rule-based responses. However, in five experiments with Mechanical Turk subjects and undergraduates at an American university, we found a consistent preference for similarity-based responding. A sixth experiment with Korean undergraduates revealed an effect of instructions, also reported by Norenzayan et al., in which (...) class='Hi'>classification instructions led to majority rule-based responding but similarity instructions led to overall similarity grouping. Our American subjects showed no such difference and used similarity more overall. We conclude that Americans do not have a preference for rule responding in classification and discuss the differences between tasks that reliably show strong rule or unidimensional preferences in contrast to this classification paradigm. (shrink)

The philosophy of medicine and psychiatry has considered the defining of disease, illness, and disorder an important project for over three decades. Within this literature, accounts based on adaptive "functions" have been prominent, particularly in the DSM nosology. In response to this trend, Jerome Wakefield has presented a view of mental disorder as "harmful dysfunction." In this view, "harm" contributes the value-element to disorder concepts, while "dysfunction" implies a value-free foundation as long as the latter is grounded in evolutionary (...) biology. In a critical review of Wakefield's and others' functionalist arguments for disorder concepts, we make four major points. We recommend a shift away from the definition of value-free disorder concepts, instead emphasizing the analysis of the logical features and the value commitments in nosological categories. (shrink)

This paper aims to consider some semantic aspects of the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice overlooked in recent literature. First, we examine different cases of hermeneutical injustices and we propose to classify them according to their semantic structure. The core of this classification lies in the distinction between cases related to problems of content and cases related to problems of circulation of social concepts. Second, we criticize a semantic conception, implicit in much of the literature concern- ing hermeneutical injustice, (...) according to which concepts are mere labels. We show that this conception cannot provide an adequate understanding of the different cases of hermeneutical injustice that we identify: first, because it fails to capture the dynamics of conceptual change or refinement that these cases involve and, second, because it leads to diagnosing them as mere problems of concept application. (shrink)

In this paper, I deal with recognising an appropriate criterion for distinguishing two competing conceptions of the propositional content among the content realists—the Fregean and the Russellian—especially in connection to some classical proponents of the realist view (Frege, Moore, and Russell). My starting point is a survey characterisation of the two conceptions and the accompanying classification of Russell’s and Moore’s conceptions of the propositional content, which I find problematic on several accounts. I set up a context for my consideration (...) and elaborate on why I find it problematic. My central point is that, given how the classical proponents of propositions understood their respective conceptions, as well as how more recent proponents of propositions (for example, David Kaplan) understood them, one should draw the distinction between the Fregean and the Russellian conception on the grounds of what propositional components do rather than the nature of propositional components (unless, of course, one ultimately reduces the latter to the former). (shrink)

The distinction between nature and artifice has been definitive for Western conceptions of the role of humans within their natural environment. But the human must already be separated from nature in order to distinguish between nature and artifice. This separation, in turn, facilitates a classification of knowledge in general, typically cast in terms of a hierarchy of sciences that ascends from the natural sciences to the social (or human) sciences. However, this hierarchy considers nature as a substantial foundation upon (...) which artifice operates and to which it responds. Here I examine three inter-related concepts that, by focusing on events rather than substances, operate beyond the nature–artifice distinction and thereby resist the hierarchical classification of the sciences: Foucault’s concept of technology, the concept of milieu as it crosses over historically from physics to biology and anthropology, and Deleuze and Guattari’s reconfiguration of the concept of milieu in terms of their concept of machine. (shrink)

One-sided classifiers are computable devices which read the characteristic function of a set and output a sequence of guesses which converges to 1 iff the set on the input belongs to the gven class. Such a classifier istwo-sided if the sequence of its output in addition converges to 0 on setsnot belonging to the class. The present work obtains the below mentionedresults for one-sided classes (= Σ0 2 classes) with respect to four areas: Turing complexity, 1-reductions, index sets and measure.There (...) are one-sided classes which are not two-sided. This can have two reasons: (1) the class has only high Turing complexity. Then there are some oracles which allow to construct noncomputale two-sided classifiers. (2) The class is difficult because of some topological constraints and then there are also no nonrecursive two-sided classifiers. For case (1), several results are obtainedto localize the Turing complexity of certain types of one-sided classes.The concepts of 1-reduction, 1-completeness and simple sets is transferred to one-sided classes: There are 1-complete classes and simple classes, but no class is at the same time 1-complete nd simple.The one-sided classes have a natural numbering. Most of the common index sets relative to this numbering have the high complexity Π1 1: the index set of the class {0,1}∞, the index set of the equality problem and the index set of all two-sided classes. On the other side the index set of the empty class has complexity Π0 2; Π0 2 and Σ0 2 are the least complexities any nontrivial index set can have.Lusin showed that any one-sided class is measurable. Concerning the effectiveness of this measure, it is shown that a one-sided class has recursive measure 0 if it has measure 0, but that thre are one-sided classes having measure 1 without having measure 1 effectively. The measure of a two-sided class can be computed in the limit. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to reveal the concept of "economic shock", to identify its basic features and to classify shock effects. The article discusses the use of the term "economic shock" in order to improve the tools of economic security. The article analyzes the concept of "shock resistance", details its interpretation in the scientific literature, and considers the differences between shock resistance and "sustainability". The scientific novelty lies in the identification of signs of an economic shock that allow (...) us to separate it from other destructive effects on the economic system. The result of the study was the consideration of enlarged approaches to the classification of economic shocks from the point of view of the nature of their formation, the predicted shock and the unpredictable shock were distinguished. (shrink)

Though causality seems to have a natural place in chemical thought, the analysis of the underlying causal concepts requires attention to two different research styles. In Part One I attempt a classification and critical analysis of several philosophical accounts of causal concepts which appear to be very diverse. I summarize this diversity which ranges from causality as displayed in regular concomitances of types of events to causality as the activity of agents. Part Two is concerned with the (...) analysis of contrasting chemical discourses, comparing the classical atomist style of Boyle, and Lavoisier and von Liebig with the later energeticist style of van’t Hoff and Hinshelwood. In detail different clusters of causal concepts can be abstracted from these discursive styles, yet they all approximate the Realist format for causal discourse. By way of summary I make an attempt to map the vernacular distinctions of Part Two onto the philosophical territory of Part One. The argument is rounded off with a brief analysis of a chemical publication of 2008. (shrink)

In Dimensions of Private Law, Professor Stephen Waddams describes the obstacles that an adequate classification of private law must overcome. The purpose of this essay is to offer a theoretical account of legal classification that explains how these obstacles can be overcome and what the resulting classification of private law might look like. I begin with the catalogue of obstacles that Waddams presents and argue that, because they are rooted in misconceptions about the classificatory project, they pose (...) no threat to an adequate conception of legal classification. In search of such a conception, I consider how three great legal theorists – Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel – answer three fundamental classificatory questions about private law. First, what is the unitythat underlies the seemingly chaotic array of legal instances? Second, what is the principle of differentiationthat applies to this unity? Third, how are legalinstancessubsumed under this differentiated unity? The focus of this essay is the enduring significance of Kant’s conception of legal classification, which provides an alternative to Waddams’ conception and offers a set of coherent answers to the fundamental classificatory questions. In contrast, both Aristotle and Hegel respond to the fundamental classificatory questions by providing a conception of the unity of private law that fails to cohere with their ensuing accounts of its differentiation. (shrink)

This thesis is divided into three parts, the first and second ones focused on combinatorics and classification problems on discrete and geometrical objects in the context of descriptive set theory, and the third one on generalized descriptive set theory at singular cardinals of countable cofinality.Descriptive Set Theory (briefly: DST) is the study of definable subsets of Polish spaces, i.e., separable completely metrizable spaces. One of the major branches of DST is Borel reducibility, successfully used in the last 30 years (...) to solve and compare many classification problems. One of our goals is the classification of knots, very familiar and tangible objects in everyday life, which also play an important role in modern mathematics. The study of knots and their properties is known as knot theory. Our plan is to gain insight into knots using discrete objects, such as linear and circular orders. This approach was already exploited in [6]. The first part of this work is therefore devoted to countable linear orders and the study of the quasi-order of convex embeddability and its induced equivalence relation. We obtain both combinatorial and descriptive set-theoretic results. We also expand our research to the case of circular orders.Another objective of this first part is to extend the notion of convex embeddability on countable linear orders. We provide a family of quasi-orders of which embeddability is a particular case as well. We study these quasi-orders from a combinatorial point of view and analyse their complexity with respect to Borel reducibility. Furthermore, we extend the analysis of these quasi-orders to the set of uncountable linear orders.The second part of the project deals with classification problems on knots and $3$ -manifolds. The goal here is to apply the results obtained in the first part to the study of proper arcs and knots, establishing lower bounds for the complexity of some natural relations between these geometrical objects. We also obtain some combinatorial results which are particularly interesting when we restrict to the set of wild proper arcs and wild knots, classes which haven’t received much attention so far. These parts are included in the two preprints [4, 5] in collaboration with my supervisor Alberto Marcone, Luca Motto Ros (University of Torino), and Vadim Weinstein (University of Oulu).The second part of this work also includes the classification of non-compact $3$ -manifolds up to homeomorphism (the case of compact $3$ -manifolds has already been solved: indeed, there are only countably many $3$ -manifolds up to homeomorphism; see [7]), and that of Cantor sets of $\mathbb {R}^3$ up to conjugation (answering to Question 5.5 of [3]). Here we resort to algebraic tools. Stone duality gives a neat way to go back-and-forth between totally disconnected Polish spaces and countable Boolean algebras (see [1]). The main ingredient is the Stone space of all ultrafilters on a Boolean algebra. In this work we introduce a weaker concept which we call “blurry filter”. Using blurry filters instead of ultrafilters enables one to extend the class of spaces under consideration beyond totally disconnected. As an application of this method, we show that both homeomorphism on non-compact $3$ -manifolds and conjugation of Cantor sets in $\mathbb {R}^3$ are completely classifiable by countable structures. These results are part of an upcoming paper in collaboration with Vadim Weinstein.The last part of this thesis concerns the natural generalization of descriptive set theory that occurs when countable is replaced by uncountable, called Generalized Descriptive Set Theory (briefly: GDST). In particular, we focus on the case of GDST for a singular cardinal $\kappa $ of countable cofinality. The goal here is to study the generalizations of the Perfect Set Property and the Baire Property to subsets of spaces of higher cardinalities, like the power set $\mathcal {P}(\kappa )$. We consider the question under which large cardinal hypotheses classes of definable subsets of these spaces possess such regularity properties, focusing on rank-into-rank axioms, like I2, and classes of sets definable by $\Sigma _1$ -formulas with parameters from various collections of sets. The obtained results are included in [2], a joint work with my co-supervisor Vincenzo Dimonte and Philipp Lücke (University of Hamburg).Abstract prepared by Martina IannellaE-mail: martina.iannella@tuwien.ac.at.URL: https://air.uniud.it/handle/11390/1262824. (shrink)

The field of knowledge organization was originally developed from library and information science, although it is of more general philosophical interest. Today its influential school of domain analysis is based on pragmatist views, according to which any classification reflects particular perspectives and purposes. This implies that there are many alternative ways to identify real, natural kinds and to group them, none of which would be superior to the others. The same concepts, e.g. rice and bamboo, are indeed grouped (...) in different ways according to disciplinary contexts, e.g. biology or agriculture or economics. On the other hand, a principle of "unique definition" was identified in the 1960s by Jason Farradane and other members of the Classification Research Group to draft a general bibliographic classification based on phenomena (as opposed to disciplines): according to such principle, a concept can be defined at a specific level of organization then combined with concepts at other levels without losing its constant notation. Some classifications inspired by that research are currently under development. Classification structures are illustrated with some actual examples. It is shown how certain technical solutions developed for bibliographic organization of knowledge, including unique definition, may also offer contributions to address epistemological issues, suggesting a way towards the development of classifications that can serve as reference to reconnect different purposes. (shrink)

The scheme for classifications of concepts is introduced. It has founded on the triplet model of concepts. In this model a concept is depicted by means of three kinds of knowledge: a concept base, a concept representing part and the linkage between them. The idea of triplet classifications of concepts is connected with a usage of various specifications of these knowledge kinds as classification criteria.

The purpose of this study is to propose and develop an intelligent e-learning system based on advanced document management techniques at Al-Quds Open University. In this article, we focus on a case using e-mail contents as supplement educational materials at QOU. We describe how the interactive classification system based on concept hierarchy can simplify this task. This system provides the functions to index, classify, and retrieve a collection of e-mail messages based on user profiles. By automatically indexing e-mail messages (...) using our E-mail Classification System for e-Learning, instructors and/or students can easily find their messages and find the topics. The test results of our system evaluation showed that a good classification quality has been achieved, with a precision of 77.4%, recall of 90%, and F-measure of 82.8. (shrink)

L’article vise à établir un lien entre les travaux de Russell sur les fondements de la géométrie et ses célèbres textes des années 1911-1914 sur la perception, la matière et les sense-data. Nous insistons d’abord sur le fait que la notion russellienne de donnée sensorielle n’est pas phénoménaliste : les sense-data des Problèmes de Philosophie sont des objets extérieurs aussi peu mentaux que les corps matériels. L’accent est ensuite mis sur l’article On Matter : Russell y introduit pour la première (...) fois l’idée que les sense-data n’ont pas une, mais deux positions — une position où ils sont vus et une position d’où ils sont vus. Cette manœuvre permet à Russell de considérer la donnée sensorielle comme le point d’intersection neutre de deux ensembles fondamentalement différents : une série « physique », matérielle, et une série de « perspectives », mentales. L’idée qu’une même chose peut être classée sous différentes catégories, donc que le mode de classification aristotélicien en espèce et en genre n’est pas le seul concevable, est à la fois la clé de voûte de la théorie des relations entre « sense-data » et « physical things » de 1914 et le nerf du ralliement ultérieur au « monisme neutre ». Nous défendons, dans une troisième partie, que ce canevas n’est lui-même qu’un lointain écho de la conception de la géométrie projective définie comme théorie générale des relations d’incidence développée par Russell dans The Principles of Mathematics (1903). (shrink)

After decades of debates about species concepts, there is broad agreement that species are evolving lineages. However, species classification is still in a state of disorder: different methods of delimitation lead to competing outcomes for the same organisms, and the groups recognised as species are of widely different kinds. This paper considers whether this problem can be resolved by developing a unitary scale for evolutionary independence. Such a scale would show clearly when groups are comparable and allow taxonomists (...) to choose a conventional threshold of independence for species status. Existing measurement approaches to species delimitation are typically shot down by what I call the heterogeneity objection, according to which independently evolving groups are too heterogeneous to be captured by a single scale. I draw a parallel with the measurement of temperature to argue that this objection does not provide sufficient reasons to abandon the measurement approach, and that such an approach may even help to make the vague notion of evolutionary independence more precise. (shrink)

Many aspects of how humans form and combine concepts are notoriously difficult to capture formally. In this paper, we focus on the representation of three particular such aspects, namely overexten- sion, underextension, and dominance. Inspired in part by the work of Hampton, we consider concepts as given through a prototype view, and by considering the interdependencies between the attributes that define a concept. To approach this formally, we employ a recently introduced family of operators that enrich Description Logic (...) languages. These operators aim to characterise complex concepts by collecting those instances that apply, in a finely controlled way, to ‘enough’ of the concept’s defin- ing attributes. Here, the meaning of ‘enough’ is technically realised by accumulating weights of satisfied attributes and comparing with a given threshold that needs to be met. (shrink)

Understanding the biological basis of consciousness is one of the central challenges for modern science. Is a mature scientific explanation really possible, and if so, how should consciousness science be organized so as to achieve this? This thesis is a collection of four papers which approach these questions via an account of the natural categories or ‘kinds’, drawn from philosophy of science, to which paradigmatic mental phenomena like consciousness belong. The central claims defended in the thesis are twofold. Firstly, that (...) to facilitate a mature science of consciousness it is crucial to explicitly introduce a new organizing concept of consciousness modelled on the kinds of concepts which underpin previous successful explanations of other natural phenomena – that of a natural kind concept of consciousness. This draws on the general observation that some concepts are better suited to scientific theorizing about the world than others, and thus that progress in scientific and philosophical domains can be (and indeed, has often been) made by working to refine our existing conceptual schemes to reflect this. Secondly, that a mature science of consciousness will be one which recognizes the reality and explanatory importance of a particular category of mental phenomena called ‘global states of consciousness’ which includes dreaming and wakefulness. Examination of this latter claim leads to a third idea explored and motivated in the thesis which brings consciousness science into closer connection with psychiatry. This is the hypothesis that Major Depressive Disorder involves a change to a subject’s global state of consciousness, marking a change from a state of ordinary wakeful consciousness to an altered ‘depressive state’ of consciousness akin to a dream or psychedelic state. (shrink)

The triplet model treats a concept as complex structure that expresses three kinds of information. The first is about entities subsumed under a concept,their properties and relations. The second is about means and ways of representing the first information in intelligent systems. The third is about linkage between the first and second ones and methods of its constructing. The application of triplet models to generalization and development of concept models in philosophy, logic, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, linguistics, artificial intelligence has (...) been demonstrated. The componential structure of the triplet model and extended concept classification have been given. Theoretical considerations are combined with historical case-studies of concept history. For scientists and students with an interest in problems of knowledge structure and representation. Abstract and Extended Summary in English. (shrink)

We shall distinguish between sortal predication and standard predication. The former kind of predication necessarily involves sortal concepts but the latter, as it is customarily viewed, does not. It is generally thought that the only essential occurrence of a concept in a standard predication is the concept being predicated. In this paper, we shall put forward an alternative view. We shall propose to understand standard predication as a cognitive act essentially requiring sortal concepts. We shall call this view (...) conceptual predication sortalism and ground it on the basis of epistemic-semantic reasons. Concepts are understood as intersubjectively realizable capacities or abilities that fulfill particular cognitive roles, such as those of classification, categorization, individuation, and referring. (shrink)

We review different conceptions of the set-theoretic multiverse and evaluate their features and strengths. In Sect. 1, we set the stage by briefly discussing the opposition between the ‘universe view’ and the ‘multiverse view’. Furthermore, we propose to classify multiverse conceptions in terms of their adherence to some form of mathematical realism. In Sect. 2, we use this classification to review four major conceptions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we focus on the distinction between actualism and potentialism with regard to (...) the universe of sets, then we discuss the Zermelian view, featuring a ‘vertical’ multiverse, and give special attention to this multiverse conception in light of the hyperuniverse programme introduced in Arrigoni and Friedman (2013). We argue that the distinctive feature of the multiverse conception chosen for the hyperuniverse programme is its utility for finding new candidates for axioms of set theory. (shrink)

The differences between classes and individuals are profound and the fact that biological species are individuals rather than classes provides the basis for organizing knowledge on a causal basis. The class of species is a natural kind and there are laws of nature for this and other classes of natural kinds such as the organism and the molecule. Particular species, like other individuals, function in historical narratives by virtue of laws of nature applying to them. The notion that species can (...) evolve by changing their members is a category mistake. Darwin believed that there is no “essential” difference between species and subspecies in the sense that there is only a quantitative difference between them. The concept of biological species is defined on the basis of a qualitative difference. The rank of taxa can be used to distinguish between important natural kinds. Without such kinds language would become purely referential, and have no “sense” as Frege had put it. (shrink)

Hans-Johann Glock develops a capacity-based alternative to the currently widespread view that concepts and experiences are mental representations. He claims that experiences must be explained by way of perceptual and sensory capacities and that concepts must be explained by way of intellectual ones, in particular, by way of capacities for classification and reasoning. Glock does not, however, identify concepts with intellectual capacities. He rather conceives of them as rules that guide the application of capacities. He defines (...) the relationship between perceptions and concepts by coupling rationalistic, Aristotelian, and Kantian motifs: perceptions are to be strictly distinguished from concepts; perceptual capacities genetically, causally, and conceptually precede conceptual ones; and conceptual capacities must, in principle, be applicable to objects of experience. Glock's “capacity approach” can accordingly be understood as a variant of non-conceptualism. (shrink)

This article first analyzes the research background of the design elements of cognitive psychology and neural networks at home and abroad, roughly understands the research status and research background of these two courses at home and abroad, and discusses the application of cognitive psychology to neural networks. The design method has not yet formed a systematic theoretical system. Then, a systematic theoretical analysis of the research in this article is carried out to analyze the relationship between the various characteristics of (...) cognitive psychology and the design elements of the neural network, and it uses these relationships to guide the design practice. Second, it analyzes the relationship between the influence and interaction of cognitive psychology on neural network design and connects cognitive psychology with neural network design. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis and research of the system, the application of cognitive psychology in neural network design, design practice, and the relationship between the two are systematically reviewed. Through the exploratory research on cognitive psychology in neural network design, we can see that the combination of neural network design and psychology, art aesthetics, and other cross-disciplinary and multidisciplinary research is necessary, which can promote the scientific and technological progress of neural network design in the context of the information age and the improvement of public mental health. Under the background of the era in which the neural network design becomes the link between people's emotions and culture, we must fully understand the essential role of each element in neural network design and build a design concept based on cognitive psychology and emotional experience. It is hoped that the content of this topic can provide a certain reference value for the future development of neural network design and cognitive psychology and clarify the new development direction. (shrink)

Many contemporary race scholars reject the biological reality of race.Elsewhere I have argued that they have been too quick to do so. Part ofthe reason is that they have overlooked the possibility that races canbe defined cladistically. Since the publication of the cladistic raceconcept, a number of questions and objections have been raised. My aimin this paper is to address these objections.

This article presents a detailed formal approach to concepts and concept combination. Sense generation is a competence‐level theory that attempts to respect constraints from the various cognitive sciences, and postulates “quasi‐classical” conceptual structures where attributes receive only one value (but are defeasible and so do not represent necessary and sufficient conditions on category membership) and where classification is binary (but explicitly context‐sensitive). It is also argued that any general theory of concepts must account for “privative” combinations (e.g., (...) stone lion, fake gun, apparent friend) as extreme test‐cases of representational and classificatory flexibility. The approach presented therefore provides a treatment of these combinations. The approach differentiates between the “lexical concept” (the stable information represented in a mental lexicon) which acts as a base from which the various “senses” (flexible contents associated with words and phrases in context, and used in classification) are “generated.” Generation allows nonmonotonicity, so that in different circumstances, different attributes may be defeated or modified. Classification is treated as relative to the perspective adopted, so that a classification acceptable from one perspective may be unacceptable from another, without contradiction. The result is a view that assumes bottom‐up priority in concept combination, where the range of senses generated by bottom‐up rules of combination is tempered by pragmatic‐communicative constraints on classification. An account of the representational and classification behavior of privative combinations is outlined, and the article concludes with a discussion of some of the implications of the approach. (shrink)

Arguments from analogy are pervasive in everyday reasoning, mathematics, philosophy, and science. Informal logic studies everyday argumentation in ordinary language. A branch of fuzzy logic, approximate reasoning, seeks to model facets of everyday reasoning with vague concepts in ill-defined situations. Ways of combining the results from these fields will be suggested by introducing a new argumentation scheme—a fuzzy analogical argument from classification—with the associated critical questions. This will be motivated by a case study of analogical reasoning in the (...) virtual friendship debate within information ethics. The virtual friendship debate is a disagreement over whether virtual friendships are genuine friendships. It will be argued that the debate could move away from its current impasse, caused by unproductive metaphysical and logical assumptions, if extant arguments are reinterpreted as fuzzy analogical arguments from classification, and subjected to a new set of critical questions which would replace the quest for facts of essence about friendship with an emphasis on empirical data, persuasion, and definitional power. (shrink)

In their response to our article (Keestra and Cowley, 2009), Hacker and Bennett charge us with failing to understand the project of their book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (PFN; Bennett and Hacker, 2003) and do this by discussing foundationalism, linguistic conservatism and the passivity of perception. In this rebuttal we explore disagreements that explain the alleged errors. First, we reiterate our substantial disagreement with Bennett and Hacker (B&H) regarding their assumption that, even regarding much debated concepts like ‘consciousness’, we (...) can assume conceptual consensus within a community of competent speakers. Instead, we emphasize variability and divergence between individuals and groups in such contexts. Second, we plead for modesty in conceptual analysis, including the use of conceptual ambiguities as heuristics for the investigation of explanatory mechanisms. Third, we elucidate our proposal by discussing the interdependence of perception and action, which in some cases appear to be problematic for PFN. Fourth, we discuss why our view of conceptual innovation is different from B&H’s, as we plead for linking explanatory ingredients with conceptual analysis. We end by repeating our particular agreement with their mereological principle, even though we present different reasons: psychological concepts should not be applied to mere components or operations of explanatory mechanisms, for which another vocabulary should be developed. (shrink)

The study of mental illness by the methods of molecular genetics is still in its infancy, but the use of genetic markers in psychiatry may potentially lead to a Virchowian revolution in the conception of mental illness. Genetic markers may define novel clusters of patients having diverse clinical presentations but sharing a common genetic and mechanistic basis. Such clusters may differ radically from the conventional classification schemes of psychiatric illness. However, the reduction of even relatively simple Mendelian phenomena to (...) molecular genetics has been shown to be a surprisingly complex and problematic enterprise. Mental illnesses exist at many levels of including social, environmental, and developmental interactions. Reductionistic shifts in the classification of such a disease entity will have to address the interlevel dynamics that take place within the structure of theories of mental illness. The question of how molecular analysis of psychiatric disease will impact on the structure of existing theories and classification systems is the central topic of this paper. (shrink)

The article considers the historical transformations of the law, and argues that many contemporary scientists are wrong to ignore it. The paper criticizes the approach to the status of laws, which is determined by the degree of their compliance with the criteria of objectivity and rationality. Instead, a classification is constructed that includes the laws of logic and mathematics, natural sciences, technology, as well as social and legal. To consider the processes of unfolding laws in the evolution of reality, (...) the concept of nomogenesis is used. The unification of laws is achieved due to the fact that they are all determined by the balance of their characteristic tendencies: objective / subjective, rational / extra-rational, determination / will. Special attention is paid to social and legal laws. The case of defining three social laws is offered. (shrink)

The meaning of the word homology has changed. From being a comparative concept in pre-Darwinian times, it became a historical concept, strictly signifying a common evolutionary origin for either anatomical structures or genes. This historical understanding of homology is not useful in classification; therefore I propose a return to its pre-Darwinian meaning.

Classifying domain entities into their respective top-level ontology concepts is a complex problem that typically demands manual analysis and deep expertise in the domain of interest and ontology engineering. Using an efficient approach to classify domain entities enhances data integration, interoperability, and the semantic clarity of ontologies, which are crucial for structured knowledge representation and modeling. Based on this, our main motivation is to help an ontology engineer with an automated approach to classify domain entities into top-level ontology (...) class='Hi'>concepts using informal definitions of these domain entities during the ontology development process. In this context, we hypothesize that the informal definitions encapsulate semantic information crucial for associating domain entities with specific top-level ontology concepts. Our approach leverages state-of-the-art language models to explore our hypothesis across multiple languages and informal definitions from different knowledge resources. In order to evaluate our proposal, we extracted multi-label datasets from the alignment of the OntoWordNet ontology and the BabelNet semantic network, covering the entire structure of the Dolce-Lite-Plus top-level ontology from most generic to most specific concepts. These datasets contain several different textual representation approaches of domain entities, including terms, example sentences, and informal definitions. Our experiments conducted 3 study cases, investigating the effectiveness of our proposal across different textual representation approaches, languages, and knowledge resources. We demonstrate that the best results are achieved using a classification pipeline with a K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) method to classify the embedding representation of informal definitions from the Mistral large language model. The findings underscore the potential of informal definitions in reflecting top-level ontology concepts and point towards developing automated tools that could significantly aid ontology engineers during the ontology development process. (shrink)

This article, a contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Fuzzy Studies: On the Consequence of Blur,” documents how some modern artists and critics have argued against any sort of verbal thinking about art. Beyond describing works of visual art and pronouncing on their relative quality, critics often assume responsibility for explaining what a given work means. Because paintings and sculptures are less precisely codified, less articulate, than verbalized communications, they may seem to require verbal translation. Yet some artists and critics (...) have warned that the advantageous emotional force of a visual presentation is diminished or even destroyed by the generalizing classifications that verbal thinking entails. Sensation suffers from any reconstitution in words. “Watch Out for Thinking” focuses on the views of two critics (Clement Greenberg, Charles Harrison) and two artists (Willem de Kooning, Donald Judd), each of whom was sympathetic to the principle that visual observation and expression should remain independent of verbal explanation. Their common principle required that each develop some method of dealing with the gap between the experience of sensation and the thoughts generated by or directed at such feeling. On this issue, each disagreed with the others, whether expressing his difference directly or indirectly; and the differences often hinged on matters of aesthetic judgment. Ironically, the practice of such judgment demanded verbal concepts for its articulation. In turn, the verbal discourse tended to render the initial aesthetic judgment more extreme, more polarizing, than it may have felt as a lived response to a specific work of art. To remedy the situation, a viewer might allow feeling to divert the logical course of thinking. (shrink)