The study is dedicated to modelling the contemporary portrayal of the philosophy of science. The essence of its theses is elucidated through the following assertions: a) right from its beginning, a communicative potential was embedded within the philosophy of science; b) its origin arises from a culmination of predecessors’ accomplishments; c) the value of the communicative approach in the philosophy of science lies in its acceptance rather than opposition to the formal direction. The analysis is conducted retrospectively. (...) The emergence of ideas within communicative philosophy of science is noticeable in its relevant relationship with the evolution of theories in logical positivism, rhetoric, pragmatism, linguistics, philosophy of language, and sociology of science. Analytical, synthetic, historical, rhetorical and structural-functional methodologies were used in the investigation. The findings of the study confirmed the hypothesis: communicative philosophy of science represents a historical combination of the field’s achievements, incorporating rhetorical, universalistic and particularistic developmental perspectives. (shrink)

In this paper, the author analyzes and discusses the communicative approach used in the philosophy of science developed by N. Luhmann. He shows how Luhmann's communicative approach can be used to discuss a wide range "the classical problems" of knowledge: criteria for scientific knowledge, its autonomy and tools for achieving it, the problem of the foundation and structure of the scientific knowledge, the relationship between concepts and words, theories and methods.The author also analyzes the problem of the communication constraints (...) imposed on the process of systematic organization of science (i.e. the delimitation principle): the specificity and opportunity of the social theory, its differences and similarities with the settled classic examples of the theorizing; the peculiarities of the particular types of the scientific observation. (shrink)

Increasingly, epistemologists are becoming interested in social structures and their effect on epistemic enterprises, but little attention has been paid to the proper distribution of experimental results among scientists. This paper will analyze a model first suggested by two economists, which nicely captures one type of learning situation faced by scientists. The results of a computer simulation study of this model provide two interesting conclusions. First, in some contexts, a community of scientists is, as a whole, more reliable (...) when its members are less aware of their colleagues' experimental results. Second, there is a robust tradeoff between the reliability of a community and the speed with which it reaches a correct conclusion. ‡The author would like to thank Brian Skyrms, Kyle Stanford, Jeffrey Barrett, Bruce Glymour, and the participants in the Social Dynamics Seminar at University of California–Irvine for their helpful comments. Generous financial support was provided by the School of Social Science and Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences at UCI. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 135, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In this paper, the author analyzes and discusses the communicative approach used in the philosophy of science developed by N. Luhmann. He shows how Luhmann's communicative approach can be used to discuss a wide range "the classical problems" of knowledge: criteria for scientific knowledge, its autonomy and tools for achieving it, the problem of the foundation and structure of the scientific knowledge, the relationship between concepts and words, theories and methods.The author also analyzes the problem of the communication constraints (...) imposed on the process of systematic organization of science (i.e. the delimitation principle): the specificity and opportunity of the social theory, its differences and similarities with the settled classic examples of the theorizing; the peculiarities of the particular types of the scientific observation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the semantics of metaphoric language in scientific contexts. According to the theory of metaphor advanced below, the benchmark of a metaphoric expression is the implicit transfer of semantic features across incongruous semantic fields. This transfer results in a conceptual variation of "meaning" in the receiving semantic field. Thus, the theory of metaphor rests on semantic field theory. Existing semantic approaches to metaphor are evaluated in Section 1. In Sections 2 and 3 an (...) alternative theory is introduced through an analysis of the mechanics of the feature transfer process followed by a discussion of some methodological cues for deciphering the metaphor's "meaning." As I explore in Section 4, this theory of metaphor explains how all metaphoric expressions are potentially literal depending on the general compliance of the community of speakers. Consequently, concept formation in scientific contexts is, in large measure, metaphoric. Finally, I argue in Section 5 that metaphoric concept formation is an essential aspect of scientific reasoning for the purpose of solving conceptual problems. (shrink)

A study of informal networks in Soviet science, this article documents the existence of a complex system of interlocking and overlapping channels ofprofessional communication that cut across the formal, hierarchical chains of command in the USSR Academy of Sciences. Through coauthorship data and career histories, one can identify science schools, research groups, social circles, and professional cliques in the Soviet scientific community during the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev regimes. There was an expansion and integration of social circles (...) over time and a pluralism of interdependent, but distinct, scientific elites. This structure took on political significance through the persistence of a liberal democratic tradition among scientists in the Academy. (shrink)

The field of science communication is plagued by challenges. Communicators face the difficulty of responding to unjustified public skepticism over issues like climate change and COVID-19 while also acknowledging the fallibility and limitations of scientific knowledge. Our goal in this paper is to suggest a new model for science communication that can help foster more productive, respectful relationships among all those involved in science communication. Inspired by the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey, we develop an experience model, (...) according to which science communication consists in people’s experiences with science and the meanings they develop from those experiences. Three principles are central to the model: experience is cumulative, context matters, and audiences have agency. We argue that this model has significant implications both for communication research and practice, which we illustrate by applying it to the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy. We show how science communicators can help to identify and alleviate structural factors that contribute to skepticism as well as fostering opportunities for meaning making around shared experiences. (shrink)

One important dimension of the debate surrounding science communication is the tension between the implementation of the deficit model and the repeated calls for the adoption of dialogical and participatory models. This article aims to show this friction empirically and interpret it theoretically. The text uses the operation of science centers as a form of science communication. Niklas Luhmann's systems theory serves as a tool to capture the broad structural difficulty in implementing participatory demands in science (...) communication. This paper is based on research conducted in Polish science centers. It demonstrates that even in the organizationally favourable and relatively inclusive conditions offered by these centers, the environment as a whole cannot regulate the activities of the science system. It lacks knowledge of the essential social determinants of research activity and the areas of unfinished science. Conversely, the detailed findings of science are challenging to integrate such that they become comprehensively readable by the community without becoming a scientific black box. Luhmann's theory elucidates this fundamental difficulty in building the science-society relationship. From this perspective, a consistent and broad turn towards the dialogical and participatory model appears impossible. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that current information and communication technology with the outcome of deep digitalization has been so profoundly integrated into everyday life that Schutz’s primary, universalistic description of the life-world which underplays the role of technology necessarily leaves a huge range of everyday experiences insufficiently discussed. Taking Schutz’s phenomenological observation as a starting point, I intend to examine the spatial, temporal, and social structures of the digitalized life-world and its meaning for the praxis of social sciences. (...) Standing by the world openness as human nature and technology as the very source of the dynamics of human-world-relation, I argue Schutz’s universalistic intended life-world analysis needs to be historicized ceaselessly to stay attuned to the most everyday reality. (shrink)

This article offers a view on the emerging practice of managing external relations of the modern university, and the role of science communication in this. With a representative sample of research universities in four countries, we seek to broaden our understanding of the _science communication (SC) function_ and its niche within the modern university. We distinguish science communication from corporate communication functions and examine how they distribute across organisational levels. We find that communication functions can be represented along (...) a spectrum of (de)centralisation: public relations and marketing activities are more likely carried out at the central level (central offices), and public affairs and SC activities are more likely carried out at decentral levels (e.g. in specific offices and/or research institutes, departments). This study shows that little attention is paid to science communication at central structures, suggesting that it is not a practice that aligns easily with university corporate communication, yet SC might find its niche increasingly in decentral locations of activity. (shrink)

This chapter shows that the experimental philosophy has much to offer to philosophy of science by reviewing the existing experimental‐philosophy work in the philosophy of science and by defending it against an important criticism. A natural way of extending experimental philosophy methods to the philosophy of science is to survey scientists’ judgments. The chapter presents two projects in the philosophy of science that can benefit from such surveys: analyzing the scientific concepts found in particular scientific communities (...) and studying scientific cognition. It explains how surveying lay people's judgments can bear on issues in the philosophy of science. The chapter examines the possible contributions of bibliometric, ethnographic and cliometric methods to the philosophy of science. Ethnographic methods are particularly useful to study the social structure of science, the nature and role of social norms in the production of scientific knowledge, and the discovery heuristics at work in everyday scientific practice. (shrink)

This article examines the communication networks within and between science and technology studies (STS) and the history of science. In particular, journal relatedness data are used to analyze some of the structural features of their disciplinary identities and relationships. The results first show that, although the history of science is more than half a century older than STS, the size of the STS network is more than twice that of the history of science network. Further, while (...) a majority of the journals in the STS network are connected by weak ties, about half of the history of science network consists of strong ties. The history of science network is thus more cohesive than the STS network. The relatively strong cohesion within the history of science network is associated with comparatively high degrees of intra-disciplinary communication, but comparatively weak ties to only a few related disciplines. The analysis also shows that very few members of the history of science cliques are situated on the shortest path between both specialties. Moreover, given the relatively impermeable nature of the history of science network, the latter partially depends on STS to reach some of the neighboring disciplines. (shrink)

The view that Islamicate science went into decline while European science was getting started is still commonly held among historians of science and almost universal in general history and popular presentations. Different versions of the decline thesis make it start in the 11 th century with the work of Ibn al-Haytham and al-Ghaz ā l ī ; in the 13 th century with the sack of Baghdad, or at latest with the beginning of the “Scientific Revolution” in (...) Europe. However, it is now increasingly apparent that Islamicate science was healthy well into the period of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals. There are many reasons for the continued attraction of the decline theses. In addition to the inaccessibility of sources, these include mistaking the nature of credentialing in Islamicate science, and mistaking the nature of the sources in which original science was appearing. In this paper, I will sketch a more appropriate social structure for understanding Islamicate science by describing the institutional structures for training scientists and awarding credentials, and the practices of recording and transmitting research in writing. Taking the Safavid scholar Bahā ʾ al-D ī n al- ʿ Ā mil ī as an example, I will suggest that these structures supported an active research community well into the early modern period, further undermining the decline thesis. (shrink)

Biologists rely on theories, apply models and construct explanations, but rarely reflect on their nature and structure. This book introduces key topics in philosophy of science to provide the required philosophical background for this kind of reflection, which is an important part of all aspects of research and communication in biology. It concisely and accessibly addresses fundamental questions such as: Why should biologists care about philosophy of science? How do concepts contribute to scientific advancement? What is the nature (...) of scientific controversies in the biological sciences? Chapters draw on contemporary examples and case studies from across biology, making the discussion relevant and insightful. Written for researchers and advanced undergraduate and graduate students across the life sciences, its aim is to encourage readers to become more philosophically minded and informed to enable better scientific practice. It is also an interesting and pertinent read for philosophers of science. (shrink)

This volume contains a facsimile reprint of the 1883 Boston edition of Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University, edited by Charles S. Peirce. In relation to this work there are three mutually related aspects of Peirce’s thought which deserve to be particularly emphasized: the community structure of science as propagated and practiced by Peirce; his consideration of the fundamental relationship between logic and semiotics; and his emphatic plea for a historisation of science and, (...) hence, of semiotics. Peirce’s Studies in Logic is preceded in this volume by a portrait of Peirce as scientist, mathematician, historian, logician and philosopher by Max. H. Fisch, and a history of semiotics and Charles S. Peirce by Achim Eschbach. (shrink)

The paper reconstructs the evolution process of scientific knowledge. The evolution theory has been applied hitherto exclusively to the famous reference problem. It the eye would be incapable seeing something really available it could not establish itself it the reality as such evolutional achievement. Contrary to this view the author states that the cognitive apparatus could survive not due to their achievements in the representations of the external world but rather due to their selfreproductive capabilities. By extrapolation of this view (...) on the level of the epistemology it means that the knowledge itself selects that it can know on the base of that it already knows. The author suggests the principles of such cognitive evolution - the mechanisms of variety, selection and restabilization. The mechanism of variety concerns exclusively some particular operations (i.e. the communicative occurrences). Something innovative (unexpected, out of the ordinary) which has been recently created would occasionally be uttered, suggested, described, and probably printed under sole condition that it is apprehensible and writable. The selection is always based on some structures i.e. on the expectations of some reproductive use of some meaning affitudes. Only the structures can be marked out symbolically: applied to the science it means that they are marked as the true or the false ones. Finely, the stabilization level consists in the continuality of the autopoesis of the scientific communication. (shrink)

This volume is dedicated to the life and work of Ernest Nagel counted among the influential twentieth-century philosophers of science. Forgotten by the history of philosophy of science community in recent years, this volume introduces Nagel’s philosophy to a new generation of readers and highlights the merits and originality of his works. Best known in the history of philosophy as a major American representative of logical empiricism with some pragmatist and naturalist leanings, Nagel’s interests and activities went (...) beyond these limits. His career was marked with a strong and determined intention of harmonizing the European scientific worldview of logical empiricism and American naturalism/pragmatism. His most famous and systematic treatise on, The Structure of Science, appeared just one year before Thomas Kuhn’s even more renowned, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As a reflection of Nagel’s interdisciplinary work, the contributing authors’ articles are connected both historically and systematically. The volume will appeal to students mainly at the graduate level and academic scholars. Since the volume treats historical, philosophical, physical, social and general scientific questions, it will be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, epistemologists, social scientists, and anyone interested in the history of analytic philosophy and twentieth-century intellectual history. (shrink)

This essay explores some relationships between social structures or systems and the internal psychological structures or systems of individuals. After defining evil, pastoral counseling, and structures or systems, I present examples of persons affected by social systems of power who have sought counseling. I present a form of counseling known as Internal Family System Therapy (IFS) and show with an extended example how I have worked with clients using this approach. In this process the client is guided (...) to use "Self-leadership" in healing and transforming inner conflict between various subpersonalities or "parts." I then compare the IFS approach to one used by mediators in community conflict transformation and peacebuilding. (shrink)

At least since Kuhn’s Structure, philosophers have studied the influence of social factors in science’s pursuit of truth and knowledge. More recently, formal models and computer simulations have allowed philosophers of science and social epistemologists to dig deeper into the detailed dynamics of scientific research and experimentation, and to develop very seemingly realistic models of the social organization of science. These models purport to be predictive of the optimal allocations of factors, such as diversity of methods used (...) in science, size of groups, and communication channels among researchers. In this paper we argue that the current research faces an empirical challenge. The challenge is to connect simulation models with data. We present possible scenarios about how the challenge may unfold. (shrink)

Philosophy of science as a scholarly discipline exists today side by side with other disciplines within an interdisciplinary framework of the history and philosophy of science or science and technology studies. The rationale for this “joint venture” is commonly seen in the division of labor. The history of science focuses on the rise and development of scientific theories in the past; the sociology of science deals with science as a social institution; the psychology of (...) science investigates the mechanisms of creativity and one’s personal impact upon scientific discoveries; and finally, the philosophy of science is responsible for the logical and methodological analysis of the structure and growth of the scientific knowledge, mostly within the context of justification. This allegedly fruitful division of labor presumes an independent existence of social, personal and cognitive domains, and the desired interdisciplinary communication between the correspondent disciplines aims to account for the complementary understanding of science. But in fact no sufficient exchange of meanings takes place for every discipline insists upon its independence and prior significance. Under these conditions, neither a consistent picture of science appears to be possible nor might science policy be construed and justified basing on this disintegrated conglomerate of knowledge. A way out of the situation is as follows: to acknowledge non-independent character of the philosophy of science; to learn more from social philosophy; to revisit the epistemological status of the natural sciences as the only cognitive ideal; to focus on the social and the human sciences in search of a new methodological experience; to cease considering concrete case studies as a new version of the “neutral language of observation”, which gives a “crucial justification” of a theory, and to view new philosophical interpretations a necessary feature of any case study. (shrink)

In this article the author studies the place and the role of social philosophy in the architecture of the social sciences and humanities. The article focuses on the relationship between social philosophy, theory of society, theoretical sociology and social ethics. Based upon the application of the concept of paradigm in philosophy, the author shows key trends of the development of social sciences and humanities: the turn from the philosophy of conscience to the communication philosophy and the “rehabilitation of the practical (...) philosophy”. In line with these trends, practical discourse philosophy is now playing the central role in the structure of the social sciences and humanities, the author says. By making a distinction between normative and descriptive dimensions of the social sciences and humanities, the author emphasizes the issue of their normative foundation and their moral and ethical re-orientation. The article analyzes discourse as an argumentative practice of founding social norms and values and as a meta-institution legitimizing social institutions. According to this approach, the social philosophy is considered as a meta-theory of social sciences, which include general social theory and theories of social systems. In this context, practical dis- course philosophy is playing a fundamental role for legitimizing specific social institutions. Social ethics also plays an important role, as it complements individual ethics, creating a system of institutional ethics, i.e. of political ethics, economic ethics, ethics of science and technology, environmental ethics. In this architectonics, social responsibility gets a new meaning, incorporating individual responsibility. Social responsibility is not an anonymous responsibility that neglects the individual responsibility, but a common responsibility implemented according to certain rules and procedures and creating the possibility to solve current problems of the globalized humanity. (shrink)

The article investigates what happens when philosophy meets and begins to establish connections with two formal research methods such as game theory and network science. We use citation analysis to identify, among the articles published in Synthese and Philosophy of Science between 1985 and 2021, those that cite the specialistic literature in game theory and network science. Then, we investigate the structure of the two corpora thus identified by bibliographic coupling and divide them into clusters of related (...) papers by automatic community detection. Lastly, we construct by the same bibliometric techniques a reference map of philosophy, on which we overlay our corpora to map the diffusion of game theory and network science in the various sub-areas of recent philosophy. Three main results derive from this study. Philosophers are interested not only in using and investigating game theory as a formal method belonging to applied mathematics and sharing many relevant features with social choice theory, but also in considering its applications in more empirically oriented disciplines such as social psychology, cognitive science, or biology. Philosophers focus on networks in two research contexts and in two different ways: in the debate on causality and scientific explanation, they consider the results of network science; in social epistemology, they employ network science as a formal tool. In the reference map, logic—whose use in philosophy dates back to a much earlier period—is distributed in a more uniform way than recently encountered disciplines such as game theory and network science. We conclude by discussing some methodological limitations of our bibliometric approach, especially with reference to the problem of field delineation. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis essay attempts to show the decisive importance of the “scientific discipline” for any historical or sociological analysis of modern science. There are two reasons for this:1. A discontinuity can be observed at the beginning of modern science: the “discipline,” which up until that time had been a classificatorily generated unit of the ordering of knowledge for purposes of instruction in schools and universities, develops into a genuine and concrete social system of scientific communication. Scientific disciplines as (...) concrete systems (Realsysteme) arise as a result of (a) the communicative stabilization of “scientific communities” at the end of the eighteenth century and the formation of “appropriate” roles and organizational structures (in universities); (b) the structural differentiation of the new scientific disciplines from the established professions (law, theology, medicine) in Europe; (c) the formation of scientific communication in the standardized form of scientific publication; the distinction of the separate action-type “scientific research” and the differentiation of these two elementary acts of all future scientific endeavor in relation to each other.2. The scientific discipline as primary unit of the internal differentiation of science has, since its genesis, been stabilized by two conditions: (a) The fact of a science differentiated into a plurality of (competing, mutually stimulating) disciplinary perspectives becomes the chief causal factor underlying the developmental dynamism of modern science; (b) Similar to the way in which the discipline functions as a cognitive address within the system of science, science also links the discipline up as a structural unit (utilized in both systems) with curricular structures in the system of education — i.e., it is stabilized by the central system/environment relation of science. (shrink)

Several current debates in the epistemology of testimony are implicitly motivated by concerns about the reliability of rules for changing one’s beliefs in light of others’ claims. Call such rules testimonial norms (tns). To date, epistemologists have neither (i) characterized those features of communities that influence the reliability of tns, nor (ii) evaluated the reliability of tns as those features vary. These are the aims of this paper. I focus on scientific communities, where the transmission of highly specialized information is (...) both ubiquitous and critically important. Employing a formal model of scientific inquiry, I argue that miscommunication and the “communicative structure” of science strongly influence the reliability of tns, where reliability is made precise in three ways. (shrink)

I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure were part of Conant’s (...) picture of science, a picture that figured prominently in the general education natural science courses that Conant taught at Harvard. On the other hand, I show that Kuhn’s Structure contains important contributions that do not figure in Conant’s picture of science. I argue that the following three themes in Structure do not originate with Conant: (1) the concept of “normal science”; (2) “the problem of scientific revolutions,” that is, the apparent threat posed by radical changes of theory in science; and (3) Kuhn’s emphasis on the social dimensions of science, specifically the social structure of research communities. (shrink)

From roughly 1965 to 1995, Columbia University's Department of Sociology was a leading center for social study of science, both nationally and internationally. It was often referred to as the Merton School or Columbia School, and four scholars paved its way: Robert K. Merton, Harriet Zuckerman, Stephen Cole, and Jonathan Cole. The goal of the Columbia School was to create and legitimate a new sociological specialty focusing on the scientific community and the growth of scientific knowledge and they (...) did this by exploring the norms, values, and structure of science. The core values of the scientific and university system and the norms attached to them consisted of deeply held beliefs as well as principles that determined how individuals would act. They were organizing principles designed to support the institution in meeting its goals and mission. They influenced the types of social structures that developed to carry out the activities of scientists. Edited by Jonathan R. Cole, this collection of individually and co-authored papers and essays by Cole represents some of the work produced by Cole and his close collaborators over the past 50 years. the essays are contextualized with an introduction by Cole. The pieces in this volume represent the major concerns on the Columbia School, whose focus of attention was not on the production of individual pieces of knowledge, but on the social systems that made that production possible. (shrink)

In his late years, Thomas Kuhn became interested in the process of scientific specialization, which does not seem to possess the destructive element that is characteristic of scientific revolutions. It therefore makes sense to investigate whether and how Kuhn’s insights about specialization are consistent with, and actually fit, his model of scientific progress through revolutions. In this paper, I argue that the transition toward a new specialty corresponds to a revolutionary change for the group of scientists involved in such a (...) transition. I will clarify the role of the scientific community in revolutionary changes and characterize the incommensurability across specialties as possessing both semantic and methodological aspects. The discussion of the discovery of the structure of DNA will serve both as an illustration of my main argument and as reply to one criticism raised against Kuhn—namely, that his model cannot capture cases of revolutionary yet non-disruptive episodes of scientific progress. Revisiting Kuhn’s ideas on specialization will shed new light on some often overlooked features of scientific change. (shrink)

Two books of American philosopher and science historian Laura Snyder are dedicated to the study of personality and teachings of William Whewell — an outstanding British philosopher and scholar, one of the father figures of the 19th century positivism. The author shows the role of communicative structures formed around prominent philosophers and scientists of the Victorian era, among which Whewell held a special and often the leading position. The purpose of these discussions and conversations, this selected discursive space (...) or a trade zone served not only to find the final scientific truth. Much more they led to legitimating and consolidating the place of scientific and philosophical dispute in the structure of scientific activity and to justifying the latter. In this perspective, Snyder gives the chronicle of scientific-technical revolution of the 19th century, which brought England to the top of the leading world powers. (shrink)

Changes of theories are major events in science. Two main types of questions may be asked about them: i) how do scientists choose new theories?, and ii) how is consensus formed? Generally, philosophers do not distinguish these two questions. Kuhn, on the contrary, offers very different answers to each of these questions. Theory-choice, on the one hand, is explained through the application of epistemic criteria, such as accuracy and consistency; nonetheless, because these values do not prescribe a single choice, (...) consensus formation, on the other hand, is explained through a series of socio-epistemic mechanisms, namely: scientific pedagogy, diffusion and production of knowledge within the community (the “wave motion”), and restructuring of the scientific field. These mechanisms are the basis of Kuhn’s social epistemology, in that they are not restricted to sociology nor epistemology, encompassing both social interactions and epistemic evaluations of theories. Keywords: Thomas Kuhn, consensus formation, social epistemology. (shrink)

In the essay part, various examples of provincial thinking in Polish culture are recalled. In the thesis part, the phenomenon of provincialism is considered more thoroughly. It is argued that provincialism can be thought of as involving a distortion of a normal division of labor within a scientific school into cre ators, correctors and applicators. The effect of provincialism occurs when this division is transferred onto whole cognitive communities: some play the role of the masters while others are expected to (...) play the role of correctors at best. (shrink)

This paper gives a survey of the philosophy of science in Finland during the two decades 1970-90. Topics covered include the background (earlier studies by Eino Kaila, G. H. von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka), the main areas of research (inductive logic, probability, truthlikeness, scientific theory, theory change, scientific realism, explanation and action, foundations of special disciplines), and the cultural impact of science studies.

I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later (...) work provides a research agenda for those who want to study scientific specialization. I briefly discuss some recent studies that promise to provide valuable insight into the social structure of science. (shrink)

A careful reading of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics focusing on his treatment of politics reveals a multifaceted discipline with political science, legislation, practice and ethics. These aspects of the discipline bear clear resemblance to the multiple conceptions of nursing. The potential that nursing is a multifaceted discipline, with nursing science as just one facet challenges the author's own conception of nursing as a practical science. Aristotle's discussion would seem to argue that nursing science is nursing, but nursing (...) is more. Nursing is also ethical practice, or art, and legislative for health. The multifaceted discipline of politics is united by the end, the common good, a just community that makes human happiness possible. Reasoning in this way, nursing is unified by its end, health of individuals and communities. Since nursing is not unique in having health as its end, this discussion ends with the question of where its uniqueness lies, i.e. within the activities or the personal presence of its practitioners. This discussion also contains some of the contemporary ethical and legislative challenges with which nursing is confronted. (shrink)

I present first results of my analysis of a collection of about 24,000 email messages from internal mailing lists of the ATLAS collaboration, at CERN, the particle physics laboratory, during the years 2010–2013. I represent the communication on these mailing lists as a network in which the members of the collaboration are connected if they reply to each other’s messages. Such a network allows me to characterize the collaboration from a bird’s eye view of its communication structure in epistemically relevant (...) terms. I propose to interpret established measures such as the density of the network as indicators for the degree of “collaborativeness” of the collaboration and the presence of “communities” as a sign of cognitive division of labor. Similar methods have been used in philosophical and historical studies of collective knowledge generation but mostly at the level of information exchange, cooperation and competition _between_ individual researchers or small groups. The present article aims to take initial steps towards a transfer of these methods and bring them to bear on the processes of collaboration _inside_ a “collective author.”. (shrink)

Works in science and technology studies have repeatedly pointed to the importance of the visual in scientific practice. STS has also explicated how embodied practice generates scientific knowledge. I aim to supplement this literature by pointing out how sound and hearing are integral aspects of experimentation. Sound helps define how and when lab work is done, and in what kinds of spaces. It structures experimental experience. It affords interactions between researchers and instruments that are richer than could be (...) obtained with vision alone. And it is a site for tacit knowledge, providing a resource for the replication of results, and the transmission of knowledge, and the construction of social boundaries within instrumental communities. (shrink)

Philosophers of science often make reference — whether tacitly or explicitly — to the notion of a scientific community. Sometimes, such references are useful to make our object of analysis tractable in the philosophy of science. For others, tracking or understanding particular features of the development of science proves to be tied to notions of a scientific community either as a target of theoretical or social intervention. We argue that the structure of contemporary scientific research (...) poses two unappreciated, or at least underappreciated, challenges to this concept of the “scientific community” in the philosophy of science. In particular, we will present two case studies from robotics research, broadly construed, which show that (1) the boundedness of the scientific community is threatened when private citizens can develop scientific and technological advances at minimal expense (democratization), and (2) the discreteness of scientific research programs is threatened by the complexly interrelated environment of contemporary scientific work (interconnectivity). Taken together, the extent of democratization and interconnectivity present a significant challenge for any practically oriented philosophy of science, one which we hope will be taken on directly by philosophers in the future. (shrink)

Referring to Habermas’ groundbreaking book ‘The structural transformation of the public sphere’, the article discusses contemporary transformations of higher education and science. In order to do so, in a first step a post-Habermas perspective will be developed, which implies two changes to the theoretical foundations guiding Habermas’ analysis: On the one hand, we are in the midst of a social transformation that has led to a pluralization of the understandings of the public – that is, publics. The representation of (...) society in society no longer finds a homogeneous form; it takes place only within the framework of different partial publics. These publics gain importance for different types of organizations (companies, public administrations, NGOs, etc.). This is where the second change to Habermas’ concept comes in because, on the other hand, from the perspective taken in this paper, such publics are constructs of the organizations themselves, that is, imagined publics. The fruitfulness of such a post-Habermas perspective on the public sphere will be illustrated by focusing on higher education and science. Universities as the organizational embodiment of higher education and science, not only represent a discursive space in the public sphere, but they are also increasingly transformed into strategically acting organizations that imagine and actively shape the publics that are relevant to them. Four examples will be used to present empirical observations that emerge from the theoretical perspective proposed here. These examples, however, require more in-depth investigations and only serve as illustrations for a new research agenda on ‘imagined publics’. In the end of this contribution, it is asked how far-reaching the discussed change processes towards universities as strategic organizations are, and what consequences result concerning a discursive and communicative understanding of universities. (shrink)

Any attention paid to the positioning of telecommunications installations in natural landscapes usually relates to the aesthetic impact. However, such paraphernalia, particularly when contrasted with “natural” surroundings, invites us to think beyond the visible. Through Heidegger’s accounts of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, as well as his later articulations on Nature as it is subjected to the ordering principles of Gestell, this paper aims to highlight the overlaps of the natural and the technological worlds inhabited by communications structures, considering the relationship (...) between the human and the natural realms, through the uncertain electromagnetic phenomena that envelops the two. The essay is underpinned by the extended phenomenological description of an encounter with such technology that includes, following Anthony J. Steinbock’s outline of a phenomenological approach that might begin with the facts of the everyday sciences, some reference to the basic concepts of physics involved in transmissions technology. (shrink)

Human languages vary in many ways but also show striking cross-linguistic universals. Why do these universals exist? Recent theoretical results demonstrate that Bayesian learners transmitting language to each other through iterated learning will converge on a distribution of languages that depends only on their prior biases about language and the quantity of data transmitted at each point; the structure of the world being communicated about plays no role (Griffiths & Kalish, , ). We revisit these findings and show that when (...) certain assumptions about the relationship between language and the world are abandoned, learners will converge to languages that depend on the structure of the world as well as their prior biases. These theoretical results are supported with a series of experiments showing that when human learners acquire language through iterated learning, the ultimate structure of those languages is shaped by the structure of the meanings to be communicated. (shrink)

Science and theatre are generally thought to share no common cognitive ground for the simple reason that the former appeals to the intellect, whereas the latter appeals to the emotions. Contrary to this view, I claim that like scientific texts, theatrical texts evince a cognitive intent and that, despite obvious differences, both types show similarities on three cognitive levels: (a) the use of equivalent systems of representation and communication; (b) the operation of a mode of thinking; and (c) the (...) embodiment of a rhetorical structure. (shrink)

Two books of American philosopher and science historian Laura Snyder are dedicated to the study of personality and teachings of William Whewell — an outstanding British philosopher and scholar, one of the father figures of the 19th century positivism. The author shows the role of communicative structures formed around prominent philosophers and scientists of the Victorian era, among which Whewell held a special and often the leading position. The purpose of these discussions and conversations, this selected discursive space (...) or a trade zone served not only to find the final scientific truth. Much more they led to legitimating and consolidating the place of scientific and philosophical dispute in the structure of scientific activity and to justifying the latter. In this perspective, Snyder gives the chronicle of scientific-technical revolution of the 19th century, which brought England to the top of the leading world powers. (shrink)

I present an attempt at an explication of the ecological theory of interspecific competition, including its explanatory role in community ecology and evolutionary biology. The account given is based on the idea that law-like statements play an important role in scientific theories of this kind. I suggest that the principle of competitive exclusion is such a law, and that it is evolutionarily invariant. The principle's empirical status is defended and implications for the ongoing debates on the existence of biological (...) laws are discussed. (shrink)

The author considers a problem of understanding. He claims that we understand texts, cultural objects rather than a man. He considers understanding as a process of interpretation of linguistic expressions and cultural objects. The author observes two sides of the meaning of linguistic expressions: a general (or social) one, which is common in a certain language community, and a personal one, which defines personal understanding. It is argued that mutual understanding is possible only on the stage of general meaning. (...) However, the exchange of personal meanings is a very sophisticated process. (shrink)

Scientific networks are often investigated by means of citation analyses. Yet, interpretation of such networks in terms of semantic (and often disciplinary) content heavily depends on supplementary knowledge, notably about author research specialties. Similar situations arise more generally in many types of social networks whose semantic interpretation relies on supplementary information. Here, author community net-works are inferred from a topic model which provides direct insights into the semantic specificity of the identified “hidden communities of interest” (HCoI). Using a philosophy (...) of science corpus of full-text articles (N=16,917), we investigate its underlying communities by measuring topic profile correlations be-tween authors. A diachronic perspective is built by modeling the research networks over different time-periods and mapping genealogical relationships be-tween communities. The results show a marked in-crease in philosophy of science communities over time and trace the progressive appearance of the specialization areas that structure the field today. (shrink)

Science is a form of distributed analysis involving both individual work that produces new knowledge and collaborative work to exchange information with the larger community. There are many particular ways in which individual and community can interact in science, and it is difficult to assess how efficient these are, and what the best way might be to support them. This paper reports on a series of experiments in this area and a prototype implementation using a research (...) platform called CACHE. CACHE both supports experimentation with different structures of interaction between individual and community cognition and serves as a prototype for computational support for those structures. We particularly focus on CACHE‐BC, the Bayes community version of CACHE, within which the community can break up analytical tasks into “mind‐sized” units and use provenance tracking to keep track of the relationship between these units. (shrink)

The “centre-periphery” relationship historically structured scientific exchanges between metropolis and province, between the fount of empire and its outposts. But the exchange, if regarded merely as a one-way flow of scientific information, ignores both the politics of knowledge and the nature of its appropriation. Arguably, imperial structures do not entirely determine scientific practices and the exchange of knowledge. Several factors neutralise the over-determining influence of politics—and possibly also the normative values of science—on scientific practice.In examining these four examples (...) of Indian scientists in encounters with their peers at the centre, exceptional scientists are seen in a social context where the epistemology of science supposedly describes its practice. Imperialism imposes practices and patronage, which moderate the exchange of scientific knowledge. But, at Level Two, the politics of knowledge and the patterns of patronage within it mediate exchanges between the centre and the periphery.The first step in reconfiguring exchanges between centre and periphery —in this case, between Europe and India during the period 1850 to 1930— is to recognise the relation between the acquisition of resources and the maintenance of legitimacy and identity.67 Political life is not confined to the core of political institutions.68 Second, in examining science as practised in the colonies, it is necessary to see stages of scientific institutions, whose development structures the exchange.From the encounter of Ramchandra and De Morgan, it is evident that the centre-periphery framework should be separated from the models of transmission embedded within it. The notion of “translation” helps to suggest that scientists bring personal motives and meanings to each encounter. Ramchandra, for example, sought a novel method of teaching Indians calculus, while De Morgan's interest lay in finding a place for algebra in a liberal education.The hierarchy inherent in the centre-periphery framework compels the conclusion that, at Level Two, the autodidact outside the institutions of science must have his work presented to scientists at the centre by authoritative figures from the centre. This is not mainly a question of imperialism, but rather of patronage. The peripheral scientist could not be granted direct entry into the collegial circle until his efforts at the periphery could be translated into the language and concerns of the central community. Ramanujan's enigmatic formulas were translated into the language of analysis by Hardy, which enabled the creation of a field to which Hardy was committed. Scientists from the periphery who were already part of the circle by virtue of their training, were not necessarily subject to the same degree of attestation as other scientists from the periphery. P.C. Ray, with his DSc from Edinburgh, and his position at Calcutta University, had less difficulty in winning the trust of colleagues at the centre, even when he returned to India. On the contrary, remaining at the periphery, he moved from a context of patronage to a sphere of competition. In addition, Ray's collegiality, even at Level Two, was more comprehensive, and connected him with Level One.Eventually, the professional Indian science graduate found collegiality within the international community of scientists. Saha's self-imposed progressive nationalism constrained his identification with the centre and made him a potential competitor instead. Once having achieved eminence in the world of science, C.V. Raman and Saha shifted their work to journals of physics published in India in order to further the cause of physics research in their own country.69To go beyond the limitations of the centre-periphery model, it is necessary not merely to examine exchanges between scientists functioning in a “shared epistemological universe”,70 but also to recognise the part played by institutions, the experience of colonialism, and the forms of patronage characterising both colonialism and science. Put another way, although there is relative epistemological autonomy within the disciplinary research communities of science, the interplay between knowledge and power structures this exchange.The scientific links between colonial India and Britain at the turn of the century were mediated by structures which prefigured change. Does structure determine all? If it does, we are left with an Orientalist reconstruction of the docile native, and a passive cultural medium into which science percolates. But this neglects the role of scientists in creating new structures within which they worked. A middle position—one more sensitive to the exigencies of colonial scientific life—would be one where the participants are seen not as the dupes of “structure nor the potentates of action”, but as occupying a ground between the two.71. (shrink)