In this study, we investigated endorsement of two types of prescriptive views of aging, namely active aging and altruistic disengagement. The study comprised a large international sample of middle-aged and older adults, covering the age range from 40 to 90 years. Participants rated their personal endorsement of prescriptive views of active aging and altruistic disengagement targeting older adults in general. Findings showed that endorsement was higher for prescriptions for active aging than for prescriptions for altruistic disengagement. Age groups in the (...) sample differed regarding their endorsement of both prescriptive views of active aging and altruistic disengagement with older adults showing higher endorsement than middle-aged adults did. Prescriptive views of active aging and altruistic disengagement related positively to each other and to the superordinate social belief that older adults should not become a burden, which attests to their functional similarity. In contrast, prescriptive views of active aging and altruistic disengagement were associated with psychological adjustment in opposite ways, with endorsement of active aging being related to better adjustment outcomes such as life satisfaction and subjective health. Our findings highlight the internalization of prescriptive views of aging in older people and their implications for their development and well-being. (shrink)

This article deals with the notion of jurisdictional discourse, which, as a specific type of complex discourse, always poses a real challenge to translators. The authors present a contrastive analysis of the texts of legal decisions in French, German and Polish in order to demonstrate the difficulties in translation and the consequences which they entail, and to suggest a strategy for overcoming them. Firstly, the authors briefly compare the texts of judicial decisions indicating their characteristics both in terms of the (...) macrostructure of the text and in terms of syntactic and lexical units. Secondly, they explain the origin of the difficulties in translation resulting from the qualitative differences of the legal systems. Thirdly, the different types of difficulties are described and illustrated by practical examples, in order to make experienced translators and apprentice translators sensitive to them. The corpus used for the analysis consists of the integral and documented texts of the French, German and Polish judgments rendered in matters of civil law [37]. It should also be noted that the analyzed texts are comparable texts, which are a valuable tool for translators and allow them to acquire means of expression that are as natural as possible [40]. Regarding the methodology, the authors adopt for the analysis the contrastive method, borrowed from the theory of cultural transfer [15]. (shrink)

Prospective memory (PM) enables people to remember to complete important tasks in the future. Failing to do so can result in consequences of varying severity. Here, we investigated how PM error-consequence severity impacts the neural processing of relevant cues for triggering PM and the ramification of that processing on the associated prospective task performance. Participants role-played a cafeteria worker serving lunches to fictitious students and had to remember to deliver an alternative lunch to students (as PM cues) who would otherwise (...) experience a moderate or severe aversive reaction. Scalp-recorded, event-related potential (ERP) measures showed that the early-latency frontal positivity, reflecting the perception-based neural responses to previously learned stimuli, did not differ between the severe versus moderate PM cues. In contrast, the longer-latency parietal positivity, thought to reflect full PM cue recognition and post retrieval processes, was elicited earlier by the severe than the moderate PM cues. This faster instantiation of the parietal positivity to the severe-consequence PM cues was then followed by faster and more accurate behavioral responses. These findings indicate how the relative importance of a PM can be neurally instantiated in the form of enhanced and faster PM cue recognition and processing and culminate into better PM. (shrink)

The empirical validity of the locality (LOC) principle of relativity is used to argue in favour of a local hidden variable theory (HVT) for individual quantum processes. It is shown that such a HVT may reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics (QM), provided the reproducibility of initial hidden variable states is limited. This means that in a HVT limits should be set to the validity of the notion of counterfactual definiteness (CFD). This is supported by the empirical evidence that (...) past, present, and future are basically distinct. Our argumentation is contrasted with a recent one by Stapp resulting in the opposite conclusion, i.e. nonlocality or the existence of faster-than-light influences. We argue that Stapp’s argumentation still depends in an implicit, but crucial, way on both the notions of hidden variables and of CFD. In addition, some implications of our results for the debate between Bohr and Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper we present a logic that determines when implications in a classical logic context express a relevant connection between antecedent and consequent. In contrast with logics in the relevance logic literature, we leave classical negation intact—in the sense that the law of non-contradiction can be used to obtain relevant implications, as long as there is a connection between antecedent and consequent. On the other hand, we give up the requirement that our theory of relevance should be able to (...) define a new standard of deduction. We present and argue for a list of requirements such a logical theory of classical relevance needs to meet and go on to formulate a system that respects each of these requirements. The presented system is a Tarski logic that extends the relevance logic R with a new relevant implication which allows for Disjunctive Syllogism and similar rules. This is achieved by interpreting the logical symbols in the antecedents in a stronger way than the logical symbols in consequents. A proof theory and an algebraic semantics are formulated and interesting metatheorems are proven. Finally we give a philosophical motivation for our non-standard relevant implication and the asymmetric interpretation of antecedents and consequents. (shrink)

Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien. The skeptical consequences of the psychologist and historicist thinking prevalent in the intellectual climate of the beginning of the twentieth century made it impossible to establish morality, religion and other humanistic sciences on an absolute foundation. Husserl saw in this situation factors which were causing real illnesses of the human spirit. It is the thesis of this work that Husserl, though well-motivated by the best humanistic intentions, fails to furnish an (...) adequate cure for the ills of the human spirit. He fails because his phenomenology lacks a metaphysical foundation and because the aim he has in mind - to remedy the sickness of the human spirit - cannot be attained through the power of human reason alone. In St. Thomas Aquinas we find a more adequate remedy for curing the sickness of the human spirit because of a metaphysically sound doctrine on man and the absence of a purely - this-world orientation in thought. The conclusion of this work is that St. Thomas' thought is the more adequate one to respond to the Husserlian problem of the human spirit's sickness. Contents: Husserl's Humanistic Intent as Expressed in Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft - Husserl's Humanistic Intent in Die Krisis de europaischen Wissenschaften - Husserl's Concept of Science Compared with the Aristotelian-Thomistic one - Husserl's Understanding of Essence in Comparison with that of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas - Norms and Objectivity in Husserl and in St. Thomas Aquinas - Husserl's Concept of Human Being and his Lack of a Metaphysical Foundation in Comparison with St. Thomas - The Self-Sufficient Nature ofConsciousness in Husserl - The Sense of Human Life According to Husserl and St. Thomas.". (shrink)

Contrastivists view ought-sentences as expressing comparisons among alternatives. Deontic actualists believe that the value of each alternative in such a comparison is determined by what would actually happen if that alternative were to be the case. One of the arguments that motivates actualism is a challenge to the principle of agglomeration over conjunction—the principle according to which if you ought to run and you ought to jump, then you ought to run and jump. I argue that there is no way (...) of developing the actualist insight into a logic that invalidates the agglomeration principle without also invalidating other desirable patterns of inference. After doing this, I extend the analysis to other contrastive views that challenge agglomeration in the way that the actualist does. This motivates skepticism about the actualist’s way of challenging agglomeration. (shrink)

Empirical evidence suggests that people often confabulate when they are asked about their choices or reasons for action. The implications of these studies are the topic of intense debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. An important question in this debate is whether the confabulation studies pose a serious threat to the possibility of self-knowledge. In this paper we are not primarily interested in the consequences of confabulation for self-knowledge. Instead, we focus on a different issue: what confabulation implies for (...) the special status of self-attributions, i.e. first-person authority. In the first part of the paper, we propose that FPA is based on a capacity for self-regulation. Accordingly, FPA depends on the extent to which we are able to bridge the gap between our sayings and doings by aligning our actions with our avowed self-ascriptions and vice versa. FPA is withheld when we fail at such re-alignment. In the second part of the paper, we contrast our view with the accounts of Scaife and Bortolotti :227–249, 2018). We claim that the apparent fact that we cannot reliably distinguish, from a first-person perspective, when we are confabulating and when we are not, does not necessarily undermine FPA. We argue that a systematic failure to align our actions with our self-ascriptions and vice-versa is a genuine threat to FPA. In the last part of the paper, we introduce the concept of self-know-how—the know-how embodied in the way one is disposed to relate to oneself in making sense of oneself with or in the face of others—and briefly explored the importance of diminished or absent self-know-how in clinical cases. (shrink)

The analysis of knowledge and belief has provoked intensive discussions in philosophy and linguistics. One of the issues in this area is the semantics of attitude verbs whose complement expresses a thought about the Self of the thinking person. What is the content of my belief when I think that I am tired? Some philosophers propose it is a proposition, others think it is a property. It will be shown in this essay that existing proposals in either direction are unsatisfying. (...) The property theorist expells the subject of the predicate "tired" from the analysis; their theory is at best incomplete. The propositionalist has difficulties with the analysis of the pronoun that refers back to the subject of the attitude, as is the case with "he" in "Wolfgang believes he is tired". The present new proposal ventures the idea that a conscious person is endowed with their own Logical Space that deviates from the standard model in providing for a separate entity, the Self, as the object or target of inner thoughts about oneself. Moreover, this Logical Space leaves room for linguistic error: in such a model, subjects may be unable to correctly identify the reference of a name or may fail to identify the Self with its bearer. By contrast, reference to the Self is immune to error through misidentification, it is a paradigm case of brute indexicality. In consequence, de se pronouns are rigid designators in the sense of Kripke. The book solves several puzzles of reference failure and explores numerous consequences for the semantics of attitude reports and for possible world semantics in general. (shrink)

Irréductiblement polysémique, l'appellation «littérature populaire» a pu désigner les «littératures de la voix», la littérature de colportage, ou encore les fictions imprimées de grande consommation. Dans tous les cas, les «littératures populaires» ont été opiniâtrement minorées par le canon culturel. Sans doute parce que, par-delà les alibis esthétiques, la condamnation des «mauvais genres» trahit l'inquiétude des élites face aux conséquences de la démocratie, en même temps que le déclassement de la «littérature industrielle» permet à la Littérature consacrée d'affirmer par (...) class='Hi'>contraste sa singularité distinctive. On s'interrogera dès lors sur les logiques de champs dont la recherche universitaire est redevable, comme en témoigne la persistance de dichotomies notionnelles discriminantes, que l'hybridité des textes et des usages sociaux invalide pourtant constamment.Popular literature, a definitely polysemous form applies to types of literature involving voices, hawking, or else the printed fictions widely read since the advent of the serialized novel. In all cases, popular literature or popular types of literature have systematically been minimized by the cultural canon. Beyond the alleged aesthetic reasons, this condemnation of "irrelevant genres" betrays the elites' worried reaction to democracy and its consequences; at the same time, the downgrading of "industrial literature" contributes to conversely reinforcing the distinctive status of established and accepted Literature. How can one then justify the fields academic research is indebted to, as is shown by the enduring discriminatory notional dichotomies which are however constantly gainsaid by the hybrid nature of texts and by social habits? (shrink)

Depuis plus de deux décennies, les gouvernements scandinaves expriment leur volonté d’augmenter le taux d’emploi des personnes handicapées. Malgré la réaffirmation ininterrompue de cette volonté politique, ce taux est resté jusqu’à ce jour nettement inférieur à celui des personnes non handicapées. Les centres municipaux pour l’emploi – et, par conséquent, les travailleurs sociaux qui y œuvrent – disposent d’une grande latitude pour classer les clients présentant des déficiences permanentes susceptibles d’entraîner un handicap dans la recherche d’un emploi. Jusqu’à maintenant, les (...) recherches se sont principalement concentrées sur le processus de classification des déficiences des personnes en recherche d’emploi. Par contraste, cette étude explore le processus par lequel les personnes souffrant de handicaps permanents sont catégorisées dans les centres d’emploi danois lors de leurs premières interactions avec les travailleurs sociaux. Les résultats d’un sondage (n=69) et d’entretiens qualitatifs (n=9) montrent un très faible degré de catégorisation formelle ainsi qu’un manque d’attention portée aux problématiques du handicap et de l’accès à l’emploi. Toutefois, ce manque d’attention ne signifie pas qu’aucune classification n’est effectuée, car les travailleurs sociaux utilisent des catégories issues de catégories politiques ou sociales adjacentes comme le système d’emploi flexible. L’une des conséquences de cette absence de classification pourrait être que les agences pour l’emploi n’identifient pas les défaillances des chômeurs, ce qui réduit la possibilité de les aider. Toutefois, un niveau de classification plus élevé comporte également des inconvénients tels que la stigmatisation. (shrink)

Taxonomies of living things and the methods used to produce them changed little with the institutionalization of evolutionary thinking in biology. Instead, the relationships expressed in existing taxonomies were merely reinterpreted as the result of evolution, and evolutionary concepts were developed to justify existing methods. I argue that the delay of the Darwinian Revolution in biological taxonomy has resulted partly from a failure to distinguish between two fundamentally different ways of ordering identified by Griffiths : classification and systematization. Classification consists (...) of ordering entities into classes, groups defined by the attributes of their members; in contrast, systematization consists of ordering entities into systems, more inclusive entities whose existence depends on some natural process through which their parts are related. Evolutionary, or phylogenetic, systematics takes evolutionary descent to be the natural process of interest in biological taxonomy. I outline a general framework for a truly phylogenetic systematics and examine some of its consequences. (shrink)

When one contrasts pain with the classic five senses, discussions generally focus on vision, which is taken as the paradigmatic example of perception. An intentionalist might argue that if the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing bodily disturbances cannot be explained at the level of the content, it can be so at the level of the mode of presentation, and more particularly at the level of the structure of the spatial phenomenology of pain. Here I will argue that the spatial (...) phenomenology of pain shares some key features with touch by contrast to sight, but these similarities should not make us neglect major differences between these two types of bodily sensations. I shall then draw the consequences of these differences for the awareness of one’s body as one’s own. In brief, to fix the boundaries of the body that one experiences as one’s own, one must answer two questions: where does the body stop, and the rest of world start? and what matters for self-preservation? I will suggest that touch primarily answers the first question, whereas pain primarily answers the second question. (shrink)

Abstract: This article contends that the relation of early logical empiricism to Kant was more complex than is often assumed. It argues that Reichenbach's early work on Kant and Einstein, entitled The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (1920) aimed to transform rather than to oppose Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. One the one hand, I argue that Reichenbach's conception of coordinating principles, derived from Kant's conception of synthetic a priori principles, offers a valuable way of accounting for the (...) historicity of scientific paradigms. On the other hand, I show that even Reichenbach, in line with Neo-Kantianism, associated Kant's view of synthetic a priori principles too closely with Newtonian physics and, consequently, overestimated the difference between Kant's philosophy and his own. This is even more so, I point out, in the retrospective account logical empiricism presented of its own history. Whereas contemporary reconstructions of this history, including Michael Friedman's, tend to endorse this account, I offer an interpretation of Kant's conception of a priori principles that contrasts with the one put forward by both Neo-Kantianism and logical empiricism. On this basis, I re-examine the early Reichenbach's effort to accommodate these principles to the paradigm forged by Einstein. (shrink)

While niche construction theory and developmental approaches to evolution have brought to the front the active role of organisms as ecological and developmental agents, respectively, the role of agents in reproduction has been widely neglected by organismal perspectives of evolution. This paper addresses this problem by proposing an agential view of reproduction and shows that such a perspective has implications for the explanation of the origin of modes of reproduction, the evolvability of reproductive modes, and the coevolution between reproduction and (...) social behavior. After introducing the two prevalent views of agency in evolutionary biology, namely those of organismal agency and selective agency, I contrast these two perspectives as applied to the evolution of animal reproduction. Taking eutherian pregnancy as a case study, I wonder whether organismal approaches to agency forged in the frame of niche construction and developmental plasticity theories can account for the goal-directed activities involved in reproductive processes. I conclude that the agential role of organisms in reproduction is irreducible to developmental and ecological agency, and that reproductive goals need to be included into our definitions of organismal agency. I then explore the evolutionary consequences of endorsing an agential approach to reproduction, showing how such an approach might illuminate our understanding of the evolutionary origination and developmental evolvability of reproductive modes. Finally, I analyze recent studies on the coevolution between viviparity and social behavior in vertebrates to suggest that an agential notion of reproduction can provide unforeseen links between developmental and ecological agency. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 55-59 [Access article in PDF] One Stage Is Not Enough Andrew W. Young and Karel W. de Pauw Keywords: delusions, Cotard delusion, Capgras delusion, cognitive neuropsychiatry. WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY to offer our reflections on Philip Gerrans' interesting paper. Our opinion is that on fundamental issues we agree quite a bit—but there are clear differences when it comes to details.The most basic issue (...) concerns the nature of the enterprise. Like Gerrans, we think that it is possible to create testable accounts of the formation and maintenance of what would otherwise seem bizarre and inexplicable delusions, and that these accounts should be grounded in theoretical models of factors that underpin our everyday perception and reasoning. This general approach certainly forms part of what has been called cognitive neuropsychiatry. However, we disagree with Gerrans in that we see cognitive neuropsychiatry as an attempt to draw on the underlying logic of cognitive neuropsychology, rather than (as Gerrans implies) its current methods. The underlying logic of cognitive neuropsychological approaches has been to try to understand the effects of brain injury in terms of disruption of different components of theoretical models of normal abilities. In this approach, a model of normal performance is tested by its ability to account for the effects of brain injury. Where the model of normal performance also provides a convincing account of brain injury it is retained, and when it fails to account for effects of brain injury, it is revised or abandoned. In cognitive neuropsychiatry, the key theoretical move has been to argue that an adequate model of normal performance should be able to account for any disordered pattern (Ellis and Young 1990). The same logic of seeking to explain disordered performance by reference to models of normal function is then attempted, but for disorders that would usually fall within the province of psychiatry.In our opinion, however, cognitive neuropsychiatry will not simply involve importing the methods of cognitive neuropsychology into the new domain; they will need to be developed and adapted to fit the new agenda (Young 2000).In cognitive neuropsychology, progress has often come from the careful investigation of people with stable, selective deficits of fundamental cognitive functions involved in sensory analysis, memory, and verbal or motor output. In contrast, delusional beliefs can be relatively unstable; often they are only held for a few weeks or even days. When the delusions change, patients may modify or abandon them as suddenly as they seemed to form them, or they may give them up much more slowly and reluctantly. At the very least, this creates difficulties in the timing of investigations and in interpreting the relation of deficits and symptoms, which may be recorded on separate dates. These methodological problems [End Page 55] are exacerbated by the fact that deficits linked to complex abnormal experiences such as delusions may be multifaceted and diffuse, even when the delusions themselves have a specific content or theme. Such complications do not invalidate cognitive neuropsychiatry, but they do mean it will need to develop its own methods for dealing with them and making appropriate inferences.One of the key complexities that has surfaced already involves the idea that delusional beliefs might reflect the interaction of two or more contributory factors. Gerrans discusses a particular variant of this idea, which had been suggested by Young and Leafhead (1996) as an approach to understanding the Cotard delusion: The Cotard delusion represents a depressed person's attempt to account for abnormal perceptual experiences. It follows that the delusion is based on an unfortunate interaction between different contributory factors. One set of factors creates the abnormal perceptual experiences, which are characterised by lack of emotional responses and feelings of emptiness, depersonalisation and derealisation. The other factors result in a misinterpretation of these perceptual changes, in which the patients' depressed moods lead them correctly to attribute the changes to themselves, but to exaggerate their consequences. (Young and Leafhead, 1996, 166) Gerrans describes this as a two-stage account, but argues that a one-stage account based only on abnormal perceptual... (shrink)

The question of 'the end of metaphysics' is generally considered as a central issue concerning the nature and significance of philosophy as such, and, accordingly, as belonging to the realm of 'pure' or 'fundamental' philosophy. By contrast, this book investigates to what extent the end of metaphysics might be related to specific influences from outside philosophy. Focusing on the period between 1830 and 1848, it argues that metaphysics was not so much challenged by internal philosophical argument, but rather by a (...) transformation of Western culture in its entirety. Metaphysics was overtaken by the modern spirit of the age. In consequence, this book approaches 'the end of metaphysics' as a problem of the philosophy of culture. Three historians of culture provide an overview and analysis of the 'Age of Revolution' by focusing upon the political revolution in France, the industrial revolution in England and the intellectual revolution in Germany respectively. The proclamations of the end of metaphysics by Auguste Comte, Friedrich Engels and Otto Friedrich Gruppe are shown to mirror this threefold cultural transformation. Against this backdrop, the idea of the end of metaphysics is brought into relief as a historical reality during the years 1830 to 1848. The editors are members of the Centre for Metaphysics and Culture at the University of Antwerp. (shrink)

In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea of human dignity in contrast to the concept of humiliation in the context of institutional, i.e. political and legal, rights. Two concepts of human dignity will be discussed. The first absolute/necessary and (...) formal/transcendental concept implies the proposition “because human beings have dignity, the following cluster of rights is valid”. Conversely, the second contingent and material concept corresponds to the thought “for being able to live in dignity, we must respect the following rights”. This paper claims that human dignity should be understood as the right to be protected from humiliation. Humiliation is the situation of incapacity or absence of self-determination. (shrink)

This article explores the motives underlying corporate responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis begins with Thomas Dunfee’s Statement of Minimum Moral Obligation (SMMO), which specifies, more precisely than any other contribution to the business ethics canon, the level of corporate beneficence required during a pandemic. The analysis then turns to Milton Friedman’s neoliberal understanding of human nature, critically contrasting it with the notion of stoic virtue that informs the works of Adam Smith. Friedman contends that beneficence should play no (...) role in corporate settings. Smith, by contrast, emphasizes the need for prudence, beneficence and self-command in all human endeavours. The article then uses these competing frameworks to reflect on a published survey of 145 corporate responses to COVID-19. In many of these responses, the benefit to a non-financial stakeholder is clear, while the financial consequence to the firm remains nebulous. This supports the contention that during a pandemic, beneficence provides a more complete explanation of many corporate actions than the profit motive alone. The article contests Friedman’s Chicago School profit imperative and goes beyond Dunfee’s SMMO by endorsing the more full-throated embrace of beneficence and stoic virtue found in the works of Smith. (shrink)

The tendency to idealise artificial intelligence as independent from human manipulators, combined with the growing ontological entanglement of humans and digital machines, has created an “anthrobotic” horizon, in which data analytics, statistics and probabilities throw our agential power into question. How can we avoid the consequences of a reified definition of intelligence as universal operation becoming imposed upon our destinies? It is here argued that the fantasised autonomy of automated intelligence presents a contradistinctive opportunity for philosophical consciousness to understand itself (...) anew as holistic and co-creative, beyond the recent “analytic” moment of the history of philosophy. Here we introduce the concept of “crealectic intelligence”, a meta-analytic and meta-dialectic aspect of consciousness. Intelligent behaviour may consist in distinguishing discrete familiar parts or reproducible functions in the midst of noise via an analytic process of segmentation; intelligence may also manifest itself in the constitution of larger wholes and dynamic unities through a dialectic process of association or assemblage. But, by contrast, crealectic intelligence co-creates realities in the image of an ideal or truth, taking into account the desiring agent imbued with a sense of possibility, in a relationship not only with the Real but also with the creative sublime or “Creal”. (shrink)

Previous studies on body ownership illusions have shown that under certain multimodal conditions, healthy people can experience artificial body-parts as if they were part of their own body, with direct physiological consequences for the real limb that gets ‘substituted’. In this study we wanted to assess (a) whether healthy people can experience ‘missing’ a body-part through illusory ownership of an amputated virtual body, and (b) whether this would cause corticospinal excitability changes in muscles associated with the ‘missing’ body-part. Forty right-handed (...) participants saw a virtual body from a first person perspective but for half of them the virtual body was missing a part of its right arm. Single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied before and after the experiment to left and right motor cortices. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and the extensor digitorum communis (EDC) of each hand. We found that the stronger the illusion of amputation and arm ownership, the more the reduction of MEP amplitudes of the EDC muscle for the contralateral sensorimotor cortex. In contrast, no association was found for the EDC amplitudes in the ipsilateral cortex and for the FDI amplitudes in both contralateral and ipsilateral cortices. Our study provides evidence that a short-term illusory perception of missing a body-part can trigger inhibitory effects on corticospinal pathways and importantly in the absence of any limb deafferentation or disuse. (shrink)

RESUMENEl artículo analiza el papel desempeñado por los argumentos de pendiente resbaladiza en los debates prácticos. Por un lado, estos argumentos suelen ejemplificar una forma d razonamiento imperfecto o paradójico. De hecho, la Filosofía clásica griega ya identificó las principales dificultades del sorites, el argumento del «montón». Por otro lado, la pendiente resbaladiza llama de nuevo la atención de la Filosofía contemporánea, ya que ocupa un lugar destacado en determinadas cuestiones morales, como pueden ser la eutanasia, los límites de la (...) investigación biomédica, o las posibles consecuencias de la intervención humana sobre el medio ambiente natural y sobe otras especies, no humanas. De esta forma, la Ética aplicada examina los riesgos y efecto son deseables de decisiones que, el comienzo, eran o parecían perfectamente aceptables, y lo hace así a pesar de que la metáfora de la pendiente resbaladiza no pueda aportar suficientes evidencias para frenar aquellas decisiones que comportan riesgos. Aun así, la pendiente sirve para expresar el peligro, la tragedia, los efectos negativos que amenazarían nuestra existencia, o la de las generaciones futuras. Por lo tanto, imágenes como la «caja de Pandora», la «ruptura de los diques», el «alud», no solo transmiten que algunas acciones pueden poner en riesgo la vida sino que, además, ilustran el uso práctico de los argumentos imperfectos.PALABRAS CLAVEpendiente resbaladiza, argumentación práctica, Ética aplicada.ABSTRACTThe article would analyze the role of the slippery-slope arguments in practical debates. On the one hand, they usually exemplify the imperfect, paradoxical reasoning; in fact, the ancient Greek Philosophy already identified the central flaws of the sorites, the «heap» argument. On the other hand, the metaphor of the slippery-slope draws again the attention of contemporary Philosophy, since it has a central part in some ethical issues, as happens with questions like euthanasia, the limits of biomedical research, and the possible consequences of the human action on the natural environment, and on non-humans. So, applied Ethics considers risks and undesirable effects of decisions that, at the very beginning, are, or seem acceptable, in spite of the fact that the slippery-slope could not allege enough evidences to prevent from this risky decision. However, it expresses how danger, tragedy, negative outcome would intrude in our existence, or in the existence of the next generations. Therefore, images like the «Pandora’s box», the «broken docks», the «avalanche», etc, not only suggest that some actions could definitively endanger life, but they illustrate the practical use of imperfect arguments.KEY WORDSslippery- slope, practical argumentation, applied Ethics. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty et Paul Ricoeur pensent tous deux l’inscription du corps dans la chair du monde, mais ne tirent pas les mêmes conséquences de ce point de départ anthropologique. Le premier creusera toujours plus profond la signification et la portée de toute inscription charnelle en développant une ontologie du sensible, une esthétique de cet entrelacs qui lie l’homme et le monde. Ricoeur, à la différence de son ainé, médiatisera de plus en plus cette inscription dans une herméneutique des identités individuelles (...) et culturelles reconnaissant l’importance structurante des institutions, accentuant la dimension éthique. Entre une quête de l’originaire qui veut retrouver l’expérience d’un être sauvage et une philosophie pour laquelle la vérité est révélation, pour un sujet, d’un sens profond que nous livre une herméneutique de la récollection du sens, quelles affinités et quels motifs de divergence alors? Le point de rupture, s’il en est un, entre les deux philosophes ne tient-il pas à ce que Ricoeur, fidèle à la tradition réflexive, maintient l’idée d’une personne, au moins capable d’une reprise de l’expérience du monde, là où Merleau-Ponty a cherché à s’en affranchir? Faut-il opposer une philosophie de la chair et de la « vision » à une philosophie du texte et de la narration jusque dans leurs conséquences pratiques?If Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur both think the inscription of the body in the “flesh” of the world, they differ as regards the consequences they draw from this anthropological starting point. Merleau-Ponty delves ever deeper into the meaning and scope of this carnal inscription, developing an ontology of the sensible, an aesthetic of the intertwining of human and world. Ricoeur, by contrast, explores the implications of this inscription for a hermeneutics of individual and cultural identities which recognizes the structuring importance of institutions, emphasizing the ethical dimension. But what affinities and what divergences are there between a quest for the originary that wishes to recover the experience of wild being and a philosophy for which truth is revelation, for a subject, of a profound meaning yielded to us by a hermeneutic of the recollection of meaning? Does the point of rupture between the two philosophers, if there is one, lie in the fact that Ricoeur, in faithfulness to the reflexive tradition, maintains the idea of a person capable at least of appropriating the experience of the world, while Merleau-Ponty relinquishes it? Is it necessary to oppose a philosophy of the flesh and of “vision” to a philosophy of the text and of narration even in their practical consequences?Maurice Merleau-Ponty e Paul Ricoeur pensano entrambi l’iscrizione del corpo nella carne del mondo, ma non ricavano le stesse conclusioni da questa comune premessa antropologica. Il primo andrà scavando sempre più a fondo il significato e la portata di ogni iscrizione carnale sviluppando un’ontologia del sensibile, un’estetica dell’intreccio che lega l’uomo e il mondo. Ricoeur medierà sempre più quell’iscrizione andando verso un’ermeneutica delle identità individuali e culturali, riconoscendo l’importanza strutturante delle istituzioni e accentuando il rilievo della dimensione etica. Quali affinità e quali divergenze sussistono allora tra una ricerca dell’originario che mira a ritrovare l’esperienza dell’essere selvaggio e una filosofia che pensa la verità come rivelazione al soggetto di un senso profondo che ci viene restituito dal movimento di un’ermeneutica che ne raccoglie pazientememnte le tracce? Il punto di rottura tra le due prospettive non ha forse a che vedere col fatto che Ricoeur resta fedele alla tradizione della riflessione, conserva l’idea che la persona sia capace di una ripresa dell’esperienza del mondo, mentre Merleau-Ponty cerca di affrancarsene? Dobbiamo allora opporre una filosofia della carne e della “visione” a una filosofia del testo e della narrazione fin nelle loro conseguenze d’ordine pratico? (shrink)

Qui peut revendiquer un territoire, sur quelles bases et avec quelles conséquences sont des questions qui font l’objet de débats en philosophie politique contemporaine. En réponse, j’adopte « la théorie de l’État légitime » proposée par Stilz. Selon Wellman, une conséquence des revendications territoriales serait le droit de l’État de refuser la migration sur son territoire. Je juxtapose son propos de l’État légitime avec celui de Stilz et soutiens que, si l’on accepte la fondation de l’État légitime sur la (...) valeur de l’autonomie individuelle, accepter seulement des devoirs négatifs, soit de ne pas violer les droits des non-citoyens, n’est pas plausible. Je justifie les devoirs positifs des États légitimes d’aider à la réalisation de l’autonomie individuelle pour tous ceux dont les États d’origine échouent à la tâche et qui souhaitent se joindre et soutenir les institutions de l’État légitime. Cela implique l’obligation de l’État de permettre leur immigration.Who can claim a territory, on what grounds and what such claims entitle to has recently been the subject of much philosophical debate. In answer to this question, I adopt the ‘legitimate state theory’ proposed by Stilz. One consequence of the claim to territory that has been proposed by Wellman is the right to refuse migration onto a territory. I contrast his and Stilz’ account of the legitimate state and argue that if we accept that legitimate states are grounded on the value of individual autonomy, it is not plausible why states only have the negative duty to not violate human rights in dealings with non-citizens ; instead, I argue that states have positive duties to realize the possibility for individual autonomy for all those whose states fail in providing them with the means to individual autonomy and who wish to join and support the institutions of the legitimate state. This implies a duty to allow their immigration. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de réévaluer la cohérence de l’un des concepts les plus importants – bien que souvent négligé – de l’ontologie fondamentale heideggérienne, le concept d’ipséité ( Selbstheit ). En insistant sur l’importance de l’affirmation selon laquelle l’ipséité se réfère à un mode d’être de Dasein, par contraste avec un autre, la perte de soi-même dans le On, et à rien d’autre qu’à cela (à aucune espèce d’étant ou d’entité), nous en tirons les conséquences pour (...) la compréhension de l’économie de ce concept, en particulier en relation aux critiques qui ont été formulées à l’encontre de l’ipséité heideggérienne par Vincent Descombes dans une optique wittgensteinienne. La dernière section de ce texte constitue une tentative pour reformuler ce concept d’ipséité en cherchant à la fois à rendre justice aux intuitions de départ de Heidegger et à éviter les « perplexités » grammaticales qu’elles sont susceptibles d’éveiller. (shrink)

L'objectif de cette these est d'etudier les fondements empiriques de notions semantiques telles que la signification, l'analyticite et la reference. J'essaie entre autres choses de defendre l'idee qu'il n'existe pas de critere permettant de definir strictement ces notions. Dans un premier temps, j'examine les critiques formulees par W. V. Quine contre la distinction analytique-synthetique. Il n'existe pas d'argument general pour rejeter cette distinction. Pour critiquer celle-ci, on doit examiner individuellement les diverses tentatives visant a l'etablir. ;Tout d'abord, j'examine les objections (...) de Quine contre le point de vue selon lequel la distinction analytique-synthetique aurait un caractere fondationnel. Ces objections sont rapprochees du paradoxe sceptique de Ludwig Wittgenstein, qui concerne le concept normatif de signification, selon lequel la signification d'un enonce justifierait son usage. ;J'aborde ensuite la question de savoir s'il est possible de tracer la distinction analytique-synthetique dans le cadre d'une theorie verificationniste de la signification, qui est fondee sur la maniere dont les locuteurs s'y prennent pour etablir la verite de leurs enonces. Une telle approche ne permet pas d'assigner aux enonces theoriques une signification determinee a cause du holisme, qui affirme que les enonces theoriques ne sont pas liees individuellement aux experiences qui les confirment , mais seulement en tant que fragments plus ou moins importants de theorie. Je tente de clarifier la these du holisme, et en etudie la source. ;Je presente ensuite le compte rendu de la signification propose par Quine, qui est fonde sur l'experience de pensee de la traduction radicale. Un manuel de traduction radicale doit organiser les donnees empiriques a partir desquelles il est construit, i.e. les dispositions verbales des locuteurs, conformement a certaines contraintes comme la contrainte de la communaute et le principe de charite. J'explique comment ces contraintes doivent etre comprises et appliquees. Le compte rendu de Quine est compare et contraste a celui de Donald Davidson, qui presente plusieurs points en commun. J'examine les principales differences qui les separent et essaie d'en decouvrir les motivations. Je montre par exemple pourquoi la theorie distale de Davidson est preferable a la theorie proximale de Quine. ;Enfin, la these de l'indetermination de la traduction est presentee. Je propose une formulation de cette these, selon laquelle l'indetermination de la traduction est directement liee a l'absence de critere empirique permettant de tracer la distinction analytique-synthetique. J'illustre ensuite cette these au moyen d'exemples et examine certaines de ses consequences, qui n'ont pas toutes ete envisagees par Quine, notamment celles qui concernent la notion de contenu empirique. (shrink)

In contrast to the thesis of a thorough homology between the demystifying vocation of modernism and the profanatory tendencies of capitalist dynamics, the work of Roberto Schwarz seems to provide elements for a more nuanced conception of the modernist experience. While denouncing the setback caused by the routinisation of artistic strategies of defamiliarization, the Brazilian critic remains reluctant to accept the postmodernist assumption that any attempt to give consequence to the modernist universe in changed circumstances is necessarily doomed to failure. (...) To be sure, works that uncritically reproduce modernist tropes and tactics of representing reality in a dislocated way in order to provoke surprise, as advertisements do, are indeed bound to falter. But as long as they let themselves be informed at every stage by a critical inadequacy to the commodified world, modernist approaches may retain a critical value within an increasingly virulent anti-modernist culture. (shrink)

La condición distribuida en el espacio y en el tiempo del deseo de saber no implica universalidad, sino más bien pluralidad, e incluso pluriversalidad. La universalidad implica tender a “lo Uno”, que desde Platón ha sido concebido como una entidad trascendente. La pluralidad que se propugna en esta contribución, inspirada en Leibniz y en James, se a!rma adversus unum, no versus unum. En consecuencia, se propugna una!losofía pluriversal, que indaga y a!rma la pluralidad en cada uno de los ámbitos que (...) investiga. También se señala el sustrato monoteísta de la universalidad en la lógica escolástica. Frente al monismo lógico-deductivo, que a!rma la existencia de un único modo de racionalidad, esta contribución a!rma la racionalidad pluralista, por contraposición a la racionalidad monista. Finalmente, se sugiere que la propia idea de universidad podría ser reemplazada ventajosamente por instituciones basadas en la multidisciplinariedad y en la pluralidad de perspectivas de análisis: las pluriversidades. "e condition distributed in space and in time of the philosophy does not imply universality, but rather plurality, and even pluriversality. Universality implies a tendency to “the One”, which since Plato has been conceived as a transcendent entity. "e plurality advocated in this contribution, inspired by Leibniz and James, states adversus unum, not versus unum. Consequently, it advocates a pluriversal philosophy, which explores and a#rms the plurality in each of the areas investigated. "e monotheistic substrate of universality in the scholastic logic is also remarked. Facing the logical-deductive monism, which a#rms the existence of a single mode of rationality, this paper claims for a pluralistic rationality, in contrast to the monist rationality. Finally, it is suggested that the very idea of the university could be advantageously replaced by institutions based on multidisciplinary and plurality of perspectives of analysis: pluriversities. (shrink)

In contrast to the common notion of experiments as a means for testing theories, Science Studies currently emphasize the explorative character of experiments, thus elevating their systematic epistemological relevance. Consequently the experiment has become another challenge to Reichenbach′s distinction between discovery and justification, which has been valid in the philosophy of science for several decades. Repeatedly the experiment has served as an epistemological paradigm in philosophy. Engaging with recent positions in Science Studies the paper investigates Kant′s understanding of the use, (...) meaning, and function of the experiment, focusing on its specifications with the catch words touchstone and the art of attempt. The historical and systematic approach shows to what extent the experiment is situated between freedom and coercion. (shrink)

La problemática adaptativa constituye un tema central para la teoría evolutiva. Uno de los principales cuestionamientos está dado por aquellos procesos que tradicionalmente se han considerado como adaptativos y que a la luz de la evidencia actual deben ser redefinidos. El estudio de la adaptación en el caso del parasitismo reviste especial importancia por sus aspectos epidemiológicos, ecológicos y evolutivos, además de su impacto en medicina evolutiva. El objetivo del presente trabajo es hacer un estudio de casos en cestodes con (...) el propósito de contrastar el grado de aplicación de la definición de adaptación propuesta por Dressino y discutir su viabilidad, limitaciones y alcances para el fenómeno parasitario. Se analizan numerosas definiciones y conceptos de adaptación y se advierte que muchas de ellas no cuentan con los requerimientos formales necesarios para su corroboración empírica. En base al análisis de casos de cestodes y teniendo en cuenta los conceptos de “interrelación de eslabones del ciclo biológico” y “potencialidad del fenómeno parasitario”, se propondrá el concepto de “concatenación de adaptaciones”. En razón de las particularidades adaptativas observadas en parásitos y de la inviabilidad de las definiciones de adaptación aplicadas a estos grupos, este nuevo concepto supone una multiplicidad de adaptaciones que se enlazan unas con otras y que la modificación de cualquiera de ellas tiene profundas consecuencias en las restantes.Adaptative issues constitute a central topic in evolutionary theory. One of the main questions concerns the processes that have traditionally been considered as adaptative and that should be redefined in the light of current evidence. The study of the adaptation in the case of parasitism was especially important for its epidemiological, ecological and evolutionary aspects, besides its impact on evolutionary medicine. The purpose of this work is a study of cases in cestodes in order to contrast the degree of application of the definition of adaptation proposed by Dressino and to discuss its feasibility, limitations and reaches for the phenomenon of parasites. A large number of definitions and concepts of adaptation is analyzed and it is observed that many of them do not fulfill the necessary formal requirements for their empiric corroboration. Based on the analysis of cases of cestodes and keeping in mind the concept of “interrelationship of links in the biological cycle” and “potential of the parasitic phenomenon”, we proposed the concept of “concatenation of adaptations”. Due to the adaptative particularities observed in parasites and the non feasibility of the definitions of adaptation applied to these groups, this new concept assumes that there is a multiplicity of adaptations that are linked to each other and that the modification of any one of them has profound consequences on the remaining adaptations. (shrink)

The most puzzling and intriguing aspect of intuitionism as a philosophy of mathematics is its claim that classical deductive reasoning in mathematics is illegitimate. The two most well-known proponents of this position are L. E. J. Brouwer and Michael Dummett. Both of their criticisms of the use of classical logic in mathematics have, by and large, been taken to depend on the thesis that the principle of bivalence does not apply to mathematical statements; and the difference between these criticisms is (...) taken to consist in their grounds for this thesis. Brouwer bases this thesis on an account of the nature of mathematics: it is an activity of mental construction essentially independent of language. Dummett, in contrast, bases the thesis on his anti-realist view of the nature of meaning. ;My first principal argument in this essay shows that the conception of anti-realism just outlined is problematic as a reading of Dummett. To begin with, Dummett explicitly rejects, not only the evidentiary restrictions of this conception, but also, more seriously, the use of specific epistemological theses in a philosophical account of meaning. Moreover, I give an alternative account of anti-realism, consisting of alternative interpretations of the manifestation requirement and of the rejection of realist truth conditions, that do not rely on an epistemology of meaning, and hence, a fortiori, not on evidential restrictions. ;My second principal argument in this essay consists of drawing a consequence of this conception of anti-realism, namely, that the failure of bivalence cannot, by itself, support a cogent criticism of classical logic. The basic reason is that, given my view of anti-realism, the claim that the legitimacy of applying classical reasoning to a class of statements depends on whether bivalence applies to that class already implies that the system of deductive reasoning applying to these statements is non-classical. Hence an argument against classical logic based on this claim is question-begging. ;Finally, I conclude by showing that Dummett's criticism of classical reasoning, as reconstructed by my third argument, fails. (shrink)

The “power of the real”, which Zubiri conceptualized in the final period of his philosophy, is “inspired” in the creation concept of the Greek Fathers, according to Zubiri’sexposition of Greek Patristics in “Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology”. In addition, Zubiri makes that concept his own in a course on Christianity, published posthumously. That inspiration can be detected when Zubiri radicalizes his philosophical approach. This implies purifying his philosophy of elements from Latin theology,whose notions he contrasts with those (...) of Greek theology in the aforementioned work. InOn Essence, these elements do not permit Zubiri to elude the horizon of nihility, in hisview in force in Western thought from St. Augustine to Hegel, but not genuinely philosophical because it originates with Revelation. A consequence of this radicalization is toconside r “creation” as a revealed datum. At the same time, and insofar as this radicalization implies sticking only to the facts, Zubiri elaborates a proof of the reality of God, fromwhich follow as intellectually legitimate non-theistic options.El “poder de lo real”, que Zubiri conceptualiza en el último período de su filosofía, está “inspirado” en el concepto de creación propio de los Padres griegos, según la exposiciónque hace de la Patrística griega en “El ser sobrenatural: Dios y la deificación en la teologíapaulina”. Además, hace suyo ese concepto en un curso sobre el Cristianismo, publicadopóstumamente. Dicha inspiración puede detectarse cuando se radicalizan sus planteamientos filosóficos. Esto implicó depurar su filosofía de elementos provenientes de la Teología latina, cuyas nociones contrapone a los de la Teología griega en el trabajo mencionado. A la altura de Sobre la esencia, esos elementos no le permitirán sustraerse al horizontede nihilidad, a su juicio vigente en el pensamiento occidental desde San Agustín hastaHegel, y no genuinamente filosófico porque se origina con la Revelación. Consecuencia deesa radicalidad es considerar la “creación” como un dato revelado. Al mismo tiempo, y en lamedida en que esa radicalización implica atenerse sólo a los hechos, Zubiri elabora unaprueba de la realidad de Dios desde la que resultan intelectualmente legítimas las opciones no teístas. (shrink)

En este artículo describiremos la vitalidad del sistema fonológico del mapudungun hablado por escolares pewenches de la Provincia del Biobío, VIII Región. Específicamente, nos hemos propuesto: a) Determinar los fonos/fonemas, y su fonotaxis, que se relevan como indicadores de vitalidad, b) Identificar las transferencias fonético-fonológicas presentes en la fonología del pewenche hablado por estos escolares y c) Interpretar las transferencias encontradas en términos del grado de vitalidad de la fonología de la lengua. La muestra está conformada por un grupo de (...) 20 escolares bilingües de entre 12 y 15 años de edad, que se encuentran cursando 7° y 8° año básico en escuelas rurales pertenecientes a dos comunidades pewenches del valle del Queuco, en la comuna de Alto Biobío. Para la recolección del material fonológico, se aplicó a los participantes una lista léxica de 65 ítems, material que se complementó con la narración oral en mapudungun de un cuento. Según nuestros datos, hemos podido constatar la existencia de una serie de rasgos fónicos en el mapudungun hablado por los escolares pewenches que obedece a la influencia de las estructuras fonológicas del castellano. Sin embargo, el grado y la difusión de los fenómenos de transferencia se desarrollan de manera heterogénea en ambas comunidades en estudio, debido, entre otros factores, a la intensidad del contacto. In this article we will describe the vitality of the phonological system Mapudungun spoken by Pewenche schoolchildren from the Biobío province, VIII Region. We intend: a) To determine the phones/phonemes, and their phonotactics, which are revealed as vitality markers. b) To identify the phonetic-phonological transferences which are present in the Pewenche spoken by these schoolchildren, and, c) To interpret the transferences found in terms of the degree of the language phonological vitality. The sample is composed of 20 bilingual schoolchildren from 12 to 15 years old, who are in 7th and 8th grade in rural primary schools belonging to two Pehuenche comunities from Valle del Queuco, in the city of Alto Biobío. To collect the phonological material, we applied a 64-item lexical list, which was complemented with the oral narration of a tale in Mapudungun. According to our data, we have been able to verify the existence of a series of phonic features in the Mapudungun spoken by Pewenche schoolchildren, which originate because of the influence of the Spanish phonological structure. However, the degree and spread of the transference phenomena develop in a heterogeneous way in both of the studied communities. due to the contact intensity, among other possible factors. (shrink)

Resumo O artigo trata da análise crítica de Jürgen Habermas a respeito das consequências do modelo neoliberal de integração global via mercado, em especial o desequilíbrio entre política e mercado, o fim do compromisso com o Estado social e o déficit democrático no nível transnacional. Para o filósofo alemão, a concepção neoliberal de sociedade desestatizada do capitalismo global atinge o nexo entre Estado nacional, democracia e justiça social, marginalizando o Estado e a política, em favor da privatização dos serviços públicos (...) e sendo insensível às questões de justiça social, aos custos sociais do crescente aumento da pobreza, desigualdade e exclusão social, mesmo em países abastados da Europa e América do Norte. Ao deslocar o fiador da integração social para além das fronteiras nacionais, o capitalismo global foge ao controle estatal e esvazia o poder dos Estados nacionais, em termos de substância democrática e de política social, e gera um déficit de legitimação, ao transferir competências nacionais para agências ou organismos transnacionais, cuja legitimação não deriva da sociedade civil ou de uma esfera pública politicamente constituída. Em contrapartida, Habermas defende um poder democrático capaz de domesticar politicamente o mercado globalizado, reconstruir a democracia estatal-social num nível transnacional, em vista de uma ordem socialmente mais equilibrada, e compensar o déficit social e de legitimação democrática, no âmbito transnacional. Depois de recapitular alguns problemas que se solucionaram nas formas de Estado nacional, o artigo descreve como a globalização econômica afeta a soberania cultural, econômica, administrativa e jurídica, política, social e trabalhista dos Estados nacionais, e quais as possibilidades de reenquadrar politicamente os mercados, estendendo a democracia estatal para além das fronteiras nacionais. Com isso, quer-se mostrar que a obra de Habermas não é cega para a relação democracia-capitalismo, para os efeitos colaterais da “colonização da política pela economia”, para a influência corrosiva da economia capitalista na despolitização da esfera pública e da política.The article presents Jürgen Habermas critical analysis of the consequences of the neoliberal model of global market integration, in particular the imbalance between politics and market, the end of the commitment to the welfare state and the democratic deficit at the transnational level. For the German philosopher, the neoliberal conception of the privatized society of global capitalism undermine the nexus between national state, democracy and social justice, marginalizing the state and politics in favour of privatization of public services and being insensitive to questions of social justice, the costs increasing poverty, inequality and social exclusion, even in wealthy countries in Europe and North America. Moving the guarantor of social integration across national borders, global capitalism is beyond the state control and exhaust the power of national states in terms of democratic substance and social policy and creates a legitimacy deficit by transferring national powers to agencies or transnational corporations whose legitimacy does not derive from civil society or from a politically constituted public sphere. In contrast, Habermas advocates a democratic power able to politically neutralize the global market, rebuild the welfare-state democracy in a transnational level in view of a more socially balanced order, and compensate the social deficit and democratic legitimacy in the transnational order. After reviewing some problems that have been solved in national state forms, the article describes how economic globalization affects the cultural, economic, administrative, juridical, political, social and labor sovereignty of the national states, and what are the possibilities of politically reframing markets, extending welfare-estate democracy beyond national borders. In this way, we want to show that Habermas’ work is not blind to the relation between democracy and capitalism, to the collateral effects of the “colonization of politics by the economy”, to the corrosive influence of the capitalist economy on the depoliticization of the public sphere and politics. (shrink)

The paper tries to develop some of the main characteristics of Dilthey’s “phenomenology of metaphysics” in the second part of the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. It is argued that we have to understand this phenomenology as an attempt to go beyond both Kant’s and Comte’s criticism of metaphysics. According to Dilthey the core of all metaphysics is its ideal of a logical coherence of the world: in contrast to modern science, Dilthey says, metaphysics is based on the conviction that there (...) is an objective and internal coherence of reality behind the phenomena. Even if this coherence is reduced to its minimal form, that is to the combination of substantiality and causality, even then, Dilthey argues, it constitutes a projection of the living unity of human consciousness into extramental reality, and this prevents metaphysics from being science. Gradually the Christian metaphysics of the Middle Ages has been replaced by science, both in our knowledge of nature and in our knowledge of our spiritual self. Consequently metaphysics as a scientific project is for Dilthey a historical phenomenon, which irrevocably belongs to the past. The apparent completion of metaphysics in the ‘private metaphysical systems” of the Modern Age is in fact, Dilthey claims, the “euthanasia” of metaphysics, its unconscious noble and gentle suicide. For they conceive nature as a “colossal fantastic reflection of the metaphysician’s own self”, and in that way achieve a complete transformation of objective into subjective reality. By so doing, however, metaphysics destroys itself at the very moment of the complete fulfilment of its task. In the systems of Leibniz, Hegel etc. the old ideal of a total understanding of the world is apparently realised. But at the same time this means, according to Dilthey, that objective reality as such no longer exists. The total disclosure of the metaphysical secret is for Dilthey nothing else but the disclosure of the illusory nature of all metaphysics. (shrink)

Veinte años de Contrastes (y aún antes)Twenty Years of Contrastes (and even Before)PASCUAL MARTÍNEZ-FREIREDirector de Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía.

In 1591, in a very innovative way, the doctor Juan de Cárdenas asserts in his Primera parte de los problemas y secretos maravillosos de las Indias, the superiority of the criollos (white people of Spanish origin, born in the American territory) over the Spaniards. His text considers American space as an element that “increases” the capacities of the body and, consequently, of the mind, making the criollos superior to the Spaniards. Cárdenas’ text appears to be a clear break with other (...) texts that consider, on the contrary, the colonial space as a space that “degrades” or “weaks” the body, reducing its physical, intellectual and moral capacities. In contrast to theories that assert that the tropical climate “diminishes” the individual, Juan de Cárdenas develops the idea of a body (and a mind) with enhanced capacities. This paper will analyse the implications and the imaginary mechanisms of this discourse, and its links to a specific social and political context. At the end of the sixteenth century, Mexico and, more broadly, the viceroyalty of New Spain saw the emergence of a new social class, the Creoles, who were increasingly occupying prestigious positions. The theory of the “augmented body” of the criollo, elaborated by Juan de Cárdenas, consolidates the new social hierarchies that were emerging at the same time in colonial Mexico. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom has it that there is a class of attitude ascriptions such that in making an ascription of that sort, the ascriber undertakes a commitment to specify the contents of the ascribee’s head in what might be called a notionally sensitive, ascribee-centered way. In making such an ascription, the ascriber is supposed to undertake a commitment to specify the modes of presentation, concepts or notions under which the ascribee cognizes the objects (and properties) that her beliefs are about. Consequently, (...) it is widely supposed that an ascription of the relevant sort will be true just in case it specifies either directly or indirectly both what the ascribee believes and how she believes it. The class of “notionally sensitive” ascriptions has been variously characterized. Quine (1956) calls the class I have in mind the class of notional ascriptions and distinguishes it from the class of relational ascriptions. Others call the relevant class the class of de dicto ascriptions and distinguish it from the class of de re ascriptions. More recently, it has been called the class of notionally loaded ascriptions (Crimmins 1992, 1995). So understood, the class can be contrasted with the class of notionally neutral ascriptions. Just as the class of notional/de dicto/notionally loaded ascriptions is supposed to put at semantic issue the ascribee’s notions/conceptions/modes of presentation, so ascriptions in the relational/de re/notionally neutral class are supposed not to.. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to analyze the consequences that affect the First Metaphysical Principles when the Ontological Argument is established. Saint Anselm and Descartes do not share the same consideration about the first principles. My intention is to show the differences between their points of view and at the same time contrast these ideas with Polo's theory.

Une morale pour les mortels est une etude d'ensemble de l'ethique de Platon et d'Aristote, a partir de la problematique philosophique qui lui donne corps: la mortalite de l'etre humain, source de ses desirs et de leur perpetuelle insatisfaction. Par contraste avec une morale du devoir, on decouvre ici une morale qui s'exprime par un il faut, poussant vers une fin qui puisse repondre au manque et au besoin qui marquent la condition humaine. A partir de cette problematique sont (...) repris et eclaires tous les concepts et theses classiques de l'ethique ancienne: la question de la mesure et de l'harmonie, la vertu dans son unite et sa pluralite, le bonheur, le bien, le plaisir, l'amitie, l'amour de soi, la volonte et les autres desirs, l'intention, l'action, et surtout la verite du paradoxe nul n'est mechant de plein gre, dont sont exposees la resistance face aux critiques d'Aristote et les consequences dans le domaine penal. L'ensemble met en valeur la specificite de l'etre humain decelee par les Anciens: qu'il soit un etre tout a la fois desirant et pensant. (shrink)

La compréhension de la raison humaine a été déterminante pour la phénoménologie de Husserl. Des Recherches logiques à la Krisis , le problème de la raison semble l'un de ses principaux thèmes de réflexion. Husserl aborde la question sous plusieurs angles distincts, évoquant les concepts de monde, de temps et de responsabilité. Ses découvertes l'ont conduit à identifier la crise de la culture. Les commentateurs doivent aujourd'hui mettre en question le concept husserlien de raison, s'ils veulent comprendre pleinement cette thèse. (...) Cet article fait valoir que le concept de raison de Husserl est élaboré en corrélation avec celui de non-raison, conduisant les phénoménologues à adopter une division binaire entre rationalité et irrationalité. Par contraste avec les commentateurs qui accentuent le caractère rationnel de la phénoménologie husserlienne, cet article affirme que l'introduction du concept d'irrationalité dans l'investigation phénoménologique élargit significativement la compréhension initiale de la phénoménologie telle qu'elle est définie dans les Recherches . Husserl fut confronté à cette question par ses propres recherches. En conséquence, on affirme ici que la phénoménologie a connu un développement immanent menant de la thèse de la raison objective à celle de la corrélation entre raison et non-raison. (shrink)

Resumen La pretensión de que la violencia es un fenómeno apto para el abordaje objetivo es altamente cuestionable. En este artículo se indicarán algunos aspectos que subyacen en los enfoques más clásicos sobre tal tópico y se destacará el potencial violentogénico que encapsulan. El núcleo de las ideas expuestas apunta a plantear que la epistemología objetivista induce a una violencia simbólica enquistada en el principio del tercero excluido. En consecuencia, los esfuerzos por convertir a la violencia en un tema de (...) investigación objetiva terminan transformándose en una flagrante retroalimentación de la misma violencia que se proponen observar. Ahora bien, en contraste con esa anquilosada postura objetivista, se explorará un enfoque epistemológico de corte socio-construccionista que complejiza el abordaje de la violencia al enmarcarla dentro de una "investigación de segundo orden".The claim that violence is a phenomenon suitable for the objective approach is highly questionable. In this article, some aspects underlying the more classical approaches about such topic will be indicated, and their intrinsic violent potential will be emphasized. The core of the ideas that aims to raise the objectivist epistemology leads to a symbolic violence entrenched in the principle of the excluded middle. Consequently, efforts to make violence a topic of objective research end up becoming a flagrant feedback of the same violence they intend to observe. However, in contrast to the ossified objectivist position, a socio-constructionist epistemological approach will be explored. It focuses on violence as a complex reality, by framing it within a "Second-Order Research". (shrink)

In the last fifty years a series of valuable contributions on Aristotle's Topics has helped to understand how a Topics functions in the dialectical argumentation. In contrast to this, Aristotle's topoi as set out in the Rhetoric does not seem to have received the same attention. Current opinion holds that the methodology in the Rhetoric involves two different kinds of topoi, the topoi koinoi and the ídia, considered by most scholars as idioi topoi. The problem, here, is that this distinctíon (...) of is topoir is not supported by any passage in the Rhetoric. Aristotle never speaks of. This work aims to show that the term'ídia is not intended to imply'ídioi topoi. The only distinction that Aristotle introduces in the Rhetoric is that between and which also appears in the Topica and which is the consequence of a fundamental coherente in thc thcory of argumentation presented by Aristotle in the two treatises. However, the results of such investigation has revcaled that the concept of which Aristotle introduces in Rhetaric 1358 a l0 clashes with the list of topoi which appears in Rhetoric B23. In the addenda, this work addresscs this issue and make a case for the possibility that Rhetoric B23 has been originally written independently from the previous sections of the Rhetoric. (shrink)

In this paper, we address the connection between deep disagreements and the rise of affective polarization. Many contemporary approaches to deep disagreement conceive it in atomistic terms, and their practical approaches only explore the consequences of their particular theories. In contrast, we offer a re-lational approach to the phenomenon, consistent with the recent political turn in analytic philosophy. Specifically, we argue that the notion of deep disagree-ment must be approached by taking into account the practical goal of detecting and intervening (...) on social injustices related to situations of deep disagreement. In this line, we briefly discuss both an operationalization of the notion and a way to take care of our disagreements. (shrink)

The paper presents the thesis that, in contrast to the conventional claim, capitalism is not characterized by virtualization, but by objectification and materialization. As materialized forms of industrial capitalism, warehouses are investigated with regard to their epistemic productivity. Central for the argument is the emergence of a new body of knowledge concerning commercial and economic sciences, which figures decisively in the practice of warehousing. After the worldwide economic crisis of 1920/21, stockpiling is called into question and a new era of (...) warehouse sciences begins, the consequences of which are also addressed in the formulation of trade cycle theories. German Der Text geht von der These aus, dass nicht, wie oft behauptet, eine Virtualisierung, sondern eine Vergegenständlichung und Materialisierung den Kapitalismus auszeichnet. Dabei werden Warenlager als materialisierte Form des industriellen Kapitalismus hinsichtlich ihrer epistemischen Produktivkraft untersucht. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Entstehung eines neuen handelswissenschaftlichen und volkswirtschaftlichen Wissenskorpus, das in die Praxis der Warenlagerung interveniert. Nach der Weltwirtschaftskrise von 1920/21 wird die Vorratshaltung in Frage gestellt und es beginnt eine neue Epoche der Warenlagerwissenschaften, deren Folgen auch bei der Formulierung von Konjunkturtheorien thematisiert werden. (shrink)

Beginning with a research review, the present paper shows that Hans Slugaʼs and esp. Robert Brandomʼs thesis, according to which Frege has adopted the context-principle and the priority of propositional from Kant, can solve problems in current Frege scholarship, on the one hand, but is itself fraught with further problems, on the other hand. In contrast, this paper maintains that the context-principle and the priority of the propositional are implicitly present in Fregeʼs Begriffsschrift since both have not been taken over (...) from Kant, but rather from neo-Aristotelianism: The context-principle and the priority of the propositional were first drawn up in 1834 by O. F. Gruppe. As a consequence, A. F. Trendelenburg has published a re-arranged edition of Aristotleʼs Organon in 1836 which became one of the most influential schoolbooks on logic in the 19th century and of which Frege ought to have been aware. In the beginning of this schoolbook, using the original ancient Greek sentences of Aristotle, the priority of the propositional (De int. I 1) is deduced from the context-principle (De anima III 6). (shrink)

The distinction between perception and fantasy is not a cliché among others. Tracing the path to its correct elaboration even allows us to think this distinction as the engine of the early Husserlian phenomenology. For this reason, this brief article aims to contrast Brentano and Husserl's vision of this subject. For the former, fantasy is an improper representation [Vorstellung] with an intuitive nucleus; for the latter, it has a properly intuitive character. In this transit, it will be shown that this (...) opposite view is mainly due to Husserl's general critique of Brentano's idea, according to which intentionality has essentially two objects and this critique is in turn rooted in Husserl's well-known theory of Auffassung. Thus, we will finally show that the dispute of both authors regarding fantasy and perception must be understood as one of the consequences of the theory of apprehension, elaborated by Husserl in the VI Logical Investigation. (shrink)