The paper argues that it is a mistake to interpret Thomas Reid as holding a libertarian notion of freedom, and to make use of Reid to argue in support of a libertarian position. More precisely, this paper shows that Reid’s theory of agent-causation may not be what these philosophers take it to be, once such crucial notions as agent-causation and active power in Reid’s theory of free agency have been fully explicated. Reid is more committed to accepting the view of (...) freedom as rational self-control over the determination of the will than a contracausal view of freedom. (shrink)

Waller offers a vigorous defense of "no-fault naturalism." He agrees with compatibilists that determinism does not rule out free will. But only contracausal freedom supports moral responsibility, and this presupposes a "miraculous belief system" ; thus none of the free will/determinism disputants come out unscathed. Libertarians do not stay within the natural realm. Compatibilists confuse freedom with responsibility. Hard determinists fail to recognize freedom in their midst.