O estruturalismo alcançou seu zênite de influência no pensamento francês nos anos 60 e 70 do século XX, quando Lévinas escreveu os seus livros mais importantes. Gostaria, portanto, de examinar sua concepção das implicações filosóficas desta corrente teorético-metodológica, cujo impacto nas sciences humaines quase não deixou nenhum pensador francês indiferente na época. Lévinas acusou o estruturalismo de não passar de uma ilusão, na medida em que sua espontaneidade subjetiva faz com que impulsos e instintos sejam descritos como valores da razão (...) prática. Todavia, apesar da divergência entre Lévinas, para quem a ciência deve estar ao serviço da ética, e Lévi-Strauss, que concebia a ética no melhor dos casos como resultado da pesquisa científica e não como seu fim, ambos pensadores embasaram sua ética na mesma premissa: respeitar a alteridade do Outro, de cada pessoa, cada sociedade e cada cultura. A crítica de Lévinas não visava a refutação do estruturalismo mas suas premissas teóricas. Se elas pudessem ser ratificadas, alguém poderia justificar a metodologia estruturalista. Portanto, a palavra-chave aqui é “se”. Sua crítica não é nenhuma negação absoluta. Sua principal crítica foi a de que o estruturalismo era uma teoria científica que não deixava nenhum lugar para a ética; portanto, Lévinas também considerava o estruturalismo uma ameaça ao judaísmo, onde a ética ocupa um importante lugar. No início do século XX, Rosenzweig – assim como Lévinas no seu fim – buscou propor uma saída da concepção de totalidade porque não deixava lugar adequado para o estatuto do ser humano como sujeito. Para Rosenzweig, tratava-se antes de mais nada de uma revolta contra a filosofia idealista de Hegel, enquanto que para Lévinas compreendia uma crítica do estruturalismo que dava primazia a estruturas inconscientes sobre a subjetividade humana. Apenas esta pode servir de base para uma ética que fosse o propósito maior de sua filosofia PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Estruturalismo. Filosofia Francesa. Lévinas. Lévi-Strauss. Rosenzweig. ABSTRACT Structuralism reached the peak of its influence in French thought in the sixties and seventies of the 20th century when Lévinas wrote his most important books. Therefore I want to examine his contention with the philosophical implications of this theoreticalmethodological current to whose impact on “les sciences humaines” almost no French thinker remained indifferent at the time. Lévinas accused structuralism that according to it subjective spontaneity is no more than an illusion by which impulses and instincts are described as values of practical reason. However, notwithstanding the divergence between Lévinas, according to whom science must serve ethics, and Lévi-Strauss, according to whom ethics is at most a result of scientific research and not its end, both established their ethics on the same assumption: to respect the otherness of the other, of every person, every society, every culture. Lévinas’ criticism did not aim at refuting structuralism but at wrestling with its theoretical assumptions. If they were possible of ratification, one might justify structuralist methodology. So the keyword is “if”. His critique is no absolute denial. His main critique was that structuralism was a scientific theory that left no place for ethics; therefore he also considered structuralism to be a danger to Judaism where ethics occupies an important place. Rosenzweig in the beginning of the 20th century as well as Lévinas at its end endeavored to propose an outlet frm the conception of totality because it did not leave any adequate place for man’s status as a subject. For Rosenzweig that had been first of all a revolt against Hegel’s idealistic philosophy, while for Lévinas it comprised a critique of structuralism that awarded priority to unconscious structures over human subjectivity. Only the latter can serve as a basis for ethics which was the chief goal of his philosophy. KEY WORDS – Structuralism. French Philosophy. Lévinas. Lévi-Strauss. Rosenzweig. (shrink)

In his philosophical texts Levinas privileges le dire, which always presupposes the relation to the other, over le dit, which transforms the other into an objective entity. Likewise in his analysis of thinking, he does not limit himself to the thought itself but aspires to reach what he characterizes by the word “transcendence.” This is a cardinal concept of his philosophy; it is not restricted to the religious meaning that God and God’s essence are beyond human comprehension, but expresses the (...) true sense of beyond myself. Such is the vocation of ethics, but it can be conceived and understood only through the secularization of “the sacred”. The literal meaning of “transcendence” is “beyond” and “ascend”. In Levinas’s work, this word designates the change of place that is conceived as the ethical passage of the I to the other, or the substitution of myself for the other. (shrink)

Pour retrouver la réalité, il faut d’abord de cesser de la penser à partir de ce qui l’absente. Rien en vérité ne nous empêche de la connaître et de l’éprouver comme absolue présence. Aucun irrémédiable exil ne nous en sépare. Revenir à la plénitude substantielle impose cependant d’abandonner tout rapport d’extériorité, pour enfin redécouvrir que « dans l’absolu nous sommes, … » (664)). L’on ne pourra ainsi échapper à la vacuité qu’en se délivrant des scissions qui nous absentent, et nous (...) év... (shrink)

Aaron Ben-Ze'ev carries out what he calls "a careful search for general patterns in the primeval jungle of emotions.".

In his remarks E. I. Ignat'ev considered a number of economic matters associated with the problem of the environment. Ignat'ev emphasized that environmental protection is becoming a vitally essential field of social activity. Inasmuch as this is the fact, he said, it is natural that, under the conditions existing in our country, this field of activity be planned in a specific way. The financial, material, and human resources needed to implement the program of conservation and improvement of the environment must (...) be planned. Moreover, this planning must be done in close connection with the further development of the country's productive forces. Since a serious basis in science is essential for successful implementation of all the activity associated with maintenance and improvement of the environment on the scale of the country at large, Ignat'ev emphasized the significance of the new resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It provides that measures for conservation, and for protection and improvement of the environment, will henceforth in our country be incorporated into the annual and five-year plans for development of the economy and will also find expression in a special section of the long-term plan now being prepared for the prospective development of the economy. (shrink)

Recently M. Szabolcs [12] has shown that many substructural logics including Lambek CalculusL are complete with respect to relativized Relational Semantics. The current paper proves that it is sufficient forL to consider a relativization to the relation x dividesy in some fixed semigroupG.

Ted Sider argues that nihilism about objects is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of gunk and takes this point to show that nihilism is flawed. I shall describe one kind of nihilism able to answer this objection. I believe that most of the things we usually encounter do not exist. That is, I take talk of macroscopic objects and macroscopic properties to refer to sets of fundamental properties, which are invoked as a matter of linguistic convention. This view is a (...) kind of nihilism : it rules out the existence of objects; that is, from an ontological point of view, there are no objects. But unlike the moderate nihilism of Mark Heller, Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks that claims that most objects do not exist, I endorse a radical nihilism according to which there are no objects in the world, but only properties instantiated in spacetime. As I will show, radical nihilism is perfectly compatible with the metaphysical possibility of gunk. It is also compatible with the epistemic possibility that we actually live in a gunk world. The objection raised by Ted Sider only applies to moderate nihilism that admits some objects in its ontology. (shrink)

An introduction to the basic ideas of philosophy as a science, materialism, the categories and laws of motion of nature, society and human thought, dialectics, the theory of knowledge.

An introduction to the mode of production, explains a social order's base and superstructure, people as decisive in social development, classes and class struggle, the state, revolutionary change, social consciousness.

The question of peaceful and nonpeaceful paths of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism is now the subject of the lively discussion in the international Communist and workers' movement. It is sometimes asserted that V. I. Lenin raised violence to an absolute, that he saw armed insurrection and civil war as virtually the only means of carrying out the socialist revolution. Inasmuch as under today's conditions, particularly in developed capitalist countries, seizure of power by the working class and (...) toiling masses through armed insurrection is allegedly totally impossible, the conclusion is drawn that a number of basic propositions of Leninism are obsolete and that Leninism is a purely Russian phenomenon with no international significance. All such conclusions are nothing but a distortion of Leninism. (shrink)

Drawing from the complete normative resemblance between the questions of moral justification of the use of force and the moral justification of deception, the author finds in Kant's ethics an example of theoretical inconsistency. He shows that Kant's conclusion about the situational moral permissibility of forcible compulsion necessarily entails a decision in favor of the moral permissibility of lying for philanthropic reasons, which Kant denies.

Looking back I count, not without some sadness, that I have been a reader of Voprosy filosofii for forty-five years, an author for almost forty, and a staff member for exactly ten. I hope that this entitles me to discuss briefly the most tempting of anniversarial problems; namely, the problem of periodization.

Contrary to the widespread opinion that in the Soviet period the Institute of Philosophy had been a mere citadel of ideological dogmatism, the author shows that even in the most oppressive periods of stagnation not only did the institute resist the imposition of this atmosphere, but it openly refused to take part in any campaign of condemnation or ideological reprisal against nonconformists, whether in philosophy, literature, economics, or politics. The reigning atmosphere in the institute at that time was one of (...) glasnost, open argument, and constructive discussion. And the mediator of such an environment was the institute's Communist Party chapter, which among other positive influences, provided the institute and its associates with real protection from Stalinism, hostility, and societal pressure. While in the country as a whole there had never been a civil society, the institute always possessed and actively displayed the key features of such an institution. The famous wall newspaper published at the institute was one sign of such its civic-social maturity. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant left us not only fundamental treatises but also a wealth of remarkable or simply memorable expressions. Some of them—like the idea of the two things that fill the mind with wonder and awe, the starry heavens and the moral law—are known even to children. Kant's other aphorisms are not widely known. His manuscripts are a real depository of such little-known passages. Here are a few examples.

The philosophy of the modern age begins with two enigmatic figures—Descartes and Bacon. They are steeped in the common spirit of philosophical reform, but view the tasks and the place of metaphysics differently. Bacon thinks that metaphysics should be constructed on the basis of physics and has an applied and empirical character. Descartes believes that physics grows out of a priori metaphysics.

The law of negation of the negation as it appears in the economic writings of Marx in general, and in Capital in particular, has repeatedly been treated in our philosophical literature in one way or another. To this day, however, as judged from the literature, attention has not been directed to the principle of negation of the negation as it is manifested not only in Marx's historical but also in his logical analysis. Negation of the negation has been examined primarily (...) as a form of expression of historical analysis . In the present article the emphasis is upon negation of the negation in logical analysis, upon the function of this principle considered as form of motion dealt with by historical analysis. All the examples of negation of the negation in historical analysis that have already been treated in the literature are omitted quite consciously, to avoid repetition. Nor is anything said about the structure of Capital as a "dialectically subdivided whole" in connection with negation of the negation, as that question has been splendidly handled in the book by L. A. Man'kovskii referred to in the footnote. (shrink)

The psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore (B&M). Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.

Для студентов, аспирантов, преподавателей и исследователей, специализирующихся в области философии и логики, истории русской философии.

The author places Herzen's view of history in the context of the development of West European political philosophy—in particular, the concepts of "open history" and "historicism.".