Naïve realism is the view that veridical experiences are fundamentally relations of acquaintance to external objects and their features, and multidisjunctivism is the conjunction of naïve realism and the view that hallucinatory experiences don’t share a common fundamental kind. Multidisjunctivism allegedly removes the screening-off worry over naïve realism, and the relevant literature suggests that multidisjunctivism is one of the naïve realist responses to the worry. The present paper argues that the multidisjunctive solution is implicitly changing the subject, (...) so the impression that the multidisjunctivist is addressing the screening-off problem is illusory. (shrink)

Hua recently raises an argument against multidisjunctivism about perception, that is, the conjunction of naïve realism about perception and the view that hallucinatory experiences do not share a fundamental kind. In this paper I present a parody argument against multidisjunctivism about personal identity in certain cases, and argue that both Hua's argument and mine fail. I conclude with another argument against naïve realism, and thus multidisjunctivism, about personal identity in these cases.

Hua recently raises an argument against multidisjunctivism about perception, that is, the conjunction of naïve realism about perception and the view that hallucinatory experiences do not share a fundamental kind. In this paper I present a parody argument against multidisjunctivism about personal identity in certain cases, and argue that both Hua’s argument and mine fail. I conclude with another argument against naïve realism, and thus multidisjunctivism, about personal identity in these cases.

Hua recently raises an argument against multidisjunctivism about perception, that is, the conjunction of naïve realism about perception and the view that hallucinatory experiences do not share a fundamental kind. In this paper I present a parody argument against multidisjunctivism about personal identity in certain cases, and argue that both Hua's argument and mine fail. I conclude with another argument against naïve realism, and thus multidisjunctivism, about personal identity in these cases.

Hua recently raises an argument against multidisjunctivism about perception, that is, the conjunction of naïve realism about perception and the view that hallucinatory experiences do not share a fundamental kind. In this paper I present a parody argument against multidisjunctivism about personal identity in certain cases, and argue that both Hua's argument and mine fail. I conclude with another argument against naïve realism, and thus multidisjunctivism, about personal identity in these cases.

This paper explains a flaw I find in Michael Martin's argument for the view that the phenomenal properties of a hallucination are its being indiscriminable from a certain sort of veridical perception. The argument relies, I argue, on the assumption that if a certain broad mental property sometimes has a certain narrow realizer, it never has any other narrow realizer. This assumption is false. Accordingly, the argumentation fails to rule out "positive multidisjunctivism": the fundamental kind of the veridical experience (...) is a broad property, while some matching hallucinations are subjective and others are intentional. (shrink)