Author: Horecka Aleksandra Title: THE CONCEPT OF AESTHETICAL VALUE IN TATARKIEWICZ’S PAPERS (Pojęcie wartości estetycznej w pracach Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 601-615 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, AESTHETICAL VALUE, ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The purpose of this paper is to report and analyse the main theses of Tatarkiewicz’s theory of aesthetic value. We concentrate on ontological problems – what is aesthetical value and (...) what is the ontological category of valuable object. Tatarkiewicz claims, that: “The term ‘value’ refers to an abstract: property of thing, or to a concrete: to thing endowed with this property”. Many types of aesthetic value (aesthetic value in narrow sense, literary value and poetical value) exist. The only difference between using concept of aesthetic value only in positive sense and using concept of aesthetic value both – in positive and negative sense – is formal. Concerning thesis (1) we claim, that expression “thing” in Tatarkiewicz’s theory is the synonym for “physical object”; not only material objects, but also physical events and processes are Tatarkiewicz’s things as well. In our opinion the concept of aesthetic value proposed by Tatarkiewicz is objective, therefore formulation of thesis of aesthetic subjectivity, which Tatarkiewicz also did, is problematical. Using Tatarkiewicz’s terminology, we construct concept of value as a state of affairs (that some object is endowed with value-property) and we accept monocathegoriality of values (value is a property, a thing endowed with this property or a state of affairs). Concerning thesis (2) we divide all objects into semantic and asemantic and we claim, that in Tatarkiewicz’s theory, only asemantic objects or semantic but semantically uninterpreted object could be endowed with aesthetic value in narrow sense. The aesthetic value in narrow sense is its property considering its appearance or structure. As to the literary and poetical values – they are ascribed to semantic object in consideration of represented object. Concerning thesis (3) we argue, that it is significant whether we use concept of value only in positive sense or both – in positive and negative sense. Only in language with both expressions (“positive aesthetic value” and “negative aesthetic value”) we can formulate the theses about aesthetically neutral objects. (shrink)

W artykule przedstawiam ogólne ujęcie relacji wartości. Jako punkt wyjścia przyjmuję szczególny typ relacji wartości, równorzędność, stanowiącą zdaniem Ruth Chang pewną postać porównywalności wartości, która rożni się od trzech standardowych postaci porównywalności: lepszości, gorszości i równowartości. Joshua Gert zasugerował niedawno, iż pojęcie równorzędności można wyjaśnić, jeśli porównania wartości zinterpretuje się jako normatywne oceny preferencji. Chociaż podstawowa idea przyświecająca Gertowi jest atrakcyjna, sposób w jaki ją rozwija jest błędny. Jego model wartości sformułowany w kategoriach dopuszczalnych sił (...) preferencji jest nieadekwatny. Zamiast tego proponuję model alternatywny, sformułowany w kategoriach przecięć racjonalnie dopuszczalnych uporządkowań preferencji. Dostarcza on ogólnej taksonomii wszystkich binarnych relacji wartości. Artykuł kończę kilkoma uwagami dotyczącymi następstw tego ujęcia dla teorii racjonalnego wyboru. (shrink)

W obszarze moich badań znalazła się problematyka wartości w lirykach Jacka Bierezina (1947–1993), poety i opozycjonisty urodzonego w Łodzi i z tym miastem związanego przez większość życia. Zajmują mnie jej związki z estetyką pokolenia ’68 oraz autorytetami autora, w przypadku poezji Bierezina możemy mówić bowiem o biografii jako literackim tworzywie. Temat ten badam, posługując się fenomenologią i aksjologią. Uważam, że wartości konstytuują się najmocniej i wyłaniają w sytuacjach granicznych, są pochodną wolności i wyboru, zatem za Józefem Tischnerem badam (...) je jako fenomen graniczny. Powiązane są z fenomenami miejsca i czasu, osadzone w dziejowości, co pokazuje filozofia spotkania i dialogu Tischnera, z którego dorobku korzystam. Poruszam się w filozofii dramatu oraz dwóch przestrzeniach: Ja aksjologicznego oraz Innego. Z filozofii spotkania wynika również komunikacyjna funkcja Innego. W poezji Bierezina ujawnia się ona w sprzeciwie wobec milczącej zgody na zło. Z zagadnieniem wartości łączy się problem aksjologii, wręcz programowo wyeksponowany w lirykach łódzkiego poety, deklarującego się jako uczeń Zbigniewa Herberta. Sumienie, wierność, piękno i smak to słowa-klucze poety-maksymalisty, który wybrał, za autorem Pana Cogito, jedną z najtrudniejszych dróg. (shrink)

The article discusses Meinong’s theory of values in its later version as laid down in his studies Über emotionale Präsentation and Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie. His early psychological works are omitted. The principal purpose aim of the article is to show that Meinong’s axiology was essentially antipsychological in its character. For the philosophical foundation of his theory of values Meinong took the theory of object which furnishes a general solution of the question of relations between emotional experience, its content (...) and its object. The intentional interpretation of feelings as emotional experiences relating to objects suggested to Meinong a new approach to values – to treat them as correlates of those experiences. (shrink)

This article is a polemic with the article by Marian Przełęcki, O pewnych filozoficznych konsekwencjach semantycznej definicji prawdy published by “Studia Filozoficzne” 6, 1973. Przełęcki claimed that certain evaluative propositions have a logical value by virtue of containing evaluative predicates which are commonly understood. The functioning of these predicates in natural languages makes it possible to identify their denotation in these languages, and thus it is possible to assign logical values to the propositions that predicate about different elements of the (...) world their values in all cases when these elements do not fall into the range of vagueness of the predicates used. The authors of the polemic points out that the propositions analysed by Przełęcki are in fact descriptive and not normative because their logical value is determined by a common understanding of the evaluative predicates which they contain. These propositions do not say what is morally good, but, what is commonly believed to be morally good. Consequently, the problem of logical value of evaluative propositions has not been settled in Przełęcki’s article, while the ascription of logical values to propositions belonging to descriptive ethics, which is the real subject matter of the article, hardly poses any questions. The authors of this polemic contend that it is not possible to settle the problem of logical value of evaluative propositions without an analysis of the meaning of evaluative predicates. (shrink)

Artykuł dotyczy wartości uznawanych przez młodzież. Obiektem badań nie bez przyczyny jest ta kategoria społeczna, gdyż młodzież, tworząc własne systemy wartości i normy moralne, kreuje nowy porządek i przyczynia się do postępu. We wstępipe przedstawiono typologię wartości oraz pojęcia, które w dalszej części pracy zostaną zastosowane w analizie omawianych zjawisk. Podstawą podjętych w artykule rozważań są wyniki badań socjologicznych przeprowadzonych w Morągu. Skupiono się głównie na stosunku młodzieży do wartości codziennych. Postawiono pytanie o wartości uznawane (...) za ważne w życiu, oraz o obawy młóodzieży. Podjęto także próbę określenia relacji między wartościami prospołecznymi i egoistycznymi. W konkluzji wskazano kierunek przemian, jakim od pewnego czasu ulegają systemy wartości I preferencje młodzieży. (shrink)

Celem niniejszego studium jest zwrócenie uwagi na płaszczyznę aksjologiczną interpretacji dzieła sztuki wizualnej. Wyróżnienie tej sfery staje się możliwe dzięki zastosowaniu odpowiedniej metody, która umożliwia identyfikację wartości w przestrzeni danego dzieła. Innowacyjnym wymiarem prezentowanych treści jest opracowanie metody polegającej na wyodrębnianiu wartości na drodze aksjologii semiologiczno-ikonograficznej. Pozwala ona nie tylko odkryć treść samego dzieła, jego znaczenie, całe bogactwo symboli, alegorii czy metafor, ale przede wszystkim zidentyfikować wartości, w tym tak istotne dla ludzkiej egzystencji wartości moralne i (...) religijne. (shrink)

The article presents Konrad Zacharias Lorenz\'s views concerning man\'s axiological space. According to Lorenz the origin of the cognitive apparatus is defined by the need to maintain orientation in the world. The apparatus is determined (ambiguously) by the biological and cultural factors. Also tendencies to accept a given type of values are dependent on inborn instincts. The harmony of mutual coexistence of biological and cultural norms is a manifestation of a \'healthy functioning of the world of values\'. In recognizing values (...) an important role is attributed to emotions. The specificity of the act of valuation results from its subjectivity outside a direct control of acts of consciousness. (shrink)

Marxist axiology presupposes the theory of historical materialism: this article is concerned with an adaptive interpretation of the latter. Its concern is reflected in the proposed definition of value: value is the family of classes of states of affairs identified by the relation of preference of an ideal social subject. The article presents the hierarchy of social categories based on the adaptive interpretation of historical materialism: primary classes, secondary classes strata, etc. In the course of argumentation the aforementioned definition of (...) value becomes more and more realistic and permits ever more precise determination of values accepted in a society. (shrink)

Poland’s transformation occurs in individuals’ attitudes and behaviour. Several years ago, the entrepreneur in Poland was associated with corruption and border-line legal activities. Today, many entrepreneurs are looked upon as positive role models. Social acceptance of entrepreneurial attitudes in Poland is growing. Increased susceptibility to entrepreneurial behaviour in a society will increase the rate at which new businesses are established, enhancing market dynamics, and accelerating innovative changes. But in Poland entrepreneurs are not seen as a positive example, unlike in the (...) United States. Willingness to take risks, self-expression and independence are not met with social acceptance, especially if rewarded with high incomes. The research undertaken by the author is aimed at analysing the essence of entrepreneurial attitudes and changes in the social acceptance of entrepreneurial behaviour. (shrink)

Trying to avoid the dilemma of axiological subjectivism and objectivism “The World of Experience” is taken as the starting point of this article. Basic values are meant to represent notions which symbolize the meaning of human experience of the world. Simultaneously these notions symbolize the meanings of the basic relations between subject and object of experience. Utility, truth and beauty are in this conception the most general notions symbolizing the meanings of practical, cognitive and aesthetic experiences. Moral goodness is a (...) notion symbolizing the meaning of personal experiences of the subject. The practical, cognitive and aesthetic experiences occur within the frame of unilateral, matter of fact contacts of the subject with an object. The specific trait of the personal experience lies in the direct contact with the subjectivity of another human being. The experience of another man as of “one who also experiences” is the foundation of moral experiences. Recognition of the subjective autonomy of another man leads to the experience which presents him as a moral subject. The relations between moral subjects are moral relations. These relations obtain within communities whose members observe certain rules which are adopted in order to protect their autonomy and to strengthen the bonds between them, which are a warrant of the existence of their community. The effort made to preserve one’s subjective autonomy and to establish bonds with other people considered as other autonomous subjects is at the same time the essence. (shrink)

When comparing aesthetic with moral values Ingarden does not define their mutual relation but tries to determine generic moments of various types. Neither aesthetic nor moral values can exist autonomously but require a vehicle. Aesthetic values appear as some qualifications of aesthetic objects, whereas moral values are some qualifications of conscious subjects and a proper structure both of subjects and of the world which must admit free actions is indispensable for the realisation of moral values. Ingarden admits the possibility of (...) a different mode at existence for moral values than for aesthetic ones, the former being more firmly rooted in their foundation. Values form hierarchies. Theory serve nothing but themselves and depend on no evaluation, Ingarden tries to demonstrate the objectivity of values, listing the conditions on which it depends, and postulates that a necessary correlation be sought between the properties of the vehicle and the values of determinate qualities. The main difference between aesthetic and moral values is that the latter are obligatory in character. This may be read from the content of their ideas. Values only partly go into the general ontology developed by Ingarden, but this ontology was no closed system even for himself and there is evidence that he may have expended his conception to embrace also the sphere of values. Ingarden described accurately neither the mode of existence nor the formal structure of va1ues. His closest interest belonged to their matter because in it he thought he might find the principle of grouping values into various genera. He regarded the study of the laws of co-existence of various value, as a major task of material ontology. Moral values may be credited with a higher dignitas than other values and their realisation is not without influence on the acting subject’s personality. In conclusion the authoress proposes to define value as a new qualitative dimension of the object serving as its vehicle. The value dimension of objects might go in various directions depending on the kind of value involved. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to reconstruct the theory of the moral perception held by G.E. Moore, with a special regard to its ontological and epistemological features. The author tries to prove first that Moore’s theory of ethical reality has been strongly influenced by his ontology and epistemology. Secondly, he indicates that the two mentioned views are interdependent ones. However the article is intended not only to give an account of the doctrine of Moore but also to be (...) a particular interpretation of it. A discerning analysis of Moore’s act of the moral perception shows that he understood it on the analogy with the sense perception. The author tries therefore to interpret the theory of the moral perception in the sense-data language. (shrink)