Results for 'rightmaking'

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  1. Rightmaking and Wrongmaking Properties, Evil, and Theism.Bruce Langtry - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. pp. 177-202.
    Michael Tooley, in Plantinga & Tooley, "Knowledge of God" (Blackwell 2008) argues that, in the absence of strong evidence in favour of the existence of God, the logical probability of God's existence is extremely low. His argument focusses on rightmaking and wrongmaking properties of divine actions, and employs Carnap's inductive logic to reach his conclusion. I argue that Tooley's argument's conceptual foundations are problematic, and that his application of Carnap's inductive logic is flawed. I then provide an alternative analysis (...)
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  2. Ubuntu as a Moral Theory: Reply to Four Critics.Thaddeus Metz - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):369-87.
    In this article, I respond to questions about, and criticisms of, my article “Towardan African Moral Theory” that have been put forth by Allen Wood, Mogobe Ramose, Douglas Farland and Jason van Niekerk. The major topicsI address include: what bearing the objectivity of moral value should have on cross-cultural moral differences between Africans and Westerners; whether a harmonious relationship is a good candidate for having final moral value; whether consequentialism exhausts the proper way to respond to the value of a (...)
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    A Carnapian Argument from Evil.Richard Otte - 2014 - In Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil. Wiley. pp. 83–97.
    In this chapter, I investigate two recent arguments by Michael Tooley that begin with some facts about evil and conclude that the probability of God existing is low or extremely low. Tooley's first argument fails because it relies on a very controversial assumption about unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking properties. Tooley's second argument makes use of some ideas about formal inductive logic and logical probability that Carnap developed, but this argument fails because it applies Carnap's ideas in ways that conflict (...)
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