I take a philosophical approach and seek to address the question of inter-religious rituals and practices with reference to what Charles Taylor has called ‘the immanent frame.’ Whilst considering the dynamics of inter-religious or cross-religious ritual, this article will focus mainly on the idea of rituality occurring in an immanent frame or habitus. I will argue that whilst there are specific cultic rituals that need to be negotiated as part of any form of explicit inter-rituality, there is a larger potential (...) that is suggested by a broader anthropological vision. Moreover, an ‘immanent turn’ by religions may be the positive step towards the joint creation of meaning and practice in the public sphere. (shrink)

Distinguer le rituel de la ritualisation, c'est opposer l'aspect statique du rituel, comme disposition collective mobilisée par un groupe ou une communauté pour gérer ses interactions entre ses membres et son contact avec d'autres groupes, d'avec l'aspect dynamique des processus d'instauration de règles de fonctionnement de nouvelles formes d'agir social. La ritualisation des processus d'apprentissage et de formation réclame l'instauration inaugurale d'un cadre. Celui-ci renvoie à l'explicitation volontaire, réitérée des règles de fonctionnement, par un animateur symboliquement garant de (...) la loi. En ce sens cette distinction postule, à côté d'une approche fonctionnelle du rite, une approche génétique des processus de ritualisation. Par ritualisation, j'entends la mise en place progressive d'habitus au moyen d'un cadre, édictant les règles de fonctionnement et les objectifs de l'activité. Au paradigme d'une causalité circulaire, qui présente les rituels à la fois comme résultats et comme producteurs d'habitus, on peut opposer le modèle d'une causalité linéaire qui pose le cadre comme induisant des processus d'apprentissage ritualisés. L'étude se focalise plus spécialement sur les rituels d'accueil et sur le démarrage des processus d'apprentissage et de formation ritualisés.Distinguish the ritual of ritual is to oppose the static aspect of the ritual, as collective provision mobilized by a group or a community to manage interactions between its members and contact with other groups, with the appearance dynamic process of establishing operating rules for new forms of social action. The ritualization of learning and training calls for the establishment of a framework inaugural. It refers to explaining voluntary repeated operating rules by a facilitator symbolic guarantor of the law. In this sense the distinction postulates next to a functional approach to the rite, a genetic process of ritualization. By ritual, I mean the gradual establishment of habitus through a frame, establishing the rules of operation and objectives of the activity. Paradigm of circular causality, which presents the rituals both as producers and as a result of habit, we can contrast the model of linear causality that arises as part of the learning process inducing ritualized. The study focuses especially on the rituals of home and starting the process of learning and training ritualized. (shrink)

Social behaviour is but an expression of instinctive mechanisms whereby the aggressive instinct is of particular importance, having given rise to most of the complexity of social behaviour through processes of phylogenetic and cultural ritualisation. The role of the aggressive instinct is to dynamically maintain the ranking order in a group, and much of social interaction is concerned with this, including monetary exchange. What is certain, is that with the elimination of aggression, … the tackling of a task or (...) problem, the self-respect [in] everything that a man does from morning till evening, from the morning shave to the sublimest artistic or scientific creation, would lose all impetus; everything associated with ambition, ranking order, and countless other equally indispensable behaviour patterns would probably also disappear from human life. — Konrad Lorenz (1963/2002, p. 269) (Published Online April 5 2006). (shrink)

Le propos de l'article est de mettre en regard les formes de la ritualisation scolaire et les constructions biographiques spécifiques dont est porteuse l'institution scolaire. Espace « abstrait » du monde, lieu d'un rapport autoréférentiel au savoir qui érige les signes et les discours en fins pour eux-mêmes, l'école est à elle-même sa propre scène: son mode d'action relève d'une performativité généralisée par laquelle elle ne cesse de faire coïncider ses accomplissements pratiques avec les signes qu'elle en produit. L'école (...) trouve les ressorts de cette performativité dans la mise en oeuvre d'espaces et de dispositifs ritualisés par lesquels elle effectue les actes d'enseignement-apprentissage dans le geste même de leur représentation. Dans ce cadre, la figure de 1' « élève », analysée comme un ensemble de prescriptions définissant les modes de participation à l'agir rituel de l'école, établit une injonction biographique particulière, qui entre en confrontation avec les figures de soi et l'expérience biographique des individus-élèves.The purpose of the paper is to look at the forms of ritual and school specific biographical constructions which carries the school. Space "abstract" of the world, rather than a self-referential relation to who erected the signs and speech purposes for themselves, the school itself is its own scene: its mode of action is a generalized performativity that it continues to match its practical accomplishments with the signs she produces. The school is the spring of this performativity in the implementation of spaces and mechanisms by which it performs ritualistic acts of teaching and learning in the very act of representation. In this context, Figure 1 "pupil", analyzed as a set of prescriptions defining the modes of participation in the ritual act of the school establishes a biographical special order, which comes into confrontation with oneself and figures the biographical experience of individuals-students. (shrink)

There are few commonalities between intraspecific aggression and predation and few convincing arguments for the conceptualisation of blood and pain as rewards for predation. Not cruelty, but ritualised intraspecific aggression is the predominant mechanism of accretion of social power and this, not cruelty, is what bestows reproductive advantages. Enjoyment of media cruelty is not reinforced by “emotional circuits” adapted to predation, but represents transient relief from culturally determined inhibition of aggression.

Practice theory has lately taken a turn towards modelling the evolution of practices, which appear situated at the centre of the study of social action. I argue in this paper, following previous criticisms, that such centrality can be revised in order to better incorporate elements of agency and normativity, which are much determinant of the emergence and development of practices. The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative heuristic which advances on lefebvrean trialectics, in order to better account (...) for process in the study of practices. For this I rely on previous concepts from anthropology and sociology, such as fetishisation, ritualisation and bricolage. A relevant case study is merely outlined in order to illustrate how such a conceptual framework can identify agencies and situate practices in relation to power structures and performance at an early stage within the research process. (shrink)

This paper makes an attempt at the conceptual foundation of descriptive ethical theories in terms of evolutionary anthropology. It suggests, first, that what human social actors tend to accept to be morally valid and legitimate ultimately rests upon empirical authority relations and, second, that this acceptance follows an evolved pattern of hierarchical behaviour control in the social animal species. The analysis starts with a brief review of Thomas Hobbes'' moral philosophy, with special emphasis on Hobbes'' authoritarian view of moral validity (...) and of the common political origins and ultimate basis of legitimacy of moral and legal systems. Hobbes'' philosophical conceptions are then put into the context of Max Weber''s influential empirical theory of legitimacy, especially charismatic revelation and authority as the ultimate source of all moral, legal and religious obligations. Weber''s concept of charismatic authority is given a biobehavioural interpretation in terms of ritualised status signals indicating an individual''s superior physical and emotional dispositions to control the social actions of others. Various conclusions are drawn concerning the concept of moral validity and its possible evolutionary interpretations. (shrink)

While some argue that the only way to make a place for Philosophy for Children in today's strict, standardised classroom is to measure its efficacy in promoting reasoning, we believe that this must be avoided in order to safeguard what is truly unique in P4C dialogue. When P4C acquiesces to the very same quantitative measures that define the rest of learning, then the philosophical dimension drops out and P4C becomes yet another progressive curriculum and pedagogy for enhancing argumentation skills that (...) can easily be appropriated by any content area. What we want to offer in this article is a reevaluation of P4C that remains faithful to a radical kernel that we find when we do philosophy with children and young adults. To theorise the potential for P4C, we draw heavily on Agamben's work, and in particular his reflections on speech and infancy. We propose that the redemption of P4C necessitates a shift from a community of inquiry to a community of infancy. Such a community is not a community that operates according to predefined rules or standardised assessment protocols but rather is an inoperative community that is defined by letting ends idle. On our account, a community of infancy is an example of dialogic studious play that is neither ritual nor just play, thus avoiding the extreme polarities of the ritualised classrooms of high-stakes testing and the ‘ludic’ postmodern classroom of free play. What is at stake here is to preserve the last vestige of freedom within the school. (shrink)

Education can transform our cognitive world. Recent use of enactivist and enactivist-friendly work to propose understanding transformational learning in terms of affective reframing is a promising first step to understanding how we can have or inculcate transformational learning in different ways without relying on meta-cognition. Building on this work, I argue that to fully capture the kind of perspectival changes that occur in transformational learning we need to further distinguish between ways of reorienting one’s perspective, and I specify why different (...) ways are differently valuable. I propose that recent approaches to Confucian ritual provide a clue to what is missing in characterisations of perspective transformation and the resultant transformed perspective. I argue that focussing on ritualised interpersonal interactions provides a further clue as to what’s missing from a mere appeal to the ritual-based inculcation of new perspectives, namely the kind of lightness and flexibility that some ritualised interactions encourage participants to have, and the deepening of perspective associated with that lightness. I argue that a case study of a project implementing a highly ritualised philosophical practice with prisoners in Scotland shows how these constraints, seemingly paradoxically, function so as to actually deepen the perspectival spaces of those agents. This case study provides a proof of concept for the proposal that certain forms of ritual engagement can reliably bring about the kind of transformation of perspective that is the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory. (shrink)

In this unprecedented time, there are many questions and plenty of speculation surrounding what life will be like after the South African nationwide lockdown. There is concern over the effects that the lockdown will have on worship services when churches are in a position to open their doors to the public once more. As a result of recognising the lockdown as a liminal phase, perspectives are shared when considering how the church will gather again in a post-lockdown context and therefore (...) a post-liminal phase. One prevailing perspective in considering this post-liminal phase involves koinonia and how an undiscriminating virus can remind those to further practise inclusivity and ubuntu, by embracing sameness and difference when ‘being church’. In contrast, another important perspective focuses on ritualising certain measures in the worship service to prevent the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), when gathering in church buildings is permissible in a post-lockdown context. This is concluded by echoing the spirit of ubuntu, namely, ‘I am because we are’, in ‘being church’ during and after the crisis of the COVID-19 global pandemic. Contribution: From the perspective of Liturgical and Ritual Studies, this article aims to contribute to the Theological perspectives of COVID-19. (shrink)

The ‘five tears’ as mystical expression in the Dialogues of the Dominican nun Catherine of Siena (1347–1380). This article explores the underestimated teaching of the ‘five tears’ as mystical expression in the text Il dialogo ( The dialogues, written in 1378) by the Dominican ( Mantellate ) nun and philosopher-theologian, Catherine of Siena (Caterina Benincasa, 1347–1380). The objective of the article is to indicate the significance of the teaching of the ‘five tears’, against the backdrop of the wider symbolic function (...) of tears and ‘holy grief’ in Late Medieval mysticism. After presenting a biographical introduction, the contemplative, communicative and secretive import of the meaning of tears in the Middle Ages are reappraised and applied to The dialogues. By synthesising the scarce references in the relevant secondary literature, the teaching of the five tears are henceforth discussed: the tears of damnation, which are the tears of ‘evil and sinful people’; the tears of fear, which are the tears of fallen humankind in the presence of God’s judgement; the tears of gratitude, cried by a ‘saved humanity’ who now ‘see and taste God’s goodness’ (implicitly referring to the eucharist); the perfect tears, cried by people in their selfless disposition toward and love for the human Other; and the sweet tears of tenderness, cried by those who love God and humankind, in a radicalisation of Jesus of Nazareth’s summary of the Law, ‘more than thyself’. Catherine’s teaching of the ‘five tears’ certainly presents unique features and its own considerations, but should, nevertheless, be interpreted as an extension of the contemplative and secretive functions of ‘holy grief’ as already presented in Scripture and reconsidered by the Eastern and Western church fathers in the second to the fifth centuries. Catherine’s contribution to Medieval mysticism is established therein that she expanded those initial contents by presenting the teaching of the five tears as a ritualised prerequisite for development in the Medieval pilgrim’s spiritual itinerary to God. Contribution: This article contributes to scholarship in Medieval philosophy by contextualising Catherine of Siena’s teaching of the ‘five tears’ within the wider symbolic realm of tears and ‘holy grief’ in late Medieval mysticism, stressing the contemplative, communicative and secretive import of tears throughout the Middle Ages. (shrink)

The Homo naledi discovery introduced questions that had not been previously posed regarding fossil finds. This is because, apart from their fascinating physiology, they seemingly deliberately disposed of their dead in a ritualised way. Although this theory may still be disproved in future, the present article provisionally accepts it. This evokes religious questions because it suggests the possibility of causal thinking, wilful and cooperative behaviour, and the possibility that this behaviour entails traces of proto-religious ideas. This poses the challenge to (...) develop a hominin hermeneutics that endeavours to reconstruct the possible motivation behind this action. The relatively larger brain with its enlarged Broca's area suggests the possibility of a sophisticated communication system and an enhanced way of dealing with emotion. We know that almost all life forms have some form of awareness and that more sophisticated degrees of consciousness may be present in the higher primates. Various 'clues' are investigated to try and understand the H. naledi phenomenon: lessons from chimpanzee studies, the implications of tool making for hominin development, the possibility of a proto-language and the role symbol formation may have played. The H. naledi case also indicates on a theological level that religion is natural. Some attention is given to this thesis. Biological and environmental factors come into play to illuminate biological factors like emotion and higher cognition without which religion would not be possible. Sophisticated cognition is coloured by affect and this makes some form of reflection on the fate of loved ones who have died a strong possibility. (shrink)

The ability of predicting upcoming events or conditions in advance offers substantial selective advantage to living beings. The most successful systematic tool for fairly reliable prognoses is the use of dynamical causal models in combination with memorised experience. Surprisingly, causality is a fundamental but rather controversially disputed concept. For both models and memory, symbol processing is requisite. Symbols are a necessary and sufficient attribute of life from its very beginning; the process of their evolutionary emergence was discovered by Julian Huxley (...) a century ago. In behavioural biology, this universal symmetry-breaking kinetic phase transition became known as ritualisation. Symbol use for predicting future dynamical processes has culminated in the unprecedented complexity of mental models used in science and technology, coining the historical ascent of modern humans. Observation and measurement transform structural information of physical exchange processes into symbolic information from which state quantities are derived by means of mental models. However, phylogenetically inherited models such as naïve realism do not necessarily explain the sophisticated insights revealed by modern experiments with, say, entangled quantum states. It is suggested to carefully distinguish observed exchange quantities from predicted unobservable state quantities, and physical reality from mental models thereof. (shrink)

Spinoza’s concepts of wonder, the imitation of affects, cheerfulness, and devotion provide the basis for a Spinozist aesthetics. Those concepts from his Ethics, when combined with his account of rituals and festivals in the Theological-Political Treatise and his Political Treatise, reveal an aesthetics of social affects. The repetition of ritualised participatory aesthetic practices over time generates a unique ingenium or way of life for a social group, a singular style which distinguishes them from the general political body. Ritual and the (...) imitation of affects explain why specific styles of art are associated with consistent styles of bodily modifications, clothing, and affects. This paper claims, not that already similar people flock to the same art, but rather, that immersion in the same art is what produces their similarity. Art (especially in the immersive, festival-like experience of live performance) can generate the affect of devotion, which intensifies in-group love, temporarily blocks affects of sadness, and focusses one intently on the aesthetic experience due to devotion’s connection to wonder. Cheerfulness shows that, through variation of aesthetic objects, art can cause pleasure without risking excess. In addition, while politics’ central affect is sad fear, aesthetically-united groups are bound by joyful affects. (shrink)

The paper explores satire not as a literary genre but as an idiom of political and moral reflection discussing the extent to which contexts of relative constraint or freedom of expression are adequate for its understanding. The argument deals with the satire of Early-Modern England, especially that of the Restoration and early eighteenth century, as for most of this time political authority was purposely oppressive, the satire produced was highly significant, and it allegedly is part of the beginnings of a (...) public sphere of open rational discourse. The paper outlines in turn: the significance of anonymity, differing understandings of humour, diverging satiric propensities, ritualised satire and taboo, and the distinction between constraint and restraint. It suggests that to locate satire between oppression and liberty lacks explanatory power and, in particular, that the very notion of a public sphere is of little historical value in discussing satire. If Habermas's concept is taken seriously it mythologises the early eighteenth century on scant evidence. If it is emptied of theoretical content, a healthy public sphere can be found in numerous places. The paper concludes by raising questions about how far the predominant roles of satire have changed since its ‘golden age’. (shrink)

Résumé Si elle disposait du dispositif théorique adéquat, la théologie protestante saurait que faire des rites que les Églises protestantes célèbrent! Fort de cette conviction, l’auteur propose de comprendre le rite comme une technique d’influence. Reprenant les travaux de Catherine Bell, il invite à rechercher les stratégies de ritualisation mises en place pour chaque rite afin de découvrir le type de relation à Dieu que chaque Église y suggère. À titre d’exemple, l’auteur applique cette méthode à la célébration de (...) la cène dans l’Église évangélique de Polynésie française.If Protestant theology had the theoretical tools to reflect upon ritual activities, it would know how to theologically analyze the rites performed in Protestant churches. Based on this conviction, the author sets up an understanding of ritual as a technique that influences cultural and religious representations. Inspired by Catherine Bell’s work, the author proposes to uncover the strategies of ritualization established for each rite in order to reveal what type of relationship to God each congregation develops. As an example, the author applies this methodology to the celebration of the Eucharist in the Evangelical Church of French Polynesia. (shrink)

The view that female mammals are more docile appears to arise in part from imposing human values on animal studies. Many reports of sexual dimorphism in physical aggression favouring the male in laboratory rodents appear to select circumstances where that expectation is supported. Other situations that favour the expression of conflict in females have been (until recently) relatively little studied. Although female rodents generally do not show the “ritualised” forms of conflict that characterise male sexual competition, they can use notably (...) damaging strategies (especially if they are of short duration). Such considerations might weigh in the selection of strategies by our own species. (shrink)

La dimension mythique ou simplement rituelle est présente dans le système économique, et ne peut être occultée puisqu'elle fonde sa plausibilité et sa légitimité. Ce court article cherche à expliciter la relation entre deux facteurs : d'une part, un mouvement pressant vers une économie de plus en plus appuyée sur le «travail émotionnel » des salariés, qui, de plus, méprise le statut du travail d'autre part, les performances émotionnelles et les mises en scène rituelles des programmes de téléréalité. Je suggère (...) en effet que de tels programmes, Big Brother ou Loft Story, sont un « théâtre secret» de la sphère économique néolibérale, où des jeux ritualisés normalisent les aptitudes requises dans une économie où le travail est toujours plus flexible: la passion, l'engagement émotionnel, l'adaptabilité individuelle, un mélange de conformité au groupe et d'ambition personnelle...Si la téléréalité cache cette «économie morale» du capitalisme, c'est que ce discours cesserait d'être effectif au moment où il deviendrait apparent.Or simply the mythic ritual is present in the economic system, and can not be ignored since it bases its plausibility and legitimacy. This short article seeks to clarify the relationship between two factors: firstly, a pressing movement to an economy increasingly relied on the "emotional labor" employees, which, moreover, despise the status of work on the other hand, performance and emotional ritual staged reality programs. I indeed suggests that such programs, Big Brother or Big Brother, is a "secret theater" of neoliberal economic sphere, where ritualized games standardize the skills needed in an economy where work is increasingly flexible: passion, 'emotional engagement, individual adaptability, a mixture of group conformity and personal ambition ... If the reality behind this "moral economy" of capitalism is that this speech would cease to be effective when it becomes apparent. (shrink)

Résumé De nombreuses musiques cherchent à exercer sur les auditeurs une « efficacité symbolique » : transformer l’instant musical en rite d’initiation, faire entrer les corps en transe, convertir les émotions musicales en émotions corporelles, c’est-à-dire les affects en actions. En s’appuyant sur les écrits théoriques de Pierre Boulez et Karlheinz Stockhausen, cet article tente de montrer comment chez ces deux compositeurs cette utopie d’une subjectivation à travers la ritualisation de l’écoute s’articule à l’entreprise formaliste d’autodéfinition de la musique, (...) en vue de la constituer comme une sphère autonome. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 (2011): 27-32. “My”—what does this word designate? Not what belongs to me, but what I belong to,what contains my whole being, which is mine insofar as I belong to it. Søren Kierkegaard. The Seducer’s Diary . I can’t sleep till I devour you / And I’ll love you, if you let me… Marilyn Manson “Devour” The role of poetry in the relationalities between people has a long history—from epic poetry recounting tales of yore; to emotive lyric poetry; to (...) rude, irreverent limericks; to Hallmark cards which have ditties that allow one to cringe, and somehow fall in love at the same moment. Without going into a notion of aesthetics, or attempting to choose which form of poetry is superior, we might want to consider why the form of poetry itself has long been a part of relationality. And whilst doing so, we might always keep in mind that poetry—especially poetry that moves, transports us—is the form that Plato has been warning us about, particularly if we want to become good citizens.As Avital Ronell teaches us in Stupidity : the poet, irremediably split between exaltation and vulgarity, between the autonomy that produces the concept within intuition and the foolish earthly being, functions as a contaminant for philosophy—a being who at least since Plato, has been trying to read and master an eviction notice served by philosophy. The poet as genius continues to threaten and fascinate, menacing the philosopher with the beyond of knowledge. Philosophy cringes (287). And considering that the philosopher is the lover of wisdom, we might begin to ask ourselves why one lover is warning against another—if the philosopher is in love with wisdom, then is the poet perhaps his rival, his challenger, for that very love? For, one must also remember that Plato—through Socrates—mentions constantly that Homer is his favourite. Moreover, by adopting both his own voice, whilst mixing it with Socrates’, Plato is adopting the form of poetry that he warns most about—the warning almost serves more as a homage to poetry than anything else. Here, we might open the register that one of the main reasons that he ejects a particular kind of poet is on the grounds of effecting effeminacy on the populace—good poetry moves you, affects you, transports you, shifts you beyond reason, puts you “out of your mind.” However, Plato also teaches us that rhetoric in its highest form requires divine inspiration by way of the daemon, or the muse. This moment of divine intervention is one that seizes—perhaps even ceases—you; putting you “beyond yourself.” In other words, a good rhetorician must always already be open to the possibility of otherness—the same otherness that possibly resides in the feminine. One could also trace this back to the poet that he both loved, and feared, most—Homer. Perhaps the effect of effeminacy that Homer's poetry opened is precisely the source of its power: through listening to Homer, one's body, one’s habitus is opened to the possibility of the feminine. And here, one must remember that the source of all learning—and all teaching—also lies in mimesis, in repetition, in habit. Once the habitus is opened to the possibility of invasion, of intervention, of otherness, there is quite possibly no possibility of distinguishing whether the mimesis is that of reproduction, or if there is always already a productive aspect to it. And by extension, if learning cannot be controlled, the very notion of teaching itself is shifted from a master-student relationality to one where the master is potentially changed as well—the relationality between the master and the student is not only inter-changing, but one cannot even know who is teaching, or learning, at any point. All that can be said is that they are in a relationality; which means that one is ultimately unable to locate the locus of knowledge, of wisdom—the site of which Plato is attempting to convince us is the sole domain of the philosopher. And it is this that philosophy is cringing from. To compound matters, philosophy is striving for wisdom; which can only come from the Gods. In other words, this is a gift that has to be bestowed on them—and more than that, wisdom is always already exterior to one’s control and knowledge. At best, it is the role of one to recognise the gift, to answer the call as it were. Here, if we listen carefully, we can hear the echo of Alexander Graham Bell, and the telephone. And as we are attempting to respond to the call of wisdom—the call that both poetry and philosophy are listening out for—it might be helpful to recall the agreement between Alexander Graham Bell and his brother Melville. In the biography, Alexander Graham Bell and the Conquest of Solitude , Robert V. Bruce notes that Aleck and Melly made a “solemn compact that whichever of us should die first would endeavour to communication with the other if it were possible to do so” (63). Since Melville was the one who passed on first, this pact put the onus on Aleck to receive the call of his brother. If you take into consideration the fact that until Melville’s death, both brothers had been working on an early prototype of the telephone, the instrument of distant sound can be read as an attempt by Aleck to maintain the possibility of keeping in touch with Melly, of hearing the voice from beyond. However, this was a connection that was not premised on any knowing, reason, or rationality; it was rather, one that was based on hope, and born out of love. And here, if we eves-drop on a cross-line with The Telephone Book , we can pick up the voice of Avital Ronell once again and hear, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading” (380). In other words, the telephone can be read as the openness to the possibility of responding to the other; one that might always remain unknown. Even in this day of caller-identification, we can never know for sure who the other person on the line is until we pick up: hence, the only decision we can make—the effects of which we remain blind to until it affects us—is to either pick up or not, to either respond or not. And it is not as if the decision to pick up comes without risks: each time we answer a call, we run the risk of it ruining our day. Even when we don’t know who the caller is, perhaps especially when we don’t know who the person on the other end of the line is—and here one only has to think of prank calls—we are leaving ourselves completely open to being affected by another. Thus, philosophy finds itself in the position of Vladimir and Estragon. Since they have no idea who Godot is, they can never know if or when he shows up—thus, if he (and we are taking his gender on the word of the boy, some boy—we don’t even know if it is the same boy—who comes round in the evening) has already come, they would not be in the position to know it. And even if someone comes to them and announces that “I am Godot,” the wait would not be over—without referentiality to the name, they would have to take on faith that that person is indeed Godot. Hence, all they can know is that they are waiting for Godot; and Godot is the name of that waiting itself. All philosophy can know is that it is waiting; and wisdom is the name of that waiting itself. Which brings us to Tina Turner’s eternal question, “what’s love got to do, got to do with it?” In order to begin to consider that, we have to first attempt to examine the notion of love itself. Perhaps we might begin to consider what the difficulty of the statement “I love you.” For, if love is a relationality between two persons—both of whom remain singular, and are attempting to respond to each other—this suggests that neither of them subsume the other under themselves. In other words, the other remains wholly other. If this is so, then the “you” in the statement always remains shrouded in mystery. And even if the “you” was replaced with the name of the person, the veiling remains: for, names refer both to the singularity that is the person, and also every other person bearing that name, at exactly the same time. To compound matters, the only time one has to utter a persons name is in their absence—thus, the correspondence of a name to that particular person is at best an affect of memory. And if we consider the notion of memory, we have to also open the register of forgetting—bringing along with it the problem that there is no object to forgetting. For instance, when one utters “I forgot,” all one is uttering is the fact that one has forgotten, and nothing more—the moment there is an object to the statement, one has strictly speaking remembered what one has forgotten. Moreover, we have no control over when forgetting happens to us. And since it is always already exterior to us, affects us, and has no necessary object, there is no reason to believe that every moment of memory might not bring with it a moment of forgetting. Hence, whenever we utter a name—even if we accept the correspondence between the utterance and the person in front of us—all we are doing is uttering the fact that we are naming. Thus, it is not so much that ‘a rose by any other name would smell as sweet’ but more appropriately, ‘a rose is a rose is a rose’—the relationality between its name and the phenomenon of its sweet smell can only be established after that moment of naming, that instance of catachresis. So, whenever one utters “I love you,” not only is it a performative statement, it is the very naming of that love—all you are doing is establishing a relationality between you and the other. And since there is no necessary referent—one is naming that referentiality as one utters it—this suggests that it is always already a symbolic statement; without which the mystery of the other cannot me maintained. In other words, one cannot love the other without maintaining this symbolic distance—through a ritual; in this case the utterance “I love you.” This might be why Valentine’s Day seems to provoke such a massive reaction: the most common one from people (besides florists) being, Valentine’s Day is mere commercialism. Those among the nay-sayers who maintain a soft spot for Karl Marx would proceed to call it the commodification of relationships; those who prefer the Gods would claim that the sanctity of relationships has been profaned; the gender theorists would note how the fact that males buy the gifts only serves to highlight the unequal power-relation between the genders. Whichever side and variation of the arguments they choose boils down to this: the discomfort lies in the fact that they are confronted with the notion of relationships moving into a mediated sphere. The underlying logic is that love is between two persons only; it should not only remain between them, but more pertinently, be an unmediated experience between two persons. Which of course completely misses the point. For, if we reopen the register that relationships are the result of a negotiation between two persons, there must then be a space between them for this very negotiation to occur. Otherwise, all that is happening is, one person is subsuming the other within their own sphere of understanding; effectively effacing the other. If that were the case, there would no longer be any relationality; all negotiation is gone and the other person is a mere extension of the self—one is in a masturbatory relationality with one’s imaginary. Hence, any relationship must always already carry with it the unknown, and possibly always unknowable. The other person is an enigma, remains—must remain—enigmatic to you. This is the only way in which the proclamation “I love you” remains singular, remains a love that is about the person as a singular person—and not merely about the qualities of the person, what the person is. For, if the mystery of the other is unveiled, then the love for the other person is also a completely transparent love: one that you can know thoroughly, calculate; a check-list. And if they are knowable, this suggests that they can also be negated, and hence, the love can also go away. Only when the love for the other person is an enigmatic one, one that cannot be understood, can that love potentially be an event—and if it is an event, then strictly speaking, it cannot be known before it happens; at best, it can be glimpsed as it is happening, or perhaps even only realised retrospectively. At the point in which it happens, it is a love that comes from elsewhere: this strange phenomenon is best captured in the colloquial phrase, I was struck by love;” or even more so by, “I was blinded by love.” This is a blinding to not only the subject of the encounter—the self—but also of the very object of that encounter, the “you”—all that can be said is that there is an encounter. And it is for this reason Cupid is blind: not just because love is random (and can happen to anyone at any time), but more importantly because even after it happens, both the reason you are in love, and the person you are in love with, remain blind to you. Since there is an unknowable relationality with the other person, the only way you can approach it is through a ritual. This is the lesson that religions have taught us: since one is never able to phenomenally experience the God(s), one has no choice but to approach them symbolically. These rituals are strictly speaking meaningless—the actual content is interchangeable—as it is the form that is important. Rituals allow us momentary glimpses at secrets; and secrets are never about their content(s). Rather, secrets entail the recognition that they are secrets; the secret lies in their form as secret. This can be seen when we consider how group secrets work: since the entire group knows the secret, clearly the content of the secret is not as important as the fact that only members within the group are privy to this secret. Occasionally the actual content can be so trivial that even other people outside the group might know the information; they just do not realize its significance. For instance, if I used my date of birth as my bank-account password, merely knowing when I was born would not instantly give you the key to my life savings. In order for that to happen, you would have had to recognise the significance of the knowledge of my birthday. This means that you have to know that you know something. Since the God(s) are, strictly speaking, unknowable, this suggests that rituals put one in a position to potentially experience the God(s). The meaningless gestures on Valentine’s Day play precisely this ritualised role. It is not so much what you give the other person, but the fact that you give it to them. The gift in this sense is very much akin to an offering; the gift opens the possibility of an exchange. Gift-giving does not guarantee that you will like what is returned; there is always a reciprocation of the gift, but what is returned to you is never known in advance, until the moment it is received. This means that the worst thing that one can do is not give the gift: that would be akin to a cutting off of all possibilities, a complete closing of all communication with the other person. This at the same time also means that you cannot wait for the other person to give you something before you get them their gift: if that were the scenario, the reciprocal gift would be nothing more than a calculated return. The only manner in which both persons can give true gifts is to offer them independently of the other person, whilst keeping them in mind. In this way, the two gifts are always already both uncalculated (in the sense of not knowing what the return is) and also a reciprocation for the other (without knowing whether the other person actually has a gift in the first place). Naturally, this would seem like an irrational, even stupid, way of buying gifts. But it is precisely the stupidity involved that saves the relationship from being banal—more importantly, stupidity prevents it from entering the mere profane. This is not to say that an enigmatic love cannot end—of course it can. However, the difference lies in the fact that if the relationality is wholly transparent, it is subsumed under reason—completely predictable, within the self, and thus never open to the possibility of otherness, exteriority, musing. A love that is an event is one that is also open to the possibility of the divine, the sacred—always already closer to the possibility of wisdom. If we establish that both love and wisdom are exterior, to our knowledge, and the finitude to our selves, this suggests that both are names for the possibility of openness to otherness. In other words, and what choice do we have here but to use the words of the other, the philosopher—the lover of wisdom—is a name for one who is waiting, and nothing more. But that still leaves us with the question of this uncomfortable relationality between philosophy and poetry. But before we address that question, we have to take a momentary detour, and consider the whether it is possible to call one a poet. For, if we take the notion of a poet to be one who reaches the highest levels of rhetoric (beyond the lawyer, and the orator, who only aim to either please the crowds, or convince by way of sophistry), then we must also acknowledge that one can only become a poet at the moment of seizing, the point of inspiration, by the muses. Without this divine moment, all (s)he can do is practice her craft. As no one can control when the muses make their appearance, one could always be practising in vain—in some way, one is always already practising to be least in the way when the muse whispers into one’s ear; one is practising so as not to be vain. And since one cannot know when the muse will appear, there is no time frame to the practising—unlike the lawyer who speaks against a clock, poetry knows no time; the only time that matters is the time appropriate to poetry itself. Thus, all the poet (if one can use this term) is practising for the possibility of effacing her/him self—and waiting. Thus, in order for poetry to occur, in order to be seized, the poet—along with all her concerns—must cease. In other words, there is no poet; there is only the possibility of poetry. However, even as there is no time frame to this waiting, even as all we can say is that poetry is a name for waiting, the one who is practising is always already also in time. And since (s)he is in a symbolic relationality with the possibility of poetry, this suggests that the practising is her sacrifice, and time is precisely what she is sacrificing. Here, it might be helpful to turn to a strange source when it comes to poetry—Georges Bataille—and consider his teachings in the first volume of The Accursed Share where he reminds us that, the “essence [of sacrifice] is to consume profitlessly .” This is where each exchange is beyond rationality, beyond calculability, beyond reason itself, “unsubordinated to the ‘real’ order and occupied only with the present.” He continues: Sacrifice destroys that which it consecrates. It does not have to destroy as fire does; only the tie that connected the offering to the world of profitable activity is severed, but this separation has the sense of a definitive consumption; the consecrated offering cannot be restored to the real order.” (58) Since there is no need for a physical change in the object of sacrifice—“it does not have to destroy as fire does”—this suggests that the tie is severed symbolically. Hence, there is an aspect of trans-substantiation in this sacrifice: the form remains the same; in fact there is no perceivable change—this is the point at which all phenomenology fails—but there is always already a difference, an absolute separation from the “real order,” from logic, calculability, reason. The object of sacrifice, the victim [,] is a surplus taken from the mass of useful wealth…Once chosen, he is the accursed share , destined for violent consumption. But the curse tears him away from the order of things…” (59). And it is this tearing away from the order of things—the order of rationality—that “restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, rendered profane” (55). For, only when it is no longer useful, when it is no longer abstracted—subjected, subsumed under—merely a use-value, can the object be an object as such, can a subject be a subject as such; be a singularity. Thus, it is never so much who or what is sacrificed, but the fact that there is a sacrifice. So even as (s)he is sacrificing her time to poetry, it is always already beyond her knowledge whether what (s)he is doing is actually preparing her for poetry or not—all (s)he can know is that she is sacrificing and nothing more. Hence, all (s)he can do is to open her self to the possibility of this relationality—all (s)he can do is be in love with poetry. At the moment the muse whispers into her ear, (s)he ceases to be, and becomes a medium for poetry—and since this possession is always already beyond our cognitive knowledge, this is also a moment of divine wisdom. In other words, there is no difference between poetry and wisdom—the moment of poetry is the moment of wisdom. And this might be the very reason for the philosopher’s aversion to poets. Not so much because they may corrupt the youth (this is after all the aim of all thinking, all philosophy), but precisely because in order to do so, the philosopher must wait for a moment of possession, for divine musing, for poetry. Hence, all thought, all thinking, all philosophy, is nothing but the waiting for the possibility of poetry itself. (shrink)

This collection of essays charts the intellectual trajectory of Barbara Glowczewski, an anthropologist who has worked with the Warlpiri people of Australia since 1979. She shows that the ways Aboriginal people actualise virtualities of their Dreaming space-time into collective networks of ritualised places resonate with Guattarian and Deleuzian concepts. Inspired by the art and struggles of different Indigenous people and other discriminated groups, especially women, Glowczewski draws on her own conversations with Guattari, and her debates with various scholars to deliver (...) an innovative agenda for radical anthropology. (shrink)

En partant de la définition des rituels, et notamment du rôle de la parole, qu'elle soit verbale ou non-verbale, cet article interroge la façon dont la ritualisation peut contribuer à l'éducation, notamment en milieu scolaire. Après un tour d'horizon des principaux aspects rituels de l'enseignement et de l'école, l'auteur questionne plus particulièrement les rituels d'apprentissage, c'est-à-dire ceux qui structurent la relation enseignant/enseigné au sein de la classe. En s'appuyant sur une théorisation psychanalytique elle montre alors comment les rituels peuvent (...) ou non, notamment en fonction de leur degré « d'ouverture », contribuer à faire exister les élèves dans leur singularité et, ce faisant, les aider à se construire dans leur rapport au savoir.Starting from the definition of rituals, including the role of speech, either verbal or non-verbal, this article examines how ritual can contribute to education, particularly in schools. After an overview of the main aspects of teaching and rituals of the school, especially the author questions the rituals of learning, that is to say those that structure the relationship teacher / learner in the class. Based on psychoanalytic theorizing it then shows how rituals may or may not, depending on their particular degree of "openness" to help students exist in their singularity, thereby helping to build in their relation to knowledge. (shrink)

This volume explores the deeply interwoven connection of education, art and nature in the context of East Asia. With contributions from authors in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, the book considers unnoticed but significant themes involved in the interplay of nature, art, and education. It manifests how nature and art can educate, and how education and nature play the role of art. The chapters explore a range of themes relevant to East Asian characteristics, including skill acquisition, Japanese calendar arts and (...) ritual of feelings, garden architecture, the ritualised body, collaborative poetry art, translational language between humans and nature, the Confucian classical Six Arts, the artistic embodiment of the Kyoto School, and the heritage art based education in Korea. The authors examine these themes in novel ways to bring to light the relevance of the East Asian insights to the contemporary global world. This book is an outstanding resource to all researchers, scholars, and students interested in educational aesthetics, philosophy of education, East Asian studies, comparative education and intercultural education. (shrink)

This article analyses the short performances of Drag Sethlas at the yearly Gran Canaria Drag Queen Contest in Spain (2017–20) from the perspective of religious studies and gender studies, following on from an earlier article in which this case was explored in light of the severe blasphemy accusations (by local and national bishops and lay organisations) against the 2017 show. These short performances consist of remarkable representations of Roman Catholic texts, saints, symbols and rituals acted out as prize-winning drag-queen shows (...) that were aired on national television. At the same time, these acts are situated, by reference to famous earlier controversial acts by the pop artists Madonna, Lady Gaga and Ariana Grande, in a genealogy of provocations and blasphemy accusations that are currently made in North American and Western European countries. In exploring the forms of ritualisation (cf. Bell 1989) in the provocation that this type of popular artistic performance with strong religious connotations evokes, I show the presence of a double theatricality in Sethlas’s first and most controversial performance: on the one hand a ‘holy drama’ centred around a religious pattern of penance, repentance and redemption, and on the other hand a specific drag theatricality, with its parodies, mockery and daring erotic scenes. It is precisely the connection between both forms of theatricality, especially the representation of the Virgin Mary and Jesus, who play a large and special role in both forms of theatricality, that contributes most to the provocativeness of this scene. (shrink)

While the majority of organised religions determine the origins of religion itself in an act of divine revelation, social science literature takes an evolutionary perspective. Without engaging the question of origin of religion from either perspective, this article proposes seven correlations between interpersonal violence and the progression of organised religion by suggesting that interpersonal violence plays a significant role in the institutionalising process of organised religion. Although interpersonal violence does not necessarily cause the structuring of faith, it reinforces and provides (...) solutions to the existing patterns of threat faced by the community, which together lead to the organisation of religion. The first part of this article (stages 1–4) surveys the psychology of violence by focusing on the theories of frustration–aggression, mimetic rivalry, triangulation and the genesis of scapegoating and guilt. The second part (stages 5–6) marks the transition from personal to social psychology and surveys violence in the primitive religion, as manifested in the ritualising process of the scapegoat, and the genesis of sacrifice. The third part (stage 7) highlights the complexity of ritual, ethics and doctrine, in the evolution of religion from a primitive state to an advanced organised institution. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne of the most powerful claims of disability theology is that the rejection of persons with disabilities somehow correlates with a rejection of God. This ‘correlative rejection’ is, however, frequently just stated rather than explored in detail, something this article therefore seeks to remedy by examining one example of the correlative rejection that draws together the ethical concerns of theologians writing on intellectual disability with Meister Eckhart’s teaching on the human relationship with God. Here, the correlative rejection is exposed as (...) an inevitable result of the narrow emphasis on autonomy and rationality in human self-perception which shape the habituated, even ritualised ways that we try to know persons with intellectual disabilities and God. By contrast, truly knowing and relating to persons with intellectual disabilities, God, and finally also ourselves, relies on a reconciliation with the dependence, vulnerability, and non-rational forms of exchange that a narrow attachment to a... (shrink)

In various professional groups, experts send rookies on absurd tasks as a joke. The fool’s errand appears in factories and hospitals, in elite schools and scout camps, among soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Why are newcomers deceived and humiliated, and why are pranks relatively similar and remarkably persistent over time? I propose that the cultural success and the recurrent features of the fool’s errand are based on evolved cognitive mechanisms activated by apprenticeship as social learning and group induction. Epistemic vigilance explains (...) how novices are reliably deceived by experts using opaque statements erroneously perceived as pedagogical. Furthermore, coalitional psychology explains why insiders use the prank as strategic signalling of hierarchies based on epistemic asymmetry. The intersection of cognitive mechanisms and patterns of professional recruitment maintains a tradition of ritualised pranking in which insiders coordinate to humiliate newcomers to assert epistemic and coalitional dominance. (shrink)

Door de Franse filosoof Maurice Blanchot geïnspireerd pleidooi voor de ritualisering van het denken.

This article explores the underestimated teaching of the 'five tears' as mystical expression in the text Il dialogo by the Dominican nun and philosopher-theologian, Catherine of Siena. The objective of the article is to indicate the significance of the teaching of the 'five tears', against the backdrop of the wider symbolic function of tears and 'holy grief' in Late Medieval mysticism. After presenting a biographical introduction, the contemplative, communicative and secretive import of the meaning of tears in the Middle Ages (...) are reappraised and applied to The dialogues. By synthesising the scarce references in the relevant secondary literature, the teaching of the five tears are henceforth discussed: the tears of damnation, which are the tears of 'evil and sinful people'; the tears of fear, which are the tears of fallen humankind in the presence of God's judgement; the tears of gratitude, cried by a 'saved humanity' who now 'see and taste God's goodness' ; the perfect tears, cried by people in their selfless disposition toward and love for the human Other; and the sweet tears of tenderness, cried by those who love God and humankind, in a radicalisation of Jesus of Nazareth's summary of the Law, 'more than thyself'. Catherine's teaching of the 'five tears' certainly presents unique features and its own considerations, but should, nevertheless, be interpreted as an extension of the contemplative and secretive functions of 'holy grief' as already presented in Scripture and reconsidered by the Eastern and Western church fathers in the second to the fifth centuries. Catherine's contribution to Medieval mysticism is established therein that she expanded those initial contents by presenting the teaching of the five tears as a ritualised prerequisite for development in the Medieval pilgrim's spiritual itinerary to God.CONTRIBUTION: This article contributes to scholarship in Medieval philosophy by contextualising Catherine of Siena's teaching of the 'five tears' within the wider symbolic realm of tears and 'holy grief' in late Medieval mysticism, stressing the contemplative, communicative and secretive import of tears throughout the Middle Ages. (shrink)

Our research on the texts of the Byzantine historians and chroniclers revealed an apparently curious phenomenon, namely, the abandonment of terminally ill emperors by their physicians when the latter realised that they could not offer any further treatment. This attitude tallies with the mentality of the ancient Greek physicians, who even in Hippocratic times thought the treatment and care of the terminally ill to be a challenge to nature and hubris to the gods. Nevertheless, it is a very curious attitude (...) in the light of the concepts of the Christian Byzantine physicians who, according to the doctrines of the Christian religion, should have been imbued with the spirit of philanthropy and love for their fellowmen. The meticulous analysis of three examples of abandonment of Byzantine emperors, and especially that of Alexius I Comnenus, by their physicians reveals that this custom, following ancient pagan ethics, in those times took on a ritualised form without any significant or real content. (shrink)

Every human community creates its own representation of its surrounding world and of the men who constitute that world. It sets out in an orderly fashion the raison d’être of social and cultural organisation, it ritualises the ties between men and their relationship with their environment. Man creates the world while the world creates man, through a relationship which varies with each society; ethnography shows us innumerable versions. Human cultures consist of symbols. It is always a matter of reducing the (...) world to the human factor, but in line with a social imaginary quantity specific to a particular group, which is itself the tributary of its past and the possible influence of other groups. (shrink)

The jaw movements of speech are most probably derived from jaw movements associated with vocalisation. Cyclicity does not argue strongly for derivation from a cyclic pattern, because it arises readily in any system with feedback control. The appearance of regular repetition as a part of ritualisation of a display may have been important.

Voir épisodiquement son enfant dans le cadre d’un espace rencontre, c’est accepter la règle posée par le juge qui énonce que l’intimité familiale de la relation parent-enfant s’exposera en un lieu public. Cette étude, menée auprès de parents détenteurs d’un droit de visite, tente de rendre compte de la manière dont ils gèrent ce hiatus, de la nécessité pour eux, voire pour leurs enfants, de ritualiser ce passage de seuil dont l’intensité émotionnelle peut être éprouvante. Nous verrons ainsi se détacher (...) quelques traits caractérisant, à un moment ou à un autre de leur parcours, l’attitude de ces parents : la convivialité, l’indépendance ou la démonstration anxieuse. (shrink)

P. J. Rhodes: Preface Polly Low and Graham Oliver: Comparing Cultures of Commemoration in Ancient and Modern Societies Polly Low: The Monuments ot the War Dead in Classical Athens: Forms, Contexts, Meanings Alison Cooley: Commemorating the War Dead of the Roman World Angelos Chaniotis: The Ritualised Commemoration of War in the Hellenistic City: Memory, Identity, Emotion Avner Ben-Amos: Two Neo-Classical Monuments in Modern France: The Pantheon and Arc de Triomphe Graham Oliver: Naming the Dead, Writing the Individual: Classical Traditions and (...) Commemorative Practices in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Stefan Goebel: Cultural Memory and the Great War: Medievalism and Classicism in British and German War Memorials Lawrence A. Tritle: Monument to Defeat: the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in American Culture and Society. (shrink)

Why is there such a striking discrepancy between the flexibility, democracy and empowerment that the Bologna process aims for, and the superficial educational activities that it actually results in? Our answer is based on the ritual theory of the American anthropologist Roy Rappaport and the psychoanalytical framework of the Austrian philosopher Robert Pfaller. Interpreting schoolified education as a ritual, we argue that both the reform initiative and its ensuing educational activities should be interpreted as mainly productive of a certain appearance, (...) of compliance with prominent norms of modern society: the norms are articulated in policy documents and enacted in educational activity. We take schoolified education to be a normal ritual, in that this appearance is accepted ‘as if’ it corresponded with reality, while at the same time most people are aware (in a certain sense) of its superficial and ritualistic character. A twist, however, is added by the fact that modern society is distinctly anti-ritualistic, and therefore constantly tries to make education work ‘for real’. Drawing on Pfaller’s distinction between belief and faith, we show that this pursuit of de-ritualisation actually makes education progressively more formalised and coercive. (shrink)

Pour le tout-petit, c’est d’une part la ritualisation de la vie quotidienne, la constance et la prévisibilité de son organisation, et d’autre part l’attitude de l’adulte à son égard qui préparent l’enfant à l’intégration des règles sociales. La délicatesse, l’attitude prévenante et polie de l’adulte à son égard constituent sans doute la meilleure et la plus naturelle des préparations. C’est seulement lorsque l’enfant montre une maîtrise suffisante du langage parlé, des codes linguistiques, et, corrélativement, un certain degré de conscience (...) de soi et de l’autre, de connaissance et de compréhension des interactions sociales – période que l’on pourrait situer autour de 2 ans et demi, 3 ans – qu’il devient pertinent d’attendre de sa part certains signes de conformité aux usages et conventions en vigueur, en termes de politesse notamment. Mais c’est d’abord et surtout parce qu’il en aura expérimenté l’utilisation habituelle par l’adulte à son endroit que l’enfant éprouvera le plaisir et la fierté de les utiliser à son tour, manifestant par là combien l’identification est un puissant ressort du processus de socialisation. (shrink)

The Archaeology of Semiotics and the social order of things is edited by George Nash and George Children and brings together 15 thought-provoking chapters from contributors around the world. A sequel to an earlier volume published in 1997, it tackles the problem of understanding how complex communities interact with landscape and shows how the rules concerning landscape constitute a recognised and readable grammar. The mechanisms underlying landscape grammar are both physical and mental, being based in part on the mindset of (...) the individual; the same landscape can thus evoke different meanings for different people and at different times. People's perception has greatly influenced the construction of landscapes over millennia but, until recently, the potential of this area has been largely untapped. Apart from chapters focusing solely upon human interaction with landscape, there are several which skilfully integrate artefacts and place with landscape (e.g. Gheorghiu and Sognnes). Other chapters look at the way people have marked the landscape through such mechanisms as rock-art (e.g. Clegg, Devereux, Estévez, Fossati, Kelleher and Skier). Rock-art establishes personal and communal identity in relation to landscape and it is clear that other forms of visual expression were in place which distinctively created special places within the landscape. Landscape constructs can bind cultures together; bringing the old ways of reading the landscape into contemporary life (e.g. Smiseth). Defining early and late prehistoric landscapes and segregating these into, say, mundane domestic and ritualised spaces rely on both clear and subtle archaeologies and in this volume distinct monument clustering and ritualised linearity are considered (e.g. Mason and Nash). A volume such as this cannot escape the influence of New World approaches, such as anthropology, and in many respects chapters by Bender, Muller and Merritt give context to other chapters within the book. Finally, one must consider text as a means of constructing landscape and this is considered by Heyd, who eloquently deconstructs the travel diary of a 17th century Japanese poet. This will be an important volume for archaeologists, landscape scholars and students. The many approaches used are tried and tested, forming an invaluable resource and not just another edited book. (shrink)

What could be more dull than the idea of a symposium? The word conjures up associations with dusty dons, tedious academic papers on deservedly obscure facts and theories. In universities these days, what used to be called ‘symposia’ are often called ‘workshops’ – perhaps in a feeble attempt to make the symposium sound more exciting. If this is your view of the symposium, you may be surprised to learn that the original ancient Greek symposium was a drinking party: the word (...) derives from the Greek for ‘drinking together’. A Greek symposium was a ritualised and often debauched affair. The master of the symposium would begin by drinking a small ‘libation’ of undiluted wine – the Greeks normally mixed their wine with water – and he would then decide in what proportion the wine was to be diluted to determine what kind of evening it was going to be. Plato’s Symposium, a dialogue on the nature of love, describes the most famous symposium of all. The great philosopher Socrates dominates the discussion (as he normally did), drinks more than anyone else, and leaves the symposium sober in the early morning, with the inferior thinkers and drinkers comatose. (shrink)

Abstract:Scholars have long been interested in how people experienced places in the past, often relying for their evidence either on modern engagements with surviving landscapes, buildings and objects, or on contemporary descriptions of the ritualised or required activities that took place in and around them. This article argues that both approaches risk eliminating the subjectivity of historical agents and, thus, the ground of experience itself, assuming an unjustifiable uniformity either among historical persons or between historical persons and modern scholars. Historians (...) thus need to find ways to return the specificity and individuality of historical subjects to their accounts of the experience of place.This article proposes that they should turn to recent work in archaeology, literary studies and cognitive science to find methodologies for describing the ‘historical phenomenology’ of a place, combining knowledge of material conditions, cultural and social environments and particular embodied encounters to produce ‘ecological’ accounts of specific place experiences in the past. It applies such an approach to an account of a pilgrimage made by a Florentine merchant in 1411 to ‘St Patrick's Purgatory’, a small but continentally renowned building on an island in northwest Ireland. By reading ‘among’ a broad range of sources, including a letter he sent describing the phenomena of his experience of the Purgatory, contemporary pilgrimage literature, medieval soteriological doctrines and the physical qualities of the Purgatory itself, this article is able to describe both critical elements of his phenomenological ecology and their dynamics as they combined in an embodied experience of place. (shrink)

This article explores a sequence of events, a combination of Orthodox Christian village and chapel festivals, associated processions and a cross-border procession, through the theoretical concept of ritualisation. The sequence of events takes place annually in the Finnish villages of Saarivaara and Hoilola, the Pörtsämö wilderness cemetery and the former Finnish municipality of Korpiselkä, located today in Russia; it attracts participants with religious and other motives, including nostalgia and family history. An analysis is made of how different and sometimes (...) contradictory modes of action are structured and intertwined to form a coherent ritual event. On the basis of original anthropological research undertaken near and over the border between Finland and Russia, in Karelia, it emerges that the ritual mastery by Orthodox priests and shared goals and motives of heritage and culture give the journey a necessary structure, which can be studied and explained in terms of ritualisation. (shrink)

This article examines the figure of Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457), and challenges his nineteenth-century interpretation as a precursor of modern critical historiography and philology, by focusing on two of his works on the ancient Roman historian Livy. The first is the Letter to King Alfonso on the Two Tarquins (1444), where Valla claimed to have discovered a mistake in Livy, and the second is the Confutation against Morandi (1455), a defence of the former work against a critic. The article has two (...) aims. The first aim is to offer a reassessment of the significance of these works, arguing against the view that Letter to King Alfonso represents the formulation of a radically new ‘critical' methodology. The second aim is to consider these works in the broader cultural context on ritualised performance in which they were conceived. Vital to their composition was the so-called ‘hour of the book’, ceremonial readings of classical authors at the court of King Alfonso, and the broader cultural context of the veneration of Livy in late medieval Italy. (shrink)

In 2001 a highly infectious animal disease, foot and mouth disease, broke out in the UK and spread rapidly. In May, when the spread seemed to be slowing down, new disease hotspots appeared in previously little affected regions, such as North Yorkshire. New biosecurity rules were imposed. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, this article shows that the biosecurity measures farmers implemented during the epidemic meant more than just reducing the risk of spreading FMD. For many, cleansing (...) and disinfecting became Foot and Mouth. Biosecurity actions became invested with symbolic values and, in particular, were ritualised as part of the symbolic spatial construction of an otherwise 'invisible' enemy. (shrink)

Using concepts of evolutionary game theory, this paper presents a critique of ethical intuitionism, or non-naturalism, in its cognitivist and objectivist interpretation. While epistemological considerations suggest that human rational learning through experience provides no basis for objective moral knowledge, it is argued below that modern evolutionary theory explains why this is so, i.e., why biological organisms do not evolve so as to experience objective preferences and obligations. The difference between the modes of the cognition of objective and of valuative environmental (...) attributes is explained with reference to different modes of natural selection acting on the cognitive apparatus of the organism. The negative implications are pointed out which the observable diversity of intraspecific behavioural adaptations and of cultural values has for the cognitivist, objectivist foundation of ethics. Eventually a non-cognitivist alternative to ethical intuitionism is outlined in terms of empirical authority relations, with the ritualisation of dominance-submission patterns as the evolutionary origin of human charismatic authority. (shrink)

Le débat sur la reconnaissance de l’histoire de l’ esclavage colonial en France illustre les conflits de mémoire qui émaillent un projet qui se veut unanime. La question de la ritualisation officielle de cette reconnaissance souligne le rôle d’instauration du groupe que joue le travail de mémoire. Dès lors que l’État sollicite des figures et mises en scène d’événements présentés comme fondateurs, cherche-t-il moins à légitimer la communauté nationale sur une base idéologique qu’à l’édifier sur le respect de la (...) diversité culturelle? (shrink)