Many religiously minded materialist philosophers have attempted to understand the doctrine of the survival of death from within a physicalist approach. Their goal is not to show the doctrine false, but to explain how it can be true. One such approach has been developed by Peter van Inwagen. After explaining what I call the duplication objection, I present van Inwagen’s proposal and show how a proponent might attempt to solve the problem of duplication. I argue that the very (...) features of the view that aid the proponent in responding to the duplication objection entails the possibility of an impossible state of affairs—that two distinct persons can at the same time be identical with the same bundle of material simples. The religiously minded materialist is caught between the horns of a dilemma. One’s view regarding human persons must be robust enough to account for personal identity over time, and so not fall to the duplication objection. At the same time, the view must not entail the possibility of two persons temporarily having complete coincident existence. (shrink)

Version française: Dean Zimmerman défend l’affirmation œcuménique selon laquelle il est possible que toutes les personnes humaines survivent à la mort biologique du corps quelle que soit la théorie plausible de l’identité personnelle adoptée. Dans cet article, je présente certains principes à propos de la survie qui sont pertinents pour n’importe quelle théorie plausible de l’identité personnelle et pertinents pour une survie qui nous intéresserait. Appliqués à certains cas particuliers d’êtres humains, ces principes rendent l’affirmation œcuménique soit fausse, soit difficile (...) à croire rationnellement. -/- English version: Dean Zimmerman defends the ecumenical claim that it is possible for all human persons to survive the biological death of the body regardless of the plausible theory of personal identity adopted. In this paper, I present some principles about survival that are relevant to any plausible theory of personal identity and relevant to any survival of interest. When applied to some particular cases of human beings, these principles make the ecumenical claim either false or difficult to believe rationally. Keywords: Dean Zimmerman, Personal Identity, Survival. (shrink)

According to several recent polls, more than 80 percent of Americans believe in life after death. Of those, many adhere to their beliefs because of religious faith. Beyond religion, though, there is increasing scientific examination of life after death hypotheses. Both religious and secular believers are more frequently using empirical research to answer the key questions of how consciousness may transcend corporeal life and death. These essays from leading survival theoreticians scientifically assay the issues and evidence. (...) Interdisciplinary in nature, it covers diverse topics including the origins of life after death hypotheses; theoretical, methodological and empirical approaches to afterlife research; hallucination experiences; evidence for consciousness survival; birthmarks and previous-life memories; suicide; and spirit participation. Concluding chapters discuss the future of afterlife research and offer a new interpretation of consciousness survival. (shrink)

Does anyone ever survive his or her bodily death ? Could anyone? No speculative questions are older than these, or have been answered more frequently or more variously. None have been laid to rest more often, or — in our times — with more claimed decisiveness. Jay Rosenberg, for instance, no doubt speaks for many contemporary philosophers when he claims, in his recent book, to have ‘ demonstrated ’ that ‘ we cannot [even] make coherent sense of the supposed (...) possibility that a person's history might continue beyond that person's [bodily] death’. (shrink)

The Zhuangzi 莊子 depicts persons as surviving their deaths through the natural transformations of the world into very different forms—such as roosters, cart-wheels, rat livers, and so on. It is common to interpret these passages metaphorically. In this essay, however, I suggest employing a “Conventionalist” view of persons that says whether a person survives some event is not merely determined by the world, but is partly determined by our own attitudes. On this reading, Zhuangzi’s many teachings urging us to embrace (...) transformation are not merely a psychological aid for dealing with death, but also serve as a tool for literally surviving it. (shrink)

The goal of this inquiry is to discover whether a plausible naturalistic case can be made for personal survival after death. Personal survival is defined, and a plausibility scale developed as a tool. ;Various analytical objections to survival are considered and rejected as faulty. A key empirical objection is then examined: namely, that personal identity depends on memories, memories are stored in the brain, and personal identity thus cannot survive the brain's death. First, we distinguish (...) habit memories from "pure" memories of individual events and insights; the latter alone are crucial to personal identity. We then review memory findings and cases in neurology, neurophysiology, psychology, psychiatry and phenomenology, concluding that brain storage of "pure" memories is highly implausible. This being so, the memory argument against personal survival fails. ;A plausible self-structure is proposed, with pure memories lodged in the inmost self, fed by the experiencing self. Further evidence and argument indicate, with moderate plausibility, that the inmost/experiencing self is not reducible to, or identical with, or intextricably dependent on, the brain; nor is it merely a cell in the social web or the natural environment. ;Further inquiry suggests that survival of the inmost/experiencing self, after death of the organic self, coheres with a defensible ontology. Building on insights of recent philosophers of becoming, this ontology grounds human existence in temporality or real duration, stretching from birth to death. In this system our mental life, largely in the inmost self, greatly overflows our cerebral life, so that, as Bergson wrote, "survival becomes so probable that the onus of proof falls on him who denies it rather than on him who affirms it." ;The inquiry then widens and deepens this ontological discussion, without entering into theology, and also offers some speculation on what a naturalistic personal survival might be like. The inquiry concludes that such survival is plausible, that is, its reality is supported by substantial evidence outweighing the opposing evidence. (shrink)

The article discusses the philosophical problems associated with the dualistic conception of the person dominant in traditions influenced by Platonism. The key suggestion made in the article is that opting for an embodied rather than a disembodied posthumous existence for the human person will in no way hinder the theistic philosopher when it comes to arguing that God exists in a disembodied form.

A new and simplified edition of Myers' major work, originally published in 1903. Previous editions had relegated all illustrative case material to cumbersome appendices. The editor of this edition has abridged this material and integrated it into the body of the text. The result is a more manageable and readable volume.--J. M. W.

Graphical AbstractWith DNA damage being a primary anti-cancertarget, a need has arisen for the development of an approach that is a harmlessfor normal tissues but allows for cancer cell-specific cytotoxicity. Previous researchfrom K. Gurova's suggests that small compounds, namely curaxins that bind theDNA can cause chromatin instability and cell death in a cancer cell-specificmanner. In this brief perspective commentary, we investigate how the scientificcommunity has further developed this anti-cancer approach.

Through an attentive reading of his essay, “Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul,” it is possible to pursue Derrida's thinking about psychoanalysis and cruelty in terms of the distinction he makes between Nietzsche and Freud, whereby the latter maintains an “opposable term” to cruelty. This article explores the status and significance of such an “opposable term” as one possible source of a Freudian future beyond Freud, and in a postscript carries its reading into the question of the “side of (...) life” and of death in Derrida's H.C. for Life. (shrink)

Offers a description of what happens to survivors after a death, based on the effect this death has on the survivor's relation to the spatial and temporal world occupied after the loss of the deceased.

We can be certain that the body does not survive death. Once the heart stops circulating blood, the brain is no longer nourished and begins to decay. On the basis of medical evidence it would seem that, within a quarter of an hour, the personality is irreparably destroyed and the individual ceases to exist. But now there is mounting scientific evidence for a life after death. In At the Hour of Death, veteran psychical researchers Karlis Osis, Ph.D (...) and Erlendur Haraldsson, Ph.D collated compelling evidence that suggests we, as conscious beings, do survive physical death. This book is the product of extensive interviews of over 1,000 doctors and nurses who have been present when cases of "post-mortem existence" have occurred. Extensive computer analyses of their observations have been made. The results are reported in this first truly scientific investigation of the experiences of the dying at the hour of death. What these doctors and nurses have witnessed cannot be explained away by medical, psychological, cultural, or other conditioning. Yet it may answer the fundamental question of human existence. "Finally, a book that probes death and dying with modern research techniques. Osis and Haraldsson present compelling evidence that the deathbed is the gateway to another existence. The visions of the dying appear to be not hallucinations but glimpses through the windows of eternity." -Alan Vaughan, editor of New Realities Magazine "A major contribution to the scientific study of the question of post-mortem existence. -Raymond A. Moody, M.D., author of Life After Life. (shrink)

What happens to us when we die? According to Christian faith, we will rise again bodily from the dead. This claim raises a series of philosophical and theological conundrums: Is it rational to hope for life after death in bodily form? Will it truly be “we” who are raised again or will it be post-mortem duplicates of us? How can personal identity be secured? What is God's role in resurrection and everlasting life? In response to these conundrums, this volume (...) presents joint work of leading philosophers and theologians on life after death. So this volume is an impressive demonstration of interdisciplinary cooperation between philosophy and theology. Various models are offered which depict what resurrection into an incorruptible post-mortem body might look like. (shrink)

Prolonged survival after the declaration of death by neurologic criteria creates ambiguity regarding the validity of this methodology. This ambiguity has perpetuated the debate among secular and nondissenting Catholic authors who question whether the neurologic standards are sufficient for the declaration of death of organ donors. Cardiopulmonary criteria are being increasingly used for organ donors who do not meet brain death standards. However, cardiopulmonary criteria are plagued by conflict of interest issues, arbitrary standards for candidacy, and (...) the lack of standardized protocols for organ procurement. Combining the neurological and cardiopulmonary standards into a single protocol would mitigate the weaknesses of both and provide greater biologic and moral certainty that a donor of unpaired vital organs is indeed dead. (shrink)

In a number of works of art, I have taken an interest in insects, bookworms that eat books, electronics as anatomy and clever robots whose actions in a way resemble the apparently primitive abilities of insects. This text has its starting point in two works of art, Eaten Books and Atlas of AInsects. In the artworks, I am interested in insect anatomy and insects as symbols of decay, survival, extinction, death and post humanity. The text is originally from (...) an artistic lecture about my work with insects and coding, and is based on a reading from within the computer program Eaten Books. A performance where the software is letting insects erase the text. (shrink)

The author introduces and critically analyzes two recent, curious findings and their accompanying explanations regarding how the folk intuits the capabilities of the dead and those in a persistent vegetative state. The dead are intuited to survive death, whereas PVS patients are intuited as more dead than the dead. Current explanations of these curious findings rely on how the folk is said to conceive of death and the dead: either as the annihilation of the person, or that person’s (...) continuation as a disembodied being. The author argues that these two conceptions are incompatible and inconsistent with each other and the evidence. Contrariwise, the author argues that the folk intuition about dead-survivors and the living dead are more easily explained by appealing to cross-culturally established concepts: the folk biological concept of death the existential concept of death, and the concept of social death. (shrink)

Whereas traditional abolitionist arguments call for putting an end to capital punishment, French-Algerian philosopher Jacques Derrida emphasizes its survival, writing that “even when it will have been abolished, the death penalty will survive.” My dissertation interprets this perplexing claim by attending to the specificity of Derrida’s discourse on survival or survivance, contending that the death penalty serves an irreducible role in the constitution of the (individual or collective) subject, such that, even in the event of its (...) abolition, some form of the death penalty must continue. Through close readings of Heidegger, Kant, Nietzsche, Freud, Michel de Montagne, and Victor Hugo, as well as Shakespeare, linguist Émile Benveniste, Hungarian psychoanalysts Abraham and Torok, and the nineteenth-century political theorist Juan Donoso Cortés, the dissertation provides an account of the function of the death penalty as a specific institution within the modern penal system of a collective political body and as the legacy of ancient political economies based on sacrificial rites. This analysis interprets the death penalty both structurally and specifically, accounting for the indissociable relationship between the institution and its conceptual structure more broadly. Survivance, I argue, only ever occurs through an other, leaving open the question of the survival of the death penalty to the dissemination of indefinite and unpredictable forms that could consist in its abolition. (shrink)

If the Supreme Court affirms either Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington or Quill v. Vacco, state legislatures will be presented with a new and unwelcome task: regulating physician-assisted suicide. This article focuses on the states task of specific policy making in light of the due process reasoning in Compassion in Dying and the equal protection reasoning in Quill. Policy makers must try to predict whether a particular regulation would in practice achieve its intended objective. They must also try (...) to predict whether the regulation would survive constitutional review if challenged. Finally, they must consider the extent to which they could, or should, maintain two different regulatory regimes: a more permissive one for decisions to forgo life-sustaining medical treatments, and a more restrictive one for decisions to obtain a prescription for a lethal dose of medication. This last issue will be especially challenging if the equal protection analysis in Quill prevails. (shrink)

What is death? Do people survive death? What do we mean when we say that someone is "dying"? Presenting a clear and engaging discussion of the classic philosophical questions surrounding death, this book studies the great metaphysical and moral problems of death. In the first part, Feldman shows that a definition of life is necessary before death can be defined. After exploring several of the most plausible accounts of the nature of life and demonstrating their (...) failure, he goes on to propose his own conceptual scheme for death and related concepts. In the second part, Feldman turns to ethical and value-theoretical questions about death. Addressing the ancient Epicurean ethical problem about the evil of death, he argues that death can be a great evil for those who die, even if they do not exist after death, because it may deprive them of the goods they would have enjoyed if they had continued to live. Confrontations with the Reaper concludes with a novel consequentialist theory about the morality of killing, applying it to such thorny practical issues as abortion, suicide, and euthanasia. (shrink)

Four-dimensionalists think that we persist over time by having different temporal parts at each of the times at which we exist. Eternalists think that all times are equally real. Deprivationists think that death is an evil for the one who dies because it deprives them of something. I argue that four-dimensionalist eternalism, conjoined with a standard deprivationist account of the evil of death, has surprising implications for what we should think about the evil of death. In particular, (...) given these assumptions, we will lack any grounds for thinking that death is an evil for some individuals for whom we would antecedently expect it to be an evil, namely those individuals who cease to exist at death. Alternatively, we will only have some grounds for thinking that death is an evil for certain individuals for whom we might antecedently be more inclined to think death is not an evil, namely those individuals who survive death, in the sense that they continue to exist after death. (shrink)

The paper begins by briefly engaging critically—on theological grounds—with Dean Zimmerman’s defense of Peter van Inwagen’s Christian Materialist idea that we are identical with our bodies, and so survive bodily death by not actually undergoing bodily death. Next, I consider the view of the mind-body relation that Dean himself is tempted by, namely Emergent Substance Dualism, arguing that it is best seen as a fig leaf that at most works to avoid offending contemporary anti-theistic “traducian” sensibilities. In displacing (...) Emergent Substance Dualism, I set out a Neo-Aristotelian account of essence and embodiment that allows for—indeed entails—the possibility of our surviving the death of our bodies. Along the way a characterization of ontological reductionism is given, which avoids the incoherent thought that reduction goes by way of identity. The characterization makes evident why mental events and states are not reducible to physical events. Finally, two non-reductive relations between mental and physical events, namely subserving and implementing, are defined, and then used to characterize the relation of embodiment, and explain how certain mental acts can be “difference-makers” in the physical realm. I only aim to show that given the manifest failure of psycho-physical ontological reduction, this new account of survival adds no further mystery to the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Book review of Georg Gasser, ed. “Personal Identity: How do we Survive Our Death?” (Ashgate, 2010).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A New Look at Animal-to-Human Organ TransplantationCharles R. McCarthy (bio)The acute shortage of organs available for transplantation into human beings combined with a new scientific understanding of the immune systems of both humans and animals make it probable that animal-to-human solid organ transplants (xenografts) may soon be attempted at a frequency rate unknown in the past. 1 Optimism about successful animal-to-human organ transplantation is greater than at any previous (...) time. The creation of a reliable supply of animal organs appears to be technically feasible. At least five major transplant centers in the United States are currently considering plans to pursue xenotransplantation. Although, at the time of this writing, no federal guidelines prohibit animal-to-human organ transplantation, the institutions considering such programs are awaiting deliberations on the subject by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).The demand for organs suitable for transplantation into human beings greatly exceeds the supply. According to the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS 1996a), approximately 44,000 patients in the United states awaited organ transplantation at the end of 1995. In 1994, more than 3,000 patients died while on the transplant waiting list, and the demand for transplantable organs increases annually (UNOS 1996b). The figures do not include the hundreds or perhaps thousands of patients who could profit from a transplant, but who do not meet the requirements of the UNOS waiting list. Even if efforts to persuade persons to donate organs are redoubled, and even if the consent to donate organs should become a legal presumption, there is little prospect of developing a sufficient supply of transplantable human organs to meet the growing demand.As technical and biological barriers to successful animal-to-human xenografts are lowered, the prospect of raising dedicated colonies of animals, genetically altered to reduce the chances that human hosts will reject organs derived from them, is being seriously discussed. 2 Such colonies do not exist at the present time. [End Page 183] However, if new techniques for animal-to-human transplantation prove successful, it is likely that animal colonies will be established to provide a ready and predictable supply of organs for transplantation to humans. Some believe that commercial investment in colonies of purpose-bred animals to serve as a source of transplantable organs is close at hand (Leventhal 1994).New drugs and new combinations of existing drugs have improved the chances of successful medical outcomes for patients who receive solid organ transplants. It is now recognized that serial application of immunosuppressive drugs can reduce the likelihood of both short- and long-term organ rejection (Makowka 1994). Improved understanding of both human and animal immune systems, insights into histocompatibility, new agents to control graft-versus-host disease, animal breeding programs for the production of transgenic animals, and improved surgical techniques have opened, as never before, the possibility of successful transfer of organs from animals to humans. Some rate the chances of good patient outcomes (usually measured in terms of time of patient survival) as high, others make more conservative predictions, but virtually all experts believe that the chances for successful human patient outcomes resulting from xenotransplantation are improved. Because many patients face immanent death unless their organs can be replaced, there can be little doubt that many humans will readily consent to xenotransplantation.History Suggests CautionDespite the advances in immunosuppression, the frequency of failure in past animal-to-human xenograft attempts should temper the optimism of the transplant community. To date, all efforts to prolong human life by implanting solid organs from animals into human recipients have failed. The first attempts at animal-to-human xenotransplantation early in the twentieth century resulted in the early death of all recipients (Neuhof 1923). More sophisticated efforts at xenotransplantation occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period when anti-rejection drugs began to make allografts more feasible. Although one human recipient of a xenograft survived for nine months (with poor quality of life), most patients died within a matter of minutes, hours, or a few days following the transplantation of organs from chimpanzees or baboons (Starzl... (shrink)

In a style that is both philosophically sophisticated and accessible to general readers, Robert Almeder introduces readers to the vigorous debate in the scientific community about the possibility of personal survival after death. He argues that belief in some form of personal survival is as empirically justifiable as our belief in the past existence of dinosaurs. Drawing on 21 of the best case studies in reincarnation, apparitions of the dead, ostensible possession, out-of-body experiences, and trance mediumships, (...) class='Hi'>Death and Personal Survival offers a comprehensive discussion of the best empirical evidence in each of these areas and refutes alternative explanations offered by sceptics. (shrink)

This paper outlines the Epicurean conception of rationality and then tries to assess the merits of the notorious contention of the Epicurean philosophers that it is irrationalto fear death. At the outset, I talk about the nature of harmful emotions or passions, of which the fear of death is an outstanding example: their dependence on one‘s disposition, their cognitive and non-cognitive components, the ways in which these elements may be related to each other, and the healthy counterparts of (...) the passions, namely the ‚bites‘. Next, I distinguish different kinds of fears involving the thought of death and I examine the Epicurean arguments against each one of them: fears about the state of being dead, others about dying prematurely, yet others concerning the dying process and especially the moment when the soul leaves the body and, finally,the fear that we must die sometime. Much of the discussion focuses on the writings of Philodemus . Philodemus offers the most sustained discussion of the fear of premature death and of the fear of dying that survive in the Epicurean literature. In addition, in the peroration of his treatise On Death, he gives a brilliant example of how we can reconcile ourselves with the fact that we shall die sometime and accept our own mortality. My provisional conclusion is that although the Epicurean philosophers often succeed in appeasing our fears about death, for the most part they fail to prove that these fears are irrational. (shrink)

William Hasker thinks that his emergent dualism provides a plausible account of the mind’s survival of bodily death, giving it a crucial advantage over physicalism. I do not share this appraisal. Emergentism by its very nature works against the (immediate) survival of death. The analogies that Hasker employs to overcome this initial implausibility fail due to factual errors, and his position ends up in no less a difficult position than the physicalism that Hasker rejects. Hasker’s attempt (...) to escape this difficulty results in what is effectively an abandonment of emergentism, and the adoption of a more traditional dualism. (shrink)

This paper will argue that many survivors’ ability to take up their existence hopefully is rooted in the deeply visceral and unintegrable memory of “living the existence of a walking corpse” (Niederland 1968b, 12) that constitutes the ontic basis for their most fundamental presence to self, others, and God. I will show, secondly, that Karl Rahner’s theological formulation of witness as “an act of self transcendence in which the subject reaches up to the unsurpassable and sovereign Mystery which we call (...) God” (TI 13, 155-6) does indeed provide the basis for some survivors’ hopeful decision about and disposal of the self in relation to God to the extent that hope inscribed in the memory of “living the existence of a walking corpse” does become expressed as the “one, unifying ‘outwards from the self’ attitude into God as the absolutely uncontrollable” (TI 10, 250) by sustaining the commitment to witness. However I will also argue, finally, that the unintegrable nature of such memory prevents survivor hope-as-witness to be completely reconciled with the theological sense of witness that Rahner proposes because his vision of witness has not taken adequately into account this unintegrable memory and its long-term effects. (shrink)

The ability to detect and respond to chemosensory threat cues in the environment plays a vital role in survival across species. However, little is known about which chemical compounds can act as olfactory threat signals in humans. We hypothesized that brief exposure to putrescine, a chemical compound produced by the breakdown of fatty acids in the decaying tissue of dead bodies, can function as a chemosensory warning signal, activating threat management responses (e.g., heightened alertness, fight-or-flight responses). This hypothesis was (...) tested by gaging people’s responses to conscious and non-conscious exposure to putrescine. In Experiment 1, putrescine increased vigilance, as measured by a reaction time task. In Experiments 2 and 3, brief exposure to putrescine (vs. ammonia and a scentless control condition) prompted participants to walk away faster from the exposure site. Experiment 3 also showed that putrescine elicited implicit cognitions related to escape and threat. Experiment 4 found that exposure to putrescine, presented here below the threshold of conscious awareness, increased hostility toward an out-group member. Together, the results are the first to indicate that humans can process putrescine as a warning signal that mobilizes protective responses to deal with relevant threats. The implications of these results are briefly discussed. (shrink)

After a vertebrate dies, many of its organ systems, tissues, and cells remain functional while its body no longer works as a whole. We define this state as the “twilight of death” − the transition from a living body to a decomposed corpse. We claim that the study of the twilight of death is important to ethical, legal and medical science. We examined gene expression at the twilight of death in the zebrafish and mouse reaching the conclusion (...) that apparently thousands of transcripts significantly increase in abundance from life to several hours/days postmortem relative to live controls. Transcript dynamics of different genes provided “proof-of-principle” that models accurately predict an individual's elapsed-time-of-death. While many transcripts were associated with survival and stress compensation, others were associated with epigenetic factors, developmental control, and cancer. Future studies are needed to determine whether the high incidence of cancer in transplant recipients is due to the postmortem processes in donor organs. In organismal death, some organ systems, tissues and cells remain functional while the body no longer works as a whole. In the “twilight of death” − the transition from a living body to a decomposed corpse − thousands of gene transcripts increase in abundance relative to live controls. (shrink)

In its October 2001 issue, this journal published a series of articles questioning the Whole-Brain-based definition of death. Much of the concern focused on whether somatic integration - a commonly understood basis for the whole-brain death view - can survive the brain's death. The present article accepts that there are insurmountable problems with whole-brain death views, but challenges the assumption that loss of somatic integration is the proper basis for pronouncing death. It examines three major (...) themes. First, it accepts the claim of the "disaggregators" that some behaviors traditionally associated with death can be unbundled, but argues that other behaviors (including organ procurement) must continue to be associated. Second, it rejects the claims of the "somaticists," that the integration of the body is critical, arguing instead for equating death with the irreversible loss of "embodied consciousness," that is, the loss of integration of bodily and mental function. Third, it defends higher-brain views against the charge that they are necessarily "mentalist," that is, that they equate death with losing some mental function such as consciousness or personhood. It argues, instead, for the integration of bodily and mental function as the critical feature of human life and that its irreversible loss constitutes death. (shrink)

Johnston presents an argument for a form of immortality that divests the notion of any supernatural elements. The book is packed with illuminating philosophical reflection on the question of what we are, and what it is for us to persist over time.

Hegel’s idealism is generally perceived as a system of rational sublation (Aufhebung) of all empirical contingencies: nothing resists notional mediation which, in a movement of negation of negation, establishes a rational totality. Already Schelling opposed to this complete sublation an “indivisible remainder” of empirical contingency. However, a close reading of Hegel makes it clear that the concluding moment of a dialectical movement of sublation is an empirical remainder which totalizes it, like the body of Christ in Christianity. And the same (...) goes for the process of “negation of negation”: it concludes with a failure of negation, and its ultimate form is a failed suicide where the subject survives as a living dead. Such a reading of Hegel makes him a thinker of our time which is the time of a failed negation: most of us live as survivors of our death, with life dragging on in depressive apathy. (shrink)

Describes beliefs concerning immortality, looks at the evidence supporting and refuting life after death, and speculates on the nature of eternal life.