Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy

In Metaphysics N 2, Aristotle criticizes Plato and the Academics for setting up the problem of principles “in an obsolete way”. For they thought all things would be one (viz. Being itself) if they did not demonstrate, against Parmenides, that not-being is. And this assumption, for Aristotle, betrays a more fundamental and questionable Eleatic debt in their ontology, namely their commitment to the obsolete view that being, taken in its own right, is one. By contrast, Aristotle believes being is originally (...) multiple and said in many ways, so there is no need to demonstrate that not-being is, to justify as much. In his commentary on Book N, Syrianus replies to Aristotle and argues, among other things, both that his criticisms are flawed and that his own ontology can only stand if the Platonist account of multiplicity, difference and not-being is also endorsed. I scrutinize these counterobjections and argue that this debate reflects two essentially different ways of explaining fundamental facts in the structure of reality. (shrink)

The article investigates the self-designation of Diogenes the Cynic as ‘citizen of the world’. It appears, contrary to scholarly opinion, that positive content can indeed be attached to the term. However, the Cynic emphasis differs from Stoic and modern definitions of cosmopolitanism. A state with moral obligations to a common humanity does not feature largely in Cynic philosophy; instead, the Cynic’s primary allegiance is to the rules of the cosmos, which call for a life of individual simplicity, self-sufficiency, moral integrity, (...) and freedom. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the views of happiness (eudaimonia) from the perspective of soul in ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools. I consider the specific way in which most schools connect happiness to soul: either as Aristotle, identifying happiness with the human good he defines it as soul’s activity in accordance with virtue or as the soul’s virtuous state as the Stoics. The Stoics famously consider a virtuous state of one’s soul to be sufficient for happiness, and it has been argued (...) that Plato and Socrates subscribed to the claim earlier. Aristotle by contrast holds that having virtue is necessary although not sufficient. Virtue of soul is still necessary for happiness for the late ancient Platonist Plotinus but in Plotinus happiness belongs to the intellect not to the soul, since the soul is capable of evil as well. A happy life belongs to the intellect intrinsically and inevitably and we live happily to the extent to which we can live a life of intellect. All of the schools considered in this chapter also hold that becoming morally or ethically good is either a necessary condition for happiness as in Plotinus, or that ethically good action constitutes happiness as in the case of Aristotle. (shrink)

In general, our concepts take shape by way of contrast. Geoffrey Lloyd commented almost 60 years ago on “the remarkable prevalence of theories based on opposition in so many societies at different stages of technological development,” and he illustrated in detail the tendency of the ancient Greeks to think in binary pairs. One fundamental distinction, found in a wide variety of cultures, is that between human beings and other animals, or, more simply, between humans and animals, which serves to identify, (...) define, and privilege our own nature as a species. Classical Greek classifications do not invariably take the form of simple polarities, to be sure; thus, one might locate humanity within the ternary taxonomy of plants, animals, and human beings, or in the alternative triad of animals, human beings, and gods, where humanity occupies the middle tier. But whatever the larger paradigm, the essential differential between human beings and other animals was the presence or absence of reason. Plants, in Aristotle’s schema, possess a vegetative soul, which is to say, the capacity to grow and develop; animals have, in addition, the faculty of perception; but human beings are unique in possessing, in addition to these two parts of the psyche, reason or, in Greek, logos, a trait that we share with the gods (they differ from us in being immortal). (shrink)

The second volume in the Homo Mimeticus mini-series advances the emerging transdisciplinary field of mimetic studies. After the linguistic and the affective turns, the new materialist and the performative turns, the cognitive and the posthuman turns, it is now time to re-turn to the ancient, yet also modern and still contemporary realization that humans are mimetic creatures. In this second installment of the Homo Mimeticus series, international scholars working in philosophy, literary theory, classics, cultural studies, sociology, political theory, and the (...) neurosciences engage creatively with Nidesh Lawtoo's Homo Mimeticus: A New Theory of Imitation to further the transdisciplinary field of mimetic studies. Agonistic critical engagements with precursors like Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, Bataille, Irigaray, and Girard, involving contributions by leading international thinkers such as Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, William E. Connolly, Henry Staten, and Vittorio Gallese, among many others, reveal the urgency to rethink mimesis beyond realism. From imitation to identification, mimicry to affective contagion, techne to simulation, mirror neurons to biomimicry, homo mimeticus casts a shadow—but also a light—on the present and future, from social media to the Anthropocene. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to point out that some mathematical doctrines attributed by Aristotle to Plato find their origin in a threefold order of problems: first, in some allusions contained in the dialogues, which might create ambiguities within the so-called standard model of ideas; second, in the Aristotelian interpretation of ideal entities as universals or predicates, an interpretation in turn partly authorized by Plato himself; third, in the tendency not to emphasize the possibility of understanding participation and the (...) whole-part relationship from a non-quantitative point of view. In this paper I will disregard the complex debate about whether or not to attribute the unwritten doctrines of the Aristotelian account to Plato, but I will appraise in what sense some Aristotelian objections to participation may arise from the fact of conceiving of numbers and magnitudes as ideas. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone analizar el motivo de la inmortalidad del poeta en lassphragídes de Metamorfosis 15 (Ov. Met. 15. 861-879) y de Amores 1.15 (Ov. Am.1.15. 1-42) y el modo en que Ovidio se sirve de su producción literaria parainsertarse conscientemente en el canon grecolatino. El complejo entramado de lasobras y la mención a autores que ya han sido canonizados, así como los correlatoscon otras fuentes, le sirven para anunciar su inmortalidad gracias a la escritura, queserá plasmada en (...) su apoteosis metafórica mediante la lectura por parte delpopulus. (shrink)

El vocablo πέπλος (“peplo”), que designa típicamente la túnica vestida por lasmujeres, se registra un total de once veces en Hécuba de Eurípides. Teniendo encuenta la estructura bipartita de esta tragedia y la importancia de la vestimenta en elmundo griego antiguo, este artículo se propone analizar las apariciones del términoen sus contextos, con la hipótesis de que los peplos ocultan pero a la vez revelan elcarácter de los personajes femeninos: Políxena, el coro de cautivas troyanas yHécuba, como también habilitan la (...) transformación de los dos últimos en una y otraparte de la obra. (shrink)

En el marco de los estudios actuales de teoría y práctica de μίμησις en Rep. dePlatón, el objetivo es indagar la caracterización [ἠθοποιία] platónica de Sócrates.La hipótesis es que la opción por el diálogo está ligada al modo de comprender yde transmitir el saber filosófico y que, en tal marco, la figura del personaje Sócratesencarna un tipo de saber hacer. Para tal fin, por un lado, se indaga lacaracterización en los Progymnásmata para mostrar su función y el lugar queocupa Platón (...) en esta tradición. Por otro lado, se analizan pasajes clave de Apologíay República I para echar luz sobre la composición narrativa y, a través de ella,intentar dar cuenta del quehacer filosófico en la caracterización socrática. Para estoúltimo, presentamos la distinción entre know that y know how de Ryle y Polanyi. (shrink)

La autenticidad de la Heroida 15 de Ovidio (Sappho Phaoni) fue objeto de grancontroversia crítica. Sin adentrarnos en la misma, pero a la luz de ella, mostramoslos mecanismos intratextuales, narrativos y estilísticos que instauran esta epístolacomo instancia de transición entre las simples (1-15) y las dobles (16-21).Abordamos fundamentalmente dos aspectos: en qué medida la Heroida 15 seconstruye como un “proemio en el medio” que determina la arquitectura global dela obra, y de qué manera su inscripción en el discurso elegíaco anticipa (...) algunosrasgos del Ars y delimita ciertos ejes de la praxis literaria ovidiana. (shrink)

Scholars have long been aware of striking similarities between a crucial passage in Book II of Plato’s Republic and the longest papyrus fragment surviving from Antiphon’s On Truth. Previous scholarship has identified some views common to both texts but has not explained how these views hang together in a unified and coherent ethical outlook. A deeper investigation into these two texts turns up a blueprint for Greek immoralist arguments, a finding which should be of considerable interest to scholars of ancient (...) Greek ethics and political philosophy. The paper argues that both texts include an argument whose demonstrandum is that it is by nature good or advantageous to commit injustice when one can do so undetected; that this argument in each case involves a set of background premises that constitute a blueprint for immoralist arguments in Classical Athens; and that the immoralist ethical theory of Republic II is an outline distilled from several more detailed theories, including the one belonging to On Truth. (shrink)

The treatise On the Nature of the Universe, attributed to the Pythagorean Ocellus, has frequently been the subject of scholarly attention due to its engagement with Aristotle’s theory of elemental transformation or its role in the late Hellenistic debate on the eternity of the universe. In this paper, I argue that its author endorses a peculiar conception of matter: prime matter is an unqualified body, only potentially perceptible. Ps.-Ocellus draws this doctrine from Stoicism but reworks it for his purposes outside (...) the framework of Stoic corporealism. The author presents it as an antecedent to both Plato’s receptacle and Aristotle’s prime matter. As it turns out, the doctrine was meant to address some of the challenges posed by an incorporeal material principle. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Aristophanes’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is tied into an interesting and hitherto unexplored web of ideas in Plato’s ethics and psychology. The poet’s analysis of erōs as ‘leading us to what “belongs” (the oikeion)’ (193d2) and as ‘restoring us in our “original nature” (archaia phusis)’ (193d4) is not a mere negative contribution that renders him a ‘target for Diotima’s fire’ (Dover). Rather, he unwittingly communicates central ethical and psychological ideas which we find developed in (...) key passages of Plato’s dialogues. What is interesting is that Diotima in a curious passage seems to dismiss his contribution of the oikeion as unrelated to our good (agathon) and irrelevant to the analysis of desire (205d10–206a1). I argue that this interpretation of Diotima’s response to Aristophanes, which would render her position an ethical anomaly in Plato’s dialogues, should be rejected. Instead, it is more plausible to read her response as proposing a revisionary conception of the oikeion, relying on the idea that our agathon is our true oikeion. In addition, I tentatively suggest that the theory of psychic pregnancy may be seen as presenting the agathon of wisdom of virtue produced in the ascent as an oikeion. Just as fascinating as Diotima’s stance on the oikeion is the question how her teachings relate to the concept of an archaia phusis of the soul. The idea that the soul’s self-perfection constitutes a return to a temporally prior condition of excellence, which in two places other than the Symposium (Republic X, Timaeus) is called the ‘archaia phusis’, is pervasive and centrally important to Plato’s psychology. I address the question whether Diotima’s ascent passage constitutes a psychological anomaly in portraying self-perfection as unrelated to the concept of the archaia phusis. I argue that an answer to this depends on the stance we take on the Symposium’s position regarding the immortality of the soul. While a reading that posits a rejection of immortality in the Symposium must indeed deny a role for the concept in Diotima’s speech, I show that a reading allowing for immortality as a theoretical commitment in the background has an interesting interpretative option: along with Timaeus 90d5, it may fruitfully interpret the ascent as an ordering of the soul ‘in accordance with its archaia phusis’. (shrink)

There is no systematic physiology of the eye within Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on Aristotle's De Sensu that would match the work of Galen in this area because Alexander is interested in the principles that (as he sees it) guide the work of medical researchers rather than the messy detail of the work itself. If he was aware of Galen’s work in this area, his criticisms of the coalescence theory of vision as set out in the Timaeus is a sufficient (...) answer at the level of philosophical principle, and the inadequate anatomical detail in Alexander’s own physiology of vision reflects that outlook. Alexander’s physiology is not ultimately to be judged against the criterion provided by the model of Galen’s dissection-based research. (shrink)

Nella «Metafisica» Aristotele fonda una scienza filosofica a cui assegna il compito di occuparsi dell’«essere in quanto essere», indagandone le cause e i principi primi. Egli denomina questa scienza «filosofia prima» e la eleva a forma massima di sapere. La filosofia prima è abitualmente riconosciuta come il punto di partenza per la formazione della disciplina filosofica che, a partire dalla prima età moderna, chiamiamo ontologia. Nel delinearne la fisionomia teorica e lo statuto, tuttavia, Aristotele si confronta da vicino con un (...) altro autorevole modello di scienza suprema, avente anch’essa l’essere per oggetto proprio: la dialettica platonica. Scopo di questo libro è esplorare il retroterra platonico della progettazione aristotelica della filosofia prima e mostrare, attraverso dettagliate ricostruzioni testuali, che Aristotele ha elaborato questa scienza come un’alternativa alla dialettica platonica. (shrink)

In this paper I show that Aristotle’s widely criticised exclusion of Platonic efficient causes at Metaph. A 6.988a7–17 is defensible as an interpretation of Plato, and that alternative accounts are unpersuasive. I argue that Aristotle is only interested in – what he supposes to be – Plato’s first principles and that the usual candidates that are brought forward in scholarship as possible first principles and efficient causes (e.g. from the Timaeus and the Philebus) all fall short in crucial respects according (...) to Aristotle. This reading has the dual benefit of illuminating Aristotle’s strategy in book A and of letting him appear as a more trustworthy doxographer of his predecessors’ views. (shrink)

This article presents a new account of the Stoic theory of case. It argues that cases belong to the Stoic class of lekta and that they play a twofold semantic role. Firstly, they relate words to the world in a process akin to reference. Secondly, they encode syntactic information which captures structural elements of the world, contributing to language’s ability to represent reality and its structure by enabling it to capture both objects and the ways in which these objects relate (...) to each other. (shrink)

Plato’s theory of recollection is classically treated as an account of “concept-acquisition” or “concept-possession,” explaining how the mind is able to employ general concepts, despite the senses only perceiving particulars. Against this, recent scholars (esp. Dominic Scott) have argued that recollection is not necessary for ordinary reasoning. Recollection is not about ordinary concepts that humans use; rather, recollection is a rare, prototypically philosophic affair that is satisfied by becoming aware of Forms or principles associated with them, which most people never (...) experience. On this view, most people do not recollect. A third position accepts both views: there are two types of recollection in Plato, one concerned with ordinary cognition, and one concerned with philosophical awareness of the Forms. This paper argues for the narrow reading, focusing on the Phaedrus. (shrink)

Anaximenes famously taught that the sun and other ‘stars’ do not move under the flat earth but around it and explained the night thereby. What he had in mind remains conjectural; the testifying fragments are ambiguous and apparently contradictory. The past 200-odd years have seen a plethora of dissenting interpretations. The bulk of these are here categorised into three groups: that the sun circles at a fixed height above sea level; that it follows the familiar inclined path by day and (...) clings to the northern horizon by night; and that it revolves in a circular orbit inclined relative to the earth. The first two scenarios are repudiated, while the third is fortified with several suggestions. It is argued that Anaximenes’ terms for ‘above’, ‘below’ and ‘around’ did not differentiate the altitudes of celestial bodies relative to the horizon, but the sizes of their orbits – as indicated by their projections on the earth’s plane. The point would have been that bodies in space are far enough from the earth to stay away from anyone’s zenith or nadir – perhaps with exceptions, following pseudo-Plutarch. This approach reconciles the variant readings in the fragments and obviates the need for emendations. The sun would still move through the north at night, but in an arc below the horizon – not horizontally over the Ocean or behind mountains, as some had it. Thus, Anaximenes would have enhanced Anaximander’s discovery that space facilitates inclined circular orbits by surrounding the earth on all sides. Awareness of the far-northern midnight twilight and the aurora borealis may have fed into all of these worldviews, the former legitimately and the latter fallaciously. (shrink)

Aristotle offers apparently inconsistent explanations for paronymous expressions derived from matter: on the received picture, derived from Metaphysics Θ.7, such expressions are used in all and only cases of substantial change, because predicating the matter directly of a substance would be false; on the error picture, derived from Metaphysics Z.7, the same expressions are used in all and only cases of change from an unclear and nameless privation, because ordinary language users conflate such privations with matter. I propose a resolution: (...) the received picture explains why the usage is fitting, but the error picture explains how the usage originated. (shrink)

The Stoic theory of movement has never been the object of a deep investigation despite the considerable number of sources in Neoplatonist commentators. This paper explores for the first time the Stoic notion of ἐνέργεια, which plays a fundamental role in the Stoic conception of movement and generally in the characterization of interaction between bodies. I will show that the Stoics identified movement and activity, so that everything that is active is necessarily moved. This implies that the Stoics merely characterized (...) ἐνέργεια in a dynamic or kinetic sense, namely by connecting it with movement. In order to prove the coherence of this philosophical position to the Stoic doctrine, I will display the compatibility of Neoplatonists’ reports with other sources. Accordingly, I will claim that the Stoics conceived this peculiar sense of ἐνέργεια in reaction to Aristotle, who clearly distinguished between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις in his physical theory. (shrink)

We may take tables for granted. However, due to a variety of factors, tables were a rarity in the history of ancient Greek culture, used only limitedly in very special contexts and generally in a non-systematic way, except in astronomy. In this paper I present the main types of tables that can be found in ancient Greek texts: non-ruled columnar lists (accounts and other types of informal tables), ruled columnar lists (mostly astronomical tables), and symmetric tables (mainly Pythagorean displays of (...) numbers). (shrink)

This article concerns the dangers of demagogues in democracies described in the Politics and the edifying purposes of Aristotle’s ethical works in relation to the politically ambitious student. The translation of σπουδαῖος as serious is key to understanding the connection between these works. Although similar arguments appear elsewhere in his Corpus, Aristotle’s arguments in the Great Ethics are unique because the audience is warned about the dangers of political rule and is ultimately led away from the pursuit of it. Aristotle (...) appears to specifically lead this class of politically ambitious students toward a serious pursuit of virtue, justice, and prudence with a final view to both friendship and citizenship. This emphasis is significant because an ‘individual who is serious-about-rule’ (σπουδάρχης) is excessively eager for office. Furthermore, ‘those serious-about-rule’ are dangerous when they act as demagogues, and this is one cause of revolutions in democracies. (shrink)

In the Republic, Plato’s Socrates argues that the wealthy feel contempt for the poor, and the poor feel hatred for the rich. But why is Socrates, leading a life of scandalous poverty, without taking wages for philosophical work, an exception to this rule? Instead of hatred, envy, or no emotion at all, Socrates consistently treats wealth and the wealthy with ridicule and kataphronēsis – active looking-down or contempt – while meditating on the temptation of the poor to appropriate the excess (...) flesh of the wealthy (Resp. 556d). It is contempt that allows Socrates to remain free and wageless, away from the tempting distortion wealth has on the soul (Resp. 330c, 554a–b). Socrates therefore insists his philosopher-kings should be paid only in food, the same reward he proposes for himself in the Apology. Instead of securing freedom from murderous epithumia through moderate property, Socrates implies only contemptuous poverty can safeguard a philosophic life. (shrink)

This article contributes to the scholarly movement beyond rigid classifications of East and West by arguing that the Persia of Herodotus’s History, commonly understood to be a tyrannical regime, possessed both external and internal freedom. It was once common to argue that, for Herodotus, internal freedom was the exclusive purview of the Greeks. Recent scholarship has shown that Herodotus laced the History with several incriminating parallels between Greek and Barbarian political practices, thereby casting doubt on the claim that Herodotus uncritically (...) supported Greek supremacy. This article reverses that method and argues, contrary to previous scholarship, that Herodotus offers several indications in the History that he knew Persia was a politically free regime. By examining the three prominent theories on the ancient definition of tyranny and showing their inapplicability to Persian government, I offer an even-handed defense of Persia that neither excuses real cruelty nor condemns without justification. (shrink)

Scholarship on the Republic has tended to stress the centrality of the tripartite soul to the Republic’s conception of justice. Yet since Socrates’s task in the dialogue is to show the desirability of justice in the ordinary Athenian sense, any emphasis on idiosyncratic psychology would render his account of justice fundamentally beside the point. This paper suggests a way out of this dilemma. It argues that Platonic justice in the Republic represents a shrewd twist on the entirely conventional, distributive Athenian (...) notion of justice as refraining from seizing for oneself what belongs to another. Plato’s twist is to substitute the performance of one’s own activity (πρᾶξις τα ἑαυτοῦ) for the possession of one’s household goods (ἕξις τα ἑαυτοῦ) as the proper object of justice. The paper then shows how this account of Platonic justice makes sense both textually and contextually, before concluding. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Λ, Aristotle appeals to the prime mover: an unmoved mover that is the first moving cause of the world. Elsewhere, he calls the science concerned with the prime mover ‘theology’ (Meta. E.1, 1026a19). But what is the point of this science? On a common view, its purpose is to give an account of the prime mover itself, and especially to prove its existence. By contrast, I argue that Aristotle’s theology in Metaphysics Λ is ‘nature-bound’: it ultimately aims at (...) explaining facts about the perceptible world, in particular the motion of heavenly bodies and the cycle of generation of perishable substances. (shrink)

Two Reasons to Study Ancient Greek Philosophy Ancient Greek philosophy began with Thales, who correctly predicted an eclipse that occurred in 585 BCE, and culminated in the monumental works of Aristotle, who died in 322.1 (Unless otherwise noted, all dates in this book are BCE.) The simple fact that these thinkers lived over 2,000 years ago should provoke a question: in the age of the microchip and the engineered gene, why bother with them? One good answer immediately springs to mind: (...) to become educated. The Greeks were the intellectual ancestors of western culture. They laid the foundations for all future developments in the natural sciences, medicine, mathematics, history, architecture, sculpture, tragic and comic drama, lyric and epic poetry, as well as philosophy. To the extent that one must know one's heritage in order to know oneself, it is imperative to study the ancient Greeks. (shrink)

Very Short Introductions: Brilliant, Sharp, Inspiring The tradition of ancient philosophy is a long, rich and varied one. Julia Annas gives a succinct account of ancient Greco-Roman philosophy, emphasizing its freshness and variety of themes, and its approach of lively discussion and argument. Getting away from the presentation of ancient philosophy as a succession of Great Thinkers, the book gives readers a sense of the freshness and liveliness of ancient philosophy, and of its wide variety of themes and styles. This (...) new edition has been fully updated to reflect updates in the field, with new illustrations and up to date further reading to allow further exploration of the field. The text has been expanded and modernized to be more comprehensive and accessible to the general reader, as well as exploring the relation of the tradition of ancient Greco-Roman philosophy to other traditions and to us. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)