Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology

Representing oneself as an existing entity and having intense fear of the unknown are human specificities. Self-consciousness and anxiety states are characteristics of our human minds. We propose that these two characteristics share a common evolutionary history during which they acted in synergy for the build-up of our human minds. We present that perspective by using an evolutionary scenario for self-consciousness in which anxiety management plays a key role. Such evolutionary background can introduce new relations between philosophy of mind and (...) psychology. The proposed evolutionary scenario starts at the Pan-Homo split time (about 6my ago) when our pre-human ancestors were able to manage representations while also being able to partly identify with their conspecifics. These identifications allowed our ancestors to merge the representations they had of parts of themselves with the corresponding representations they had of their conspecifics. The scenario proposes that such merger has led our ancestors to progressively build up a representation of their own entity as existing in the environment, like conspecifics were represented as existing. This evolutionary process is considered in the scenario as the source of an ancestral form of self-consciousness. The same process has also produced identifications with suffering or endangered conspecifics which have created in the minds of our ancestors some new anxieties coming in addition to the animal ones. The resulting psychological sufferings had to be limited for evolution to continue. The tools developed to that end by our ancestors (caring, collaboration, communication, ToM, ...) have also procured significant evolutionary benefits with positive feedbacks on identifications. Overall, the evolutionary scenario proposes that the combination of the anxiety management processes with the evolution toward self-consciousness has created an evolutionary engine that has accelerated the coming up of our human self-consciousness. As a result, our today human minds contain important anxieties interwoven with an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. Such perspective brings to consider that many of our mental states may be unconsciously guided by these evolutionary sourced anxieties (which are still to be clearly understood). Corresponding anxiety management processes are then key contributors to our human feelings and motivations, and to our interpersonal relationship. For instance, the role of Pascalian type diversions can be understood as keeping consciousness away from psychological sufferings produced by too anxious mental states. Also, part of our human sexuality developed during human evolution can be considered as a multidimensional escape and refuge from anxiety. This also brings to look at our psychological well-being and to our mental health as much more related to anxiety management than assumed so far. Dis-functioning of anxiety management processes can then be source of mental disorders and illnesses. On that subject the evolutionary scenario proposes that avoidances of too anxious mental states can lead to evil behaviors. These subjects need more developments. Possible continuations are introduced. (shrink)

Current approaches in psychology have replaced the idea of a centralized, self-present identity with that of a diffuse system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and socially embedded. However, the failure of contemporary perspectives to banish the lingering notion of a literal, if fleeting, status residing within the parts of a psycho-bio-social organization may result in the covering over of a rich, profoundly intricate process of change within the assumed frozen space of each part. In this paper (...) I show how Heidegger, Derrida and Gendlin help us think from this more intimate process to transform current views of metaphor, the unconscious, and the relation between affect and cognition. (shrink)

PLoS ONE 3(3): e1897. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.

For agents like us, the feeling of effort is a very useful thing. It helps us sense how hard an action is, control its level of intensity, and decide whether to continue or stop performing it. While there has been progress in understanding the feeling of mental effort and the feeling of bodily effort, this has not translated into a unified account of the general feeling of effort. To advance in this direction, I defend the single-feeling view, which states that (...) the feeling of effort is one and the same for both mental and bodily actions. This feeling represents the subjective costs, both mental and physical, of performing a given action. Cost-based approaches have recently become influential for the feeling of mental effort. Here I focus on arguing that our sense of bodily effort does not simply represent physiological processes, but rather represents the subjective costs of a bodily action. Through this paper I discuss the role of the feeling of effort (and affective states more broadly) in action guidance and the sense of agency. I also define efforts themselves in terms of the feeling of effort. (shrink)

Previous research has demonstrated the influence of emotions during linguistic processing, indicating the interactivity of both processes in the brain. However, little is known regarding such interplay in a second language (L2). This study addressed this question by examining the reading effects of syntactic violations while processing L2 emotional and neutral statements. Forty-six Spanish-English bilinguals with various levels of L2 proficiency and emotional resonance (i.e. capability for emotional experience in L2) were presented with a self-paced sentence reading task. Sentences contained (...) positive (16), neutral (16) and negative (16) verbs, half of them presented in agreement and half in disagreement with the preceding pronoun. Analysis of verb reading times using linear mixed effects modelling revealed a significant interaction between syntactic violation, verb valence and emotional resonance, suggesting that stronger emotional L2 experience results in a higher saliency of negative verbs, reducing the impact of syntactic violations. (shrink)

Individuals high in depressive symptom severity show probability bias: they believe negative events are relatively probable, and positive events relatively improbable, compared to those with less severe symptoms. However, this has only ever been demonstrated using self-report measures, in which participants explicitly estimate events’ probabilities: this leaves open the risk that “probability bias” is merely an artefact of response bias. We tested the veracity of probability bias using an indirect behavioural measure, based on a sentence-reading task. Study 1 tested 112 (...) Turkish students; Study 2 tested 117 international users of online groups for people with depressive and anxiety disorders. As predicted, participants with higher depressive symptom scores responded relatively quickly to sentences stating negative events might occur, and relatively slowly to sentences stating positive events might occur, compared to those with lower scores. This effect was only marginal in Study 1, but reached significance in Study 2. However, contrary to predictions, this effect was not moderated by the probability level stated in the sentence. This makes our findings difficult to interpret, and we must present these studies as a failure to convincingly demonstrate depression-related probability bias. We hope this stimulates more work on the nature and veracity of probability bias. (shrink)

Aníbal Monasterio Astobiza y Jesús Ezquerro Martínez Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language, and Information, Universidad del País Vasco, España Desde … Read More →.

People often think about how things could have been better or worse. People make these upward and downward comparisons in different situations and with differing emotional consequences. We investigated whether the direction of counterfactual comparisons affects people’s judgements of counterfactual closeness. In four preregistered experiments (N = 2,142), participants saw vignettes where agents lost or won a luck-based game. In Experiments 1, 2, and 4, participants judged counterfactual closeness in two ways: if a counterfactual outcome almost happened, and if it (...) easily could have happened. These judgments were affected by different factors, but did not substantially differ based on the direction of comparison. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants predicted agents’ emotions – whether losers would be sad, winners would be happy, and whether both would be surprised by the outcome. Emotion predictions showed similar patterns regardless of whether agents lost or won. Participants predicted stronger emotional reactions when the prior probability of the counterfactual outcome was high rather than low, though this effect was somewhat stronger when agents lost. Together, these findings join recent work in suggesting that Almost and Easily judgments tap into distinct forms of counterfactual closeness, and also suggest this distinction is robust to the direction of counterfactual reasoning. (shrink)

Elliot-Kleerkoper, Marietta On the green glass wall of my shower recess...

The Anatomy of Boredom offers a comprehensive examination of boredom—a ubiquitous, important, yet often misunderstood dimension of human existence. It explores boredom's elaborate history, provides a systematic presentation of the diverse literature on the subject, examines boredom's social grounds and consequences, and considers its future implications—all in the service of advancing a novel theoretical model of the workings of boredom that illuminates both boredom’s complex nature and its diverse psychological, behavioral, and social effects. Specifically, the book argues for a functional (...) theory of boredom, one that understands and individuates boredom in terms of its role in our mental, behavioral, and social existence. Boredom, the book posits, is the painful realization of suboptimal cognitive engagement, and as such, a powerful mechanism for regulating cognition and behavior. The functional articulation of boredom offers several important advantages over alternative theories of boredom: it provides a parsimonious and productive synthesis of existing research; it connects the present of boredom to its past; and finally, it permits us to extend our knowledge of boredom and to apply it to relatively unexplored domains, such as boredom’s relationship to the good life, self-regulation and self-control, poverty and capitalism, advancements in AI, animal emotions, and even aesthetics and art appreciation. The study of boredom is thus revealed to be more than just an analysis of a complex and important affective experience; it is also shown to be a perspicacious investigation into the complexities of human (and even non-human) existence. (shrink)

This is the penultimate and peer-reviewed version of Chapter 5 from The Anatomy of Boredom, to be published by Oxford University Press in late 2024/early 2025. Please note that this version may differ from the final published version. All rights to this work, including but not limited to rights of reproduction and distribution, are reserved by the publisher, Oxford University Press.

This is the penultimate and peer-reviewed version of Chapter 5 from Elpidorou, A., The Anatomy of Boredom, to be published by Oxford University Press in late 2024/early 2025. Please note that this version may differ from the final published version. All rights to this work, including but not limited to rights of reproduction and distribution, are reserved by the publisher, Oxford University Press.

Given the complexity of human social life, it is astonishing to observe how quickly children adapt to their social environment. To be accepted by the other members, it is crucial to understand and follow the rules and norms shared by the group. How and from whom do young children learn these social rules? In the experiments, based on the crucial role of affective social learning and dominance hierarchies in simple rule understanding, we showed 15-to-23-month-olds and 3-to-5-year-old children videos where the (...) agents’ body size and affective cues were manipulated. In the dominant rule-maker condition, when a smaller protagonist puts an object in one location, a bigger agent reacts with a positive reaction; on the contrary, when the smaller protagonist puts an object in another location, the bigger agent displays a negative reaction. In the subordinate rule-maker condition, the roles are shifted but the agents differ. Toddlers expect the protagonist to follow the rules (based on anticipatory looks), independent of the dominant status of the rule-making agent. Three-to-five-year-old pre-schoolers overall perform at the chance level but expect the protagonist to disobey a rule in the first trial, and obey the rule in the second trial if the rule-maker is dominant. (shrink)

Affective realism, roughly the hypothesis that you “perceive what you feel”, has recently been put forward as a novel, empirically-backed explanation of police shooting errors. The affective states involved in policing in high-pressure situations result in police officers literally seeing guns even when none are present. The aim of this paper is to (i) unpack the implications of this explanation for assessing police culpability and (ii) determine whether we should take these implications at face value. I argue that while affective (...) realism stands to diminish, if not eliminate, the moral and legal responsibilities of officers who have made shooting errors, the empirical data itself does not directly support such a radical rethink of police culpability. (shrink)

Emotions can be insensitive to certain attributes of a situation: Fear of flying is not always reduced by remembering air crash probabilities. A large body of evidence shows that information on probabilities, large numerical counts, and intentions is frequently disregarded in the elicitation and regulation of emotions. To date, no existing theory comprehensively accounts for the features that tend to be overlooked by emotion. In this paper, I call attention to the common denominator of such features: they do not contribute (...) to the iconic representation of events. For instance, the exceedingly low probability of a plane crash does not affect its imagistic representation (i.e., the iconic representation of the event is silent about the event’s probability). This paper introduces the Iconic Prioritization Hypothesis, positing that the prioritization of input in the iconic format by emotions can explain the neglect of information that is representationally silent in this format. Delving into the causes of this format prioritization, I argue that emotion might favour iconicity as it is the format of immediate information about our surroundings (perception) and of stored first-hand evidence (episodic memory). Lastly, the hypothesis's compatibility with philosophical theories of emotion causation and its implications for experimental research are examined. (shrink)

The present study assessed whether dementia worry is associated with adults’ subjective cognitive difficulties, and whether any associations are moderated by age. Participants were 477 adults aged 18–90 years. They completed standard, subjective measures of dementia worry and everyday cognitive difficulties (i.e. attention, language, verbal and visual-spatial memory, and visual-perceptual ability). Moderated regression analyses included dementia worry as a predictor of specific cognitive difficulties, and age as a moderator. Covariates included gender, trait cognitive and somatic anxiety, general aging-related anxiety, depression, (...) stress, mental health treatment status, and health status. Greater overall dementia worry, and specifically more frequent dementia worry, were both associated with greater attentional difficulty in middle-aged and older adults, but not in young adults. Cognitions about developing dementia in reaction to memory lapses were also associated with greater cognitive difficulties across the adult lifespan for multiple cognitive domains. Results highlight a robust relationship between dementia worry and subjective attentional difficulties, especially in middle-aged and older adults. Worry frequency is also more influential with adult aging. A cognitive or meta-cognitive mechanism may underlie subjective cognitive concerns across the adult lifespan. (shrink)