Given the hypercomplex nature of human societies, progressive political action aimed at the structural transformation of society will always have unintended consequences, sometimes indeed the opposite of what was initially sought. The question then naturally arises: Given the essential unpredictability of its outcomes, how is such political action possible? In search of an answer to this question I turn to Immanuel Kant, and reconstruct his notion of “rational hope” (Vernunftglaube) in the Critique of Practical Reason in political terms. After outlining (...) what I take to be a Kantian idea of socialism, I suggest that political action aiming at realising socialism must always incorporate hope as its immanent moment. Finally, I discuss a Freudian-derived objection to Kant, namely, the idea that socialism is an illusion, and answer it from a Kantian point of view. (shrink)

In his 1956 essay “Die Welt als Phantom und Matrize”, Günther Anders provided a thorough interpretation of radio and television. Far from just being a time-specific document of early electronic mass media, it still continues to provide insights into how human experience is changed through each new technical medium. This will be illustrated via three critical concepts proposed by Anders. He coined the term “iconomania” to conceptualise the ongoing medial shift from a writing-based to a primarily visual culture. “A priori (...) conditional forms” is Anders’ way of getting a grasp on the structural influence of mass production and mass media on human perception and behaviour. The term “psychotechnics” was originally introduced by Anders’ father, William Stern, for early forms of applied psychology. Anders adopted it in a critical fashion in his warnings of an all-encompassing power of reshaping psychical functions that proves especially fruitful when applied to contemporary design principles. Finally, Anders’ media theory will be briefly compared to Shane Denson’s recent work on “discorrelation” between human perception and digital images. (shrink)

The philosopher, writer and technology critic Günther Anders, né Stern (1902–1992), occasionally referred to his own thinking as “occasional philosophy”. In order to reconstruct this mode of thought, which is also an essential key to understanding Anders, I will refer to a previously unpublished typescript of the same name from his literary estate. This reconstruction will be based on three theses: From the outset, Anders’ work is characterised by a preoccupation with questions of method. Secondly, the tools of occasional philosophy (...) can be found not only in his philosophical writings, but above all in his reflections on art, literature and photomontage. Thirdly, the prima vista eclectic and anti-systematic method is a logical reaction to the fundamentally changed conditions of philosophising in a (post-)modern, technologised society. (shrink)

How can Günther Anders’ concern with the threat of the atomic bomb enlighten current social thought about the Anthropocene? Building on Anders’ frustration with the “apocalypse blindness”, “laziness” and “indifference” of his contemporaries and his plea for an “apocalyptic passion,” this text sketches the contours of a thinking in and for ‘our’ end times – a time marked by destruction and the irretrievable loss of habitability on this planet. It first translates Anders’ notion of the end times into current debates (...) about the Anthropocene, and then formulates three perspectives for such thinking in ‘our’ end times – the search for orientation, the spatio-temporal extension of responsibility, and the expansion of feelings in “the apocalyptic situation”. (shrink)

This paper deals with Thomas Hobbes’ conception of the state of nature. Deviating from its interpretation as a logically indispensable hypothesis for the purpose of the individualist-contractualist legitimation of the state, the article directs the discussion away from the question of the state of nature’s status within Hobbes’ anthropological or legal framework and towards the issue of where and what kind of evidence for this narrative is supposed to be found. If one interrogates this narrative in epistemological terms, an interpretative (...) perspective is opened up in which ordinary forms of competitive and exploitative behaviour as well as of unmediated rule are of central importance, and the consideration of the state of nature as both a situational-relational and gradual concept is made possible as well as necessary. This contribution not only shows how such interpretative possibility is substantiated by the primary sources, but also asks how it relates to Hobbes’ own reflections on knowledge and scientific method. It is shown that what is crucial here is not the distinction between empirical and idealist approach, but the one between two kinds of experience, the second of which corresponds to a nominalist view of knowledge about politics. (shrink)

This article tracks the wider politics of emotion that run through the work of Günther Anders. It conceptualises the emergence of “anaesthetic violence”, a feel-good, or even unsensed form of power that configures around user-friendly devices. Anders’ mapping of the sense of inferiority, obsolescence and humiliating dependency our devices can invoke in us is gaining scholarly traction, but his work also exposes anaesthetic structures of feeling that merit further consideration. To open this perspective, the first part develops the quasi-Socratic formula (...) “I feel that I feel nothing” through a detailed reading of the politics of emotion in Anders’ work. This provides the pretext for an outlook on the anaesthetic dimension of human-machine interaction in the context of digital technologies. (shrink)

Review of: Schmid Hans Bernhard. We, Together: The Social Ontology of Us. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023, 301 S.

Against the background of current debates on the topic of ‘academic freedom’, this article analyses the relationship between academic freedom and truth as found in the philosophical approaches of Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger and Karsten Schubert (et al.). The aim is to show that the two concepts – despite different interpretations and accentuations – are mutually dependent for all authors and are correlated with the dimension of the political. In Kant’s work – as later in the system of the 1949 (...) German constitution – academic freedom and the neutral finding of truth refer to each other and form the basis for a counter-public. Heidegger links the freedom and ‘self-determination’ of the university to a ‘higher’ power and truth, thus preparing the ground for a comprehensive politicisation of the sciences. With a similar, but emancipatory intention Schubert links a ‘critical’ academic freedom to a material concept of truth, which here is given attributes such as ‘strong’ and ‘robust’ and is intended to do justice to the ‘standpoints’ of ‘affected people’. (shrink)

This paper compares the theories of Hervaeus Natalis and Franz Brentano on intentionality. It considers three questions: the status of the intentional object, the question of the definition of the intentional relation, and the identification of the mark of the mental. Throughout the study, the analysis of Aristotle’s works serves as a tertium comparationis between the two authors. Although the comparison reveals some similar approaches to the matter, it shows distinct strategies regarding the distinction between what is mental and what (...) is not. (shrink)

This paper offers an assessment of some of the central aspects of Edith Stein’s conception of intentional acts proposed in Potency and Act. Studies Towards a Philosophy of Being. Her account hinges upon a combination of Thomistic and Husserlian concepts. She borrows from Aquinas two conceptual pairs that are central to his metaphysics and theory of knowledge: the actuality-potency dichotomy; and the distinction between sensible and intelligible species. The distinction and relevant articulation between sensible and intelligible species provide Stein with (...) the basis to present her own conception of intentionality (with special focus on perception): the sensible species is regarded as the correlate of the object’s Gestalt; by contrast, the intelligible species is mobilised to account for what Husserl labels noesis-noema correlation. But Stein’s ambition is also to inscribe her account of the species sensibilis within an overall (critical) interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, financing the project “Intentionality and Person in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology” (GAČR 21-08256S). (shrink)

From a decolonial perspective, Habermas’ theory is seen by many as Eurocentric and in philosophical alliance with colonial rule. In particular, his theory of progress is seen as offensive because it devalues non-Western ways of understanding in comparison to their modern Western counterparts. On the one hand, this is true. On the other hand, Habermas’ actual concept of progress can also be used to formulate a critique of colonialist development imperatives. Moreover, his concept of “systematically distorted communication” can make an (...) interesting contribution to understanding colonial rule: even colonial rule is communicatively mediated, with the constant risk of dissent precariously held in check by racist discourse barriers. Fanon already provides strong starting points for this communication-theoretical view of colonial rule. With him, the decolonial struggles against racist discourse barriers also come into view. (shrink)

In his 1956 book Das Gemüt, Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser’s theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important phenomenological insights from Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the passions of the soul. Both Strasser and Aquinas view happiness as the fulfilment of intentional striving and differentiate between various feelings associated with the pursuit and attainment of a goal, such as joy and pleasure. However, while Aquinas believes (...) that only an imperfect form of happiness can be attained in this life, Strasser aims to determine the essence of the highest form of happiness possible for human beings as the felt anticipation of perfect happiness in the future. Strasser, therefore, interprets Aquinas’ theory through the lens of an existential-phenomenological approach. (shrink)

The article discusses the role of Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy in recent attempts to reformulate the critique of instrumental reason formulated by Max Horkheimer from a metaethical point of view. Here, the focus is on the determination of the relationship between normative and rational aspects with regard to the deontological conception expressed by the imperatives. Using the example of the differing readings of Christine Korsgaard and Konstantin Pollok on the relevance of the hypothetical imperative introduced by Kant in the second (...) section of the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten for questions concerning metaethics and the theory of action, the author shows that Kant’s practical philosophy can be interpreted both as an affirmative theory and as a criticism of instrumental reason. With Pollok, the article argues on the one hand for a reading of Kant that emphasises the prevalence of the categorical imperative over the instrumental forms of action. Simultaneously, it points to the problems of relating Kantian theorems to the socio-philosophical problems of a critique of instrumental reason that takes an overarching view of philosophical, scientific and social developments. (shrink)

People who, by intention or negligence, deceive themselves put other people at risk of being misinformed. The paper argues that this kind of misinforming other people is to be avoided for largely the same reasons for which lying is to be avoided – regardless of what exactly these reasons are. This makes the ethical evaluation of self-deception in part dependent on the ethical evaluation of lying. In order to bring out this result as clearly as possible, detailed characterisations of the (...) concepts of attempted deception, lying, and self-deception are given. (shrink)

In environmental ethics, many approaches are searching for a justification of the protection of nature and biodiversity via an account of the intrinsic or inherent value of non-human nature, i. e. a justification that does not rely on the perspective of human beings. This leads to intricate problems regarding value theory. This paper proposes to avoid those problems by investigating explicitly anthropocentric pathways. It discusses what kinds of reasons for the protection of nature can be developed from the consistent practical (...) self-understanding of agents. First, it is argued that the practical commitments of agents necessarily involve some normative commitments to the protection of the generic conditions of agency, which are particularly relevant for the ecological conditions that enable us to act and to realise goals. Second, it is discussed whether the presence of non-human nature is particularly relevant from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. Is it not important for human beings to experience non-human nature as an environment that is not fully planned and designed by human beings? The general aim is to show that it is worthwhile to search for justifications of the protection of nature and biodiversity from the practical self-understanding of human beings. (shrink)

The essay outlines modelling theory in terms of an active form of thinking. In contrast to concepts of theory whose validity can be described by a scientific explanatory approach with a systematic character and the claim to universalization regarding a specific field of research, the question here is about varieties of theory building. The focus is on theoretical activity, not on theory as a result. Based on ancient implications of the term θεωρία (theoria), models of a theoretical activity, attitude or (...) stance are brought into focus, whereby ways of distancing are constitutive in each case. What does theorizing mean from the perspective of a spectator and to what extent is purposelessness to be thought of as a critical potential? Does the theoretical performance of thought include a sense of possibility and to what extent is this articulated in the aesthetic forms of language? Do theoretical realizations in the literary medium move on a threshold between historical determinisms and the freedom of a conceivable future? To what extent do theoretical views have a synaesthetic dimension, and can we imagine poetic language as a medium of theoretical reflection? Is the nuanced linguistic nature of theoretical articulation modes the very condition of critical intervention? All these modellings of aesthetic distancing ask about the forms in which theory can be expressed, including ways of writing theoretical activity. (shrink)

Regarding the question of “theory”, the paper takes the perspective of creation, i. e. of producing texts that exhibit theoretical qualities and that in this sense both do justice to a – certainly complex – “function” of philosophical theory and also “work” as theory (namely in a sustainable way, and perhaps also beyond the current scientific orthodoxies) and can thus be received in the long line of the philosophically relevant reading canon. On the one hand, it is proposed to take (...) the project character of philosophical theory seriously. On the other hand, the conditions for the success of philosophical (theoretical) prose have to be looked at carefully. In addition to scholarship and a critical concern with and deep knowledge of discourse, literary qualities are also relevant. There is interplay between time-bound – i. e. historically changing – requirements and a paradoxically persistent style of philosophizing that proceeds despite the plurality of canonical references. “Philosophy”, of course, is not something timeless; it remains something provincial on an intercultural scale and, in principle, something that can be lost. (shrink)

Contemplative and explanatory theories are distinguished. The corpus of European philosophy includes many sorts of texts. Only a few have explanatory value. Some are contemplative. But there are also therapeutic and sceptical texts. It was an old ideal of philosophy to lead a theoretical life. What could that mean? What does “life” mean in this context? We cannot choose forms of life, because all choices and preferences come up in life. Nevertheless a theoretical life is possible. What kind of life (...) is it – one spent in contemplation, in explanation, or a sceptical one? (shrink)

This article explores both the significance and difficulty of the work of Paul Valéry (1871–1945), arguing that his challenging ideas on Europe and its crisis have much to contribute to recent debates on the philosophy of Europe. For Valéry, Europe is inseparable from its (spiritual) history, caught up in the process of self-understanding and self-alienation. In order to examine this process, the article focuses on Valéry’s tripartite composition of Europe’s “influences,” namely the institutions and laws of the Roman Empire, the (...) self-examination of Christianity, and the discipline of spirit and development of science in ancient Greek culture. (shrink)

This paper approximates a definitional distinction between philosophical problems and scientific problems. It defends the claim that philosophical problems can be defined as certain inconsistent sets ???? of propositions. This set is characterised by its minimality, the plausibility of its individual propositions, the non-empirical character of some of these propositions, and by the fact that a discursive context exists within which some of ????’s non-mathematical non-empirical assumptions are rejected by argument. In particular, this extrinsic and pragmatic criterion constitutes the novel (...) character of the definition presented. Starting from the concept of philosophical problem, a classification of philosophy as an academic and intellectual discipline is presented. The last part of the paper deals with the question whether such an analytical understanding of philosophy is to be understood exclusively, or whether other kinds of philosophy should still be considered possible. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs the relationship between critique and theory constitutive for Critical Theory. Based on Max Horkheimer’s 1937 program, the first part shows that “critical behaviour” must, on the one hand, seek proximity to social practice. On the other hand, such behaviour is dependent on the distance from its object that all “theoretical work” entails. Since the inception of a genuinely critical theory in the early works of Karl Marx, the proximity to practice goes hand in hand with the demand (...) to work towards its change, implying a proximity to political movements. The second part shows that, for historical reasons, Horkheimer’s program distances itself from such movements. The third part interprets this dialectical attitude towards social practice as conditioning the peculiar – ideology-critical – capacity of Critical Theory. In conclusion, the fourth part problematises two current tendencies towards dissolving said dialectics: a return to what Horkheimer calls traditional theory on the one hand, and the abandonment of the demanding social-theoretical program in favour of political positioning on the other. (shrink)

The article outlines the basic lines of a phenomenology of driving. The starting point is the thesis that “driving” does not occur in nature and is therefore a form of movement reserved for humans, which is linked to the invention of the wheel. This invention expanded the possibilities of mobility in technical and social terms. We argue that, on the one hand, travelling on wheels strengthens individuality and the feeling of freedom, but on the other hand it has a strong (...) socio-political component that is often ignored: Efficient driving requires a dense road network, and this only emerges as the achievement of a community. Referring back to Matthew B. Crawford’s philosophy of driving and Günther Anders’ philosophy of technology, the question of whether the “autonomous car” restricts or expands the freedom of drivers is discussed. Finally, it is shown that the concept of driving, as manifested above all in the automobile, has also had a significant influence on our concept of social progress. However, this concept has fallen into crisis due to the ecological collateral damage of combustion technology. (shrink)

In this article, Breny Mendoza examines and critically discusses María Lugones’ concept of the “coloniality of gender.” Lugones’ influential thesis asserts that the binarity of gender was introduced in the colonies as part of colonial rule and displaced previously predominant egalitarian systems of gender relations. As Mendoza outlines, this thesis has been challenged in recent years by Latin American and indigenous feminisms (such as the Argentinean anthropologist Rita Segato, and indigenous feminists from countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico). In (...) light of these new perspectives, Mendoza expounds and acknowledges Lugones’ ideas, while also pointing out their pitfalls and limitations, since such an approach can lead to a romanticisation of pre-colonial orders, presenting them as the “absolute other” of colonial violence. In contrast, drawing on the analysis by Bolivian Aymara feminist Julieta Paredes, Mendoza argues that the imposition of gender can only be understood as an “entanglement of patriarchies.” Finally, Mendoza applies these discussions to issues surrounding sexualised violence, i.e., feminicide, in Latin America proving them to provide a fruitful framework for understanding and addressing these current forms of violence. (shrink)

This paper reevaluates Adorno’s theory of non-identity following from a critical examination of his reading of Hegel. The main discussion revolves around two theses central to both philosophers: 1. Conceptual thinking forms the centre of philosophical thought (identification). 2. Philosophical thought aspires to become everything (totality). The analysis of two distinct interpretations, one stricter and one more moderate, demonstrates that Adorno takes the hardline view. With the moderate view, however, not only do the limits of Hegelian philosophy become more pronounced, (...) they also reveal novel systematic connections with pivotal concepts inherent to Critical Theory – connections that have notably lacked substantial consideration within relevant research. (shrink)

In this article, Carlos Pereda introduces the concept of “colonial reason” and explores how philosophical practices and modes of thought are entwined with colonial political structures of exploitation, exclusion, and oppression. Pereda argues that philosophy in Latin America risks perpetuating and reinforcing the colonial gesture, either by turning to the European centers of thought (thus pursuing debates that always take place elsewhere) or by isolating itself and idealising the “own.” According to Pereda, both approaches fail to dismantle colonial violence within (...) philosophy. In his alternative approach, Pereda outlines principles and methodological criteria for the decolonisation of reason and philosophy. He emphasises the importance of methodological prudence that discerns between innocent, paralysing, and strategic uses of identity expressions and advocates for modes of reading and argumentation that conceive philosophy as an inclusive and ongoing dialogue. In Pereda’s terminology, this entails fostering “permeable reason” that manifests itself through “nomadic thinking,” a form of thinking that is capable of questioning itself and being questioned. (shrink)

In this article, Laura Quintana elaborates on a conceptual distinction between violence and rage. Along with this distinction, she recognises that while rage may possess a destructive potential, it can also be politicised in emancipatory practices that confront conditions of injustice and structural violence. Her analysis centers on contemporary political movements in Latin America, which she views as collective manifestations of rage. Within these movements, the manifestation of rage is intertwined with forms of care and communal labor. Quintana characterises such (...) movements as embodying a “dignified rage” (digna rabia) that calls for an emancipatory transformation of the status quo. She contends that these practices can be understood in terms of the notion of “anti-violence,” as it has been coined by Étienne Balibar. In this she diverges from Judith Butler, since, according to Quintana’s analysis, such practices challenge the demand for non-violence that has often served to neutralise the disruptive force of such manifestations and movements. (shrink)

Theories that treat Artistic Research (AR) as their object have been experiencing a boom since the beginning of the 21st century. Increased interest in AR resulted from a historical situation interconnecting at least three fields. First, the art world, which, starting in the 90s, produced AR as a phenomenon in the first place; second, higher education policy, which, in the implementation discussions concerning the Bologna reforms from the 90s onwards, drew on reflections on AR; and third, Germanophone aesthetics, which, during (...) the 2000s, paid increased attention to heteronomy aesthetics. Within these fields, multiple factors are to be accounted for to understand both the sudden increase in pertinence as well as the concrete shape that these theories took in the Germanophone sphere. (shrink)