The Portuguese elections occurred this March, and the left’s decline has accompanied the far-right’s growth, as in previous elections. Explanations for such phenomena are often carried out using quantitative and qualitative methods. Philosophical conceptual analysis, in contrast, is frequently dismissed as a method for analysing political change. In this paper, I will show how, by using conceptual analysis, it is possible to assist in explaining voting behaviour from the left on the far-right party Chega in Portugal. This methodology resembles philosophers (...) and political theorists using concepts like ‘class’ and ‘authoritarianism’ to assist in explaining socio-political changes. I will use concepts, such as ‘complex ideology’ and ‘anti-power/anti-system politics’, which have helpful explanatory power to the phenomenon I address. Particularly, I argue that the right-wing party Chega can attract voters from the left because of its anti-system ideology, an ideological characteristic of left voters in Portugal. Thus, I argue that the rise of the far-right partly relates to the changing politics of some smaller left parties with parliamentary representation. These political changes within these parties create a space for specific anti-system ideologies that the far-right, in the case of Portugal, can fill. (shrink)

Shmuel Nili’s Philosophizing The Indefensible – Strategic Political Theory represents a sophisticated response to the widespread support of political positions that seem unreasonable from the perspective of liberal political morality. Nili takes seriously extreme right-wing, pro-life, pro-business, and climate change-sceptic positions that other liberal theorists seem to prefer sweeping under the carpet when turning towards yet another puzzle of liberalism. This is a refreshing move, which Nili pursues masterfully through the critical analysis of such seemingly indefensible positions in painstaking detail. (...) That said, readers who are intrigued by the political philosophical methods of Charles Larmore and the late John Rawls, who accept the fact of reasonable moral disagreement and focus primarily on the question of political legitimacy, may sometimes find that Nili’s argumentations are somewhat moralistic. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism – the view that moral concern, and consequently moral duties, are not limited by borders – seems to justify colonialism with a ‘civilizing’ mission, because it supports the enforcement of moral norms universally, with no distinctions between territories, and settler colonialism, because it promotes ideas like common ownership of the Earth and open borders. I argue that existing attempts to defend cosmopolitanism from this worry fail, and that instead the cosmopolitan should embrace a cosmopolitan instrumentalist defence. According to cosmopolitan (...) instrumentalism, colonialism is wrong (when it is wrong) for instrumental reasons: it has all sorts of terrible effects. There is nothing per se wrong with colonialism itself, so cosmopolitanism need not worry about licencing it in principle. There is much that is wrong with colonialism in practice, so cosmopolitanism can easily condemn colonialism as egregiously wrong, although it cannot condemn it as per se or necessarily wrong. (shrink)

My paper explores the question of when it is wrong for a state’s immigration criteria to discriminate against people with disabilities, focusing on the idea that discrimination is wrong when it demeans a group, rather than when it disadvantages them. I argue that selecting against people with disabilities often demeans them but might not always do so even when immigration criteria explicitly exclude people on the basis of having disabilities – that is, in cases of direct discrimination. Moreover, I demonstrate (...) that certain cases of less direct forms of discrimination that select against people with disabilities – in particular, when states apply health-cost limits on admissions – can function as proxies designed to exclude people with disabilities and thereby demean them. Finally, I explain why my analysis of discrimination’s wrong does not typically apply to health conditions in general, such as heart, liver, or lung disease or cancer, setting my view apart from a prominent view in the literature. (shrink)

This special issue consists of four articles, contributed by David Owen; Désirée Lim, Sahar Akhtar and (as co-authors) Mollie Gerver, Miranda Simon, Patrick Lown and Dominik Duell. These contributions address issues related to migration policies with the aim of bringing normative theories of migration and discrimination into dialogue. These theories describe the various types of discrimination inherent in the domestic and global migration systems, as well as assess arguments, pro et contra, about whether these forms of discrimination are permissible.

This article presents moral dilemmas that arise when expressing an argument persuades citizens to support rights for migrants, but also persuades citizens to support rights for some migrants and not others. We draw upon an original survey experiment to illustrate versions of these dilemmas.

This paper examines how everyday practices of ‘bordering’, as conceived by Yuval- Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy (2019) as the ongoing proliferation of border sites where migrants are assessed to be fit for inclusion or exclusion, may violate moral respect by subjecting migrants to a wide array of discriminatory treatment, leading to what I call ‘status-harms’. Section II begins by providing an overview of bordering and the various forms it has taken, such as internal immigration checkpoints or even online visa application (...) processes. Section III develops an account of comparative and non-comparative status-harms and why they constitute violations of moral respect. There, I pay special attention to comparative status-harms by proposing three conditions under which a comparative status-harm can be said to have occurred: (a) if an individual or group is singled out for disadvantageous treatment that others are not subjected to on the basis of a socially salient attribute, (b) if the attribute marks them out as inferior relative to those who are not affected thus, and (c) ascriptions of inferior status occur within a morally objectionable social hierarchy where they are targeted by hostile norms and practices centred around that attribute. I then consider how discriminatory practices of bordering routinely imposes status-harms on migrants. Section IV draws a distinction between two types of discrimination that migrants may be subjected to at border sites, which I term policy-based discrimination and procedure-based discrimination, and explores their relationship to the comparative and non-comparative status-harms suffered by migrants. I conclude in Section V. (shrink)

This article considers the question of the value and limits of the concept of discrimination for the ethics of migration by drawing attention to the need for a conceptualization of discrimination that can encompass forms of group-based disadvantage that are enabled and reproduced by the three central norms of our contemporary regime of global migration governance: the state’s right to unilateral control over its border regime, birthright citizenship and rights of (re)entry to one’s own state, and the individual right to (...) leave a state. I sketch an historical account of the forging and yoking together of these norms as bound up with the history of European imperialism and argue that they function to enable the reproduction of the advantage of states of the Global North. I illustrate this argument by reference to the example of the transnational migration of medical professionals from sub-Saharan Africa and argue that this may amount to structural discrimination against the human right to health of the populations of these states of emigration before considering two responses to this condition: ‘no recruitment’ and ‘no disadvantage’. (shrink)

There is a broad consensus on the legitimacy of states to control immigration. However, this belief has recently been questioned, among other reasons, due to the contradiction with current practices in emigration and internal mobility. The principle of symmetry states that any restriction on immigration should also apply to emigration; or that, to the contrary, if there is a right to emigrate, there should be a corresponding right to immigrate. The principle of coherence posits that every reason one might have (...) for moving within a country also counts for moving between countries. This article proposes to extend the coherence principle from external to internal migration, arguing that the same reasons that justify restrictions on mobility across borders justify restrictions on mobility within borders too. Therefore, either freedom of movement is a fundamental right or the right of the political community to control mobility prevails. The interests at stake are in both cases the same, so asymmetry is not warranted. This leads us to an apagogical argument for open borders. (shrink)

Recently, there have been debates in Portugal regarding the morality of assisted death. One of the leading opponents in Portuguese society against assisted death are Catholics. They argue that the right to life implies that assisted death is immoral and provide four key arguments they believe justify their position. In this article, we reply to these four articles and show that they all fail.

The book Property and Justice: A Trend Towards Marxist Political Philosophy by a Chinese political philosophy scholar, Prof. ZHANG Wenxi, provides a refreshing and thought-provoking analysis of Mar...