Rights

Este manual sobre tecnologías para un envejecimiento activo y saludable, también conocido como Vida Asistida Activa (Active Assisted Living – AAL en sus siglas en inglés), ha sido creado como parte de la Acción COST GoodBrother, que se ha llevado a cabo desde 2020 hasta 2024. Las Acciones COST son programas de investigación europeos que promueven la colaboración internacional, uniendo a investigadores, profesionales e instituciones para abordar desafíos sociales importantes. GoodBrother se ha centrado en las cuestiones éticas y de privacidad (...) relacionadas con la monitorización empleando cámaras y micrófonos en entornos de provisión de cuidados. El objetivo ha sido garantizar que, mientras las tecnologías AAL ayudan a las personas mayores y a los individuos vulnerables, sus derechos de privacidad y protección de datos se mantengan como una prioridad. Este manual está diseñado para guiar en el papel que juegan las tecnologías AAL en la mejora de la calidad de vida de personas mayores, sus cuidadores y personas con discapacidades. Las tecnologías AAL ofrecen herramientas para quienes enfrentan desafíos cognitivos o físicos. Pueden mejorar la independencia, asistir en las rutinas diarias y promover un entorno de vida más seguro. Sin embargo, el aumento de estas tecnologías también plantea preguntas importantes sobre la protección de datos y la autonomía del usuario. A~través de estudios de casos prácticos, este manual explora escenarios reales en los que se aplican las tecnologías AAL. Ofrecen información sobre sus beneficios y desafíos. Se discuten situaciones en las que personas mayores han recuperado su sentido de independencia, por ejemplo, mediante el uso de sistemas de detección de caídas o dispositivos de monitorización de salud. Estas historias ofrecen una perspectiva humana de la tecnología, mostrando cómo pueden mejorar el bienestar mientras plantean cuestiones sobre la privacidad y el uso ético. El manual también destaca la importancia de tomar decisiones informadas al elegir e implementar sistemas AAL. Se enfatiza la~necesidad de que estas tecnologías equilibren seguridad y conveniencia con respeto a los derechos individuales. Encontrará información sobre cuestiones clave, incluyendo cómo seleccionar dispositivos adecuados, gestionar la configuración de privacidad y garantizar que la tecnología se integre de manera fluida en la vida diaria. Además de estos casos de estudio, el manual aborda temas importantes, como la seguridad de los datos, las consideraciones éticas y el papel de las normativas europeas, como el Reglamento General de Protección de Datos (RGPD), en la protección de la privacidad del usuario. Comprender estos aspectos es esencial para asegurar que los sistemas AAL no solo sean efectivos, sino también respetuosos de los derechos y la dignidad de los usuarios. Este recurso está destinado a una amplia audiencia, incluidos usuarios finales, cuidadores, profesionales de la salud y responsables de políticas. Proporciona orientación práctica sobre cómo integrar las tecnologías AAL en entornos de cuidados mientras se protege la privacidad y se garantiza un uso ético. Las ideas presentadas aquí buscan empoderar a los usuarios y cuidadores para que tomen decisiones informadas que mejoren tanto la calidad del cuidado como el respeto por la autonomía personal. (shrink)

"... These breakfast bowls of credit and the associated vehicles that enable the creation of business interests, guide governmental regulation, and provide the basis for the interpretation and explanation of business strategy and government policy, simultaneously depend on and are underscored by consumer indebtedness which they (categories 1 and 2) themselves have formed and managed, and from whose obligations and restrictions they remain remarkably and disproportionately aloof...".

Gelten Rechtsnormen auch im Computerspiel? Mit dieser Frage, die anders als die Frage nach moralischen Normen im Computerspiel kaum je gestellt wurde, beschäftigt sich der vorliegende Beitrag und entwickelt eine Antwort mithilfe der Naturrechtstheorie J. G. Fichtes. Es wird sich zeigen, dass Computerspiele alle Bedingungen für ein Fichte’sches Rechtsverhältnis erfüllen: Sie konstituieren virtuelle Räume, in denen wirksame und freie Handlungen in der Interaktion mit anderen Individuen ausgeführt werden können. Dennoch bergen Computerspiele rechtsphilosophische Besonderheiten: Handlungen im Computerspiel sind rechtlich irrelevant, wenn (...) sie durch Spielregeln explizit legitimiert sind und keine Personen tangieren, die dem Spiel nicht zugestimmt haben. Dies betrifft, wie sich zeigen wird, vor allem Singleplayer-Spiele, während sich die meisten Handlungen in Multiplayer-Spielen im Spektrum der (Il-)Legalität bewegen. (shrink)

The point of this paper is to show that the understanding Solovyov penned and voiced about humanity close to the end of his life suggests that he regarded human rights as sacred. First of all, we provided a rough sense of who Solovyov was as a person, for he is a bit of a stranger to the majority of the audience, including scholars, in the Western hemisphere. Afterwards, we carried out what we have already said we intended to do here, (...) drawing on a public lecture that Solovyov gave at Saint Petersburg Imperial University to mark the 100th anniversary of Auguste Comte’s birth. Our perception is that Solovyov clearly thought of human rights from a faith-based angle and believed them to be sacred, and that all of his insights and those inspired by them are remarkably conducive to reflecting on human rights at the present time, whatever the religious background of each one of us. -/- . (shrink)

I provide a defence of the classical liberal tradition (from Locke and Smith to Hayek and Tomasi) as a blueprint for a 'bleeding-heart libertarian' framework of society. Such a society defends three principles: 1) Freedom from private coercion (Private Property), 2) Freedom from public coercion (Limited Government); and 3) Within these limits, the provision of a limited range of public goods and public welfare (Limited Welfare State). I show that principles can be abstracted from a reading of the classical liberal (...) tradition. Then, through an extensive analysis of Locke, I show the importance, and consequentialist justifications, of the Three Principles for any liberal welfare state. Through a critique of Nozick, I show the inadequacy of the hardcore libertarian interpretation. Then, I show that John Tomasi, Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek have all defended versions of limited welfare states. On this basis, I propose that the Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is a good example, supported by Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman, of a welfare principle that is compatible with bleeding-heart libertarianism. I believe we can justify, on the basis of a consequentialist theory, that the limited welfare state, which combines welfare with liberty, and the free market with a social safety net, has highly beneficial effects on the society. It thus suggests itself as a viable competitor to rights-based libertarianism and more expansive social liberalism. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of whether vegan activists should cater to their audience by framing their message according to the pre-existing values of their interlocutors. Specifically, I focus on deliberative activism, which is based on speech and exchanges with the audience. I propose that message framing can lead to a neglect of animal suffering in favor of focusing on less contentious motives for veganism, such as environmental or health benefits. I claim that neglecting the issue of animal suffering can (...) have several problematic consequences. Concretely, I argue that message framing can: (1) lead to the objectification of animals, treating them as mere means to other ends (such as environmental and health benefits); (2) imply a denial of their personhood; (3) perpetuate their status as property; (4) enable future harm to animals; and (5) create a hierarchy of moral worth among different animal species. For these reasons, I suggest that message framing is less appealing than it initially seems. (shrink)

The paper argues that the concept of a civilizationally transformed state envisions a new governance paradigm that emphasizes moral values, collective responsibility, and compassion over traditional ideas of sovereignty and legality. This model emerges from the failure of conventional states to address global crises like climate change, economic instability, and democratic erosion. It proposes a state that prioritizes human dignity, justice, and the common good. Drawing from philosophical traditions such as Ubuntu, it seeks to foster mutual accountability and elevate compassion (...) as a guiding principle of governance to ensure care for the vulnerable. The 2024 Bangladeshi student-public uprising reflects this vision by rejecting repressive governance and demanding moral accountability. Realizing this transformation requires a cultural and ethical shift where the state serves as a moral authority inspiring pluralism, collective growth, and humanity's highest aspirations. (shrink)

In a common, pejorative sense of it, ideology consists in attitudes whose presence contributes to sustaining, by making them seem legitimate, social orders that are problematic. An important way a social order can be problematic concerns the prospects for well-being facing the people living in it. It can make some people wind up worse off than they could and should be. They have “real interests” that are not properly served by the social order, and the interests aligned with it are (...) in fact “false,” merely “apparent,” or “distorted.” Ideology critique consists in part in noting the existence of such different interests, and in challenging the latter to facilitate the fulfillment of the former. This picture of ideology critique implies that ideology thwarts well-being. This paper aims to clarify, develop, and vindicate this picture. It argues that ideology critique should indeed draw (inter alia) on prudential considerations, and that a specifically objectivist view of well-being would be fitting. The fruitfulness of this approach is shown by exploring the specific case of the critique of working practices in contemporary capitalism. (shrink)

While it is clear what those attracted to fascism today are against, it is less clear what they are for. Not in the sense of how they want to remake society—this is usually clear enough. What is less clear is the fundamental values that are driving their desire to create a different kind of order. Compounding this difficulty, too many liberals are stubbornly sticking to some conventional beliefs: that human nature is as liberals think it is, not something that is (...) fundamentally disputed; that facts are what liberals think they are, even if some people choose to ignore them; and that everybody is pursuing basically the same conception of the good, even if some of them are deluded as to where we are now and how to get where we want to go. -/- But this move to the right is not being driven simply by mistakes; it is a principled move, backed by a coherent, consistent, and historically well-sourced value system, even if this value system is perverse. Fascism has its own conception of the moral subject; of the need for a rigid social hierarchy of men; of the nature of individual rights; and of the importance of purity in blood, soil, and ideology. It believes in the unity of the people, the leader, and the state; it embraces very different and (to liberals) often disturbing moral ends; and it employs starkly different rules of social interaction. And it believes, in the end, that this all leads to the greatest expression of democracy ever invented. (shrink)

This article examines the idea of mind-reading technology by focusing on an interesting case of applying a large language model (LLM) to brain data. On the face of it, experimental results appear to show that it is possible to reconstruct mental contents directly from brain data by processing via a chatGPT-like LLM. However, the author argues that this apparent conclusion is not warranted. Through examining how LLMs work, it is shown that they are importantly different from natural language. The former (...) operates on the basis of nonrational data transformations based on a large textual corpus. The latter has a rational dimension, being based on reasons. Using this as a basis, it is argued that brain data does not directly reveal mental content, but can be processed to ground predictions indirectly about mental content. The author concludes that this is impressive but different in principle from technology-mediated mind reading. The applications of LLM-based brain data processing are nevertheless promising for speech rehabilitation or novel communication methods. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of digital health innovation, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), is transforming healthcare. The growing role the European Union (EU) plays in regulating the use of AI in healthcare renders national laws insufficient to safeguard patients from unique AIrelated risks. This underscores the urgent need for the recognition of a canon of patients' rights in the scope of EU law. This paper proposes the blueprint for an EU Charter for Digital Patients' Rights, consolidating and adapting existing rights for patients (...) to address these specific challenges. Traditional patients' rights such as the right to privacy and the right to informed consent are interpreted in light of the challenges posed by AI. It also proposes novel rights for patients, such as the right not to be subject to automated medical decision-making and the right to meaningful human contact. This paper highlights the EU's central role in protecting patients' rights and outlines strategies for effective implementation. This comprehensive approach aims to address the current shortcomings and enhance the legal framework governing digital health in Europe. (shrink)

Can people alive now have duties to future generations, the unborn millions? If so, what do we owe them? What does “justice” mean in an intergenerational context, both between people who will coexist at some point, and between generations that will never overlap? -/- In this book, Axel Gosseries provides a forensic examination of these issues, comparing and analyzing various views about what we owe our successors. He discusses links between justice and sustainability, and looks at the implications of the (...) fact that our successors’ preferences are heavily influenced by what we will actually leave them and by the education they receive. He also points to how these theoretical considerations apply to real-life issues, ranging from pension reform and Brexit to biodiversity and the climate crisis. He ends by outlining how intergenerational considerations may translate into institutional design. -/- Anyone grappling with the dilemmas of our obligations to the future, from students and scholars to policy makers and active citizens, will find this an invaluable theoretical and practical guide to this moral and political minefield. (shrink)

Arguments against inflicting violence on people to defend animal rights have relied on the view that inflicting violence is always wrong. But these arguments end up prohibiting too much, as defensive violence should be permissible in certain extreme cases. We argue that considerations about the counterproductiveness of defensive violence are better at distinguishing permissible and impermissible instances of animal rights violence than a blanket rejection of violence. We respond to the objection that assuming violence to be counterproductive is ad hoc, (...) discussing real-world and fictional examples of animal rights violence. We argue that defensive violence on behalf of animals should almost always be assumed to be counterproductive because it threatens to trigger self-reinforcing reactions on the part of the socio-technical regimes that violate animal rights in the first place. (shrink)

The argument I defend in this paper challenges whether Waldron’s explanation of the conditions required for a moral right to satisfy its autonomy-promoting function is the best one available. It questions the suitability of Waldron’s preferred taxonomy of moral action, where acts are divided into: (1) those that are morally required; (2) those that are morally prohibited; and (3) those that are morally indifferent, advocating instead for a binary classification consisting of: (a) actions that admit of reasonable moral disagreement; and (...) (b) actions that do not admit of reasonable moral disagreement. My claim is that the protective sphere moral rights set up in organizing the moral relations among persons is applicable only to the former category—namely, actions that admit of reasonable moral disagreement. Actions that do not admit of reasonable moral disagreement will either: (b’) not normally demand a right against interference in the first place (if the action is unquestionably permissible); or (b”) fail to admit of a right against interference at all (if the action is unquestionably impermissible). This competing explanation allows us to preserve the autonomy-promoting conception of moral rights Waldron endorses while avoiding a number of its suspect implications. (shrink)

This article studies the response of the US disability community to the prevalent assumption that disabled people do not have a future, in the form of the disability rights movement. It provides an exploratory discussion of the key role played by utopianism in the response. In doing so, the article adds to critical theorizing on the importance of utopia to the oppression of non-dominant groups and to transcending that oppression. I use utopian studies scholarship to interpret the activities leading up (...) to the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 as a minor utopia, characterized by an ambiguous, grounded, and provisional effort to imagine alternative ways of being. I articulate the central role played by a positive vision of disability and disabled people for this inversion of the historically negative relationship between utopia and disability. The article turns to disability activists to show that the movement countered exclusionary utopian approaches by acting as if it had a right to envision and enact a different, better future for all from the perspective of disability and disabled people. (shrink)

Superficially, citizenship appears relatively simple: a legal status denoting political membership. However, critical citizenship studies scholars suggest that citizenship is first and foremost a political practice. When non-citizens, such as irregularised migrants, constitute themselves as citizens through their actions, irrespective of legal status, these practices of citizenship have transformational potential because they are extra-legal. Yet, there is an ambivalence here: rights-claiming migrants tend to frame their key demands within the terms of the law often by calling for the regularisation of (...) their status. This article addresses this ambivalence by adopting a ‘deconstructive method’ to investigate the legal dimensions of citizenship as sites of theoretical and political intervention. It is argued that practices of rights-claiming by irregularised migrants are important to grasp because they mobilise the paradoxes inherent to the fact that universal rights are enshrined in the constitutional texts of modern citizenship in order to generate new legal meanings and horizons of justice. This hypothesis is explored through a series of illustrative examples of rights-claiming taking place within and beyond the formal confines of legal orders. In so doing, the article sets out a novel conceptual framework for analysing how migrants’ claims to justice strategically negotiate citizenship in its legal form. (shrink)

This paper presents a new version of the democratic argument for the freedom of expression that has the resources to give a plausible reply to the perennial objection—ordinarily considered fatal—that such accounts fail to deliver protections for abstract art, instrumental music, and lots of other deserving nonpolitical speech. The argument begins with the observation that there are different things that a free speech theory might aim to accomplish. It will hope to justify a right to free speech, of course, with (...) a particular scope and shape, but that right might be a moral right, an ordinary legal right, or a specifically constitutional right. The new version of the argument—the refined argument from democracy—aims to justify a specifically constitutional right to political speech, administered by strong-form judicial review. The democracy theorist can accommodate the intuition that abstract art deserves protection by agreeing that we have a moral right, and probably ought to have an ordinary legal right, to produce and view abstract art. She must only insist that abstract art should not be protected by a specifically constitutional right administered by strong-form judicial review. Not because abstract art does not deserve constitutional protection, but because, on this view, whether a particular right ought to be enshrined in the constitution and administered by judicial review is not solely a matter of the importance of the right or the value of the interests it protects. (shrink)

Should historical injustices always be repaired? Most public institutions and present holdings reveal links to past injustices, making reparation imperative. However, what if repairing historical injustices conflicts with distributive justice demands? Through discussions of post-colonial injustices against Indigenous peoples and of the injustices committed by the Global North against the Global South, particularly in the context of climate change, this book argues that repairing historical injustices can and must be reconciled with the imperatives of distributive justice.

As opaque algorithmic systems take up a larger and larger role in shaping our lives, calls for explainability in various algorithmic systems have increased. Many moral and political philosophers have sought to vindicate these calls for explainability by developing theories on which decision-subjects—that is, individuals affected by decisions—have a moral right to the explanation of the systems that affect them. Existing theories tend to suggest that the right to explanation arises solely in virtue of facts about how decision-subjects are affected (...) by opaque systems. But this ignores an important part of the normative landscape: sometimes, facts about a decision-maker’s rights and freedoms can make a difference to whether she owes anyone explanations of her decisions. I illustrate the point by calling attention to examples of artistic, romantic, and supererogatory altruistic decisions; in at least some cases of this sort, even highly influential decisions can legitimately be kept entirely private and opaque. (shrink)

Do non-human animals have moral standing? Work on this question has focused on choosing the right grounding property (for example, personhood or sentience) while little attention has been paid to the various ways that the connection between grounding properties and moral standing has been explained. In this paper, I address that gap by offering a fresh way to approach the debate over the grounds of moral standing, including a novel taxonomy of positions, and argue that one kind of position, which (...) takes a ‘value-first’ approach, is preferable to the other, which takes an ‘interests-first’ approach. According to value-first accounts, some individuals have moral standing because they have properties that make them valuable. According to interests-first accounts, some individuals have moral standing because they have interests, and any interest must always be taken into account. I argue that we should prefer value-first accounts because they engage directly with the problem the concept of moral standing is employed to solve, and because interests-first accounts cannot meet their explanatory burdens without begging the question against value-first accounts. (shrink)

This special issue consists of four articles, contributed by David Owen; Désirée Lim, Sahar Akhtar and (as co-authors) Mollie Gerver, Miranda Simon, Patrick Lown and Dominik Duell. These contributions address issues related to migration policies with the aim of bringing normative theories of migration and discrimination into dialogue. These theories describe the various types of discrimination inherent in the domestic and global migration systems, as well as assess arguments, pro et contra, about whether these forms of discrimination are permissible.

I offer a Kantian argument for the idea that the state lacks the authority to punish neglected, impoverished citizens when they commit crimes to cope with that neglect. Given Kant’s own commitments to the value of external freedom and the state’s obligation to ensure it in Doctrine of Right, there is no reason a Kantian state can claim authority to punish an impoverished citizen while also failing in significant ways to protect her external freedom.

Hypocrites, we are told, lack the moral standing to blame. But what is this standing to blame? Why would hypocrisy undermine it? Do any other conditions compromise standing to blame? Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s The Beam and the Mote offers the first book-length treatment on such complex questions. Yet the book admirably pushes even further, extending the scope of standing into other normative domains, such as praise, forgiveness, and encouragement. In our review, we critically engage with four of the book’s central topics: (...) (1) the nature and scope of the moral standing to blame, (2) why hypocrisy undermines standing to blame, (3) what other conditions undermine standing to blame, and (4) standing in other normative domains. Although we argue that Lippert-Rasmussen’s views on (2) and (4) require further development, his expansion of standing into underexplored domains is praiseworthy. (shrink)

Voor het eerst hebben jongeren onder de achttien in Duitsland en België deze maand gestemd, bij de Europese verkiezingen. Nederlandse leeftijdsgenoten hebben dit recht (nog) niet. Te beïnvloedbaar, ze kunnen nog niet verantwoord stemmen, klinkt het. Deze tegenwerpingen zijn oneerlijk. Ze gelden ook voor miljoenen anderen die al wel stemrecht hebben.

States are in the process of creating controversial legislation aimed at subjecting ‘harmful’ online communication on social media and search engines to new regulatory regimes. Critics argue that these measures are serious threats to the right to freedom of expression and freedom from surveillance. This article first draws on elements of systems theory to reframe the right to freedom of expression in democracy as a means of protecting the value of generalised second-order observation. Taking the UK’s Online Safety bill as (...) the paradigm example of the new laws, the article analyses the concept of harmful communication at three levels: society, organisation, and subject. It identifies a shift in the law’s epistemic approach to communication, by which individuals are reconfigured from agential subjects into contingent users, whose capacities are determined by the structure of online communication platforms. In this configuration, norms previously considered indispensible are relegated to second-order effects of the affordances of media. Arguing that it is insufficient to merely reaffirm subjective rights in light of this shift, the article suggests systems theoretical analysis as a means of identifying lines of critique. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

States’ right to exclude prospective members is the subject of a fierce debate in political theory, but the right to include has received relatively little scholarly attention. To address this lacuna, we examine the puzzle of permissible inclusion: when may states confer citizenship on individuals they have no prior obligation to include? We first clarify why permissible inclusion is a puzzle, then proceed to a normative evaluation of this practice and its limits. We investigate self-determination – a dominant principle in (...) theories of the right to exclude – as a normative ground for limits on the right to include. We argue that states’ duties to respect one another’s self-determination yield limits on permissible inclusion. When inclusive policies for citizenship undermine the permissible scope of self-determination of other states, they are impermissible; they should either be prohibited, or require compensation. (shrink)

Unfortunately, many people today see the regulation of lies, disinformation, hate speech, and fake news as an infringement of free speech, at least when such speech is ‘political,’ despite the damage that such speech can do. But this very protective attitude toward speech rests on a mistaken understanding of the role of free speech in a liberal society. The right to free speech is based on the liberal value of freedom, and as such can be no broader than freedom itself. (...) And freedom has always been subject to reasonable limits in a liberal society. Indeed, while the principles of toleration and neutrality are often cited as supporting a broad interpretation of the right to free speech, they also tell us that certain limits apply to that right. We need not tolerate speech that encourages intolerance, and while government should be neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good, it need not be neutral between reasonable and unreasonable conceptions. These ideas form the framework of liberal society, and as I shall show, also provide a guide for understanding what kind of speech is protected in a liberal society and what it is not. (shrink)

This article critically analyzes Rawls’s attitude toward envy. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is predominantly concerned with the threat that class envy poses to political stability. Yet he also briefly discusses the kind of envy that individuals experience toward their social peers, which he calls particular envy, and which I refer to as peer envy. He quickly concludes, however, that particular envy would not present a serious risk to the stability of his just society. In this article, I contest (...) this claim by arguing that the principles that structure Rawls’s ideal society are likely to exacerbate particular envy to a politically risky extent. Section 1 reconstructs his account of envy, giving special attention to his belief that competition kindles envy between peers. Section 2 then examines the way in which Rawls often endorses rivalry within the body politic. I argue that the society governed by justice as fairness is, on account of this rivalry, likely to generate a politically problematic degree of particular envy. In Section 3, I invoke ancient Greece as an example of a society that was, as a result of its intense competitiveness, often imperiled by dangerously elevated levels of peer envy. I then survey the key institutional mechanisms by which the ancient Greeks sought to manage this hazardous emotion. It turns out, however, that most of these mechanisms would be unavailable to Rawls insofar as they starkly contravene his principles of justice. I conclude that if Rawlsians wish to establish a society that fosters rivalry, they would do well to reflect on the means by which peer envy can be effectively harnessed. (shrink)

What would it look like for researchers to take non-human animal rights seriously? Recent discussions foster the impression that scientific practice needs to be reformed to make animal research ethical: just as there is ethically rigorous human research, so there can be ethically rigorous animal research. We argue that practically little existing animal research would be ethical and that ethical animal research is not scalable. Since animal research is integral to the existing scientific paradigm, taking animal rights seriously requires a (...) radical, wholesale reimagining of science.Trial registration: ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT05340426. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept that, as well as having a right that others not harm us, we also have a right that others not subject us to a risk of harm. And yet, when we attempt to spell out precisely what this ‘right against risk imposition’ involves, we encounter a series of notorious puzzles. Existing attempts to deal with these puzzles have tended to focus on the nature of rights – but I propose an approach that focusses instead on the nature (...) of risk. The key move is to distinguish two different ways in which to conceptualise the risk that a given action presents – one of which is linked to the notion of probability and the other to the notion of normalcy. (shrink)

A notable feature of our moral and legal practices is the recognition of privileges, powers, and entitlements belonging to a select group of individuals in virtue of their status as victims of wrongful conduct. A philosophical literature on relational normativity purports to account for this status in terms of such notions as interests, rights, and attitudes of disregard. This paper argues that such individualistic notions cannot account for prevailing and intuitive ways of demarcating the class of victims. The focus of (...) the discussion is the wrongful infliction of harm, and the mediating role played by impersonal “danger-making properties” in the determination of the class of victims. Beginning with a treatment of one of the most well-known discussions of negligently-inflicted harm — from the most famous case of the American common law tradition, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. — the analysis is then extended to the morality of harm-doing more broadly, negligent and intentional alike. The paper’s chief targets are interest theories of rights — including contractualist theories of moral claim-rights of the kind defended by R. Jay Wallace — and neo-Strawsonian Quality of Will theories of “moral injury”. (shrink)

Taking as its starting point Miri Gur-Arye’s critical discussion of a legal duty to report crime, this paper sketches an idealising conception of a democratic republic whose citizens could be expected to recognise a civic responsibility to report crime, in order to assist the enterprise of a criminal law that is their common law. After explaining why they should recognise such a responsibility, what its scope should be, and how it should be exercised, and noting that that civic responsibility must (...) include a responsibility to report one’s own crimes; it discusses whether that civic responsibility could ground at least a limited legal duty to report certain types of crime. It then turns to the question of whether a civic responsibility to assist the criminal law’s enterprise of bringing wrongdoers to account could include a responsibility to arrest suspected or known offenders if the police cannot or will not do so—a responsibility to make a citizen’s arrest, and the legal power to discharge that responsibility: how far should citizens feel entitled, or duty-bound, thus to ‘take the law into their own hands’? (shrink)

In articles published ten years apart in 2011 and 2021, Gur-Arye argues that when considering an agent’s explanation for doing something that looks, prima facie, like a criminal offence, we should distinguish between a plea of justification, and an assertion that one acted within one’s power. The former explains an agent’s reasons for having committed a pro tanto offence (i.e., actus reus + mens rea). The latter is a denial that the agent committed any pro tanto offence at all. In (...) this piece, I build on Gur-Arye’s argument, suggesting that her claim about powers can be extended to all instances in which rights are displaced. I argue that in its expanded form, the practical significance of Gur-Arye’s claim goes well beyond what she identifies. It points to important and underappreciated points about the structure and classification of defensive claims in the criminal law, and helps identify errors in some arguments commonly made to support claims about disputed features of justifications. (shrink)

Genetic testing has familial implications. Counsellors find themselves in (moral) conflict between medical confidentiality (towards the patient) and a potential right or even duty to warn at-risk relatives. Legal regulations vary between countries. English literature about German law is scarce. We reviewed the literature of relevant legal cases, focussing on German law, according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines. This article aims to familiarise counsellors with their responsibilities, compare the situation between countries and point out (...) legally unresolved areas.According to the German Genetic Diagnostics Act (Gendiagnostikgesetz) in case of an ‘avoidable or treatable’ genetic disorder, geneticists ought to confine themselves to the obligated advice to the patient. Whether a breach of the duty of confidentiality can be justified in exceptional cases by ‘necessity as justification’ for actively informing relatives at risk remains legally unclear. In case of a ‘neither avoidable nor treatable’ genetic disease, geneticists should also refrain from actively informing relatives as the justifiable state of emergency does not permit to break the duty of confidentiality. (shrink)

Advances in assisted reproductive technologies can give rise to several ethical challenges. One of these challenges occurs when the reproductive desires of two individuals become incompatible and conflict. To address such conflicts, it is important to unbundle different aspects of (non)parenthood and to recognize the corresponding reproductive rights. This article starts on the premise that the six reproductive rights—the right (not) to be a gestational, genetic, and social parent—are negative rights that do not entail a right to assistance. Since terminating (...) or continuing a pregnancy is a form of assistance, the right (not) to be a gestational parent should enjoy primacy in conflicts. However, while refusing assistance may hinder the reproductive project of another person, “prior assistance” does not entitle someone to violate a reproductive right. Therefore, our analysis provides reasons to argue that someone has a right to unilaterally use cryopreserved embryos or continue the development of an entity in an extracorporeal gestative environment (i.e., ectogestation). Although this could lead to a violation of the right not to be a genetic parent, it does not necessarily entail a violation of the right not to be a social parent. (shrink)

Arguing for a pro-democratic approach in authoritarian times, this book challenges the focus on age in identifying children in child rights. It argues that, even for the purposes of a benevolent rights regime, adopting a monist construction of child identity artificially separates the law from reality, potentially foreclosing children's democratic deliberative agency in self-identification. An essential feature of other human rights regimes is the scope for a claimant to argue one's identity, or foundationally 'I am a human being;' but such (...) a contention is foreclosed when identification as a child is decided uniquely by reference to age. Drawing on Critical Race Theory's narrative method and inspired by W.E.B. DuBois' identity construction, Professor Grahn-Farley advocates a new theoretical understanding of the child and of child rights, cognisant of social interaction and democratic participation. This book will appeal to researchers in child and human rights, and to sociologists, legal theorists and activists.__This title is part of the Flip it Open programme and may also be available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details. (shrink)

Contributors examine the ethical issues surrounding microfinance, including questions about exploitation, human rights, and efforts to promote global justice.

In 1967, the superior general of the Society of Jesus, Pedro Arrupe, sent a memorandum on the American “racial crisis” to the Jesuit priests, brothers, and social institutions of the United States. Through appeals to the American legal and Catholic moral traditions, On the Interracial Apostolate articulated why Jesuits should strive to achieve racial equality, initiating a historic period of expansion in Jesuit civil rights programs. Given scholars’ limited engagement with On the Interracial Apostolate’s distinctive rhetorical features, this article explains (...) why the document was framed within the discursive framework of prophetic indictment by uncovering the influence of William J. Kenealy, a Jesuit legal scholar, on the document’s drafting. In light of this drafting history, this article concludes by suggesting that the emergence of twentieth-century “Jesuit anti-racism” can, in part, be explained by how questions about racial equality came to be understood as discrete expressions of broader debates about the American legal tradition’s moral foundations. (shrink)

How should we treat animals? The long-held belief that other animals exist solely for human use has undergone radical challenge in the past half century. How much further do we need to go to minimize, and even eliminate, animal suffering? The field of animal rights raises big questions about how humans treat the other animals with which we share the planet. These questions are becoming more pressing as livestock farming exerts an ever-greater toll on the planet and the animals themselves, (...) and we learn more about their capacity to think and experience pain. This book shows why animals ought to have greater rights and what the world might look like if they did. (shrink)