Technology Ethics

The use of psychedelics has recently gained increased interest among bioethicists, as the articles published in this journal attest. Some of the recent scholarship suggests that psychedelic experie...

This anthology aims to explore the current Norwegian context of implementation of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),as well as the challenges and fragilities associated with it. It is grounded in the experience of a networking and learning centre called AFINO (acronym for‘ Ansvarlig Forskning og Innovasjon i NOrge’, or Responsible Research and Innovation in Norway),to which most of the authors of this book are affiliated. Whether the authors are trying to illustrate a fragility or challenge, (...) to understand its origins, or to illustrate how they have been tackled or how things developed in unexpected ways that raise new fragilities and questions, we believe that all chapters contribute to bringing to light the richness of the domains of research, innovation, policy, and business. (shrink)

Attempts to steer research, innovation and business in desirable directions have failed to meet expectations. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and responsible research and innovation (RRI) seem to be losing ground, while the challenges they sought to address remain. Despite their shortcomings, these concepts remind us of the need to take responsibility for what we as researchers and entrepreneurs bring into the world, and to keep questioning the given framework. -/- Drawing from the experience of the AFINO project, a unique attempt (...) to bring together RRI and CSR and to promote networks, learning and skills building in Norway, this book contextualises and explores the practical challenges of actualising responsible practices even in the propitious Norwegian context. Readers interested in RRI, CSR, transdisciplinarity, and in the governance of research and innovation will find extensive information and insights about the challenges of steering research and business practices towards desirable ends and how to address them. -/- This book is unique in bringing together the perspectives of Responsible Research and Innovation and Corporate Social Responsibility. Draws from the unique experience of the AFINO research centre and network. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to explore and evaluate the various philosophical methodologies and perspectives on technology, and apply them to questions concerning digital and information communication technologies. My goal is to consider, within the tradition of the philosophy of orientation, what these technologies promise and enable, what they constrain, and what they render impossible. I will argue for a substantivist and existential instrumentalist understanding insofar as these technologies represent both a totalizing force and the embodiment of human needs and (...) desires. (shrink)

Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and speech of a deceased loved one. If you start having regular interactions with this “thanabot,” could this new relationship be a continuation of the relationship you had with your loved one? And could a relationship with a thanabot preserve or replicate the value of a close human relationship? To the first question, we argue that a relationship with a thanabot cannot be a true continuation (...) of your relationship with a deceased loved one, though it might support one’s continuing bonds with the dead. To the second question, we argue that, in and of themselves, relationships with thanabots cannot benefit us as much as rewarding and healthy intimate relationships with other humans, though we explain why it is difficult to make reliable comparative generalizations about the instrumental value of these relationships. (shrink)

Internet users fill in interactive forms with multiple fields, check/uncheck checkboxes, select options and agree to submit. People give their consents without keeping track of them. Dominance of the machine producing human consent is ubiquitous. Humanless bureaucratic procedures become embedded into routine usage of digital products and services automating human behavior. This bureaucracy does not make individuals wait in conveyor-like lines (which sometimes can cause a collective action), it patiently waits or suddenly pops up in an annoying message requiring immediate (...) action and consuming time. It follows pre-installed procedures so cannot be distracted or appealed to. It lacks what Sofia Ranchordás calls ‘administrative empathy’. Users can hardly reach through bureaucratic procedures and communicate with another human. An individual involved in these sequences of actions contributes to increasing the quantity of bureaucratic procedures. The algorithmic bureaucracy power resides in the limited ability of human beings to make conscious and informed decisions when dealing with high complexity levels. This ubiquity makes it virtually impossible for individuals to track and verify statuses and control binding power of all legal actions on the platform. The authors apply critical analysis to explore social implications, threats and possible alternatives for corporate and governmental algorithmic bureaucracy in the emerging digital society. (shrink)

Navigating the Digital Age explores how modern technologies impact our societies and our lives. Throughout history, technologies and media, from Roman roads to today’s 5G and nanotechnologies, have influenced our society and reshaped our behavior and lifestyle. Compiled by a group of international academic authors, this book describes numerous ways technology is reshaping our world, the environments, the communities we belong to, and our understanding of them. It is hard to imagine a technology that only affects society/culture, or a society/culture (...) that only affects technology. Rather, we observe a reciprocal process: On the one hand, technology develops from the needs of society, while on the other hand, technology changes society. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider a common refrain among critics of digital platforms: big tech "exploits" us. It gives voice to a shared sense that technology firms are somehow mistreating people—taking advantage of us, extracting from us—in a way that other data-driven harms, such as surveillance and algorithmic bias, fail to capture. Exploring several targets of this charge—gig work, algorithmic pricing, and surveillance advertising—I ask: What does exploitation entail, exactly, and how do platforms perpetrate it? Is exploitation in the platform (...) economy a new kind of exploitation, or are these old problems dressed up as new ones? What would a theory of digital exploitation add to our understanding of the platform age? First, I define exploitation and argue that critics are justified in describing many platform practices as wrongfully exploitative. Next, I focus on platforms themselves—both as businesses and technologies—in order to understand what is and isn’t new about the kinds of exploitation we are witnessing. In some cases, digital platforms perpetuate familiar forms of exploitation by extending the ability of exploiters to reach and control exploitees. In other cases, they enable new exploitative arrangements by creating or exposing vulnerabilities that powerful actors couldn't previously leverage. On the whole, I argue, the language of exploitation helps express forms of injustice overlooked or only partially captured by dominant concerns about, e.g., surveillance, discrimination, and related platform abuses, and it provides valuable conceptual and normative resources for challenging efforts by platforms to obscure or legitimate them. (shrink)

Don Ihde’s postphenomenological theory of technological relations has proven its value for understanding the role material artifacts play in our lives. However influential it may be, some of his key concepts have remained ambiguous. In this paper, we analyze and critically evaluate how Ihde describes one of these concepts, namely, alterity relation (Alterity). Alterity describes how technologies appear to subjects as humanlike others, or, as Ihde calls them, quasi-others. We identify and discuss three key problems with Ihde’s account of Alterity, (...) namely, objectness, focality, and continuum. We argue that an overarching issue is prevalent in his account of Alterity: a subtle and possibly unintended emphasis on the subject’s role in constituting technological otherness. This emphasis runs counter to the interrelational ontological foundations of postphenomenology. Moreover, it hinders postphenomenological research from fully addressing the ethical and moral dimensions of its framework. By clarifying these problems, we aim to provide a fruitful groundwork for further reconsiderations of the framework’s key concepts and for the improvement of postphenomenological investigations concerning the nature of artifacts: our multifaceted engagements with, in and through them. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe in improvement: they think that the world is a better place than it used to be, and that future generations will fare even better. Others see decline: they claim that the condition of humanity has deteriorated and will continue to do so. Much ink has also been spilt over what explains these historical patterns. These two disagreements about the shape of history concern largely descriptive issues. But there is also a third, purely normative question that has been (...) neglected: is it better if a history features a pattern of improvement rather than deterioration, holding other things equal? This paper develops an answer to this normative question and explores some of its implications for matters related to the future of humanity. (shrink)

Despite numerous publications on the philosophy of technology, little attention has been paid to the relationship between being and value in technology, two aspects which are usually treated separately. This volume addresses this issue by drawing connections between the ontology of technology on the one hand and technology’s ethical and aesthetic significance on the other. -/- The book first considers what technology is and what kind of entities it produces. Then it examines the moral implications of technology. Finally, it explores (...) the connections between technology and the arts. (shrink)

The article deals with the ethical challenges posed by the increasing spread of artificial intelligence (AI) in people's everyday lives. The authors emphasize that despite the growing presence of AI systems, there is often insufficient understanding of how they function, which leads to sometimes unrealistic media portrayals. Doria and Zöllner begin their article with a critical examination of the concept of AI and its development. In conclusion, the authors emphasize the need for an AI ethics that develops a vision of (...) the good life and the good society in the digital age. They point out that important ethical principles such as freedom, autonomy, justice, transparency and responsibility must be taken into account when using AI. The article stresses that, despite all technological advances, human judgment and ethical reflection remain indispensable in order to shape the development and use of AI systems responsibly. (shrink)

Can it be rational to favour the status quo when the alternatives to the status quo promise considerable increases in overall value? For instance, can it be rational to favour the status quo over radical human enhancement? A reasonable response to these questions would be to say that it can only be rational if the status quo is indeed the better choice on some measure. In this paper, I argue that it can be rational to favour the status quo over (...) a radical improvement such as human germline genetic enhancement. First, I distinguish between three different meanings of the “status quo.” Then, I argue that the status quo enjoys modal and epistemic advantages that sometimes translate into other advantages. I propose eight parameters for comparison between the status quo and radical options. These parameters weigh in favour of the status quo but can be outweighed by the benefits of change. Each of these parameters needs to be assessed from case to case. I defend what I refer to as an Open Status Quo position over a Fixed Status Quo position. The former is decision-specific and does not entail a commitment to remaining with the status quo in later decisions. Lastly, I address the objection that an Open Status Quo position risk slipping into a Fixed Status Quo position that would, in turn, block radical progress, change, and discovery. (shrink)

Integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into critical domains such as healthcare holds immense promise. Nevertheless, significant challenges must be addressed to avoid harm, promote the well-being of individuals and societies, and ensure ethically sound and socially just technology development. Innovative approaches like Embedded Ethics, which refers to integrating ethics and social science into technology development based on interdisciplinary collaboration, are emerging to address issues of bias, transparency, misrepresentation, and more. This paper aims to develop this approach further to enable future projects (...) to effectively deploy it. Based on the practical experience of using ethics and social science methodology in interdisciplinary AI-related healthcare consortia, this paper presents several methods that have proven helpful for embedding ethical and social science analysis and inquiry. They include (1) stakeholder analyses, (2) literature reviews, (3) ethnographic approaches, (4) peer-to-peer interviews, (5) focus groups, (6) interviews with affected groups and external stakeholders, (7) bias analyses, (8) workshops, and (9) interdisciplinary results dissemination. We believe that applying Embedded Ethics offers a pathway to stimulate reflexivity, proactively anticipate social and ethical concerns, and foster interdisciplinary inquiry into such concerns at every stage of technology development. This approach can help shape responsible, inclusive, and ethically aware technology innovation in healthcare and beyond. (shrink)

The moral status of human brain organoids (HBOs) has been debated in view of the future possibility that they may acquire phenomenal consciousness. This study empirically investigates the moral sensitivity in people’s intuitive judgments about actions toward conscious HBOs. The results showed that the presence/absence of pain experience in HBOs affected the judgment about the moral permissibility of actions such as creating and destroying the HBOs; however, the presence/absence of visual experience in HBOs also affected the judgment. These findings suggest (...) that people’s intuitive judgments about the moral status of HBOs are sensitive to the valence-independent value of phenomenal consciousness. We discuss how these observations can have normative implications; particularly, we argue that they put pressure on the theoretical view that the moral status of conscious HBOs is grounded solely in the valence-dependent value of consciousness. We also discuss how our findings can be informative even when such a theoretical view is finally justified or when the future possibility of conscious HBOs is implausible. (shrink)

This thesis explores the ethical challenges that a potential research program for solar climate engineering via Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) could incur. These ethical challenges are comprised of epistemic hurdles in relation to the research process, as well as societal questions of justice and the value of nature. The thesis proposes a variety of tools and approaches to assess and possibly govern the risks and uncertainties invoked by the research of SAI and its societal implications. The methodological approach is based (...) mainly on ethical and philosophical analysis and reflection and the main findings take the form of discursive argumentation and normative reflection. (shrink)

Self-tracking-technologies can serve as a prominent example of how digital technologies put to test established practices, institutions, and structures of medicine and healthcare. While proponents emphasize the potentials, e.g., for individualized healthcare and new research data, opponents stress the risk that these technologies will reinforce gender-related inequalities. -/- While this has been made clear from—often intersectional—feminist perspectives since the introduction of such technologies, we aim to provide a queer-feminist perspective on self-tracking applications in healthcare by analyzing three concrete cases. In (...) this way, we want to show why such a perspective is helpful in assessing self-tracking technologies and how such a perspective might contribute to a queering of healthcare. -/- After a short introduction to self-tracking in healthcare and the corresponding risks of reproducing gender-related inequalities, we introduce queer bioethics as a methodology to examine structural discrimination and marginalization in bioethical research. We apply this framework in the analysis of three exemplary self-tracking applications from the areas of nutrition/fitness, reproductive health, and mental health. In the subsequent discussion of these results against the backdrop of already existing queer-sensitive technologies, we identify an equal access, a subversive design, an inclusive database, and a diversity-sensitive and discriminatory-critical definition of purposes as well as individualized usage possibilities as first possible starting points for a queering of self-tracking applications. Finally, we draw conclusions, how such a critical perspective on self-tracking applications might also contribute to a queering of the healthcare system at a structural level. (shrink)

In "Digital Doppelgängers and Lifespan Extension: What Matters?", Iglesias et al. argue that “some of the aims or ostensible goods of person-span expansion could plausibly be fulfilled in part by creating a digital doppelgänger”. Since person-extension aims are deeply heterogeneous, however, no single type of doppelgänger system is likely to suffice to meet all such needs. We propose a partial typology of doppelgängers—the family heirloom, the research archive, the public legacy, the project surrogate—and suggest appropriate training methods, design features and (...) governing norms for each. Finally, we reflect on the implications of concurrent yet heterogeneous doubles for questions of personal identity. (shrink)

Recently, there has been much discussion of ‘fair machine learning’: fairness in data-driven decision-making systems (which are often, though not always, made with assistance from machine learning systems). Notorious impossibility results show that we cannot have everything we want here. Such problems call for careful thinking about the foundations of fair machine learning. Sune Holm has identified one promising way forward, which involves applying John Broome's theory of fairness to the puzzles of fair machine learning. Unfortunately, his application of Broome's (...) theory appears to be fatally flawed. This article attempts to rescue Holm's central insight – namely, that Broome's theory can be useful to the study of fair machine learning – by giving an alternative application of Broome's theory, which involves thinking about fair machine learning in counterfactual (as opposed to merely statistical) terms. (shrink)

We introduce the Bias Network Approach (BNA) as a sociotechnical method for AI developers to identify, map, and relate biases across the AI development process. This approach addresses the limitations of what we call the "isolationist approach to AI bias," a trend in AI literature where biases are seen as separate occurrence linked to specific stages in an AI pipeline. Dealing with these multiple biases can trigger a sense of excessive overload in managing each potential bias individually or promote the (...) adoption of an uncritical approach to understanding the influence of biases in developers’ decision-making. The BNA fosters dialogue and a critical stance among developers, guided by external experts, using graphical representations to depict biased connections. To test the BNA, we conducted a pilot case study on the "waiting list” project, involving a small AI developer team creating a healthcare waiting list NPL model in Chile. The analysis showed promising findings: (i) the BNA aids in visualizing interconnected biases and their impacts, facilitating ethical reflection in a more accessible way; (ii) it promotes transparency in decision-making throughout AI development; and (iii) more focus is necessary on professional biases and material limitations as sources of bias in AI development. (shrink)

Have you been surprised by the recent development and diffusion of generative artificial intelligence (AI)? Many institutions of civil society have been caught off guard, which provides them with motivation to think ahead. And as many new plausible pathways of socio-technical development are opening up, a growing interest in technology ethics that addresses our corresponding moral uncertainties is warranted. In Sven Nyholm’s words, “[t]he field of technology ethics is absolutely exploding at the moment” (p. 262), and so the publication of (...) his introduction to the topic is well timed. (shrink)

AgeTech refers to a growing sector that is advancing the use of technologies, such as information and communication technologies (ICTs), mobile technologies, robotics, wearables and smart home systems to enhance the lives of older adults. Although AgeTech can be seen as an opportunity for empowering older people and enhance their overall quality of life, crucial ethical issues have to be addressed. The articles in this topical collection focus on these and other ethical questions, particularly in respect to key emerging technologies (...) of AI and robotics. The overall aim is to explore the multifaceted ethical landscape of emerging AgeTech and to provide frameworks and strategies for ethically-appropriate technologies that support the health, well-being, and quality of life of older adults. (shrink)

Can technology resolve social problems by reducing them to engineering challenges? In the 1960s, Alvin Weinberg answered yes, popularizing the term “techno-fix” in the process. The concept was immediately criticized and over time evolved into a disparaging term—a synonym for unrealistic technological proposals and their advocates. As the debate progressed, skepticism grew to include condemnation of a related term: “techno-solutionism.” Despite extensive criticism, both “techno-fix” and “techno-solutionism” remain ill-defined concepts. In this article, we provide more precise definitions and clearly distinguish (...) between techno-fixes and techno-solutionism through conceptual engineering. By refining these concepts, we aim to advance the discussion and lay the groundwork for more productive analyses of the role of technology in solving social problems. (shrink)

From the perspective of digital ethics, this book chapter outlines a model for dealing with the challenges posed by digital media environments in a responsible and appropriate manner. This concept is based on preliminary considerations of “digital citizenship”. At a time when digital technologies - the “data-sphere” - are being increasingly implemented and intensified, the question of humans' roles and skills in using these digital technologies in a sensible and meaningful way is becoming more and more urgent. In the age (...) of European Enlightenment, Western societies had already assigned a central role to people's maturity, which was to be achieved fundamentally through literacy and education in order to create free individuals and, ultimately, citizens capable of making decisions. In contrast, in the current age of digitality, characterized by networking and immersion that has prevailed since the 1990s, many people experience and participate in such life-worlds primarily as consumers. In this role, they increasingly appear as economic objects that are constantly encouraged to produce data sets. Social networking sites and applications of generative artificial intelligence in particular exert a certain pull, the functioning of which many people are at best instrumentally proficient in, but not reflexively. Against this background, Zöllner's article outlines the contours of the concept of "digital citizenship" from an ethical perspective. This form of citizenship should enable people to lead a free life in digital and networked environments in which they are not merely subject to the exploitation interests of digital corporations. (shrink)

This paper is a study of the decisions that researchers take during the execution of a research plan: their researcher discretion. Flexible research methods are generally seen as undesirable, and many methodologists urge to eliminate these so-called ‘researcher degrees of freedom’ from the research practice. However, what this looks like in practice is unclear. Based on twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork in two end-of-life research groups in which we observed research practice, conducted interviews, and collected documents, we explore when researchers (...) are required to make decisions, and what these decisions entail.An abductive analysis of this data showed that researchers are constantly required to further interpret research plans, indicating that there is no clear division between planning and plan execution. This discretion emerges either when a research protocol is underdetermined or overdetermined, in which case they need to operationalise or adapt the plans respectively. In addition, we found that many of these instances of researcher discretion are exercised implicitly. Within the research groups it was occasionally not clear which topic merited an active decision, or which action could retroactively be categorised as one.Our ethnographic study of research practice suggests that researcher discretion is an integral and inevitable aspect of research practice, as many elements of a research protocol will either need to be further operationalised or adapted during its execution. Moreover, it may be difficult for researchers to identify their own discretion, limiting their effectivity in transparency. (shrink)

What is a fair distribution of risk? This chapter will look into three separate, but related, aspects of fairness in risk distributions. Firstly, I will locate the object of fairness when it comes to risk distribution. In contrast to distributions of goods, which we want to both increase and distribute fairly, risks are something we want to decrease and distribute fairly. The question of fairness in risk distributions is the question of how to combine these two partially conflicting claims; to (...) fairness on the one hand and to risk reduction on the other. Secondly, I will take a closer look at what an equal distribution of chances for harm might be. I will point to the problem that the very idea of distributing probabilities entails. Thirdly, I address the question of when deviations from equal distributions of risks may be justified and how such inequalities can be addressed in a fair way. It will be suggested that the locus of fairness of risk should be sought in two steps: (1) the justification of particular risky activities, where the level of risk and the spread of that risk is taken into account, and (2) that any resulting higher risk for certain groups or individuals should be addressed through a combination of consent, precaution, and compensation, seeking to even out unfair exposure. (shrink)

The use of the open publishing is expected to be the dominant model in the future. However, along with the use of this model, predatory journals are increasingly appearing. In the current study, the awareness of researchers in Jordan about predatory journals and the strategies utilized to avoid them was investigated. The study included 558 researchers from Jordan. A total of 34.0% of the participants reported a high ability to identify predatory journals, while 27.0% reported a low ability to identify (...) predatory journals. Most participants (64.0%) apply “Think. Check. Submit.” strategy to avoid predatory journals. However, 11.9% of the sample reported being a victim of a predatory journal. Multinomial regression analysis showed gender, number of publications, using Beall’s list of predatory journals, and applying “Think. Check. Submit.” strategy were predictors of the high ability to identify predatory journals. Participants reported using databases such as Scopus, Clarivate, membership in the publishing ethics committee, and DOAJ to validate the journal before publication. Finally, most participants (88.4%) agreed to attend a training module on how to identify predatory journals. In conclusion, Jordanian researchers use valid strategies to avoid predatory journals. Implementing a training module may enhance researchers’ ability to identify predatory journals. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of digital health innovation, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), is transforming healthcare. The growing role the European Union (EU) plays in regulating the use of AI in healthcare renders national laws insufficient to safeguard patients from unique AIrelated risks. This underscores the urgent need for the recognition of a canon of patients' rights in the scope of EU law. This paper proposes the blueprint for an EU Charter for Digital Patients' Rights, consolidating and adapting existing rights for patients (...) to address these specific challenges. Traditional patients' rights such as the right to privacy and the right to informed consent are interpreted in light of the challenges posed by AI. It also proposes novel rights for patients, such as the right not to be subject to automated medical decision-making and the right to meaningful human contact. This paper highlights the EU's central role in protecting patients' rights and outlines strategies for effective implementation. This comprehensive approach aims to address the current shortcomings and enhance the legal framework governing digital health in Europe. (shrink)

Engineers make decisions with global impacts and empathy can motivate ethical reasoning and behavior that is sensitive to the needs and perspectives of stakeholders across the globe. Microethics and macroethics offer two frames of reference for engineering ethics education, but different dimensions of empathy play distinct roles in micro- and macroethics. Microethics emphasizes individual responsibility and interpersonal relationships whereas macroethics emphasizes societal obligations and impacts. While empathy can support ethical reasoning and behavior for each, in this paper I argue that (...) affective empathy plays a primary (but not exclusive) role in microethics whereas cognitive empathy plays a primary role in macroethics. Gilligan’s and Kohlberg’s theories of moral development are used to further depict how affective empathy aligns with care (depicted as an interpersonal phenomenon) and how cognitive empathy aligns with justice (depicted as a systems-focused phenomenon), thus positioning these ethical principles as playing primary (but again, not exclusive) roles in micro- and macro-ethics, respectively. Building on these ideas, this study generates a framework that describes and visualizes how empathy manifests across six frames of reference, each of which are increasingly macro-ethical in nature: self, team, operators, participants, bystanders, and future generations. The paper describes how proxy stakeholders can be identified, developed, and leveraged to empathize with stakeholder groups. Taken together, the manuscript seeks to clarify the role of empathy in engineering ethics and can enable engineering students to better empathize with the range of stakeholders impacted by engineering decisions, ranging from one’s self to stakeholders across the globe. The intrapersonal understandings and motivations that students generate by empathizing across six frames of reference can facilitate ethical reasoning processes and behaviors that are more inclusive and comprehensive. (shrink)

This paper aims to engineer the concept of biomimetic design for its application in agricultural technology as an innovation strategy to sustain non-human species’ adaptation to today’s rapid environmental changes. By questioning the alleged intrinsic morality of biomimicry, a formulation of it is sought that goes beyond the sharp distinction between nature as inspiration and the human field of application of biomimetic technologies. After reviewing the main literature on Responsible Innovation, we support Vincent Blok’s “eco-centric” perspective on biomimicry, which considers (...) the human and natural worlds as indistinguishable parts of a shared Earth. We propose this approach as a complement to the “evomimetic” critique, which warns biomimetic research against the limits of adaptationism. By merging these two reframing of the biomimicry concept, we thus pave the way for a new understanding of the use of human-inspired technology (such as artificial intelligence) to help the “evolution” of domesticated species into (semi)autonomous natural-technological hybrids. In particular, the examples we consider concern the potential of AI-enabled robotic bases in technological beekeeping. (shrink)

Safe-by-Design (SbD) is a new concept that urges the developers of novel technologies to integrate safety early on in their design process. A SbD approach could—in theory—support the development of safer products and assist a responsible transition to the bioeconomy, via the deployment of safer bio-based and biotechnological alternatives. Despite its prominence in policy discourse, SbD is yet to gain traction in research and innovation practice. In this paper, we examine a frequently stated objection to the initiative of SbD, namely (...) the position that SbD is already common practice in research and industry. We draw upon observations from two case studies: one, a study on the applicability of SbD in the context of bio-based circular materials and, two, a study on stakeholder perceptions of SbD in biotechnology. Interviewed practitioners in both case studies make claims to a strong safety culture in their respective fields and have difficulties differentiating a SbD approach from existing safety practices. Two variations of this argument are discussed: early attentiveness to safety as a strictly formalised practice and early attentiveness as implicit practice. We analyse these perceptions using the theoretical lens of safety culture and contrast them to the aims of SbD. Our analysis indicates that professional identity and professional pride may explain some of the resistance to the initiative of SbD. Nevertheless, SbD could still be advantageous by a) emphasising multidisciplinary approaches to safety and b) offering a (reflective) frame via which implicit attentiveness to safety becomes explicit. (shrink)

We address an open problem in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI): how to justify the epistemic attitudes we have towards the trustworthiness of AI systems. The problem is important, as providing reasons to believe that AI systems are worthy of trust is key to appropriately rely on these systems in human-AI interactions. In our approach, we consider the trustworthiness of an AI as a time-relative, composite property of the system with two distinct facets. One is the actual trustworthiness of (...) the AI and the other is the perceived trustworthiness of the system as assessed by its users while interacting with it. We show that credences, namely, beliefs we hold with a degree of confidence, are the appropriate attitude for capturing the facets of the trustworthiness of an AI over time. Then, we introduce a reliabilistic account providing justification to the credences in the trustworthiness of AI, which we derive from Tang’s probabilistic theory of justified credence. Our account stipulates that a credence in the trustworthiness of an AI system is justified if and only if it is caused by an assessment process that tends to result in a high proportion of credences for which the actual and perceived trustworthiness of the AI are calibrated. This approach informs research on the ethics of AI and human-AI interactions by providing actionable recommendations on how to measure the reliability of the process through which users perceive the trustworthiness of the system, investigating its calibration to the actual levels of trustworthiness of the AI as well as users’ appropriate reliance on the system. (shrink)

In this paper, we suggest that personalized LLMs trained on information written by or otherwise pertaining to an individual could serve as artificial moral advisors (AMAs) that account for the dynamic nature of personal morality. These LLM-based AMAs would harness users’ past and present data to infer and make explicit their sometimes-shifting values and preferences, thereby fostering self-knowledge. Further, these systems may also assist in processes of self-creation, by helping users reflect on the kind of person they want to be (...) and the actions and goals necessary for so becoming. The feasibility of LLMs providing such personalized moral insights remains uncertain pending further technical development. Nevertheless, we argue that this approach addresses limitations in existing AMA proposals reliant on either predetermined values or introspective self-knowledge. (shrink)

El texto aborda cómo la interacción entre tecnología y sociedad, sobre todo desde el contexto del determinismo tecnológico, ha configurado el entorno humano desde la prehistoria hasta la contemporaneidad. La tecnología no es solo una herramienta, sino un agente activo que afecta y reconfigura las dinámicas sociales, además de estar influenciada por valores y decisiones humanas. En este sentido, se subraya la necesidad de una ética tecnológica que garantice que los avances sirvan al bienestar humano y promuevan la justicia social. (...) Esta ética aplicada, que emergió como respuesta a los impactos negativos de los avances tecnológicos, explora dimensiones complejas y multifacéticas de decisiones morales influenciadas por la racionalidad humana. Además, se enfatiza la responsabilidad compartida de ingenieros, sectores industriales y sociedad para guiar la tecnología hacia un futuro sostenible, promoviendo una relación armoniosa entre los valores humanos y el desarrollo tecnológico. (shrink)

Die Beiträge in diesem Band spiegeln den Stand der Reflexions- und Forschungsprozesse an der Fakultät Gestaltung der TH Würzburg-Schweinfurt, der HBKsaar und der New Design University in St. Pölten. Sie repräsentieren einen Prozess der Aufklärung, dessen Prüfstein Walter Benjamins Frage ist, wie sich ›die Art und Weise der Sinneswahrnehmung‹ geschichtlich gewachsener Kollektive durch neue Medientechnologien verändert.

This chapter provides a philosophical overview of different approaches to age and aging. I challenge the belief that our age is always determined by the amount of time we have existed: chronology. I propose there are different views on age and aging. Biological age, which can be estimated based on epigenetics, might be more useful and important concept than chronological age. I suggest that sometimes some people should be allowed to change their legal age to reduce the harms that come (...) from unjust assumptions related to old age. Changing legal age could also be used to fight ageism, discrimination based on age. (shrink)

I suggest that shaping knowers of facts implies the teaching of intellectual virtues. To justify this claim, I do not appeal to the intrinsic value of epistemic goods such as truth or knowledge. Instead, I suggest that we have political reasons to teach intellectual virtues to high school and college students. The current epistemic environment – especially that found on social media – is not conducive to good democratic decision-making, but acquiring intellectual virtues can prepare students to make good political (...) decisions and increase the epistemic potential of democracy. For this reason, we should envision intellectual virtues as civic virtues, that is, excellencies that relate to the democratic process and that can help individuals become good citizens. (shrink)

Attempts to influence people’s beliefs through misinformation have a long history. In the age of social media, however, there is a growing fear that the circulation of false or misleading claims will be more impactful than ever now that sophisticated technological means are available to those who desire to spread them. Should democratic societies worry about misinformation? If so, is it possible and desirable for them to control its spread by regulating it? This chapter offers an answer to these questions. (...) First, I propose a definition of misinformation and explain how it proliferates in online contexts. Second, I consider four reasons to worry about misinformation by discussing its likely impact on people’s political opinions, emotions, physical safety and personal autonomy. Third, I assess three strategies for regulating misinformation—individual self-regulation, platform-based innovations and governmental action—and suggest that the most effective ones are those that spare human agents from having to successively review individual pieces of content. (shrink)

According to recent discussions, trolls attempt to spark the anger of internet users by feigning engagement in serious conversations with unsuspecting targets who are turned into objects of ridicule in front of a complicit audience. In this chapter, I extend the traditional definition of trolling to non-conversational endeavours. In my view, trolling is the deceptive disruption of joint action regardless of whether such action is conversational or non-conversational in nature. In conjunction, I propose an account of the moral wrong in (...) trolling according to which trolls hinder the pursuit of valuable human goods such as knowledge, mutual understanding, friendship, empathy and play by deceptively engaging their targets in spurious forms of joint action. To illustrate these claims, I consider a recent case of non-conversational. (shrink)

One of the main differences between science and engineering is that engineering is not just about better understanding the world but also about changing it. Many engineers believe that such change improves, or at least should improve, the world. In this sense engineering is an inherently morally motivated activity. Changing the world for the better is, however, no easy task and also not one that can be achieved on the basis of engineering knowledge alone. It also requires, among other things, (...) ethical reflection and knowledge. This book aims at contributing to such reflection and knowledge, not just in a theoretical sense but also more practically. This book takes an innovative approach to engineering ethics in several respects. It provides a rather unique approach to ethical decision-making: the ethical cycle. This approach is illustrated by an abundance of cases studies and examples, not only from the US but also from Europe and the rest of the world. The book is also innovative in paying more attention than most traditional introductions in engineering ethics to such topics as ethics in engineering design, the organizational context of engineering, the distribution of responsibility, sustainability, and new technologies such as nanotechnology. There is an increasing attention to ethics in the engineering curricula. Engineers are supposed not only to carry out their work competently and skillfully but also to be aware of the broader ethical and social implications of engineering and to be able to reflect on these. According to the Engineering Criteria 2000 of the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) in the US, engineering graduates must have "an understanding of professional and ethical responsibility" and "the broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in a global and societal context" (Herkert 1999). This book provides an undergraduate introduction to ethics in engineering and technology. It helps students to acquire the competences mentioned in the ABET criteria or comparable criteria formulated in other countries. More specifically, this book helps students to acquire the following moral competencies. (shrink)

Femtech refers to a growing range of technologies that aim to address health needs typically associated with women’s bodies, such as maternal health, fertility, menstruation, sexual wellness, or contraception. We examine a specific popular femtech product, cycle tracking apps, as an instrument of self-surveillance for greater productivity. Our analysis is grounded in the phenomenology of temporality—we understand workplace surveillance technologies as advancing an internalized sense of time discipline, generating a personal experience of time as a constant call to improve one’s (...) workplace productivity. We then examine how the same dynamic reveals itself in the vocabulary and functionality of popular cycle-tracking apps. Our paper contributes to the existing feminist critiques of femtech, namely, the examination of cycle-tracking apps as promoting a false sense of empowerment and separating users from self-knowledge of their bodies. We argue that cycle-tracking apps perpetuate the attitude that menstruators need to manage their cycle for the sake of reliable participation in productivity demands, creating a disconnect between their internal experience of the temporality of menstruation and external pressures. (shrink)

Any moral algorithm for autonomous vehicles must provide a practical solution to moral problems of the trolley type, in which all possible courses of action will result in damage, injury, or death. This article discusses a hitherto neglected variety of this type of problem, based on a recent psychological study whose results are reported here. It argues that the most adequate solution to this problem will be achieved by a moral algorithm that is based on Confucian ethics. In addition to (...) this philosophical and psychological discussion, the article outlines the mathematics, engineering, and legal implementation of a possible Confucian algorithm. The proposed Confucian algorithm is based on the idea of making it possible to set an autonomous vehicle to allow an increased level of protection for selected people. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can be implemented alongside other moral algorithms, using either the framework of personal ethics settings or that of mandatory ethics settings. (shrink)