Ethics

Existing social disparities in the United States are inconsistent with Lincoln’s promise of democracy; therefore, there is a need for a critical conceptualization of the first principles that undergird American democracy and the genesis of democratic social change in America. This study aimed to construct a grounded theory that provides an understanding of the process of American democratic social change. The result was the construction of two frameworks: the demoralization process that triggers social change, and a formal grounded theory that (...) could explain democratic social change endeavors across different domains and levels of analysis. This democratic social change grounded theory answers the research question: How do the principles of the American founding documents provide an understanding of the process of American democratic social change? (shrink)

An introductory textbook, Logic for Justice covers, in full detail, the language and semantics of both propositional logic and first-order logic. It motivates the study of those logical systems by drawing on social and political issues. Basically, Logic for Justice frames propositional logic and first-order logic as two theories of the distinction between good arguments and bad arguments. And the book explains why, for the purposes of social justice and political reform, we need theories of that distinction. -/- In addition, (...) Logic for Justice is extremely lucid, thorough, and clear. It explains, and motivates, many different features of the formalism of propositional logic and first-order logic, always connecting those features back to real-world issues. (shrink)

As automating technologies are increasingly integrated into workplaces, one concern is that many of the human workers who remain will be relegated to more dull and less positively impactful work. This paper considers two rival theories of meaningful work that might be used to evaluate particular implementations of automation. The first is achievementism, which says that work that culminates in achievements to workers’ credit is especially meaningful; the other is the practice view, which says that work that takes the form (...) of an open-ended practice is especially meaningful. Of the two, the practice view is the better tool for assessing the future of meaningful work, because achievementism is explanatorily inadequate in two ways. Moreover, the practice view can explain why the most meaningful forms of work cannot be automated. A procedure can only be automated as long as the steps are defined, whereas, in such work, which steps to take is indefinitely open to redefinition. This reveals the real threat to meaningful work to be a political-economic one. The relevant ethical questions there have to do with how much creative control workers retain in crafting their own jobs, when those jobs involve meaningful work in collaboration with machines; and how to liberate workers from jobs that do not involve meaningful work, which should be left to machines anyway. (shrink)

This article advances three claims about the bindingness of duties to oneself: (1) To defend duties to oneself, one had better show that they can bind, i.e., provide normative reason to comply. (2) To salvage the bindingness of duties to oneself, one had better construe them as owed to, and waivable by, one's present self. (3) Duties owed to, and waivable by, one's present self can nevertheless bind. In advancing these claims, I partly oppose views recently developed by Daniel Muñoz (...) and Paul Schofield. My arguments at least tentatively suggest three general lessons for moral theory: (a) Bindingness is an essential feature of duties in general. (b) The long sought-after explanation of supererogation is not to be found in waivable duties to oneself. (c) The bindingness of duties is a distinctive normative phenomenon which does not crucially depend on some physical, temporal, or psychological distance between the binding and the bound self. (shrink)

The 1929 confrontation between Heidegger and Cassirer in Davos (Switzerland) is pivotal for the history of the twentieth-century philosophy. The stake of that encounter was the appropriation of Kant’s legacy during the first half of the last century and the fate of Neo-Kantianism between the two World Wars. Since then, the “Davos disputation” has become controversial among researchers of the development of philosophical orientations in the twentieth century. Moreover, not only these researchers, but also the attendants of that dispute, express (...) opposite views on its outcome. Central at Davos was the issue of human finitude and transcendence within a Kantian framework. Although Kant addresses this issue most explicitly in his moral philosophy, the research of the Davos disputation tends to focus primarily on theoretical matters. The thesis revaluates Heidegger’s and Cassirer’s debate on human finitude and transcendence against the background of their written interpretations of Kant’s critical ethics. Heidegger’s reading of Kant’s conception of human finitude turns out to underestimate Kant’s views on the human potential for transcending, while Cassirer turns out to overestimate that potential by downplaying Kant’s arguments for ineluctable finitude. According to a moderate interpretative position, halfway between Heidegger’s and Cassirer’s, a finite being has, for Kant, a potential to transcend “within” – not “beyond” – finitude. (shrink)

A ‘vestigial social practice' is a norm, convention, or social behavior that persists even when few endorse it or its original justifying rationale. Begby (2021) explores social explanations for the persistence of prejudice, arguing that even if we all privately disavow a stereotype, we might nevertheless continue acting as if it is true because we believe that others expect us to. Meanwhile the persistence of the practice provides something like implicit testimonial evidence for the prejudice that would justify it, making (...) it rational for members of the next generation to acquire the corresponding prejudiced beliefs. This paper distinguishes between three different types of vestigial social practice in terms of the underlying explanatory mechanisms, and argues that the persistence of prejudicial social stereotypes is most tightly linked not to others’ beliefs or expectations, but to the ways that material infrastructure constrains options shapes social outcomes. Given that, the persistence of a practice only provides grounds to infer that most people endorse the corresponding prejudiced belief only if we are in a position to dismiss relevant alternative explanations. (shrink)

تقديم: في الحاجة إلى الترجمة في قضايا علوم التربية. الدكتور الصديق الصادقي العماري. باحث في علم الاجتماع. وجدت التربية مع وجود الحياة الإنسانية، وهي ظاهرة اجتماعية بامتياز عرفها الإنسان منذ أن وطئت قدماه الأرض، كما أنها كانت موضوع اهتمام الأديان عبر العصور والأزمنة، وهذا يدل على دورها الفاعل والهام في تطوير الشعوب والأمم وتقدمها. وقد عرفت تطورات نوعية وكيفية عميقة جنبا إلى جنب مع التحولات الاقتصادية والثقافية والاجتماعية والسياسية... إلى أن أصبحت علما بل علوما متعددة ومتنوعة، وكذلك من بين التخصصات (...) التي تدرس في الجامعات والمعاهد العامة والخاصة، وبذلك أضحت عابرة للقارات ولا تعترف بالحدود الجغرافية والعلمية. وقد عرف عالم اليوم ثورة علمية ومعلوماتية بفعل العولمة التي اخترقت كل الحدود القومية، مما وضع النظم التربوية أمام ضرورة اعتماد منهج تربوي قويم كفيل بأن يخلق نوعا من التوازن داخل المجتمع الذي أصبح مفقودا نتيجة أزمات متعددة، خاصة أزمة القيم التي أفرزت مشاكل اجتماعية متعددة كالانحرافات بكل أشكالها والأمية الوظيفية بالخصوص وغيرها من المشكلات التي احتار المختصون في حلها. حيث أصبح لزاما علينا اليوم الانفتاح على تجارب إنسانية تربوية عالمية ناجحة أثبتت نجاعتها في الواقع، عن طريق الترجمة والتفكيك والتحليل والتفسير والتأويل، وتفادي النظرة الضيقة للتربية والتعليم التي تبقى حبيسة الصراعات والأيديولوجيات المحلية. ساهمت الترجمة في الانفتاح والتواصل بين الثقافات على اختلاف أنواعها، حيث لعبت دورا كبيرا في تقليص هوة الاختلاف والصراع بين الشعوب والأمم، وتوحيد المعرفة العلمية ومناهج وتقنيات بنائها بجميع اللغات، حيث تؤدي ترجمة المصطلحات والمفاهيم في أي تخصص علمي إلى إغنائه وتوضيح رؤيته أكثر. وتخصص علوم التربية ليس بمعزل عن هذه الصناعة، إلا أن الغرب عرف تجارب كبيرة في مجال التأليف والإنتاج العلمي في موضوع التربية عكس العرب. وتتأسس علوم التربية على العديد من المصطلحات العلمية التي تحدد هويتها وتتحكم في فعاليتها ونجاعتها، من ضمنها نذكر التربية والمقاربة والتعليم والبيداغوجيا والديدكتيك والتقويم والتقييم والمنهاج والبرنامج والمحتوى والدعم والكفاية والقدرة والمهارة وغيرها كثير، والتي تختلف في معانيها ودلالاتها من باحث أكاديمي إلى آخر، حسب طبيعة المدرسة الفكرية التي ينتمي إليها، ونوع التخصص الذي ينتصر إليه وغيرها من المحددات. ///// Editions Revue Brochures Educatives منشورات مجلة كراسات تربوية سلسلة كتب جماعية رقم 02. (shrink)

Some normative theories are self-defeating. They tell us to respond to our situations in ways that bring about outcomes that are bad, given the aims of the theories, and which could have been avoided. Across a wide range of debates in ethics, decision theory, political philosophy, and formal epistemology, many philosophers treat the fact that a normative theory is self-defeating as sufficient grounds for rejecting it. I argue that this widespread and consequential assumption is false. In particular, I argue that (...) a theory can be self-defeating and still internally consistent, action-guiding, and suitable as a standard for criticism. (shrink)

Transhumanists and their fellow travelers urge humanity to prioritize the development of biotechnologies that would eliminate aging, delivering ‘an endless summer of literally perpetual youth.’ Aspiring not to age instantiates what philosopher Martha Nussbaum calls the yearning for ‘external transcendence,’ or the fundamental surpassing of human bounds due to confidence that life without them would be better. Based on Immanuel Kant’s account of the parameters of human understanding, I argue that engineering agelessness could not be a rational priority for humanity (...) on the level of public policy. This stance is complemented by an argument focused on individual decision-making in liberal-democratic milieus, where no governing conception of the good is presumed and the first-personal level matters greatly. Here, drawing on philosopher and cognitive scientist Laurie Ann Paul’s concept of ‘transformative experience,’ I maintain that individuals could not ‘rationally,’ meaning, here, ‘prudentially,’ say ‘yes’ to agelessness. Absorbing the irrationality of human zeal to eliminate aging, based on assurance that an ageless existence would be better, should spur a redoubled dedication to human flourishing. (shrink)

Normative error theorists aim to defend an error theory which says that normative judgments ascribe normative properties, and such properties, including reasons for belief, are never instantiated. Many philosophers have raised objections to defending a theory which entails that we cannot have reason to believe it. Spencer Case objects that error theorists simply cannot avoid self-defeat. Alternatively, Bart Streumer argues that we cannot believe normative error theory but that, surprisingly, this helps its advocates defend it against these objections. I think (...) that if Streumer’s argument is successful, it provides error theorists an escape from Case’s self-defeat objection. However, I build upon and improve Case’s argument to show that we could never even successfully defend normative error theory whether we can believe it or not. So, self-defeat remains. I close by offering some reasons for thinking our inability to defend normative error theory means that we should reject it, which, in turn, would mean that it’s false. (shrink)

The discussion will begin with a narrative introduction, which will fo¬cus on the first occurrence in literature of testimony of a cyber-rape. From this introduction, the main philosophical issues involved in these phenom¬ena will emerge. This introduction will be followed by a brief discussion of the different forms of cyber-rape, which will refer, in particular, to feminist literature on the subject. Subsequently, the chapter will enter the heart of the philosophical dis¬cussion, addressing the first of the topics to which it (...) is dedicated: the nature of acts of sexual and gender-based online violence. Three sections will be devoted to dismantling those arguments that, even accepting that The Dangerous Liaison cyber-rape is a moral wrong, it cannot be considered on the same level as rape. Then, having established that the seriousness of a “virtual” rape is com¬parable to that of a physical rape, it will show how the former occurs more frequently (but is not conceptualised as “real”) than the latter. This will be attributed to an asymmetry between the seriousness of the act and its common perception. Finally, the chapter will go on to question the reasons for this asymme¬try, first exploring the hypothesis—long held by many scholars—of ano¬nymity as a catalyst for violence, only to partially discard it in the face of more recent evidence and replace it with a more convincing explanatory hypothesis. In general, the aim of this chapter is to make a feminist contribution from the perspective of philosophy of technology to the issue of cyber-rape. Tools provided by philosophy of technology will be tested in order to, on the one hand, dismantle the idea that there can be such a thing as a virtual agency that is “less serious” than the real one, and, on the other hand, explore the ways in which digital technologies affect the perception of personal responsibility. (shrink)

Moral fundamentalism is the habit of acting as though one has access to the exclusively right way to diagnose problems, along with the single approvable practical solution to any particular problem. This approach causes us to oversimplify situations, neglect broader context, take refuge in dogmatic absolutes, ignore possibilities for finding common ground, assume privileged access to the right way to proceed, and shut off honest inquiry. In this way, moral fundamentalism-exacerbated by social media silos-also makes the worst of native impulses (...) toward social bonding and antagonism. This makes it impossible to debate and achieve superordinate social goals, such as public health, justice, security, sustainability, peace, and democracy. Drawing from John Dewey's pluralistic and pragmatic approach to philosophical questions, Steven Fesmire develops an alternative to both the oversimplification of moral fundamentalism and the arbitrariness of relativism. His pragmatic pluralism is set up as a response to particular conditions and consequences, so it gains practical leverage with complex ethical, political, educational, and policy problems without flattening variability among values or presuming that abstract theories can determine what we ought to do. He argues that the reductive monistic premise that logically underlies moral fundamentalism is both unwarranted and constrictive, and there is little to be said in favor of the grand philosophical quest for a unifying principle that cannot be accommodated within a wider pluralistic approach. In a concrete and engaging style, Fesmire clarifies and illustrates the promises and challenges of democratic decision-making in societies struggling to grow beyond moral fundamentalism. (shrink)

Este trabajo critica del derecho y la economía, bajo la corriente desarrollada por Franz Hinkelammert. Se utiliza el método transdisciplinario, atravesando la Filosofía indígena, la Teología de la Liberación y la Filosofía de la Liberación. En el análisis de casos se recurre a la justicia comunitaria del pueblo kichwa Saraguro. Se critica que tanto la teoría como la filosofía del derecho grecorromana está centrada en la propiedad privada, que justifica y protege al sistema económico capitalista. La propuesta está centrada en (...) el cuidado de la vida, es decir, se busca que la teoría y filosofía del derecho tome como centro de análisis al sujeto vivo: personas, plantas, animales, montañas, etc. Esto, a su vez, constituye la crítica de la economía política, porque la teoría económica también está centrada de una manera necrótica en la generación de utilidades; y, cuando el derecho asume la reproducción de la vida como centro de protección, la economía también se transforma. (shrink)

Michael Walzer’s use of John Stuart Mill’s A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859) helped to inaugurate it as a canonical text of international theory. However, Walzer’s use of the text was highly selective because he viewed the first half as a historically parochial discussion of British foreign policy, and his interest in the second was restricted to the passages in which Mill proposes principles of international morality to govern foreign military interventions to protect third parties. As a result, theorists tend (...) to see those canonized passages as if through a glass darkly. Attention to the detail and context of Mill’s first-half critique of Lord Palmerston’s opposition to the Suez Canal project reveals that his discussion of purely protective intervention is embedded in a broader exploration of the limits of self-defence, including the moral permissibility of preventive military force and the use of protective interventions for defensive purposes. Moreover, reading the text holistically facilitates a refutation of some objections directed at it by Michael Doyle to the effect that Mill’s conception of self-defence incorporates elements of aggression which makes it extremely dangerous when adapted for application to the contemporary world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Drawing upon a distinction between epistemically and metaphysically motivated notions of a concept, I consider the insurmountable problems of theories that appeal to our epistemic capacities to address the problem of the nature of concepts satisfactorily. Prominent theories of concepts hold that primitive concepts must have internal structure if they are to account for the explanatory functions that cognitive scientists have attributed to such constructs as prototypes, exemplars, and theories. Vindicating the role of non-experimental philosophy in the critical examination (...) of empirical theories, I argue that the explanatory effectiveness of those constructs is orthogonal to an argument concerning the structure of primitive concepts. Conceptual atomism provides an alternative approach to individuating primitive concepts the precise formulation of which has yet to be worked out. Despite its unpopularity, the atomist alternative is still in a better position to face the question of what concepts are than its competitors. RESUMEN Haciendo una distinción entre nociones de concepto epistémica y metafísicamente motivadas, considero las dificultades insuperables que enfrentan las teorías que apelan a nuestras capacidades epistémicas para abordar el problema de la naturaleza de los conceptos. Las teorías de conceptos más importantes sostienen que los conceptos primitivos deben poseer una estructura interna para cumplir aquellas funciones explicativas que científicas y científicos cognitivos les han atribuido a constructos tales como prototipos, ejemplares y teorías. Reivindicando el aporte de la filosofía no experimental en la evaluación de teorías empíricas, planteo que un argumento a favor de la estructura de los conceptos primitivos es independiente del poder explicativo de dichos constructos. El atomismo conceptual proporciona un enfoque alternativo para individualizar conceptos primitivos cuya formulación precisa aún no se ha elaborado. Pese a su impopularidad, la alternativa atomista está en una mejor posición que sus rivales para enfrentar la pregunta acerca de qué tipo de cosas son los conceptos. (shrink)

Bilgisayar, tablet, cep telefonu gibi iletişim ve bilgi teknolojilerinin yaşamımızın merkezine girmesiyle birlikte sanal gerçeklik de kültürümüzün bir parçası olmuştur. -/- Sanal gerçeklik ile birlikte yeni suç unsurlarının da oluşması tüm dünyada küresel bir sorunu da gündeme getirmiştir. Siber suçlar, suç dünyasındaki bilinen ve bilinmeyen en yeni ve en karmaşık sorunları da beraberinde getirmiştir. -/- Siber teknoloji, bir yandan bilgi ve iletişimi hızlandırıp kolaylaştırırken diğer yandan kötüye kullanım da bir o kadar hızlı ve kolay olmaktadır. Siber saldırılarla seçimlere müdahale edilebilmekte, (...) elektrik, doğal gaz kesintileri, bankacılık ve iletişim sistemleri çökertilebilirken bireyin en mahrem alanına girmekten farklı istismar boyutlarını da kapsayan çeşitli sahtecilikleri içeren dev suçlar söz konusu olabilmektedir. -/- Ülkeler artık en büyük yatırımlarını siber dünyaya yapmaktadır. Tüm dünyada yaşanan siber devrimi ıskalayan ülkelerin yeniden kurulan dünya düzenindeki yerinin neresi olacağını tahmin etmek çok da zor olmasa gerek. -/- Bilişim teknolojilerini olabildiğince verimli kullanıp araştırma ve geliştirmeye yatırımlar yaparak siber devrimin içinde yer almamız zorunlu görünüyor. Diğer yandan bilişimin kötüye kullanılmasıyla ortaya çıkan siber suç ve buna bağlı kavramlar ile bu suçun etkilerini irdelemek de zorunluluk. Yaşamımızı önemli ölçüde kolaylaştıran sanal dünya bir yandan da bu duruma uygun yeni hukuksal düzenlemeleri de zorunlu kılıyor. Siber suçlara yönelik uluslararası hukuk boyutunda daha kapsamlı düzenlemelerin yapılması ve her geçen gün etkisini arttıran siber suç olgusu üzerine sadece yerel değil evrensel bir yaklaşım gerektiğinin altını çizmeliyiz. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that we should be suspicious about shame. For example, Nussbaum endorses the view that shame is a largely irrational or unreasonable emotion rooted in infantile narcissism. This claim has also been used to support the view that we should largely abandon shaming as a social activity. If we are worried about the emotion of shame, so the thought goes, we should also worry about acts which encourage shame. I argue that this line of reasoning does not license (...) the leap from the critique of shame to the critique of shaming. This is because shaming does not always aim to inflict shame on its targets. Many acts of shaming (which I label ‘performative shaming’) should simply be understood as aiming to serve their characteristic function of shoring up social norms and standards. (shrink)

The unifying theme of the papers in this volume is the human good, analyzed from the perspectives of different disciplines. Their guiding intuition is that the topic of the human good is neglected. They draw attention to values which are present and operative in public life, and attempt to strengthen the intellectual resources available for talking about them. The disciplines of theology, philosophy, politics, sociology, economics and aesthetics are engaged in a conversation about a shared concern and strengthen the literacy (...) for appreciating the values which are aspects of our common goods. (shrink)

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant gilt zu Recht als einer der wichtigsten Philosophen in der Geschichte der westlichen Philosophie. In dieser Einführung werden – neben einem Seitenblick auf seine Biografie und seinen intellektuellen Werdegang – die bedeutendsten Werke seiner kritischen Periode vorgestellt und anhand ihrer Schlüsselbegriffe erklärt. Außerdem wird Kants Neuansatz in der Philosophie aus einer zentralen Idee verständlich gemacht: der Idee, dass nicht nur das menschliche Handeln, sondern alle leitenden menschlichen Weltbezüge «normativ» strukturiert sind.

Turkish Bu makalede bireylerin eylemlerine müdahale etmenin tek haklı gerekçesinin başkalarına zarar gelmesini önlemek olduğunu ifade eden ‘‘zarar ilkesine (Zİ)’’ getirilen üç eleştiriyi tartıştım. Öncelikle ilkeyi anlamlı kılabilecek bir zarar tarifinin bulunmadığı eleştirisini ele alarak bu eleştirinin, ilkenin ancak problemsiz bir zarar tanımı ile birlikte makul kabul edilebileceği varsayımına dayandığını tespit ettim. Zarar kavramına ilişkin var olan bilgi dağarcığımızı görmezden gelmesi ve zarara başvuran ilkeler haricindeki diğer birçok ilkeyi de kapsayan genel bir şüpheciliğin önünü açması nedeniyle ilgili varsayımı reddetmemiz gerektiğini (...) savundum. İkinci olarak, zarar vermenin yanlışlığının halihazırda yaygın olarak kabul ediliyor olmasından ötürü Zİ’nin bize yeni bir şey söylemediği, zararın türü/miktarı gibi güncel tartışmaların yoğunlaştığı noktalarda suskun kaldığı ve dolayısıyla artık işlevsiz olduğu eleştirisini değerlendirdim. Buna karşın hangi zarar tarifinin benimsendiğinden bağımsız olarak Zİ’nin, zararın varlığı kanıtlanmadıkça bireylerin eylemlerinde serbest bırakılmaları gerektiğini vurgulayan bir özgürlük karinesini temsil etme ve bazı eylemlerin zarar içermese dahi yasaklanabileceğini düşünen hukuki ahlakçılara yasak taleplerini gerekçelendirme yükümlülüklerini hatırlatma şeklinde iki önemli işleve halen sahip olduğunu iddia ettim. Son olarak Zİ'nin potansiyel kötüye kullanımlarına dair endişelere değindim. Bu endişelerin giderilmesi için yapılması gerekenin, zarar içeren eylemleri belirlemeye çalışmak değil, her eylemin bir miktar zarar içerme olasılığına sahip olduğunu kabul ederek hangi tür zararların hukuken düzenlenmesi gerektiği özelinde makul bir seçenek ortaya koymak olduğunu iddia ettim. Zİ’nin suiistimallerinin genellikle zarar kavramının geniş yorumlanmasının ürünü olduğunu düşünerek, cebir ve hile eylemlerinin neden olduğu birinci derece zararları esas alan, hukuki öngörülebilirliği artıracak bir hukuki çerçeve benimsemeyi tercih ettim. Kuşkusuz bu tercih yasaklanması gereken bazı zararlı eylemlere karşı hukuki koruma sağlayamama riskini içermektedir; ancak bu, özgürlüğü korumayı taahhüt eden genel bir ilke ortaya koymak için ödenmesi gereken bir bedeldir. Buradan hareketle, ele aldığım üç eleştiriden hiçbirinin Zİ’nin reddedilmesini gerektirmediği sonucuna vardım. English In this article, I discuss three criticisms of ‘‘the harm principle (HP)’’, which states that the only justification for interfering with individual’s actions is to prevent harm to others. First, I address the criticism that there is no definition of harm that can make the principle reasonable, and I find that this criticism is based on the assumption that the principle can only be considered reasonable with an unproblematic definition of harm. I argue that we should reject this assumption because it ignores our existing knowledge of the concept of harm and opens the way for a general skepticism that extends to many principles other than those addressing harm. Secondly, I consider the criticism that, since the wrongfulness of causing harm is already widely accepted, the principle tells us nothing new, is silent on the points where current debates intensify, such as the type/amount of harm, and is therefore no longer functional. On the other hand, I argue that, regardless of the definition of harm adopted, the HP still serves two important functions: Representing a presumption of liberty that emphasizes that individuals should be free to act unless the existence of harm is proven, and reminding legal moralists who believe that some acts can be prohibited even if they do not involve harm of their obligation to justify such prohibitions. Finally, I address concerns about potential abuses of the HP. I argue that what is needed to address these concerns is not to try to identify acts that involve harm, but to recognize that every act has the potential to involve some level of harm, and to make a reasonable choice as to which types of harm should be regulated by law. Considering that abuse of HP often arises from a broad interpretation of the concept of harm, I prefer to adopt a legal framework that would increase legal predictability, based on the first-degree harms caused by acts of force and fraud. Undoubtedly, this choice entails the risk of failing to provide legal protection against certain harmful acts that should be prohibited, but this is a price that must be paid for a general principle that is committed to protecting liberty. Thus, I conclude that none of the three criticisms I discussed require the rejection of HP. (shrink)

Looking back at the "War on Terror" and its policies, actions, and the violence that followed, this book analyzes the resulting changes in international power structures and the relationship between citizens and their representatives. It defines our shortcomings in opposing this type of violence by demonstrating how the notion of legitimate violence has been broadened. -/- The impact of the "War on Terror" on the public view of Liberalism is explored, as well as its effects on the role of state (...) authorities in our lives. Thus, this book names the lessons we ought to learn from the actions taken against terrorist organizations. (shrink)

This essay offers a uniquely feminist interpretation of Book III in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics by examining the relevance of Aristotle's ethical framework to modern intersectional debates. I begin with an analysis of Aristotle's distinctions between involuntary, voluntary, mixed, and nonvoluntary actions, along with his nuanced discussion of ignorance. I then examine the implications of these concepts in contemporary social issues, and emphasize their potential to make intersectionality more accessible and fostering a constructive dialogue on prejudice. These concepts are then applied (...) through a modern lens to reveal the blameworthy and inexcusable nature of conservative ignorance towards intersectional issues in our current socio-political landscape. I assert that Aristotle provides a framework for intersectional feminists to address socio-political ignorance and discrimination, and argue for the importance of evaluating beliefs and actions to ensure their positive contribution to ones character. (shrink)

The article examines education in the information age, proposing an informational perspective. By analyzing the epistemology of informational learning, I offer a framework for understanding how individuals acquire knowledge, highlighting the role of design and models in active and constructive learning. Following this, the paper presents the UDL and ODDE educational models, outlining their key features and potential contributions. I then showcase the practical application of these models through case studies focusing on the use of AI to develop personalized learning (...) tools and inclusive environments. I propose EIML as a competence to address the abundance of information in learning and the need for the concept of reciprocity. (shrink)

Is the exemplar of modern ethical theory estranged from their intimates because the motive of duty dominates their motivational psychology? While this challenge against modern ethical theory is familiar, I argue that with respect to a certain strand of Kantian ethical theory, it does not so much as make sense. I explain the content and functional role of the motive of duty in the psychology of the moral exemplar, stressing in particular how that motive shapes and informs the content of (...) others, including those characteristic of intimacy. I argue that to the extent that a subject does not integrate their motive of duty with their other motives, their moral and intimate relationships are compromised, and on the same grounds, because intimate relationships are interpersonal relationships and the motive of duty just is the motive to respect another person as a separate person. (shrink)

How can we make progress on the question of whether debate can do harm, and if it can, whether that’s a sufficient reason to suppress particular debates, or to adopt a ‘no debate!’ approach to particular topics ourselves? Obviously we’ll need to get clear on the key ingredients of the claim, which are what we’re counting as debate, and what we’re willing to countenance as harm. But we’ll also need to think about what exactly the harms are thought to be, (...) of debating any one of these controversial topics, and what, if anything, might be more important than avoiding those harms. I want to think about both the general question, which is whether the idea that debate can do harm makes sense and is sometimes true; and the more specific question, which is whether specific contemporary topics in which one side takes a ‘no debate!’ position or for which there is public support for not debating the topic, do in fact risk harm sufficient to justifying #nodebate tactics. (shrink)

Tapping into the deep and expansive legacy of Madiba's life of struggle, Busani Ngcaweni and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni's book, through an impressive and careful assemblage of a mixture of academics, activists and those who worked closely with him, skilfully and empirically demonstrate how Mandela embodied a rare type of leadership that is current missing in many parts of the world. The book displays a deep longing for ethical, committed, humanistic, decolonial and innovative, original and responsive leadership that Mandela's life of struggle (...) and presidency represented. (shrink)

A review of "Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians," by Eldon Soifer (author).

“Hay momentos en la vida en los que la cuestión de saber si se puede pensar distinto de como se piensa o percibir distinto de como se ve es indispensable para seguir contemplando o reflexionando” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8). Esta declaración foucaultiana es la que impulsa la voluntad genealógica que presenta este ensayo, así como su pretensión proyectiva para pensar hoy la educación. El momento filosófico crítico consiste en volver sobre las prácticas que día a día llevamos a cabo y (...) configuran nuestras vidas y nuestras instituciones. Este es necesario para realimentar y reorientar la savia de las instituciones, y especialmente la savia de nuestras instituciones académicas, suelo en el cual se teje la sustancia ética que posteriormente dará lugar a la articulación social. Si se aplica el elemento crítico que la actividad filosófica supone a la experiencia de la educación, entendiendo por ella la correlación dentro de una cultura entre campos de saber, tipos de normatividad y formas de subjetividad, podemos preguntarnos: qué es la educación y qué función desempeña hoy con respecto al ejercicio mismo del pensamiento en un contexto atravesado por las nuevas tecnologías y la IA. (shrink)

Quien enseña sin emancipar no solo embrutece, predicaba Joseph Jacotot, sino que también adoctrina. Pasado un siglo y medio desde entonces, el filósofo y esteta francés emérito de la Universidad de París VIII y European Graduate School Jacques Rancière, en un ejercicio característico de la filosofía de la educación, publica en 1987 El maestro ignorante a partir de la experiencia de Jacotot. A lo largo de su vida y producción literaria, Rancière reflexiona concienzudamente sobre la naturaleza del proceso de enseñanza (...) y aprendizaje humano y se pregunta: ¿es posible enseñar? ¿qué decide el alumnado en su proceso de aprendizaje? ¿Cuáles son los límites de la palabra transmitida en el aprendizaje? ¿Es la determinación del saber un ejercicio del poder? ¿Son todos los seres humanos capaces de comprender lo que otros hacen y saben? ¿Qué relación hay entre el poder del maestro y el poder de la palabra? (shrink)

Wissen wir, wer oder was unseren Lebensgang bestimmt? Wissen wir überhaupt, was in uns und ausserhalb von uns abläuft? Das einzig Gewisse ist unser Tod, doch was hilft die Gewissheit unseres Todes, wenn ungewiss bleibt, wann er kommt? Unsere Bedürfnisse kennen wir, aber wo sind die Grenzen der Befriedigung? Wenn unsicher geworden ist, wer oder was das bestimmt, was faktisch geschieht, wenn die Welt uns körperlich und seelisch bedrängt und die einzige Gewissheit in der Zukunft unser Tod ist, wenn uns (...) unsere Bedürfnisse und die Grenzen ihrer Befriedigung unklar geworden sind, dann hilft nichts mehr als das Nachdenken – das Nachdenken über unsere Natur und ihren Platz in der Welt, über die Hierarchie unserer Bedürfnisse, darüber, wie wir das Gelingen unseres Lebens mit Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit in Einklang bringen. Kurz, es hilft nichts als der Epikureismus. ********** Do we know who or what determines the course of our lives? Do we even know what is going on inside and outside of us? The only certain thing is our death, but what good is the certainty of our death if it remains uncertain when it will come? We know our needs, but where are the limits to their fulfilment? When it has become uncertain who or what determines what actually happens, when the world oppresses us physically and emotionally and the only certainty in the future is our death, when our needs and the limits of their fulfilment have become unclear to us, then nothing helps more than reflection - reflection on our nature and its place in the world, thinking about the hierarchy of our needs, about how we can harmonise the success of our lives with reason and justice. In short, nothing helps but Epicureanism. (shrink)

This book chapter represents one of the engagements between Catholic and Wesleyan philosophers at the 2008 Wesleyan Philosophy Society. The issue of what precisely "Wesleyan philosophy" would mean and comprise can be usefully illuminated by comparison with the positions and issues that were raised and discussed by Catholic scholars during the 1930s Christian philosophy debates in France, which included Etienne Gilson, Maurice Blondel, Jacques Maritain, and Gabriel Marcel. We also discuss how the thought on a contemporary Catholic philosopher Adriaan Peperzack, (...) specifically on affectivity, can be brought into comparison with that important theme in Wesleyan philosophy. (shrink)

There are notorious differences between the Jesuit theology of Gracián’s Humanism and the Pascalian theology of grace of the Colombian thinker Nicolás Gómez Dávila. In addition, Gómez Dávila criticizes Spanish Baroque when he compares it with other literatures. However, the virtuous hero of Gracián and the philosophical way of life of the Colombian thinker are connected. Both philosophies develop a mundane ethic that solves a puzzle: how the human spirit can access transcendence through the dark labyrinths of earthly difficulties.

My aim in this chapter is to explore an analogy between logic and ethics, as Wittgenstein understands them in the Tractatus. First, I argue that Wittgenstein regards logic as a condition of the possibility of meaning, in the sense that logic makes meaningful language and thought possible. Second, I ask why Wittgenstein calls both logic and ethics ‘transcendental’. I suggest that, while logic is a condition of the possibility of semantic meaning, ethics is a condition of the possibility of existential (...) meaning. Without ethics, life could not be meaningful. Third, I show that harmony and agreement play a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s accounts of logic and ethics. A meaningful proposition can be true or false, a meaningful life can be happy or unhappy, and both truth and happiness consist in some kind of harmony or agreement with reality. (shrink)

The way we human beings approach the world has always been mediated. To be precise, it is mediated by interfaces. The starting point of this paper, therefore, will be to define, in the most general way possible, the interface. I will then focus mostly on the analysis of contemporary digital visual interfaces, and on how they changed the human way of perceiving. In the light of this analysis, I will highlight the “ideology” that spoils current interface design and allows contemporary (...) interfaces to “deceive” us much more than previous technologies did. The central part of the paper will be devoted to illustrating the peculiar way in which digital visual interfaces capture attention and predispose to courses of action. The case study provided by TikTok will help to explain this mechanism. Finally, I will point out the possible negative effects of ideological interfaces and I will review some possible solutions. (shrink)

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock (...) of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This foreword gives an overview of ethical perspectives on the question of economization and commodification. Major theories are reviewed and linked to the overarching (and seemingly inevitable) idea and leitmotif of the "market" as the driving force of societal action and organization.