Political Authority

This book addresses a systematic weakness in contemporary political theory and philosophy. Most contemporary political theorists and philosophers are unable to explain, vindicate, or justify the authority of the liberal democratic institutions most of them live under. Instead, they endorse moralist accounts of the right to rule which require governments to meet impossibly high standards to avoid condemnation as illegitimate usurpers. This is true not just of the dominant Rawlsian mainstream, but of many of its radical critics, whose membership of (...) more critical traditions leaves them sceptical of the value of existing institutions, even where they provide stable, decent rule. The book instead provides a realist account of the authority of liberal democratic rule focused on impersonal rule and regulated democratic competition. It uses groundbreaking work in political economy to explain how, at least under reasonably favourable conditions, these two mechanisms can be expected to combine to generate a growing surplus whose fruits will be made widely available. The prosperity and protection provided by liberal democratic rule to most of those it governs forms the basis of its authority, even though the hierarchies and exclusions that remain leave liberal democratic societies a long way from justice. Understanding liberal democratic authority in this way allows us to reassess challenges to it. Protest and resistance must accept impersonal rule and regulated democratic competition. While anger, and even violence, may then be acceptable and even appropriate, even peaceful attempts to remove the winners of democratic elections must be condemned. (shrink)

1. Hundreds of decisions are made in my name every day. The German Code of Civil Procedure stipulates, for example, that judgments ‘shall be entered in the name of the people’.1 And so, being a mem...

During the last decade, we can observe rising support for right-wing leaders who produce a discourse of semblance of strength. These leaders, the new masters of politics, concentrate on the performance of political charisma and manifest a disregard for the norms of the contemporary public sphere. Using Jacques Lacan’s theory of discourses, this article argues that there is a structural relation between the discontents in neoliberal forms of power and the success of these leaders performing the theatre of charisma and (...) political dominance. The key to understanding the rise of the new masters of politics is the relation between the discourse of the master and that of the university. The political prominence of the new masters of politics can be interpreted as a precise reaction to the form of power dominant in neoliberalism – bureaucracy operating according to the norms of economic rationality. The main aim of this paper is to provide a theoretically informed interpretation of discourses of semblance of strength in the broader frame of the historical moment of a crisis of neoliberal form of power. (shrink)

In the dynamic international area, the emergence of new superpowers alongside the sustained influence of established powers, signals a significant shift in global dynamics. This article examines the multifaceted implications of the rising superpower landscape, highlighting the economic, political and military dimensions of their ascendance. Ultimately, this analysis underscores the necessity for a nuanced understanding of these rising powers, advocating collaborative approaches that mitigate risks while harnessing their potential to foster a more equitable and stable global system.

Despite the existence of distinctive female personalities and individual interventions on behalf of women, feminism – understood as a mass movement – remained a rarity in Spain until April 14, 1931; that is, until the proclamation of the Second Republic. For feminism to triumph, two things were necessary: first, the popularization of the ideas represented by the French Revolution, and second, the Industrial Revolution. Neither of these two prerequisites existed in Spain until the Second Republic and the country remained in (...) the grip of conservative Catholicism, without anything resembling the Industrial Revolution that was happening in the rest of Europe. (shrink)

This definitive 8-volume reference is a comprehensive print and electronic resource covering the history of protest and revolution over the past 500 years – throughout the modern era of mass movements. From the rebellion against the Peasant's Revolt in Germany to the Taiping Uprising in China, and from the Enlightenment-inspired revolutions in Europe and America to the anti-colonial revolts of Pancho Villa and the Mau Mau, it covers every major revolution that has altered societies or changed the course of history (...) on a local, regional, national, and international scale. It presents major uprisings and protest movements, and the ideas, ideologies and activists that propelled them, chronicles the manner in which they unfolded, traces their roots, goals, tactics, and influence, and evaluates their successes and failures. -/- No other reference examines in such detail or with such breadth the revolts and popular uprisings, large and small, that have transformed our world. (shrink)

En 1944 el famoso sociólogo alemán Theodor W. Adorno publicó un libro en el que aparecía una de las frases que pasarán a la historia del imaginario colectivo; la frase decía: “. . . escribir un poema después de Auschwitz es un acto de barbarie y esto también corroe al conocimiento, el cual afirma por qué se ha vuelto imposible escribir poemas” (Adorno, Prismas 23). Aceptada como axioma por unos y ampliamente criticada por otros, lo cierto es que dicha frase (...) no dejó indiferente a nadie. Ésta vendría a decir que hay momentos tan graves para la humanidad que marcan un antes y un después en la historia. Esos momentos kairológicos se sacralizan hasta tal punto que intentar explicarlos, comprenderlos o representarlos artísticamente supone un acto de barbarie. Sin embargo, cientos de judíos que pasaron por la terrorífica y vergonzosa experiencia de los campos de concentración “escribieron poemas” después de Auschwitz. Y lo hicieron no como desafío sacrílego sino como modo de mostrar las polimorfas caras del ser humano; lo hicieron como enseñanza a la humanidad para que la historia no se repitiera; y, en definitiva, lo hicieron como terapia individual y también colectiva, para intentar superar el trauma más grande del siglo XX y evitar así que la dolorosa experiencia del luto se extendiera ad infinitum. No se ha citado a Adorno por casualidad. A nuestro parecer resulta muy sugerente establecer un paralelismo entre lo dicho por Adorno y el tema que se va a analizar. Salvando las diferencias, la pregunta que servirá como hilo conductor a las siguientes investigaciones resulta de algún modo similar a la que se hizo Adorno algunos años después de la guerra civil española; esa pregunta dice: ¿se puede hacer humor después de y sobre la guerra civil? En lo que sigue, trataremos de demostrar en este trabajo que no sólo se puede sino que se debe hacer humor después de una experiencia tan traumática como la española. (shrink)

Existen, como se sabe, innumerables contextos, circunstancias y, también discrepancias, en la interpretación del complejo fenómeno del exilio así como del concepto de identidad. Se trata de conceptos existenciales que se remontan a los orígenes de la humanidad. En todas las culturas existe una profusa literatura al respecto que evalúa y reevalúa los discursos derivados de la experiencia del exilio y de la identidad. Este es un tema de investigación muy activo y popular que en dichas revisiones tiene la capacidad (...) de expandir la conciencia inicial de lo leído y lo vivido. "Exilio e identidad" es un libro interdisciplinar constituido por la recopilación de un total de 37 ensayos y material adicional, que versan sobre estos dos conceptos clave en el mundo hispano, y cuyo enfoque se centra en el siglo XX, concentrándose en particular en los siguientes aspectos: reflexiones filosóficas sobre el tema del exilio y la identidad; estudios históricos, biográficos y sociológicos del exilio; y representaciones del exilio en el mundo de la literatura hispánica. Los estudios revelan distintos aspectos del exilio -filosófico, político, literario, geográfico, etc.,-y si bien no pretenden ofrecer una interpretación exclusiva del fenómeno a estudiar, se encargan de articular y dar nueva expresión a experiencias únicas. Los distintos estudios incluyen manifestaciones diacrónicas, individuales y colectivas, lingüísticas, filosóficas, etc., vinculadas a temas vigentes como la ausencia, la errancia, la pérdida, la distancia, el silencio, voluntario o forzado, la enajenación, el éxodo, la muerte, la desterritorialización, el olvido, la marginación, la represión, la cárcel, física o simbólica, entre otras. (shrink)

A continuación se va a analizar de manera breve tres periódicos libertarios publicados en el exilio francés: "Solidaridad Obrera" (1946-1961), "CNT" (1944-1961) y, por último, "Espoir" (1962-hasta la muerte de Franco). La finalidad de estas indagaciones, por un lado, va a ser crear una teoría crítica en la que se expliquen las razones por las que (en opinión de los anarquistas) el hecho de regresar a la España franquista suponía una traición absoluta tanto personal como colectiva a los principios democráticos (...) esbozados durante la Segunda República. También se pondrá esta idea en contraposición con la visión franquista de la «reintegración a la Patria» como un acto de «reconciliación nacional». Por otro lado, el estudio se encargará de analizar la propaganda y publicidad que conllevaban estos regresos. Adelantando la tesis principal del estudio, se verá que con cada «rehabilitación» de un español universal, el franquismo se presentaba al mundo como un régimen liberal, comprensivo y acogedor con las que fueron sus antiguas ovejas negras (y también rojas). En conclusión, se observará cómo su maquinaria publicitaria se puso en marcha desde el primer minuto para crear de manera sutil una opinión pública (nacional e internacional) si no favorable al régimen, al menos comprensiva con él, cosa que, por supuesto (como se demostrará en las siguientes páginas), los anarquistas trataron ferozmente de desmantelar. (shrink)

La recerca sobre el franquisme continua revelant-nos, en ple segle XXI, dades i fets insospitats. A l’abril del 2010, els investigadors que van participar en el congrés «La dictadura franquista: la institucionalització d’un règim», organitzat pel Centre d’Estudis Històrics Internacionals (CEHI), van avançar en la recuperació de la memòria col•lectiva de l’època franquista, especialment en els inicis de la implantació del nou règim. L’interès del congrés no sols va raure en el perfil dels ponents, els principals historiadors del període, sinó (...) també en el contingut de les comunicacions dels nombrosos investigadors que hi van participar, de les quals presentem una selecció. És per això que aquesta obra, que aplega tant les ponències com les comunicacions del congrés, representa una de les aportacions més valuoses a la historiografia sobre la dictadura. (shrink)

There is no good human life outside of a state, and the good state enables us to live well together – so says Constitutivism, the theory developed in this book. Reinvigorating Aristotelian ideas, the author asks in what sense citizens of modern, populous and pluralistic societies share a common good. -/- While we can easily find examples of cooperation that benefit each member, such as insurances, the idea that persons could share a common good became puzzling with modernity – a (...) puzzlement epitomised in Margaret Thatcher’s ‘What is society? There is no such thing!’ Aristotle describes the state as the end of human development, both chronologically and normatively, but modern philosophers, from Thomas Hobbes to Carl Schmitt, conceive the relation between state and citizen as instrumental. Either the state is a means of advancing each member’s individual good or the individual is a means of advancing some collective good. From both perspectives, the Aristotelian idea that human individuals somehow realise their own good in realising some communal good appears metaphysically puzzling, even nonsensical. -/- This puzzlement, the author argues, results from our profoundly modern understanding of rational actions, which we generally see as means toward outcomes. If we allow that not only outcomes but also histories and identities can be good reasons for actions, then it makes sense to see a person’s good and the common good of their political community as constitutive of one another, as Aristotle thought. Building on this idea, the author argues that individual actions and lives exist only in conjunction with a political community. In designing our institutions, we hence also give ourselves an identity and, in that sense, constitute ourselves as persons. Her arguments shed new light on a range of traditional topics of political theory, such as the justification of state authority or the question of how to justify or challenge the design of social institutions. (shrink)

Business corporations hold an enormous amount of power towards employees, contractors, customers, and the general public and they do so largely without effective democratic control. Within the workplace democracy debate scholars have argued that this current state is unjustifiable and that corporations must be democratized. But what exactly does that mean? In my thesis, I explore three questions regarding the details of democratization. First, who should be enfranchised in a democratic business corporation? Second, what are plausible pathways towards democratic corporations? (...) And, third, how can we ensure that democratized business corporations last? I discuss these questions in the spirit of methodological realism, paying special attention to considerations of feasibility, ability, and motivation as well as empirical data and examples. I argue that democratization should involve a number of constituencies beyond workers, especially customers and local populations, because an all-affected principle of participation best captures what is distinctive about corporate power. I then offer a number of institutional innovations for the process of democratization. Building on the example of the Berlin expropriation campaign, I argue that expropriation policies can help circumvent the power of those opposed to democratization and provide a helpful path towards democratization. I suggest that a transitional democratic dictatorship modelled after Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat could solve problems of cooperation and sabotage for newly democratized corporations. And, finally, I propose a class-specific corporate tribunate and a right to strike for the democratic corporation to provide institutional counterpower in order to prevent elite capture and the degeneration of democratic corporations. (shrink)

The Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive has introduced a pre-emptive, risk-based approach in the landscape of European databases and information exchange for security purposes. The article contributes to ongoing debates on algorithmic security and data-driven decision-making by fleshing out the specific way in which the EU PNR-based approach to security substantiates core characteristics of algorithmic regulation. The EU PNR framework appropriates data produced in the commercial sector for generating security-related behavioural predictions and does so in a way that gives rise (...) to a paradoxical normativity directly dependent on empirical states. Its ‘securitisation move’ is moreover characterised by an inherent tendence to expand. As a result, the PNR Directive poses challenges for existing check and balance mechanisms and for human autonomy. These challenges could be partially addressed by strengthening ex-post control procedures and independent auditing. Yet in the decision to adopt a risk-based security model, something more fundamental seems to be at stake, namely, the preservation of the idea of human beings as moral agents able to direct and modify their behaviour in accordance with an intelligible, reliable and predictable normative order. (shrink)

I argue that if we claim colonialism is per se wrong, then we face a dilemma that stems from the fact that many states today are a result of past colonialism. We believe that postcolonial states have a right to self-determination such that it is wrong to colonize them. But this entails that there is a process that can turn a colonial state into a rightful state, and so we admit that there is a way to carry out colonialism that (...) is not wrongful. To avoid this conclusion, we must accept that the wrongness of colonialism has been superseded or remedied. These options either entail instrumentalism, which admits that colonialism is not per se wrong, or they are implausible. (shrink)

This paper argues that we can better distinguish and evaluate right and left forms of contemporary populism with the help of two Nietzschean claims: first, that “slave morality” is a distinctly non-political form of revolt and, second, that it is not the work of “slaves” or the “masses”—it is initiated by a “priestly” subclass of the ruling class rather than by the underclass, which it manipulates in its own interest. I first suggest that contemporary right-wing populism is mistakenly interpeted as (...) a division of the right against against the left, modernity, and progressivism, when it is better understood as a division within the modern economic right, a reaction against the rise of the neoliberal, technocratic form of capitalism that materially disrupts and culturally devalues earlier conservative forms of identity and social life that were compatible with capitalism’s earlier industrial form. Novel conditions of capitalism’s growth and development produce a new cultural hierarchy and morality that valorizes international over national identity and interests; urban over rural life; technological, scientific, and secular worldviews over cultural and religious ones; and identities defined by education and profession over family and community. Neoliberalism’s material disruption of the conditions of old conservative forms of social life, identity, and self-worth produces a deep sense of social inferiority among conservatives of all classes, leading to a moral revolt in which the old economic masters harness the resentment of the underclass to avenge themselves against the moral hierarchy of new economic masters who are quickly overpowering them, leaving them with a lesser, “priestly” rather than “knightly” form of aristocratic superiority over the populace—that is, national and regional, cultural and religious power rather than the international economic and political superiority wielded by the “knightly” neoliberal class. Right-populism is, consequently, a false populism, a master morality in the guise of a slave revolt that is directed, funded by, and ultimately serves the moral interests of a conservative priestly subset of the ruling class. Unable to regain material superiority, the priestly class seeks to regain its social capital over the knightly class by channeling the populace’s resentment away from the destructive consequences of capitalism (the shared politics of both factions), toward marginalized segments of the underclass and toward the socially-liberal morality of neoliberalism—a morality that is anti-conservative only to the degree compatible with capitalism, defending the marginalized only within the interests of the growth and protection of its economic power. This accounts for its paradoxical character as a slavish-master morality, blending privilege and resentment, the material status of master with the evaluative mode and social status of slave. (Consider, for example, that many Trump supporters not only were not working class but wealthy, and that a surprising percentage were neither white nor male.) At the same time, right-populism is also a false politics, aiming not primarily at political but cultural power, targeting not neoliberal policy but only its cultural ideology insofar as it is independent of the demands of capitalism. Indeed, by falsely divorcing the social liberalism of neoliberal morality from its conservative, capitalist politics, right-populism indirectly promotes the knightly-neoliberal class’s politics of privatization, deregulation, and austerity, furthering the decline of conservative forms of social life and further aggravating the conservative resentment it claims to remedy. Moreover, right-populism directly diminishes the success of left populism, of a truly populist, truly political resistance to neoliberalism, not only indirectly enabling the neoliberal class’s dismantling of social democracy and the welfare state, but also directly demonizing the left, conflating its anti-neoliberal politics with neoliberal morality and drawing the left’s energies away from political resistance toward culture wars that turn the left, and the general populace, against itself rather than against the ruling class, obscuring broader lines of discontent with, and potential political alignment against, neoliberalism. I conclude that it is the under-appreciated historical-materialist character of Nietzsche’s analysis of slave morality that offers particular insight into our present predicament. On one hand, he rightly stresses that slave revolt is not about material power alone but also about social recognition, a resentment over social status that infects the privileged as well as the marginalized. On the other hand, he insists that such reactionary social movements are effective only because their deeper cause is the real political power of a ruling class—reminding us that they are only effectively defeated through material rather than moral resistance, and through a politics that targets the ruling classes rather than the people they manipulate. Consequently, we should also suspect that anti-populism is not an effective or progressive politics but, like right-populism, merely a moral reaction to moral reaction, a slavish-master morality ultimately in the service of, and doomed to foster, the very conservative politics it pretends to oppose. (shrink)

Debate between Dan Demetriou (Philosophy, Minnesota Morris) and Michael Huemer (Philosophy, Colorado), forthcoming in Problems in Applied Ethics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates, Steven Cowan, ed. (Bloomsbury). The main essays are 5000 words or fewer; replies are 1500 words or fewer. This penultimate version is published here with permission from the editor.

Government action has advantages, which explains the central role of states in political theory. However, taking states for granted limits the ability to critique the status quo and consider alternatives. The rejection of domination by anarchists and their vision of a society free of domination can be a productive starting point for critical reflection on statehood. Drawing on works by the philosophical anarchists Robert Paul Wolff and A. John Simmons, as well as Joseph Raz, this study presents a compelling anarchist (...) challenge to the state. This demonstrates that state action can only be legitimised if it enables us to lead a self-determined and emancipated life. (shrink)

In this commentary, I explain how a student movement evolved from a social movement for quota reform into a political movement demanding regime change. I argue that the key factor enabling this transformation was its ability to unite various factions, which shifted public sentiment from addressing specific grievances to mounting a broader challenge to the regime.

Fair-play theories of political obligation hold that persons have a duty to obey the law based on the fact that they benefit from the law and have a duty of reciprocity to comply in return. These accounts are vulnerable to the open-ended reciprocity challenge, according to which persons have discretion over how they discharge debts of reciprocity, such that they may discharge the debts they incur from being members of society in ways other than compliance with the law. I defend (...) fair-play theories against this challenge by arguing that the principle of reciprocity shares a ground with the principle of public equality, and that the latter ultimately requires that legal institutions be arranged in such a way that persons may not exercise discretion over how they discharge the debts of reciprocity that they incur from others’ compliance with the law. (shrink)

We should drop the marketplace of ideas as our go-to metaphor in free speech discourse and take up a new metaphor of the connected city. Cities are more liveable when they have an integrated mix of transport options providing their occupants with a variety of locomotive affordances. Similarly, societies are more liveable when they have a mix of communication platforms that provide a variety of communicative affordances. Whereas the marketplace metaphor invites us to worry primarily about authoritarian control over the (...) content that circulates through our communication networks, the connected-city metaphor invites us to worry, more so, about the homogenization of the tools and formats through which we communicate. I argue that the latter worry demands greater attention under emerging technological conditions. (shrink)

Chilling Effects occur when the risks surrounding a speech restriction inadvertently deter speech that lies outside the restriction’s official scope. Contrary to the standard interpretation of this phenomenon I show how speech deterrence for individuals can sometimes, instead of suppressing discourse at the group level, intensify it – with results that are still unwelcome, but crucially unlike a ‘chill’. Inadvertent deterrence of speech may, counterintuitively, create a Heating Effect. This proposal gives us a promising explanation of the intensity of public (...) debate on topics for which there is, simultaneously, evidence of people self-censoring, for fear of breaching speech restrictions. It also helps to pinpoint two problems with existing theoretical analyses of the Chilling Effect: (i) in how they construe the relation between individual- and group-level discursive phenomena; and (ii) how they characterize the distinctively wrongful nature of inadvertent speech deterrence. (shrink)

I offer a Kantian argument for the idea that the state lacks the authority to punish neglected, impoverished citizens when they commit crimes to cope with that neglect. Given Kant’s own commitments to the value of external freedom and the state’s obligation to ensure it in Doctrine of Right, there is no reason a Kantian state can claim authority to punish an impoverished citizen while also failing in significant ways to protect her external freedom.

The victims of severe injustice are allowed to employ disruption and violence to seek political change. This article argues for this conclusion from within Rawlsian political liberalism, which, however, has been criticised for allegedly imposing public reason’s suffocating norms of civility on the oppressed. It develops a novel view of the applicability of public reason in non-ideal circumstances – the “no self-sacrifice view” – that focuses on the excessive costs of following public reason when suffering from severe injustice. On this (...) view, those treated in what Rawls describes as less than a reasonably just way are relieved of the duty of public reason and therefore entitled to employ disruption and violence. In contrast, their privileged fellow citizens must still obey public reason’s civility unless they have been authorised by the oppressed to join their fight. This article also starts exploring from within political liberalism the normative principles governing disruptive and violent protest. (shrink)

This chapter claims that only rarely do critical youth studies and social policy include young people in a truly participatory way. The implications of and reasons for this failure are explored. Moreover, through evidence collected over a 3 year youth-led research programme, the chapter investigates how the tools found within the field of user-led, action research can be used for the construction of evidence-based youth policy and the development of new theoretical and methodological models for critical youth studies. A secondary (...) aim is to identify best practices that encourage true participation of young people in decision-making and democratic structures. -/- . (shrink)

In his collection of articles, "Where Are We Now - The Epidemic as Politics", Giorgio Agamben appears to make some very startling (if not downright outrageous) claims concerning the political situation in Italy and elsewhere in Europe during the Covid-19 pandemic. In this piece [in German] I analyse how these claims are rooted in the philosophy of Agamben's "Homo sacer" project. Focussing on three central notions (Schmitt's "state of exception", Foucault's "biopolitics", and Agamben's very own "bare life"), I show how (...) Agamben's illegitimate identification of the bare life with the subject of biopolitics leads to the derailment of his theory as well as to some of the grave political misjudgments he makes regarding the pandemic. (shrink)

Auf den Ersten Weltkrieg folgte in Mitteleuropa ein grundlegender politischer Umbruch. Albert Dikovich arbeitet die Folgen dieser demokratischen Zeitenwende für die deutschsprachige Philosophie umfassend auf. Dabei untersucht er zum einen, wie nach dem katastrophalen Gewaltereignis des Krieges und angesichts der akuten Eskalation im Inneren die Grenzen der moralisch legitimen Mittel politischer Konfliktaustragung neu gezogen wurden. Zum anderen beleuchtet er den Zusammenhang zwischen rechts- und erkenntnistheoretischen Annahmen und Positionierungen innerhalb eines Spannungsfeldes konkurrierender politischer Neuordnungsentwürfe. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die damals geführten (...) philosophischen Kämpfe um die Demokratie mit unserer Gegenwart mehr zu tun haben, als es der geschichtliche Abstand vermuten lässt. (shrink)

This book is about the ways in which real-world democracies fall short of democratic ideals and why those shortfalls matter. The project is rooted in a vast body of empirical findings that political scientists have accumulated over the last seven decades. These are findings about political ignorance, voter behaviour, the policymaking process, polarization, and the popular control of representatives. These findings are often both surprising and troubling—they suggest our democracies fall far short of democratic ideals. The book is a detailed, (...) careful exploration of why such findings matter. In part, that involves giving an account of what makes democracy valuable in the first place: why does democracy matter? And in part it involves connecting the value of democracy to the rights and duties of ordinary citizens. The overarching argument is that our duties to obey the law, and the moral permissibility of enforcing those laws, depend on the realization of democratic ideals. So the shortfalls of our democracies undermine the moral authority and legitimacy of our states. (shrink)

On one account, courts ought to enforce legislative intent only when the public meaning of the text of the statute is unclear, and on another account, they should enforce the intent even when the public meaning is clear. In this paper, I argue against both approaches. My argument rests on considerations related to the moral authority of the democratically made law. More specifically, I argue that those considerations which make democratic law morally authoritative entail that judges ought to enforce the (...) public meaning, when this is clear, and that interpretation of the public meaning which is closest to the balance of moral reasons, when the public meaning is unclear. (shrink)

Sometimes, political bald-faced lies pass for truth. That is, certain groups of people behave according to them – behave as if the political bald-faced lies were true. How can this phenomenon be explained? I argue that to explain it we need to take political bald-faced lies to be performative utterances whose goal is to bring about a worldly state of affairs just in virtue of making the utterance. When the former US-President tweeted ‘we won the election’, people stormed Capitol Hill (...) to protest election fraud and some were killed. In this way, the bald-faced lie was successful in passing for truth. My performative view of political bald-faced lies is to be preferred over various other views such as the contempt for truth view (Lynch 2021), the deception view (Lackey 2013), and the value-signaling view (Stanley 2012). These alternative views fail to adequately account for how political bald-faced lies pass for truth. (shrink)

The notion that immigrants have a right to immigrate to the U.S. appears to conflict with the government’s or citizens’ property rights. Michael Huemer has given one of the most interesting and provocative arguments on immigration in years. It turns the dominant view on its head. Unfortunately, the argument fails. U.S. citizens own land, individually, collectively, and via their government. For immigrants to gain a right to enter on it, Huemer must think that the landowners have lost their rights to (...) their land, the landowners’ rights are overridden, or the landowners’ rights are undermined. He does not show that any of these are true. A separate issue and one not discussed here is whether it is a wise policy to reduce or end immigration to the United States. (shrink)

Robert Nozick is the most discussed libertarian philosopher of these days. The paper examines the question of whether he supported forced taxation. The normative basis of Nozick’s position, the neo-Lockean theory of natural human rights are analyzed. On the basis of this theory, his argument in favor of the moral justification of the minimal state is reconstructed. While this reconstruction leaves it ambiguous whether such the state should be funded by taxation, six arguments are offered in favor of such tax (...) funding. These arguments are based on the same normative premises as Nozick’s own argument and can therefore be supported by contemporary Nozickians even if Nozick himself rejected taxation. These arguments are shown to help overcome some of the critical objections faced by Nozick’s theory and neo-Lockeanism as a whole. However, accepting these arguments entails accepting not only the tax financing of the minimal state, but also the expansion of the functions of this state to provide citizens with a social minimum in the form of an unconditional basic income or some other form of redistribution. (shrink)

Authority is an important feature of military life. Political and military superiors claim the power to give binding orders to their subordinates. If they have the authority they claim (and that many citizens and soldiers take them to possess), then the subordinates are morally required to do as commanded. Tadros’ To Do, To Die, To Reason Why challenges the authority claims that political and military superiors make in giving orders: the kinds of considerations ordinarily thought to underpin their authority – (...) in particular, the instrumental benefits of authoritative decision-making in politics and military life – cannot justify it. Tadros’ claim is not that subordinates are never required to do what their superiors order. Trivially, superiors may order subordinates to do what they are anyway required to do. (The captain orders the privates not to kill the prisoners.) Less trivially, superiors’ orders may change the subordinates’ factual or epistemic circumstances, which results in their having duties that they would otherwise have lacked. (The captain orders a private to jump into the sea. His order startles a child on the shore so it loses its balance and plunges into the water. The private may now have a duty to jump in to save the child, and he may have that duty because the superior gave the order.) Yet this way of changing the subordinates’ duties is not, for Tadros, a genuine exercise of authority: authority brings about normative change directly, rather than by changing the subordinate’s factual or epistemic circumstances. It is authority so understood that, according to Tadros, military and political superiors claim and yet lack. Tadros offers two complementary arguments for this anarchist conclusion. First, he argues that superiors have practical authority over subordinates only if the subordinates have duties to obey (or follow) the superiors’ orders, rather than merely to conform with them (by doing something which happens to be what they were ordered to do). There must be a suitable link between order and action. But, Tadros argues, soldiers don’t have a duty to obey their superiors’ orders. (Call this the Obedience Claim.) So military superiors lack practical authority vis-à-vis their subordinates. (Call this the Authority Claim.) Second, Tadros argues that authority is either unjustified or otiose. Exercises of practical authority, by imposing duties, restrict their subjects’ freedom. Moral duties are difficult to justify precisely because they are freedom-restricting in this way; and only certain kinds of considerations suffice to make an action morally obligatory. Tadros argues that there are sufficient reasons for a superior to have and exercise the power to make ving morally obligatory by issuing a directive only if there are already sufficient reasons for ving being independently morally obligatory. (We call this the No Duty, No Authority Claim.) We challenge both arguments. Sections 2 and 3 show that, even if the Obedience Claim is true, it does not entail the Authority Claim. Section 4 casts doubt on the No Duty, No Authority Claim. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

“How too, for that matter, could such large populations be fed, without chains of command to organize the masses, formal offices of leadership; full-time administrators, soldiers, police, and other non-food-producers, who in turn could only be supported by the surpluses that agriculture provides? These seem like reasonable questions to ask, and those who make the first point almost invariably make the second. But in doing so, they risk parting company with history. You can’t simply jump from the beginning of the (...) story to the end, and then assume you know what happened in the middle” (Pg. 274). In the monograph The Dawn of Everything from Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, anthropologist David Graeber and archaeologist David Wengrow discuss the consequences of state formation theory, and how countless anthropological and archaeological cases disprove common assumptions regarding the evolution of civilization. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of the second ‘theological’ pattern in Plato’s Republic. Situating Plato within his religious context, it argues that this pattern calls into question the traditional ancient model of divine epiphany. Divine epiphany was a central element in Greek religion. Yet, in the absence of a centralized religious organization, this model threatened the philosophers’ authoritative position. Plato’s second pattern seeks not only to undermine this potential threat but also to pave the way towards a new, philosophicalmodel (...) of divine epiphany, thus further establishing the philosophers’ authority and legitimacy within and outside his ideal city. (shrink)

The Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration has recently proposed to make in-person citizenship ceremonies optional. These ceremonies are oaths of allegiances: naturalizing citizens swear loyalty to King Charles and obedience to the laws of Canada. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration proposes to allow naturalizing citizens to take these oaths by checking a box online rather than by taking part in an in-person ceremony. In this commentary, I argue that Canada should go much further. It should stop forcing naturalizing (...) immigrants to swear oaths of allegiance altogether. Such oaths create an unjust inequality between naturalized and natural-born citizens: they mean the former have much weightier political obligations than the latter. (shrink)

Democracy is widely praised as a great achievement of humanity. However, in recent years there has been an increasing amount of concern that its functioning across the world may be eroding. In response, efforts to combat such change are emerging. Considering the pervasiveness of technology and its increasing capabilities, it is no surprise that there has been much focus on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to this end. Questions as to how AI can be best utilized to extend the (...) reach of democracy to currently non-democratic countries, how the involvement in the democratic process of certain demographic groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, women, and young people) can be increased, etc. are frequent topics of discussion. In this article I would like not merely to question whether this is desirable but rather argue that we should be trying to envisage ways of using AI for the exact opposite purpose: that of replacing democratic systems with better alternatives. (shrink)

Many philosophers have recently become interested in conceptual engineering, or the activity of producing better conceptual schemes in human populations. But few, if any, are asking the question: what would it mean for actual human agents to possess the social authority to modify a conceptual scheme in this way? This paper argues for a deontological approach to conceptual engineering, wherein we have to secure social authority qua engineers before attempting to modify social concepts. I show that the dominant, consequentialist conception (...) of engineering violates basic rights that concept-users have, particularly over their own identity-constituting concepts. Using examples from the philosophy of race and sexuality, I show that conceptual engineers cannot authoritatively modify social concepts if they employ consequentialist reasoning about those concepts. (shrink)

Michael Wendeler’s disputation on the Turkish republic is a discussion of Ottoman history, political philosophy, and the concept of monarchy and tyranny. Half of his disputation concerns the identification of the Turks with the little horn which arises on the head of the fourth beast in the prophet’s vision described in the Book of Daniel 7:1–28. Giving copious historical references, Wendeler explains that this little horn cannot be referring to Christ as the Jews believe, nor to the Seleucid monarch Antiochos (...) Epiphanes as the Calvinists believe. Nor can it be identifed with the Antichrist as the Catholics believe. Wendeler puts forth a detailed argument that the little horn on the fourth beast in the prophecy of Daniel can only be identified with the Turkish monarch (Ottoman Sultan). In conclusion, Wendeler draws a parallel between the monstrous ‘little horn’—the tyrannical Turkish monarchy—and the tyranny of the Catholic Church, exemplified by the untrustworthy Pope and the satanic writings of the Catholic Machiavelli. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to take the complexity of our histories of rights as seriously as the nature of rights themselves. Let me say immediately that the point is not to satisfy our sense of moral superiority by smugly pointing out the prejudices found in arguments made over three hundred years ago. We have more than our own share of problems and prejudices to deal with. Rather, in coming to grips with this history, and especially how early-modern political (...) theorists struggled with the extension and application of natural rights to the ‘New World’, we may learn something about our own struggles to extend human rights beyond the boundaries of the state system of which Grotius, Hobbes, Locke and Vattel were among the key intellectual architects. For Richard Tuck, the autonomous rights-bearing agent at the heart of liberal individualism is a product of seventeenth-century theorizing about the nature of the autonomous state acting in the international sphere. The sovereign individual is the ‘traditional cousin of the sovereign state’, argues Tuck, and especially the aggressive, violent, and minimally constrained relative described by Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Emer de Vattel. Thus the connection between liberalism and imperialism, on this reading, is not merely chronological or historical but metaphysical. The analogy between the sovereign state and the sovereign individual acting on the basis of their natural rights, constrained by the recognition of the basic rights of others (but not much more than that) represents an influential vision of liberal freedom. This minimalist account of freedom represents only one vision, however, and Tuck’s account of the pre-history of liberal rights has to be balanced against other conceptions, including more emancipatory ones. (shrink)

Two challenges have faced policymakers during the Covid-19 pandemic: First, they must determine the reliability of expert testimony in the face of uncertainty; second, they must determine the relevance of different kinds of expertise with regard to particular decisions. I argue that both these problems can be fruitfully analyzed through the lens of trust by introducing an in-depth case study of Iceland’s handling of the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. I contend that the problem of relevance highlights the limited (...) appeal of a thoroughly technocratic society. Value judgments, best realized through democratic processes, are always lurking in the background. (shrink)

The paper examines one of the considerations that determines the extent to which policymakers pursue the objec- tives demanded by constituents. The nature and extent of their ignorance serve to determine the incentives confronted by policymakers to pursue their constituents’ demands. The paper also considers several other consequences of policymaker ig- norance and its relationship to expert failure.

Confucian political authority is often assumed illegitimate and it is regarded as meritocratic rather than democratic. However, I disagree with such an assumption, because from my perspective, Confucian political authority actually has a potential legitimacy which may contribute to establishing a responsive and harmonious state. Doing so, I argue that, since Confucian political authority is derived from the idea of “service” and “reciprocity,” it therefore advocates non-coercive moral persuasion and reciprocal obligations. In the following discussion, I will point out that (...) certain modern democratic theories on political authority, such as those concerning “general acceptability,” “consent,” “autonomy,” and “paternalism,” are inadequate to refute the legitimacy of Confucian political authority. Accordingly, I will propose that our contemplation over whether Confucian political authority is legitimate or not ought to be furthermore widened and deepened. (shrink)

The state is central to social scientific and historical inquiry today, reflecting its importance in domestic and international affairs. States kill, coerce, fight, torture, and incarcerate, yet they also nurture, protect, educate, redistribute, and invest. It is precisely because of the complexity and wide-ranging impacts of states that research on them has proliferated and diversified. Yet, too many scholars inhabit separate academic silos, and theorizing of states has become dispersed and disjointed. This book aims to bridge some of the many (...) gaps between scholarly endeavors, bringing together scholars from a diverse array of disciplines and perspectives who study states and empires. The book offers not only a sample of cutting-edge research that can serve as models and directions for future work, but an original conceptualization and theorization of states, their origins and evolution, and their effects. (shrink)

Is political equality viable given the unequal private property holdings characteristic of a capitalist economy? This book places the wealth-politics nexus at the centre of scholarly analysis. Traditional theories of democracy and property have often ignored the ways in which the rich attempt to convert their wealth into political power, operating on the implicit assumption that politics is isolated from economic forces. This book brings the moral and political links between wealth and power into clear focus. The chapters are divided (...) into three thematic sections. Part I analyses wealth and politics from the perspective of various political traditions, such as liberalism, republicanism, anarchism, and Marxism. Part II addresses the economic sphere, and looks at the political influence of corporations, philanthropists and commons-based organizations. Finally, Part III turns to the political sphere and looks at the role of political parties and constitutions, and phenomena such as corruption and lobbying. Wealth and Power: Philosophical Perspectives will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in political philosophy, political science, economics, and law. (shrink)

Orson Scott Card and his Ender Series have had a profound impact on the genre of contemporary science fiction, meriting an academic analysis of some of his more theoretical ideas. I have chosen to analyze his concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations found in Xenocide and Children of the Mind through the lens of international relations, sociological, and political theory, in order to bring nuance to an underdeveloped theory that many non-academics may be familiar with. Ultimately, we must conclude that (...) Card’s concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations is too stagnant and does not account for social and hegemonic change, which influences the justifications of why these “nations” may be considered “Center” in the first place. (shrink)

Those who bear the burdens of injustice and oppression are entitled to act in ways contrary to existing laws and institutions to secure their own entitlements and those of others. This article aims to articulate a Confucian perspective on resistance against injustice. There are reasons for thinking that the notion of resistance is fundamentally at odds with Confucian political thought. In this article, I move beyond this simple conflict/compatibility model and explore the complex relationships between resistance and Confucianism. On one (...) hand, some of Confucianism’s core commitments can be better attained in contemporary societies by allowing resistance; on the other, a Confucian perspective can offer insights into current discussions on the ethics of resistance. (shrink)

What gives some people the right to issue commands to everyone else and force everyone else to obey them? And why should people obey the commands of those with political power? These two key questions are the heart of the issue of political authority, and, in this volume, two philosophers debate the answers. Michael Huemer argues that political authority is an illusion and that no one is entitled to rule over anyone. He discusses and rebuts the major theories supporting political (...) authority's rightfulness: implicit social contract theory, hypothetical contract theories, democratic theories of authority, and utilitarian theories. Daniel Layman argues that democratic governments have authority because they are needed to protect our rights and because they are accountable to the people. Each author writes two replies directly addressing the arguments and ideas of the other. Key Features Covers a key foundational problem of political philosophy: the authority of government. Debate format ensures a full hearing of both sides. A Glossary includes key concepts in political philosophy related to the issue of authority. Annotated Further Reading sections point students to additional resources. Clear, concrete examples and arguments help students clearly see both sides of the argument. A Foreword by Matt Zwolinski describes a broader context for political authority and then traces the key points and turns in the authors' debate. (shrink)