When philosophers do not have a way out for choosing between the account they defend or a competing one, they usually appeal to theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, unity, fruitfulness, explanatory power, and so on. In this paper, my aim is to question the status of simplicity as a criterion for theory choice. My main arguments are that, first, it is hard to determine an objective metrics for evaluating simplicity, and second, we have no way to decide which one we (...) should prioritize: whether the ontological or the ideological variant of this theoretical virtue. In order to defend this stance, I will present the defenses of both ontological and ideological simplicity and then criticize each of them. I will also point out that the usual appeal metaphysicians make to scientific practice is not enough, given that the role of simplicity in science is not so clear and that philosophy in general has a very distinct nature as an endeavor. In the end, I will sketch a metaphilosophical pessimistic conclusion according to which not just metaphysics, but much of philosophy, is maybe doomed to be an endless effort of inconclusive arguments, since most of philosophical explanations appeal to theoretical virtues as a decisive factor in their disputes. (shrink)

Appealing to science is a popular suggestion for separating projectible predicates. According to this suggestion, we can expect science, eventually, to separate such predicatesfor us, rendering it unnecessary to make further attempts to explicate the criteria for pro-jectibility. In this essay, I address three theoretical challenges to this suggestion. The firststems from the inductive character of science, which casts doubts on its efficacy in separat-ing projectible predicates, since induction itself requires this separation. The second is theinferential externalism implied by this (...) suggestion, whereas the problems of induction havebite only if inferential internalism is presumed. The third challenge appears when a strongrelationship between projectibility and kindhood, on the one hand, and kindhood and sim-ilarity, on the other, is posited, such that a more projectible predicate is believed to be apredicate which tracks better similarities in nature. Now the question appears: whether andhow science enables us to track better similarities? I distinguish two conceptions of similarity,one intuitive, the other theoretical, and I argue that the theoretical one is to be preferred,showing that how scientific practice involves shifting from an intuitive idea of similarity to atheoretical one. Through answering these three challenges, I attempt to support the appealto natural science as far as Goodman’s problem of induction is concerned. (shrink)

The central question of ontology has long been thought to be ‘What is there?’. The central way of answering it has been to consider which entities we must posit as part of a best total explanatory theory. This paper argues against this ‘explanatory’ conception of metaphysics, by showing that it relies on an unarticulated assumption that all the terms at issue in these metaphysical debates serve an explanatory function. Making use of work in systemic functional linguistics enables us to identify (...) the many different functions played by terms of interest in metaphysics. And that makes it clear that ‘contribution of explanatory power’ should be rejected as an across-the-board criterion in ontology. This work in functional linguistics also enables us to see why it is useful to have a language that entitles us to use redundant inferences to introduce terms for properties, numbers, and the like, giving us new reason to accept ‘easy’ inferences that there are such things. As a result, we should give up thinking that ‘what is there?’ provides a deep and interesting question for a discipline called ‘ontology’ to answer, and give up thinking that the task for ontology is to determine which entities to ‘posit’ as part of a best total explanatory theory. (shrink)

Rodrigo Borges (2020, 2017) argumenta que os supostos casos de conhecimento via falsidade não são casos nos quais o status epistêmico da crença-alvo p dependa de uma crença falsa e, ainda assim, concede que a crença em p é uma instância de conhecimento. O objetivo deste artigo é analisar essa alegação. Para isso, iniciarei explicando o que é o problema do conhecimento via falsidade e, na sequência apresentarei a proposta concessiva de Rodrigo Borges. Por fim, argumentarei que essa proposta não (...) é adequada por não acomodar todos os supostos casos de conhecimento via falsidade. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer an Aristotelian critique of virtue epistemology, particularly of the way virtue epistemologists use the concept of intellectual virtue in their definitions of knowledge. I engage with David Bronstein’s thesis that virtue reliabilists, despite claims of being contemporary representatives of Aristotle’s epistemology, construct their key epistemic categories in ways that fundamentally deviate from Aristotle’s own virtue epistemology. In addition to Bronstein’s argument, I will argue that a similar critique applies to the other main branch of virtue (...) epistemology – namely, Zagzebski’s responsibilism. I intend to clarify both the gist of contemporary virtue epistemologists and the motivation behind their approaches, highlighting that, not only do they differ from Aristotle, but also that their theories run the risk of vicious circular reasoning. I conclude by proposing alternative options, within virtue epistemology, that may avoid the problems I identify in mainstream virtue reliabilism and responsibilism. (shrink)

In this article, we try to argue, against McIntyre’s proposal in How to talk to a science denier, that there is a relevant difference between various forms of science denialism. Specifically, we contend that there is a significant distinction to be made between those forms of denialism which deny the existence of an expert consensus (the model of which is the strategy of the tobacco companies in the 1950s) and those which deny the probatory value of such expert consensus (on (...) the basis, e.g., of conspiracy theories involving scientists). While McIntyre and others advocate for the value of communicating consensus as an effective and perfectly rational strategy against those forms of denialism which deceivingly deny the existence of scientific agreement, we argue that this approach becomes question-begging against those which deny its probatory value. Accordingly, then, we object to McIntyre’s characterization that “all science denial is basically the same” and suggest a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. (shrink)

Our paper addresses the problem of a two-fold approach to skeptical inferences in the context non-monotonic logics. We tackle the problem through the analysis of ambiguous theories, such as the Nixon Diamond, as instantiated in non-monotonic inheritance networks, and the notion of an extension. Our paper presents a detailed description of the inner mechanisms underlying both approaches to skeptical inference, i.e. direct and indirect skepticism, and how each information processing policy is applied to ambiguous networks like the Nixon Diamond. Finally, (...) we discuss the extent and limitation of each approach, and we propose an alternative stance towards the existence of diverging implementations to skeptical inferences in non-monotonic reasoning. (shrink)

Recent approaches to the epistemology of logic, under the title of “anti-exceptionalism about logic”, explicitly adopt what is asserted to be the method of theory choice and the correct account of explanation in the sciences. Without embracing such a doctrine, but still keeping within a broad anti-exceptional trend, the current discussion proposes a contextual theory of explanation in logic, based on Bas van Fraassen’s framework of why-questions, which neither claims that logic is a science, nor relies on the metaphysical assumption (...) of a validity-phenomenon to give account of the methodology of logic. (shrink)

The paper discusses the epistemological role of consciousness in Nicolas Malebranche's Recherche de la Vérité. After presenting the problem of how an epistemologically negative view of consciousness could represent an obstacle to the project of founding a ‘science of man’, it is argued that Malebranche understands ‘reflection’, a specific type of consciousness, as a pure / intellectual form of perception and therefore an unproblematic way of accessing mental phenomena from an epistemological point of view. Reflection could be the foundation of (...) the science of man. (shrink)

Embodied cognition and enactive approaches have criticized the associationist, also called mechanistic, view of habits. Motivated by the enactive account of habits and research on the field of Motor Control, I argue that Ryle was both wrong and right about habits and their relation to intelligent behavior. Ryle was wrong in claiming that habits fall short of intelligent behavior. But Ryle was also right, he correctly puts habits in a continuity that goes from dispositions in general to what he considers (...) bonafide intelligent behavior or knowing-how. After some background, the Rylean distinction between habits and intelligent behavior is explored. I then move to Ryle’s mistake and its roots, tacitly endorsing the idea of instinct as innate behavior. In doing so, he neglected that variability and modifiability are the rules and not the exceptions in behavior. Research on the phenomena of motor redundancy of animal behavior, the enactive account of habits, and a dynamic account of intelligence are mobilized to correct his mistake. My proposed account explains Ryle’s mistake, why it is a mistake, and why it is an understandable mistake coming from someone with his perspective. The last section of the paper re-articulates the continuum between simple dispositions, habits, and highly skilled behavior. I reconceived the continuum of intelligence as including not only our habits, but all animal behavior. (shrink)

For constructive empiricism, being observable or unobservable is defining for deciding about the empirical adequacy and epistemic value of theory components. The classification of microscopic images has been particularly debated. van Fraassen initially classified microscope images as unobservable and then as mere images, like rainbows. Afterwards, he claimed it is not irrational to maintain neutrality about their classification and left them in some kind of limbo between being images of something real or being mere images. Here, I provide an argument (...) to classify microscopic images of cells as copy-qualified images. The argument is described in general terms to sustain that any unobservable entity that is derived from observable self-dividing entities and looks similar to the observable entity when detected under the microscope, corresponds to a copy-qualified image of something real. Because of the existence in nature of large observable cells that fulfil these properties, I conclude that microscopic images of cells are images of something real. This determines their empirical adequacy and epistemic value, making them hard-core and stable components of biological theories. The argument described provides a strategy to develop a more grained classification of what is observable and unobservable with the consequent implications for theory development. (shrink)

In this paper, the author reproduces one of Nicolas Malebranche’s arguments for God’s existence. The text offers (I) a logical formalization of the argument, (II) a formal proof of validity of the argument and, finally, some philosophical reflections concerning not only (III.I) the soundness of the argument, but (III.II) the intellectual benefits that a logical formalization offers to a philosophical historian of philosophy.

This article constitutes the first part of a more extensive work on hermeneutics and existential philosophy. It’s articulated as an analysis of some central statements of Truth and Method of Gadamer and both Being and Time and Contributions to Philosophy of Heidegger, conducted alternating five different points of view: metaphilosophy, epistemology, philosophy of logic, bio- and cognitive linguistics, and philosophy of language. In the present article I focus on philosophy of logic, with some excursions into philosophy of language. The main (...) objective of the work consists in demonstrating what follows. A general impredicative structure is variously described and commented on in Truth and Method; I argue that it 1) corresponds logically to the intesional Liar-paradox; 2) derives exegetically from Heidegger’s differentiation between ἀλήθεια and truth in λόγος; 3) should be interpreted philosophically as the Hegelian Identity in Difference, despite Gadamer’s intention to avoid dialectic conclusions. Priest showed that the concept of Identity in Difference and the Law of Dialectical Contradiction describe the same structures, imposing a dialetheic lecture. Along this line, I argue, Gadamer’s followers should better present their argument as paraconsistent. (shrink)

There are some sentences that include expressions that refer to entities that do not exist. One example is this: Mary is in terror of werewolves. Some argue that this sentence cannot be translated into predicate logic. This may be seen as flaw in predicate logic. Against this, I argue in this paper that the problem is not predicate logic, but rather our commitments with the existence and nature of certain things. By revising some of these commitments, we can see that (...) predicate logic is perfectly capable to deal with the problematic sentences. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt a formalization of Descartes’ causal argument for the existence of God presented in the Third Meditation. By taking into account the philosophical setting of Descartes’ Meditations, I argue that the best logical theory to carry out the formalization is quantified modal logic where free logic is used for the first-order axioms. This fact is related to Descartes’ distinction between formal and objective reality which — to my mind — suggests both the adoption of modality (e.g. (...) true in formal vs true in objective reality) and the possibility of using empty names (i.e. names which lack reference in “formal reality”). After presenting the formal system and the reconstruction of Descartes’ proof, I will discuss some issues related to the philosophical import of the formalization, such as the understanding of rigid designation and lack of reference. I will argue that the formalization of Descartes’ argument has an intrinsic philosophical value for it sheds light on the structure of argument, its implicit difficulties, and the use of logic itself to understand the philosophical tradition. (shrink)

In this article I issue a challenge to philosophers engaged in constructing logical languages. Formal languages that have had a great influence on various areas of philosophy have ineffable statements that arise from metaphysical assumptions, thus limiting what we can do with them. I deal with two cases. The case of Frege known as “The paradox of the concept horse”, and that of Kripke that is not as famous as the Fregean problem, which I call “The necessary bearing of the (...) name.” I briefly develop each case and show that together they give us sufficient evidence of the limits of what we can do with logic when the formal systems employ unexamined metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

Logic is an excellent tool for reasoning about most philosophical topics, including logical issues themselves. Discussions about the validity or otherwise of certain principles have been widespread throughout the history of logic. This chapter exemplifies that with the analysis of the debate surrounding connexive logics. In connexive logics, certain principles involving mainly negation and implication hold good, whereas they are not valid in most well-known logics. Despite their intuitiveness, the connexive principles quickly lead to contradictions and even to triviality, i.e. (...) to the truth of every proposition. This chapter surveys the main arguments against the connexive principles and discusses some prospects for challenging those arguments and endorsing the connexive principles. (shrink)

This paper aims to reconstruct Kant’s derivation of the formula of the categorical imperative from its mere concept with the help of the resources of Searle’s and Vanderveken’s illocutionary logic. The main exegetical hypothesis is that the derivation envisaged by Kant consists in deriving the formula from the success conditions of categorical imperatives. These conditions, which are analogous to the success conditions of ordinary orders, contain restrictions for the successful construction of a system of moral laws that determine what the (...) content of the categorical imperative must be. (shrink)

Serious discourse is regularly opposed to fictional discourse. But what is serious discourse? Fictional discourse is ubiquitous and raises challenging questions to philosophical semantics. How to define serious discourse in a non-circular way? I use action theory and speech acts theory to propose an analysis of what a serious discourse is. The notion of expectation is central, as well as that of satisfaction: in serious discourse, we expect the satisfaction of illocutionary act and of perlocutionary plans.

The five modes of suspension of judgment outlined by Sextus Empiricus (HP XV 164-188) coordinate a complex argumentative strategy to prompt the general suspension of judgment. But modes (τρόπος) are general argument forms that can be deployed individually against the dogmatist, who is willing to accept that a certain answer to a question establishes how things really are. In this case, the aim of the modes is not the general suspension of judgment but the continuation of the investigation. I present (...) a deductive version of the mode of undecidable dissension that pinpoints some principles and assumptions the skeptics requires to run their arguments. (shrink)

The Liar Paradox is a classic argument that creates a contradiction by reflection on a sentence that attributes falsity to itself: ‘this sentence is false’. In our paper we will discuss the ways in which the Liar sentence (and its paradoxical argument) can be represented in first-order logic. The key to the representation is to use first-order logic to model a self-referential language. We will also discuss several related sentences, like the Liar cycles, the empirical versions of the Liar and (...) the Truth teller sentences. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a formal reconstruction of the classical argument for fatalism set forth by Aristotle in On Interpretation 9. From there, I expose two different formal solutions for avoiding the unwanted conclusion based on the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s rejection of the Principle of Bivalence: On the one hand, Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic and, on the other hand, supervaluation semantics. I also address some criticisms made against these two proposals. To finish, I remark on some alternative interpretations of (...) Aristotle’s intentions maintaining that the Stagirite philosopher rejected fatalism without abandoning the Principle of Bivalence. (shrink)

In this paper, an argument by Fisher (2004) is formalized and evaluated by means of some tools of classical logic. The argument presented by Fisher is a version of a piece of reasoning of great historical importance known as Pascal’s Wager. According to Fisher, “this is a fascinating piece of reasoning. It is complex and important and hard to handle”. Here is shown that, although formal logical analysis has limitations to evaluate everyday deductive arguments, it is perfectly capable to formalize (...) and evaluate Fisher’s argument. This should show that its usefulness is undeniable. (shrink)

In this article I will review McGee's famous counterexample to Modus Ponens and I will argue that it is not a real counterexample. I will claim that the problem lies in an infelicitous assertion of the second premise. As result of this diagnosis, I will suggest that when dealing with indicative conditionals a pragmatic theory is needed.

Using semantic and syntactic methods, we prove the compatibility of the truth of universally quantified slurring sentences of the form [all Ss are Ns] or [all Ss are S*s] with the existential core of moral and semantic innocence. We also show that proving their mutual compatibility by means of logic leaves untouched the moral problem tied to their material truth. Finally, we trace the problem back to the failure to signal in the spelling of the slurring term’s meaning that the (...) derogatory concept it denotes is not universally accepted. (shrink)

Providing some basic arguments and a historical context, I introduce the special volume What can we do in Philosophy using Logic? In this introduction, I discuss whether logic is useful for understanding, evaluating or building arguments in philosophy. I argue that, although there has been research supporting the idea that logic can serve as a philosophical instrument, this has not shown completely its utility. This is the reason I offer to discuss the importance of logic in philosophy, trying to show (...) that philosophers employ logic when they work with arguments and also obtain worth benefits by applying it. (shrink)

Sorites is the paradox which exploits the tolerance of vague language to get an absurd conclusion. The present note argues that, contrary to some other approaches, formalizing the antinomy does not serve the purpose of elucidation.

Belief Revision studies how rational agents change their beliefs in response to new information. The main objective of the works in this area is modelling these dynamics by defining some formal operators of change. This paper is an overview on the AGM model for revision, introducing some of the major questions that are addressed in this area of study.

I analyze an argument by Aquinas on God’s will mutability (Summa Theologica), which presupposes the collective predication on the term ‘man’. This explains why God repents of having made the collection of men, but not some men. The argument is valid, but its second premise and its conclusion are false.

Counterspeech is a kind of communicative resistance that tries to oppose, neutralize or remedy harmful speech. It can be defined as a form of non-coercive intervention that is, in some cases, available for any competent speaker. In recent years, some philosophers of language have focused on analyzing and proposing different varieties of in situ counterspeech in the hopes that their insights about communicative mechanisms can contribute to the identification of efficient strategies. This investigation is however still new and in programmatic (...) expansion. Our first goal then is to suggest a separation between two categories of counterspeech, confrontational and redirecting, adopting the impact of the intervention on the cooperation between participants as an organizational criterion. Secondly, we propose a type of confrontational counterspeech, which we call elucidation, and a type of redirecting counterspeech, namely, reframing. In cases of elucidation, the recalcitrant hearer makes a problematic aspect of what was said salient. This is a way of calling the bigot out for the commitments that he/she undertakes in virtue of choosing to use certain words. In reframing, the recalcitrant hearer tries to neutralize the effects of code words by replacing them for semantically equivalent alternatives that have different social meanings and connotations. For example, replacing ‘ideologia de gênero’ (‘gender ideology’) by ‘diversidade de gênero’ (‘gender diversity’), when accommodated, gives the hearer additional control over the discursive topics (the QUD) and the “terms of the conversation”. (shrink)