Ethical argumentation, objectivity, and bias

Abstract

On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of 'partiality,' bias. Still another view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative actions. My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality in relation to arguments of the kind presented in first-order ethical argumentation. Part of my discussion will focus on one type of theory of practical reasons; theories of this type are objective in as much as they hold that practical reasons are based on values that are objective in the sense of being mind-independent. I will refer to selected philosophers, including Wayne Sumner, Russ Shafer-Landau, Derek Parfit and Peter Singer.

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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Normative Ethics.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - Mind 109 (434):373-377.
The fundamentals of ethics.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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