Abstract

Locke's introduction of the word semeiotikē is well known. His claim that what he calls ideas are "signs or representations" of things outside of the mind has been interpreted as an early insight into the original cognitive role of signs. But the most unexpected claim to be made about Locke by a contemporary semiotician is that his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is formally inconsistent in what it says of ideas as signs, the claim of John Deely in several writings. For Locke, ideas are the first or direct objects of understanding, thought, and perception. What makes this inconsistent, Deely thinks, is that Locke also says ideas are signs. According to Deely, that is a contradiction and cannot be true. However, it is a reasonable principle that outright contradiction in a text is less likely than misinterpretation. This need not always be the case, of course, but the principle is sound, and there is a presumption against Deely's claim. I shall show that the presumption is not discharged by his arguments, and that the allegation of inconsistency in Locke's semiotic is implausible and unproven.