The Abyss of Contingency: Purposiveness and Contingency in Darwin and Kant

History of Philosophy Quarterly 20 (4):373 - 391 (2003)
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Abstract

Kant empahtically denied that living forms unfold according to a mechanical law. Yet if living nature were not law-like, natural science would be futile. The justification for a concept of purposiveness is to ensure “the lawfulness of the contingent” against the last exception. It was not until we learned to think about contingency without effacing it that natural history crossed the threshold of a science, Darwin leading the way. While his theory of evolution proposes mechanical explanations for a wide range of natural historical phenomena, the explanations do not overcome but actually presuppose life’s ultimate contingency.

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Barry Allen
McMaster University

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