History of Biology

Right after Philo’s about-face in Part 12 of the Dialogues, he gives an argument that the dispute between the theist and the atheist is merely verbal. Since everything is at least a little like everything else, the atheist must concede that the source of order is at least remotely like a human intellect, even if this source is something like a rotting turnip. This passage provides a major argument for dismissing Hume’s apparent avowals of theism in the Dialogues and elsewhere, (...) since Philo’s assertions are so loose as to let in a rotting turnip. The right reading of the passage is more interesting. The paragraph was written in 1776, right before Hume’s death. It’s thus one of the few philosophical texts written late enough to reflect his encounter with the French philosophes in the 1760s. We have good biographical evidence that Hume was criticized for being too much of a theist in France. The turnip is rotting not in order to make fun of the argument from design, but in order to make fun of d’Holbach's and Diderot's account of the origin of life, accounts that generalized dramatically from John Needham’s observations of nematodes in rotting wheat. In the rotting turnip paragraph, Hume is attempting to establish that the dispute between the theist and the atheist isn’t empirically tractable, that atheists will never outflank the apophatic theologian on the question of whether human minds are unlike God, and that if atheists are consistent with their analogical methods, they ought to be more open to the argument from design. (shrink)

I argue that Binkley et al. use causal process tracing in conjunction with a natural trajectory experiment and two natural snapshot experiments in their re-examination of the Kaibab. This shows that Aldo Leopold may have been right about trophic cascade in the Kaibab in the 1920s, i.e., that there are good reasons to think that a loss of predators led to a deer irruption which decreased aspen recruitment. Using the different cause-finding practices in combination can strengthen causal inferences and mitigate (...) the shortcomings that each practice has. (shrink)

To approach the issue of the recent proposal of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) put forth by Massimo Pigliucci and Gerd Müller, I suggest to consider the EES as a metascientific view: a description of what’s new in how evolutionary biology is carried out, not only a description of recently learned aspects of evolution. Knowing ‘what is it to do research’ in evolutionary biology, today versus yesterday, can aid training, research and career choices, establishment of relationships and collaborations, decision of (...) funding and research policies, in order to make the field advance for the better. After reviewing the concepts associated to the EES proposal (categorized for convenience as mechanisms, measures, fields, perspectives and applications), I show their transience, and sketch out ongoing disagreements about the EES. Then I examine the deep difficulties, i.e., the enormity and complexity of the covered field, affecting the achievement of trusted metascientific views; the insufficiency of conceptual analysis to capture the substance of scientific research; the entanglement between empirical and metascientific concepts, between multiple chronologies, and between descriptive and normative intentions; and the ineliminable stakeholding of any reviewer involved in the reviewed field. I propose that disciplines such as scientometrics, ethnography, sociology, economics and history, combined with conceptual analysis, inspire a more rigorous approach to the evolutionary biology scientific community, more grounded and shared, confirming or transforming claims for ‘synthesis’ while preserving their maintenance goals. (shrink)

First, we will address the unnecessary link between symbio-studies and Gaia, asking for the historical and epistemological reasons why they become associated. In particular, we contend that the association is mediated by the common interest in large-scale physico-chemical and biochemical patterns, rather than by an emphasis on harmony, equilibrium, and cooperation (Visvader 1992). Second, we will ask what Gaia is in a metatheoretical sense: is it a scientific hypothesis, a theory, a metaphor, an inspired invention, or a resurgence of antiscientific (...) attitude? After examining some alternatives that show the importance of metatheorizing, we will define Gaia a ‘scientific narrative’, this being a technical term in a sketchy metatheory. Let us just say, for now, that by narrative we don’t mean fairytale or artistic fiction, but rather a way of telling the history of our planet. We are not going to answer the question whether or not we should ban Gaia from any scientific discourse, nor the question how symbio-students should deal with the traditional association of their field with Gaia. But we hope to frame the dilemma in which symbio-students and the scientific community at large are held in a better way than simply insisting on classic demarcations between science and non-science. (shrink)

We have been accustomed at least since Kant and mainstream history of philosophy to distinguish between the ‘mechanical’ and the ‘teleological’; between a fully mechanistic, quantitative science of Nature exemplified by Newton and a teleological, qualitative approach to living beings ultimately expressed in the concept of ‘organism’ – a purposive entity, or at least an entity possessed of functions. The beauty of this distinction is that it seems to make intuitive sense and to map onto historical and conceptual constellations in (...) medicine, physiology and the related natural -philosophical discussions on the status of the body versus that of the machine. In this presentation I argue that the distinction between mechanism and teleology is imprecise and flawed, on the basis of a series of examples: the presence of ‘functional’ or ‘purposive’ features even in Cartesian physiology; work such as that of Richard Lower’s on animal respiration; the fact that the model of the ‘body-machine’ is not at all a mechanistic reduction of organismic properties to basic physical properties but on the contrary a way of emphasizing the uniqueness of organic life; and the concept of ‘animal economy’ in vitalist medical theory, which I present as a kind of ‘teleo-mechanistic’ concept of organism – neither mechanical nor teleological. (shrink)

The species of vitalism discussed here, to immediately rule out two possible misconceptions, is neither the feverish cosa mentale found in ruminations on ‘biopolitics’ and fascism – where it alternates quickly between being a form of evil and a form of resistance, with hardly any textual or conceptual material to discuss – nor the opaque, and less-known form in which it exists in the worlds of ‘Theory’ in the humanities, perhaps closely related to the cognate, ‘materiality’. Rather, vitalism here is (...) a malleable construct, often with a poisonous reputation, hovering in the realms of the philosophy of biology, the history of medicine, and the scientific background of the Radical Enlightenment. This is a more vital vitalism, or at least a more ‘biologistic’, ‘embodied’, medicalized vitalism. I first distinguish between what I would call ‘substantival’ and ‘functional’ forms of vitalism, as applied to the eighteenth century. Substantival vitalism presupposes the existence of something like a vital force which either plays a causal role in the natural world as studied by scientific means, or remains a kind of hovering, extra-causal entity. Functional vitalism tends to operate ‘post facto’, from the existence of living bodies to the desire to find explanatory models that will do justice to their uniquely ‘vital’ properties in a way that fully mechanistic models cannot. I discuss some representative figures of the Montpellier school as being functional rather than substantival vitalists. A second point concerns the reprisal of vitalism in ‘late modernity’; from Hans Driesch to Georges Canguilhem. I suggest that in addition to the substantival and functional varieties, we then encounter a third, more existential form of vitalism, articulated by Canguilhem, in which vitalism is a kind of attitude towards Life. All of this, I hope, argues for a form of vitalism which is neither tedious scientism nor dangerous political rhetoric of health and sickness; instead, a vitalism with its own discreet charm. (shrink)

I praise Franklin's full descriptions of important and exemplary experiments, and wish that he had said more about why they are exemplary.

What kinds of norms constrain mechanistic discovery and explanation? In the mechanistic literature, the norms for good explanations are directly derived from answers to the metaphysical question of what explanations are. Prominent mechanistic accounts thus emphasize either ontic or epistemic norms. Still, mechanistic philosophers on both sides agree that there is no sharp distinction between the processes of discovery and explanation. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that ontic and epistemic accounts of explanation will be accompanied by ontic and epistemic (...) accounts of discovery, respectively. As we will show here, however, recent discovery accounts implicitly rely on both ontic and epistemic norms to characterize the discovery process. In this paper, we develop an account that makes explicit that, and how, ontic and epistemic norms work together throughout the discovery process. By describing mechanism discovery as a process of pattern recognition we demonstrate that scientists have to develop epistemic activities to distinguish a pattern from its background. Furthermore, they have to determine which epistemic activities successfully describe how the pattern is implemented by identifying the pattern’s components. Our approach reveals that ontic and epistemic norms are equally important in mechanism discovery. (shrink)

Prosper Lucas (1808–1885) is a unique figure in the history of psychiatric genetics. A physician-alienist, he authored one of the most important books on human genetics in the mid-19th century cited frequently by Darwin: the 1,500 page treatise—Philosophical and Physiological Treatise on Natural Heredity (1847–1850). This book contained a novel theory of the nature of inheritance and a detailed review of the heredity of a range of human traits and disorders, including various forms of insanity. Lucas postulated four forms of (...) heredity (direct, crossed, indirect, and atavistic), supported the importance of hereditary factors in insanity, accepted the inheritance of acquired characteristics, considered it important to examine both ancestors and collateral relatives, and recognized that heredity could influence both primary insanity and insanity secondary to other medical conditions. He reviewed the then available literature on most major forms of insanity including separate sections on hallucinations and suicidal monomania. The literature consisted of case reports of unusual families with high concentrations of illness. Lucas advocated for the homogeneity of transmission of forms of illness in families but recognized that—just as the form of illness could evolve within individuals over time—it could change forms when transmitted between relatives. (shrink)

The aim of this collection is to create a curated set of key German source texts from the eighteenth-century life sciences devoted to theories of generation, heredity, and race. The criteria for inclusion stem from our sense that there is an argument to be made for connecting three domains of inquiry that have heretofore remained mostly distinct in both their presentation and scholarly analysis: i) life science debates regarding generation and embryogenesis, ii) emerging philosophical and anthropological theories regarding the nature (...) of racial typology, and iii) the role of empire in supplying the ethnographic materials in use as evidence for the various investigations and theories being proposed. The Key Texts volume thus has three sections. The first section is devoted to selections from theorists working to create an account of the processes guiding generation and embryogenetic development. Given that at the time there were few ways to definitively prove that babies received contributions from both parents in their creation, mixed-race children became increasingly valuable sources of evidence for those insisting on joint inheritance. Although this sets up the second section of the volume—since one can trace a clear facet of racial biometric science out of this original set of enquiries—the bulk of section two is devoted to the many different accounts created at the time to understand and delineate racial differences. The third section is focused on ‘race and empire’ in order to situate the scientific texts of the previous sections in their socio-historical context. By including these pieces, it is our aim to remind readers that scientific curiosity over the nature and origin of racial diversity did not develop in a vacuum but indeed existed in full knowledge of the exploitation and dispossession of human beings. The ‘materials’ for this research program were in many cases either directly taken from black and brown human beings caught up in Europe’s colonial projects or were provided by the data gathered during large-scale voyages of exploration. The material basis of this type of research was rarely reflected upon by any of the theorists in sections one and two of the volume, a fact that has led many historians of science to focus on these theories without attention to the socio-historical context; we are deliberately trying to avoid this and indeed to deepen our own readers’ appreciation of the fact. (shrink)

This article aims to compare notions of progress and evolution in the social theories of Freud and Spencer. It argues 1) that the two authors had similarly complex theories that contained mixed elements of positivism and teleology; 2) In its positivist elements, both authors made use of unified natural laws and, in its teleological aspect, they made use of notions of final cause in that progress and the evolution of civilization was understood as a linear path of progressive development with (...) an aim, 3) that that aim was both ethno- as well as - in Freud?s case in particular? self-centric and, finally, 4) that such understanding of natural law led to ethical commitments to the individual. (shrink)

There is at present uneasiness about the conceptual basis of genetics. The gene concept has become blurred and there are problems with the distinction between genotype and phenotype. In the present paper I go back to their role in the creation of modern genetics in the early twentieth century. The terms were introduced by the Danish botanist and geneticist Wilhelm Johannsen in his big textbook of 1909. Historical accounts usually concentrate on this book and his 1911 paper “The Genotype Conception (...) of Heredity.” His bean selection experiment of 1900–1903 is generally assumed to be the source of his genotype theory. The present paper examines the scientific context and meaning of this experiment, how it was received, and how the genotype theory became securely established by the early 1910s. I argue in conclusion that the genotype/phenotype distinction, which provides the empirical basis for Johannsen's gene, was scientifically well founded when introduced and still is. Keith Baverstock's criticism does not consider the force of the bean selection experiment at the time and as a paradigm for following investigations of heredity. (shrink)

There is at present uneasiness about the conceptual basis of genetics. The gene concept has become blurred and there are problems with the distinction between genotype and phenotype. In the present paper I go back to their role in the creation of modern genetics in the early twentieth century. The terms were introduced by the Danish botanist and geneticist Wilhelm Johannsen in his big textbook of 1909. Historical accounts usually concentrate on this book and his 1911 paper “The Genotype Conception (...) of Heredity.” His bean selection experiment of 1900–1903 is generally assumed to be the source of his genotype theory. The present paper examines the scientific context and meaning of this experiment, how it was received, and how the genotype theory became securely established by the early 1910s. I argue in conclusion that the genotype/phenotype distinction, which provides the empirical basis for Johannsen's gene, was scientifically well founded when introduced and still is. Keith Baverstock's criticism does not consider the force of the bean selection experiment at the time and as a paradigm for following investigations of heredity. (shrink)

Grice, Lewis, and Skyrms proposed similar distinctions between kinds of meaning. The meaning of terms in human language, as Lewis and Skyrms had it, is ‘conventional’. Skyrms presented models showing how it is possible for conventional meaning to evolve in a population without reliance on pre-existing meaning. But one might think of conventionality as coming in degrees, based on whether the evolutionary process begins with ‘natural saliences’. We propose a theory of natural salience and several extensions of Skyrms’s models to (...) capture this notion. These models reveal that natural saliences can hinder, as well as help, the evolution of language. (shrink)

It has been over 60 years since Ernst Mayr famously argued for the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. In the following decades, Mayr’s proximate-ultimate distinction was well received within evolutionary biology and widely regarded as a major contribution to the philosophy of biology. Despite its enormous influence, there has been a persistent controversy on the distinction. It has been argued that the distinction is untenable. In addition, there have been complaints about the pragmatic value of the distinction (...) in biological research. Some even suggest that the distinction should better be abandoned. In contrast, Mayr had consistently maintained the significance of the proximate-ultimate distinction in biology. There are also other attempts to defend the distinction. The paper examines the debate by taking an integrated History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) approach and argues for a functional approach to causal concepts in scientific practice. (shrink)

Since it was inspired by Bernard and developed and named by Cannon, the conceptof homeostasis has been invoked by many as the central theoretical framework for physiology. Ithas also been the target of numerous criticisms that have elicited the introduction of a plethoraof alternative concepts. We argue that many of the criticisms actually target the more restrictiveaccount of homeostasis advanced by the cyberneticists. What was crucial to Bernard and Cannonwas a focus on the maintenance of the organism as the goal (...) of physiological regulation. We analysehow Bernard’s and Cannon’s broad conception of what was required to maintain the organismwas narrowed to negative feedback, characterized in terms of setpoints, by the cyberneticistsand demonstrate how many of the alternative concepts challenge the role of setpoints – treatingthem as variable in light of circumstances or in anticipation of future circumstances, or asdispensable altogether. To support our analysis, we draw on the experimental and theoreticalwork on thermoregulation, a phenomenon that has been considered as a paradigmatic example ofhomeostasis and has been a common focus of those advancing alternative concepts. To integratethe insights advanced by the original proponents of homeostasis and the theorists proposingreplacement notions we advance a framework in which regulation is viewed from the perspectiveof maintaining the organism. (shrink)

In 1861 the physiologist Ernst Brücke (1819–1892) published “The Elementary Organisms,” calling for a major reform of the definition of the animal cell. An annotated English translation of Brücke’s essay is presented here for the first time, with additional references to works cited by Brücke. Figures referenced by Brücke but not included in his original essay are also provided. I have also presented an introductory essay to my translation that provides background on Brücke and his arguments: “The Schema and Organization (...) of the Cell,” doi:10.1007/s10739-024-09774-8, in this same issue of the Journal of the History of Biology. (shrink)

According to the standard formulation, natural selection requires variation, differential fitness, and heritability. I argue that this formulation is inadequate because it fails to distinguish natural selection from artificial selection, intelligent design, forward-looking orthogenetic selection, and adaptation via the selection of nonrandom variation. I suggest adding a _no teleology_ condition. The no teleology condition says that the evolutionary process is not guided toward an endpoint represented in the mind of an agent, variation is produced randomly with respect to adaptation, and (...) selection pressures are not forward looking. (shrink)

My dissertation defends a non-mechanistic interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of nature. Inspired by the picture of nature in the Critique of Pure Reason and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, most readers align Kant with Early Modern mechanists, who claim that we can know that the internally purposive form of causality characteristic of organisms has no place in nature. To these mechanistic readers, Kant banishes internal purposiveness from nature. To moderate mechanistic interpreters, because we cannot know whether there are internally purposive (...) things in nature and we can demonstrate that mechanism applies to nature, Kant pushes us to believe that any seemingly internally purposive natural products will eventually be explained in mechanistic terms. To strong mechanistic interpreters, Kant gives us the tools to know that there is no room for the special kind of teleology organisms exhibit in nature. My non-mechanistic interpretation rejects this trend by arguing that Kant urges us to believe that the internally purposive activity characteristic of organisms exists in nature. Belief in this context is a firm, positive, and voluntary attitude that aligns with and serves a subject’s interests and ends, and that has implications for the subject’s rational action, assertion, and deliberation. Kant’s stated goal in the third Critique is to bridge the gulf between freedom and nature. My non-mechanistic interpretation offers a new account of how Kant promises to construct this bridge. (shrink)

Eighteenth-century German writers with broad interests in natural history, and in particular, in the kind of ethnographic reports typically included in travel and expedition narratives, had to be able to access and read the original reports or they had to work with translations. The translators of these reports were, moreover, typically forced more than usual into the role of interpreter. This was especially the case when it came to accounts wherein vocabulary did not exist or was at least not settled, (...) and more importantly where scientific understanding was uncertain or altogether lacking, a situation that could only make the creation of semantic categories all the more significant. With this state of affairs in mind, this essay concentrates on Immanuel Kant’s work to develop a specialised racial vocabulary, and does so in a manner that reveals the importance of Buffon’s account of variation as a resource for Kant, even as Kant sought to position the new vocabulary as an improved template for transforming taxonomy or Naturbeschreibung into a genuine historical science or Naturgeschichte. (shrink)

Edward Stuart Russell (1887–1954) was a central figure in the philosophy of biology during the first half of the twentieth century. Although he worked as a government fisheries scientist for much of his life, he still managed to establish himself as one of the most prominent biological theorists of his time. The views he developed, which were antireductionistic, organism-centred, and teleological, challenged the prevailing mechanistic orthodoxy. His book 'The Interpretation of Development and Heredity' (1930) provides one of themost incisive critiques (...) of the chromosomal theory of the gene ever published, and it has acquired a renewed relevance in light of recent empirical findings. Russell’s interest in the theoretical problems of biology is as much historical as philosophical, and many of his works, particularly his first book 'Form and Function' (1916), are still regarded today as landmark contributions to the history of biological thought. (shrink)

The concept of “progress” in evolutionary theory and its relationship to a putative notion of “Progress” in a global, normatively loaded sense of “change for the better” have been the subject of debate since Darwin admonished himself in a marginal note to avoid using the terms ‘higher’ and ‘lower.’ While an increase in some kind of complexity in the natural world might seem self-evident, efforts to explicate this trend meet notorious philosophical difficulties. Numerous historians pin the Modern Synthesis as a (...) pivotal moment in this history; Michael Ruse even provocatively hypothesizes that Ernst Mayr and other “architects” of the Synthesis worked actively to eliminate Progress from evolutionary biology’s scientific purview. I evaluate these claims here with a textual analysis of the journals Evolution and Proceedings of the Royal Society B (a corpus of 27,762 documents), using a dynamic topic modeling approach to track the fate of the term ‘progress’ across the Modern Synthesis. The claim that this term declines in importance for evolutionary theorizing over this period can, indeed, be supported; more tentative evidence is also provided that the discussion of ‘progress’ is largely absent from the British context, emphasizing the role of American paleontology in the rise and fall of ‘progress’ in 20th-century evolutionary biology. (shrink)

Davide Serpico describes his research at the Special Collection dedicated to the distinguished population geneticist John R. G. Turner at the University of Leeds’ Library.

This paper investigates conceptions of explanation, teleology, and analogy in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832). Richards (2000, 2002) and Zammito (2006, 2012, 2018) have argued that Kant’s philosophy provided an obstacle for the project of establishing biology as a proper science around 1800. By contrast, Russell (1916), Outram (1986), and Huneman (2006, 2008) have argued, similar to suggestions from Lenoir (1989), that Kant’s philosophy influenced the influential naturalist Georges Cuvier. In this article, I wish to (...) expand on and further the work of Russell, Outram, and Huneman by adopting a novel perspective on Cuvier and considering (a) the similar conceptions of proper science and explanation of Kant and Cuvier, and (b) the similar conceptions of the role of teleology and analogy in the works of Kant and Cuvier. The similarities between Kant and Cuvier show, contrary to the interpretation of Richards and Zammito, that some of Kant’s philosophical ideas, whether they derived from him or not, were fruitfully applied by some life scientists who wished to transform life sciences into proper sciences around 1800. However, I also show that Cuvier, in contrast to Kant, had a workable strategy for transforming the life sciences into proper sciences, and that he departed from Kant’s philosophy of science in crucial respects. (shrink)

Bu kitap sizi, Antik yazarlarca kapısı aralanan ve Orta Çağ filozoflarınca belirli bir yetkinlik düzeyine ulaştırılan bir bilimle tanıştıracak: Bitkilerin bilimi. Sanki bir ritüelin parçası gibi sürekli tekrar edilmesi gereken bir cümle, 3 farklı dilde gözler önündedir: -/- ان الحياة موجودة في الحيوان والنبات Vita et in animalibus et in plantis esse deprehensa est. Yaşam, hayvanlarda ve bitkilerde mevcuttur. -/- Aristoteles’e göre bitkilerde zihnî herhangi bir melekenin bulunmadığı, bitkilerin yalnızca beslenme, büyüme, gelişme ve üreme gibi yetilerle donandığı görülür. Bu sayılan (...) yetiler de herhangi bir öznellikten azade, edilgin, mekanik süreçlerdir. Esasında Aristoteles’in bitki tasarımı, bitkilere atfedilebilecek en ufak bir iradi ya da ihtiyari hareketin, rasyonel herhangi bir ilkenin ayıklanması suretiyle bitkisel fenomenlerin yalın, basit, pasif olduklarının ikrarıdır. Çünkü bitkilere layık gördüğü nebati nefs ya da bitkisel canlılık ancak ve ancak bu kadarına kadir ve ancak bu kadarını kabildir. -/- Gayriinsani organizmaların tasnifine dönük biyoçeşitlilik çalışmalarından elde edilen veriler, büyük resmi görmek ve göstermek bakımından gerekli ve faydalıdır. Biyosferin ve hatta gezegenin selameti açısından bakterilerin, mantarların ve hayvanların neden önemli oldukları da tartışmaya kapalıdır. Ancak şu soru hayati önemdedir: Gerek biyokütleleri gerek insanın günlük hayatına giren tür sayıları ve gerek gerçek hayatta insanın hayatını idame etme maksadıyla kurduğu türlü ilişkilerde maddi kaynak olmaları bakımından, bitkiler âleminin tüm bireylerinin gezegende yaşamın süregitmesi adına belki de ilk sırada sayılması gereken canlılar topluluğu olduğunu anlamamız için acaba kıyamet günü mü beklenmektedir? -/- Şamlı Nikolaos’un Aristoteles’ten ilham alarak dile getirdiği, önce İbn Sînâ, ardından İbn Bâcce tarafından yorumlanmış kült bir eserdir Kitâbu’n-Nebât. Bu silsileden günümüze intikal eden metinlerin Arapça ve Latince orijinalleriyle Türkçe tercümeleri belirli bir amaç dâhilinde fiziksel dünyanın bir parçası olan bitkisel fenomenleri sistematik olarak incelemiş, gözlemlemiş, kendi dönemlerindeki paradigma içerisinde nedensellik bağı kurarak açıklamaya çalışmış filozofların metinleridir. Dolayısıyla Antik ve Orta Çağ’daki bilginlerin bitkiler üzerindeki entelektüel emeklerini bilim olarak adlandırmamız ve bu eserleri bilim tarihi alanında ele almamız bir yöntem, bir yoldur. Hatta bitki bilimi felsefesi için bitki bilimi tarihine bakmamız gerektiğini gösteren belki de en doğru yol budur. (shrink)

This article presents a comparative analysis of the views on plants in Ps. Aristotle namely Nicolaos of Damascus and Avicenna, examining the distinct philosophical frameworks each thinker employs to understand the nature of plants. The representative work of the Aristotelian tradition, De Plantis, offers a naturalistic perspective, focusing on biological processes such as growth, nourishment, and reproduction. (T)his approach is empirical, categorizing plants as distinct from animals but still subject to similar material causes within the natural order. The Aristotelian framework, (...) emphasizing observable processes, laid the foundation for subsequent studies in plant biology. In contrast, Avicenna builds upon Aristotelian ideas, introducing a metaphysical dimension. In his Kitab al-Nabat, Avicenna posits the existence of the “vegetative soul” as a guiding principle that governs plant growth, while also reflecting divine intelligence and cosmic order. Avicenna’s metaphysical and theological insights distinguish his approach from Aristotelian naturalism, positioning plants as both biological entities and manifestations of divine wisdom. This article highlights how the intellectual development of botany and the history of philosophy has been shaped by the synthesis of Aristotelian empirical naturalism and Avicenna’s metaphysical synthesis. The comparison reveals the continued relevance of these two perspectives in contemporary debates in the philosophy of biology, particularly in reconciling material causality with higher principles of existence. (shrink)

This essay argues for the importance of an organismic perspective in plant biology and considers some of its implications. These include an increased attention to plant-environment interaction and an emphasis on integrated approaches. Furthermore, this essay contextualizes the increased emphasis on the concept of organism in recent years and places the concept in a longer history. Recent developments in biology and worsening environmental crises have led researchers to study plant responses to changing environments with whole plant approaches that situate plants (...) in their environments, emphasizing the intricate and dynamic interaction between them. This renewed attention to the organism recalls the debates of the early twentieth century, when organicism was one of the three main frameworks in biology (along with vitalism and mechanism). Some scholars see this renewed importance today as a “return” of this earlier period. This essay argues that including insights from plant biology will benefit philosophy of biology research that examines the concept of organism and organicism now and in earlier periods. A comprehensive account of the concept of organism should involve a botanical conception of the organism as well as a zoological one (which is more frequently considered). Although this essay does not aim to present a conceptual analysis, it presents examples of how an organismic perspective can be useful for understanding concepts (such as phenotype, stress, etc.) and research processes (such as experiment set-ups, data processes, etc.) in plant biology. Philosophy of biology investigations that aim at a comprehensive understanding of the concept of organism can benefit greatly from examinations of cases in plant biology, both now and in the past. (shrink)

For the last ten years, within molecular life sciences, the reproducibility crisis discourse has been embodied as a crisis of trust in scientific images. Beyond the contentious perception of “questionable research practices” associated with a digital turn in the production of images, this paper highlights the transformations of gel electrophoresis as a family of experimental techniques. Our aim is to analyze the evolving epistemic status of generated images and its connection with a crisis of trust in images within that field.From (...) the 1980s to the 2000s, we identify two key innovations (precast gels and gel docs) leading to a “two‐tiered” gel electrophoresis with different standardization procedures, different epistemic statuses of the produced images and different ways of generating (dis)trust in images. The first tier, exemplified by differential gel electrophoresis (DIGE), is characterized by specialized devices processing images as quantitative data. The second tier, exemplified by polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (PAGE), is described as a routine technique making use of image as qualitative “virtual witnessing.” The difference between these two tiers is particularly apparent in the ways images are processed, even though both tiers involve image digitization. Our account thus highlights different views on reproducibility within the two tiers. Comparability of images is insisted upon in the first tier while traceability is expected in the second tier. It is striking that these differences occur not only within the same scientific field, but even within the same family of experimental techniques. In the second tier, digitization entails distrust, whereas it implies a collective sentiment of trust in the first tier. (shrink)

The type-level abstraction is a formal way to represent molecular structures in biological practice. Graphical representations of molecular structures of biological objects are also used to identify functional processes of things. This paper will reveal that category theory is a formal mathematical language not only to visualize molecular structures of biological objects as type-level abstraction formally but also to understand how to infer biological functions from the molecular structures of biological objects. Category theory is a toolkit to understand biological knowledge (...) at the type-level formally, not individual token-level, as well as typical heuristic strategies in molecular biology. (shrink)

Although it has not been much noticed, reproduction is the central theme of François Jacob’s important history of biology, La logique du vivant (The Logic of Life). In a book ostensibly devoted to heredity, this molecular biologist had reproduction integrate levels of organization from organisms to molecules and play a major role in each historical transition between them, not just in the influential argument for a shift “from generation to reproduction.” Moreover, I claim, La logique was the first general history (...) of (research on) reproduction. Earlier histories had tackled only aspects of generation and reproduction; none historicized the latter. Jacob’s innovation came out of the rising prominence of reproduction in neo-Darwinist studies of populations and in his own field, the cellular genetics of bacteria and their viruses, and engagement with history and philosophy of science. The discovery of bacterial “sex” enabled microbial genetics but, ironically, led Jacob to a sexless concept of reproduction. This approach molded a history that reached across the living world but slighted sex and the complexities of reproduction in multicellular organisms. Readers can learn from its strength and limitations. (shrink)