The general concept of antinomicity

Foundations of Science 3 (2):429-465 (1998)
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Abstract

Antinomicity is not necessarily dependent on negation; there is a more general conception of antinomicity based on the fundamental idea of opposition. To study this fact is indispensable to show first that truth and falsity are independent of assertion and negation. Then it can be seen that antinomies can be found everywhere, and that some single categories are in intrinsic opposition with themselves while others are opposed to one another in pairs. An antinomic ‘manifesto’ concludes the work

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References found in this work

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Oxford: Macmillan. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees & G. H. von Wright.
Russell's Mathematical Logic.Kurt Gödel - 1944 - In The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Northwestern University Press. pp. 123-154.
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.Bertrand Russell - 1940 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 18 (2):233-233.
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.Bertrand Russell - 1942 - Philosophy 17 (65):82-85.
Logic of antinomies.F. G. Asenjo & J. Tamburino - 1975 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 16 (1):17-44.

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