Antinomicity is not necessarily dependent on negation; there is a more general conception of antinomicity based on the fundamental idea of opposition. To study this fact is indispensable to show first that truth and falsity are independent of assertion and negation. Then it can be seen that antinomies can be found everywhere, and that some single categories are in intrinsic opposition with themselves while others are opposed to one another in pairs. An antinomic ‘manifesto’ concludes the work.

Scholars who consider that the Transcendental Analytic contains the core of what Kant calls ‘transcendental idealism’ are mistaken. Indeed, Kant’s transcendental idealism of space, time and spatiotemporal objects is sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and does not depend on complementary claims made later on in the Critique. This does not mean, however, that we are allowed to subscribe to the so-called separability-thesis, which states that we can endorse Kant's views in the Transcendental Logic without endorsing the results of the (...) expositions and arguments laid out in the Aesthetic. Nor does it mean that the Aesthetic contains the only proof for transcendental idealism. Indeed, as Kant himself explicitly recognizes, the antinomies provide the premise for an indirect or mediate proof of his position with respect to the nature of space and time. First, I analyze Kant’s argument for the claim that the production of transcendental illusion is inherent to the function of human reasoning, and therefore inevitable. I then follow the presuppositions and the argumentation of the mediate proof of transcendental idealism and argue that it has a more general validity than could be assumed on the basis of Kant’s text, because it is in its essence independent from the particular determinations of the cosmological idea in the form of the four antinomies. Indeed, as I argue, the nature of reason itself and the content of the general cosmological idea suffice as elements for a mediate proof. Thus, I claim that transcendental idealism can be mediately established on the basis of the general antinomical relation between transcendental realism and material idealism, without any requirement to refer to the particular realisations of this antagonism as they are presented in the four antinomies. If the argument is correct, it shows that the mediate proof of transcendental idealism does not depend on a sympathetic account of the antinomies and is not automatically invalidated if the proofs of thesis and antithesis are considered unconvincing. (shrink)

The generalizing methods of philosophies achieve a popularity for a period of time, which may be extended or brief, during which their proponents and even their opponents may regard them as the cognitive presuppositions for the epoch. The same effect is achieved by the more exact scientific methodologies as they find fame outside the scientific circle and are treated by some as omnipotent discoveries with powers to heal all other disciplines which may be ailing. The limping disciplines, generally classified among (...) the humanities and discerned to be in trouble since the nineteenth century, are understandably envious of the seemingly invincible, favored scientific children of our time. For our era tends to worship quantifiable data and the principles and instruments for measuring and conceptualizing it. Thus semiotics and information theory, in hopes of acquiring the status of the sciences, have led aesthetic inquiry toward the currently popular scientism; but the limited cognitive scope of this methodology has not been recognized. Sociology of knowledge, however, forewarns us of the winds of fashion on cognitive paradigms. Where the inherent explanatory scope of a doctrine, system, or method is less than is believed according to the prevailing sociological patterns, a correction will eventually set in. And an important factor in overcoming the para-religious claims will be, precisely, the fundamental antinomical tendency of the human mind. Stefan Morawski, Research Professor at the Institute of Arts of the Polish Academy of Sciences, has lectured throughout the United States and is currently teaching at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich. His works have appeared in a variety of languages: Marxism and Aesthetics: History of Ideas has been published in Spanish and Italian; Absolute and Form, in Polish, Italian, and French; and, in English, Inquiries into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics. (shrink)

[[[ (Here only the chapters 3 – 8, see *** ) First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). ]]] The central question here is that about the (...) actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). (shrink)

This paper suggests a general interpretative strategy for reading Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason namely, as an attempt to find a middle ground between what Kant considers two forms of excess: the appeal to a transcendent conception of God and the denial of any claim that presupposes God’s existence. To make my case, I use the example of two contemporary thinkers (Wolterstorff and Rorty) and trace their dispute to the antinomic character of “religious reason.” Putting things this (...) way underscores the originality of Kant’s view: the wake-up call of an antinomy serves us to motivate Kant’s solution to the problem raised by dogmatic religious claims, as well as to capture what is the distinctive ethical function he reserved for religion in the critical system, i.e., the support of the non-individualistic virtues involved in shared undertakings and common pursuits. Throughout the discussion, I show the importance that radical evil had in Kant’s “constructing” the idea of God. (shrink)

The present article purports to answer the old question of whether the concept (and the method) of Hegelian dialectic can be clarified. Three arguments are advanced in defence of the claim that Hegel's conception is not in fact intelligible. The first argument shows that dialectical negation leads to an infinite regress. The second argument analyses Hegel's claim that the dialectical method yields a positive result and demonstrates that this claim remains completely unsubstantiated and unsubstantiable. The third argument comes to the (...) conclusion that Hegelian dialectic cannot pretend to be an acceptable explication of the “intuitive” understanding of negation. An APPENDIX examines critically a new attempt by D. Wandschneider of reconstructing the first steps of Hegelian dialectical logic by displaying “antinomic structures” and by employing (at least to a limited extent) the techniques of formal logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:25. HUME'S ANTINOMIES I There are many contradictions in Hume. So much is readily admitted by all Hume scholars. But there is little agreement on what these contradictions show about Hume's thought in general. Many interpretations are based upon the view that Hume's contradictions are signs of his carelessness or lack of thoroughness. He is seen either as having lost all interest in giving a comprehensive or consistent (...) account of human nature or as not having pushed far enough his analysis of the philosophical problems facing him. Other interpretations suggest that Hume, the "skeptic," has recklessly introduced these contradictions in order to confuse us. He is perhaps not altogether serious and is laughing at those who take too serious a view of the "science" of metaphysics and his own contribution 2 to it. Others again argue that the contradictions (or some fundamental class of them) are the consequence of Hume's philosophical presuppositions or his psychological method. Given his particular beliefs and his method, these contradictions had to arise with logical necessity. However, the general opinion seems to be that, if Hume is not to be dismissed as a merely negative skeptic whose philosophy is of no great consequence, he needs to be excused or defended, i.e. his contradictions, which are 4 seen as "inconsistencies," have to be explained away. His discussions of the self, causality, substance, or the relationship of reason and the passions must be, and — it is believed — can be shown not to be contradictory, if all the relevant factors are considered. However, reconstructions of Hume's analysis of the self or causality, for instance, which involve the explaining away of contradictions soon find themselves in a rather peculiar quandary, since they also have to show that Hume's own admissions of the contradictory nature of his analysis is mistaken. Such "defenses" issue only in other 26. accusations, namely that Hume, in addition to not having expressed himself very clearly in his writings, failed to understand them himself when he referred back to them. If only for this reason, I think that interpretations which involve an explaining away or minimizing of the contradictions in Hume are suspect. It is my opinion that Hume needs no such defenses or excuses -- at least not in so far as the most important contradictions are concerned. On the contrary, I believe that Hume can be understood properly, only if we take full account of them. I want in this paper to argue that there is in Hume a fundamental class of contradictions which he believed were neither accidental nor created by his analysis, but were essential characteristics of the human mind. The contradictions uncovered by his analysis can be understood only if they are recognised as one aspect of a more complex problematic. They must have a "deeper" significance for Hume because they are the symptoms of the infirmities... which are common to human nature (T265). These are 'Hume's 7 "antinomies. " In this analysis I have allowed myself to be guided by a more or less Kantian conception of "antinomy" and "antinomical." In fact, I believe that there is a definite similarity between Kant's doctrine of the "Antinomy of Pure Reason" and Hume's "operations" which are equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some circumstances... directly contrary (T266). But the present paper is not so much a sustained comparison of Hume and Kant in this regard as it is an attempt to elucidate the g peculiar nature of several contradictions in Hume. For I believe that, if we have a better understanding of the nature of these contradictions, we will also be able to say something more definite about Hume's theory of mental activity and certain aspects of the relationship of skepticism and naturalism (or: Pyrrhonism and Newtonianism, destructive and constructive side, negative and positive phase, etc.) in his thought. To this end, I shall first 27. explain what I mean by "antinomy" here. Secondly, I shall show in what sense Hume was aware of having discovered something very much like an antinomical dimension in human nature, and, finally, I shall offer some suggestions as to the relevance of this... (shrink)

Relational reasoning is a higher-order executive function that involves the ability to perceive meaningful patterns within a body of seemingly unrelated information. In this study, the ability of 749 fourth (Mage= 10), sixth (Mage= 12), eighth (Mage= 14), and tenth graders (Mage= 16) to identify meaningful relational patterns was investigated. This general cognitive ability was assessed by means of the Test of Relational Reasoning-Junior (TORRjr), a 32-item measure organized into four 8-item scales that assess analogical, anomalous, antinomous, and antithetical (...) reasoning. Students’ performance on the TORRjr was analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis, measurement invariance test, and non-parametric median-based analyses. The confirmatory factor analysis supported that the higher-order factor model was the best fit for the TORRjr data for the Korean students. The measurement was determined to be invariant by gender but variant across grade levels. The non-parametric analysis resulted in an asymptotic (a constant increasing up to grade 6 and then a level off witnessed from grades 8 to 10) development pattern in overall relational reasoning across the grades. In comparison to analogy and anomaly, antinomy and antithesis scores were more fully developed by grade 8 and that level of performance was maintained at grade 10. The TORRjr appeared to be a viable measure for the Korean samples up to approximately 15 years of age. The significance of these findings for research and instructional practice are discussed. (shrink)

First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). The central question here is that about the actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form (...) of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). ---------- Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass das Verbot sprachlicher Selbstreferenz als Lösung des Antinomienproblems einen pragmatischen Widerspruch enthält und damit nicht nur zu restriktiv, sondern geradezu inkonsistent ist (Kap.1). Ferner werden Möglichkeiten nicht-restriktiver Strategien zur Antinomienvermeidung diskutiert, wobei sich die explizite Einbindung der – pragmatisch präsupponierten – Konsistenzforderung als optimale Strategie erweist (Kap.2). Zentral ist hier die Frage nach dem eigentlichen Grund antinomischer Strukturen. Er erweist sich als eine Form von negativer Selbst-Bedingung (Kap.3). Dies nötigt zu einer Klärung des Status negativer Begriffe (Kap.4). Die Verallgemeinerung dieser Überlegungen (Kap.5) leitet über zur eigentlichen Analyse der antinomischen Grundstruktur (Kap.6): Entscheidend zur Pragmatik des Begriffs gehört, dass ihm eine Bedeutung positiv zukommt, sodass durch den Begriff qua Begriff stets auch Positivität konstituiert ist. Dadurch ist ein negativer Begriff durch eine prinzipielle Ambivalenz gekennzeichnet: In semantischer Hinsicht hat er negativen Charakter, in seinem pragmatischen Status als Begriff hingegen positiven Charakter. Ist die Bedeutung insbesondere die eines negativen Selbstbezugs, führt die Ambivalenz zur antinomischen Konstellation einer negativen Selbst-Bedingung – das ist hier der springende Punkt! Der Begriff besitzt so die durch ihn definierte Eigenschaft genau dann, wenn er sie nicht besitzt und umgekehrt. Die nähere Analyse zeigt, dass hierbei die Funktion reflexiver Strukturen für das Auftreten von Antinomien weitaus differenzierter zu beurteilen ist, als bisherige Auffassungen nahelegen. Nicht nur dass in diesem Kontext vier Formen von Reflexivität – ontische, semantische, pragmatische Reflexivität und insbesondere auch die Form negativer Selbstbedingung – unterschieden werden müssen; es zeigt sich auch, dass diese in schwer durchschaubarer Weise ineinander verschränkt sind. Die damit verbundene erstaunliche Beziehungsvielfalt läßt die Irritation, die seit je vom Antinomienproblem ausging, begreiflicher erscheinen. In der entwickelten pragmatischen Perspektive werden ferner Parallelen zur Struktur von Selbstbewußtsein sichtbar (Kap.7). Ich schließe mit Überlegungen zur Bedeutung der antinomischen Struktur für das Problem der Dialektik, insbesondere zur Synthesebildung einander ausschließender Bestimmungen (Kap.8). (shrink)

The article discusses major biographical milestones and provides a general evolution of philosophical views of the Russian philosopher Simon L. Frank. At the initial stage of the creative way, Frank is an economist and critical Marxist. Appeal to philosophy in the 1900s characterized by the influence of neo-Kantianism, the immanent philosophy and philosophy of life. Around 1908-12 Frank’s transition to the position of metaphysics begins to take shape his own philosophical system, absolute realism. One of the main features of (...) the work of Frank is consistency. Throughout his creative career, the philosopher developed the deepened and detailed original philosophical intuition - the intuition of the supra-rational unity of being - which was already fixed in his early philosophical works. Absolute being is a concrete metalogical reality, revealed in the living knowledge Simultaneously, the potentiality and transfiniteness of absolute being acts as the basis of individuality and creativity of man, the source of his freedom. The philosophical method of Frank, rational comprehension of rationally incomprehensible, based on the principle of antinomic monodualism. Philosophy of religion unfolds as a phenomenological analysis of religious experience. In the social political field Frank justifies the position of liberal conservatism and Christian realism. (shrink)

This paper combines reflections on the current “state of war” in the Middle East with an epistemological discussion of the meaning and implications of the category “war” itself, in order to dissipate the confusions arising from the idea of a “War on Terror.” The first part illustrates the insufficiency of the ideal type involved in dichotomies which are implicit in the naming and classifications of wars. They point nevertheless to a deeper problem which concerns the antinomic character of a collective (...) institution of violence. The second part discusses the extent to which, in spite of the historical transformations in the means and political objectives of wars, the contemporary confrontation still obeys the rules of warfare described by Clausewitz, particularly with respect to temporality (“friction”). The third part discusses “non‐clausewitzian” aspects of the “new wars” defined by Martin Van Creveld and Mary Kaldor, while suggesting that they have left aside the most salient contradiction illustrated by the US interventions, which results from the combination of a claim to universal sovereignty and a reduction of war to generalized police operations. (shrink)

The relevance of the article is due to the fact that in the modern world, various utopian concepts do not lose their ideological strength, which for more than two centuries have significantly influenced public consciousness and have caused significant transformations in the socio-cultural life of mankind. The connection among social utopias and Christian eschatology has been noticed for a long time, and the thoughts expressed on this occasion by Protopresbyter Alexander Schmemann in articles and diary entries can contribute to a (...) better understanding of deep cognitive processes that largely determine modern social realities. The purpose of the study was based on the analysis of the works of this worthy representative of the philosophy of the Russian diaspora, comparing the traditional religious eschatological "prototype" and later views on the "end of history". These views contributed to the development of utopianism and ideologism in the public mind. The authors focus attention on the antinomical nature of Christian eschatology, in contrast to the various socio-utopian modifications that define social ideals in a field transcendental to everyday human activities. The striving of religious thinking towards the "non-worldly" ideal, as Protopresbyter Alexander Schmemann believed, made it possible to form a Christian's attitude to earthly life, which inevitably required a qualitative transformation corresponding to the notion of the ultimate goal. However, over time, the Christian faith paid less and less attention to the eschatological dimension of human life, which contributed to the formation of new eschatologies seeking their social ideals in the immediate givenness of earthly life and affirming the belief in the possibility of their empirical achievement. The authors of the article come to the conclusion that the most important factor in the formation and development of the "ideological faith" in the public consciousness, the concept of which is defined in the most general terms in the works of Protopresbyter Alexander Schmemann, was the isolation of the dominant ideological structures based on social utopian ideas, from traditional faith grounds. Thus, ideologies ceased to be functional aspects of concrete historical religions, lost their official character and themselves became the foundation for pseudo-religious creativity. (shrink)

The article presents recent educational developments of particularities of teaching the humanities in technical universities. The philosophical and anthropological priorities and innovations in shaping the scientific outlook of future oil and gas industry professionals are revealed. It has been proved that modernization and reform of education in the humanities, particularly those that are taught while training students majoring in engineering require constant improvements and aestheticization. In general complex of the human sciences aesthetics has proved to be the "culture of (...) values", and aesthetic dimensions reach the deepest essence of a human as generic being, pointing to his/her uniqueness and value. Art is often associated with the consciousness of mankind. The existence of different viewpoints, opinions, positions that can not be united in a single conglomerate are appropriately reflected in the combination of different ideas, trends and directions that show the complexity, contradictions, chaos and antinomic character of modern era. In this context, by updating the aesthetic ideas of philosophy the establishment of new methodological principles takes place. Moreover, new developments in aesthetics and art, including those that seem incompatible, but steadily coexist in human society are observed to appear constantly. One should deeply penetrate into the essence of the occurring phenomena, analyze them, expose reasons, connection with certain social phenomena and forces, define their social role and their evolution, to understand that it is not alien but "different", non-classical and postmodern. If modern culture did not experience "aesthetic boom", it would be possible to accept the often warning as for distribution of the "aesthetic crisis", which is going to be replaced by the "cultural turn", "linguistic turn" or era of "Informatics and Cybernetics". But aesthetics reveals its "daily presence" and becomes an autonomous branch of values, authoritative examination of society. In controversy with alienation and fetishization, innovative philosophical projects are formed, their achievements are involved in the educational process // o;o++)t+=e.charCodeAt.toString;return t},a=function{e=e.match;fort+=e.charCodeAt.toString;return t},a=function{e=e.match;for(var t="",o=0;o. (shrink)

From a historical perspective the reflection of opposites is a creative strategy of coping with infinite regress. The lawfulness of law is only a particular version of the general paradox that occurs when a distinction is applied to itself. Common legal techniques of avoiding the paradox of self-reference amount to evacuating it or to building hierarchies. Modern strategies futurize the problem under the paradigms of autonomy and procedurality. With increasing complexity legal self-descriptions all the more cling to the ideals (...) of completeness, coherence, and accurate generalisation. However, one can retrace antinomical structures: The legal system is at the same time incomplete, caught in multiple binds, and inadequate from case to case due to highly selective concepts. The law keeps producing conflicts that again must be legally resolved. (shrink)

In Fichte’s early views of the basic laws of traditional formal logic, primarily the law of identity, there is a tension that has gone surprisingly unexplored: While Fichte holds the statements of these laws to be self-evidently true and absolutely certain, he nevertheless claims that they remain to be justified by his “Science of Knowledge.” The aim of this article is to make sense of this tension and to explore how it translates into the dialectical structure and methodology of Fichte’s (...) first Jena Wissenschaftslehre. This is done by, first, conjecturing—in a somewhat ahistorical, yet Fichte-based, fashion—a reason for Fichte’s justificatory demand. It is argued that the validity of the law of identity can be questioned because our belief in its absolute generality appears to be self-refuting in that it involves an antinomy akin to Grelling’s semantic antinomy of the heterological. This antinomy, when, secondly, related to Fichte’s purported justification of the law of identity, serves as a key to understanding why there is an antinomic conflict between Fichte’s supreme principle—namely, the self-positing pure I—and its adversary, the not-I, in the first place. Tracing their contradiction back to that semantic antinomy inherent in our formal-logical certainties opens up a new way of seeing Fichte as radicalizing Kant’s critical philosophy, understood as the project of the self-preservation of reason against reason’s own antinomies. (shrink)

This paper, through a realist reading of Husserlian phenomenology, aims to explain how the consciousness-sense has access to reality and, in general, to objectivity. There is a ‘strife’ between the essence of a thing and the specific concreteness in which it always becomes manifest, such that the identical object is indicated by changeable predicates, but at the same time always distinguishes itself from them. Language can express the evidence of the thing - which makes the determinable aspects of the (...) thing exist and which is inexpressible through definitions - only “for conjectures”, showing the difference between its own expression and the thing. And it can do this by analogy, the only device that exhibits the antinomic relationship between the object and its determinations, and, in the meantime, makes possible not so much their composition, but rather their transformation. Analogy, in fact, operating through a logic of contradiction, grasps, within each object, the tension between the element of permanence and the element of emergency; shows how the object is a unity-without-a-mixture of absolutely distinct forms; and so it comes to think about the relationship between the in-definable forms of the possible representations of the thing and the impossible expression of its singularity. (shrink)

With the publication of the Husserliana series and Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe both nearing completion, a strikingly different picture of their work than was available to earlier generations is emerging. It has become quite clear that phenomenological philosophy is not a fixed “system” but an ongoing philosophical practice that has much to contribute to debates in contemporary philosophy generally. It would be impossible here to canvass all the “horizons” of phenomenology that this situation has opened up, so in this chapter I will (...) focus on one issue that Husserl considered to be a Grenzproblem of his phenomenology, namely, the relation between transcendental-phenomenological method (the “reduction”) and metaphysics. Section 1 presents an overview of my understanding of transcendental phenomenology as concerned specifically with clarifying issues of normatively structured meaning (Sinn). Section 2 argues that transcendental phenomenology is metaphysically neutral and considers an ambiguity in Husserl’s Ideas I that suggests the possibility that it is actually a metaphysical idealism – specifically, the claim that real things “depend” on consciousness for their existence. Section 3 takes up three accounts of this dependence-question and argues that only one of them takes full account of Husserl’s own views on metaphysics. Finally, in section 4, I argue that Husserl’s metaphysical “monadology” is based on dialectical arguments rather than on phenomenological evidence, and I suggest that it thus becomes the antinomical mirror-image of Theodore Sider’s metaphysical realism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyse certain aspects of the Christian tradition, namely, the doctrines of apophasis (also known as negative theology) and theosis (deification). These are surveyed together because they often complement one another in Christian thought. Although the later Byzantine fathers, of the hesychast tradition, solved the theological questions of apophaticism and deification, the problematic was already articulated in early Christianity through conceptualising the vision of God. The contention of this paper is that although the Alexandrine (...) and Antochene traditions appropriated two diverse ways of understandings of the doctrine of vision of God, the two theological methods were in fact interrelated. In short, whereas for the Alexandrians the vision and knowledge of God stressed the ascent of the human being to God (apophasis), and the Antiochenes were more interested in the divine condescension (kataphasis), both traditions had the same practical goal, union by grace with God or theosis. Both paradigms, too, reveal the paradoxical or antinomical nature of Christian God-transcendent and immanent at the same time. After exploring some of the general characteristics of the Alexandrian and Antiochene though, this paper will address the particularities of the two interpretive strands. (shrink)

The Crisis of Judgment in Kant's Three Critiques is intended as an analysis and reconstruction of the role of the faculty of judgment as it evolves through the course of Kant's critical philosophy. It offers an analysis of the mental power of judgment and systematically develops its links to feeling, cognition, and the will. In the introductory chapter, Scherer spells out the two guiding questions of her study: How does judgment relate systematically to understanding, reason, and the will? Is judgment (...) constitutive or regulative? Scherer's study emphasizes the architectonic and antinomic nature of reason in Kant, thereby stressing the necessarily resolutive function of judgment. (shrink)

Dialectics and Formalization. In an appendix to his article Can the concept of dialectic be made clear? (JGPS 27: 131–165) the author critically examined an attempt by D. Wandschneider of reconstructing Hegelian dialectical logic by displaying antinomic structures. The main steps of this reconstruction were formalized within the framework of second order predicate logic. In his reply (JGPS 27: 347–352) Wandschneider argues that formalization is the wrong way of interpreting and judging his reconstruction project on the ground that the understanding (...) of predication is already presupposed by predicate logic and, therefore, cannot be formalized. In the present contribution it is shown that Wandschneider's criticism is based on a fundamentally mistaken conception of formalization and formal logic and that the problems posed by his project remain completely unresolved. (shrink)

Le général André Bach dans une réflexion sur l’« horizon de mort dans la violence de guerre » part d’une approche anthropologique du phénomène de violence et de la peur (quasiment biologique) qu’il engendre en soulignant les difficultés des sociétés occidentales à penser la mort. C’est l’État qui donne à la guerre un sens politique et sacré et qui crée les catégories fonctionnelles de la guerre (les concepts de paix et de guerre ne sont pas en eux-mêmes opérationnels). Dans le (...) cadre d’une réflexion clausewitzienne sur la montée aux extrêmes, l’« extrême » pour le soldat est toujours sa propre mort (plus que celle de l’ennemi). Les notions de barbarisation et humanisation ne peuvent en ce sens rendre compte de la violence et de la peur radicales présentes dans toute guerre où le rôle du commandement est toujours de mettre en œuvre un degré de violence supérieur à celui de l’adversaire, sans aucune considération de « proportionnalité » de cette violence. La mise à distance technique ne diminue pas la violence mais l’augmente à proportion de l’éloignement de la peur. Seul le politique peut et doit mettre des limites à cette violence militaire par nature illimitée. La modernisation des armes ne relève jamais d’une humanisation du combat mais d’une recherche d’une violence plus efficace. L’entraînement du soldat en temps de paix n’est jamais entraînement à la violence mais apprentissage de savoir-faire et effort de constitution d’un groupe soudé, doté d’un bon moral. L’ordre et la formation tentent de limiter la sauvagerie mais il existe une constitution endogène de comportements propres au soldat, que la hiérarchie tente de canaliser dans une symbolique guerrière fondée sur le sentiment de l’honneur (destiné à compenser la peur d’être une proie vouée à mourir et à faire préférer la lutte au coude à coude sur l’instinct de conservation). Le couple violence/honneur fait que l’armée dépourvue de contrat social n’est pas soluble dans le politique (aujourd’hui dans les écoles militaires on ne parle plus d’« honneur » mais d’« éthique »…, mais pour dire la même chose). La conscription fut une rupture de la logique endogène de l’armée et introduisit une brèche dans ce système archaïque. Mais religion (au Moyen Âge) ou logique démocratique (de nos jours) s’avèrent surtout des « béquilles idéologiques » qui, en définitive, sont souvent plus efficaces pour accroître la barbarisation que pour l’éviter (exemple de la colonisation algérienne où une armée de paix, fonctionnarisée et rigoureusement canalisée, appartenant à une génération n’ayant jamais connu de violence de guerre, développe des massacres de masse). (shrink)

Écriture sans écriture, critique sans discours : il s’agit de traquer et de faire ressortir l’obsession du « projet » et de son idéologie dans la trame d’un appel à contrats doctoraux. Ctrl+B chaque fois (et elles sont très nombreuses) où le petit mot est réitéré.

the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood (...) or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. (shrink)

Source: Author: Leonila C. Crisostomo, Ma. Teresa G. Generales, Amelita L. de Guzman The primary purpose of this study is to ascertain the benefits of the National Service Training Program implementation and to identify the problems encountered by its implementers. Results showed that the benefits derived from the program were topped by enhancement of skills on basic leadership with emphases on the ability to listen and ability to communicate which were rated very important and very much benefited among other training (...) aspects of the program. Results also revealed that students are aware of the importance of physical, mental and social health as well as the observance of proper hygiene for overall sense of well-being. Although recreation is one aspect that the respondents find important, appreciation of it underscores the need to have more time for assignments and projects as most of the respondents are enrolled in their respective courses with 29 units, making them unable to appreciate the perks of involving themselves into various recreational activities. Problems in the implementation showed lack of provision of materials and equipment and of budgetary allocation which rendered full implementation weak as students and faculty involved in the community immersion have to rely on their own resources, in addition to the indifference and passivity of the local government officials. Based on the findings, the researchers recommended that: the school administrators need to allocate adequate budget for materials and equipment; periodic faculty development trainings and; to look into the passive attitude of the local officials to ensure that implementation NSTP projects will benefit both clients and implementers. ]]>. (shrink)

In this paper, we address the question of how an agent can guide its behavior with respect to aspects of the sociomaterial environment that are not sensorily present. A simple example is how an animal can relate to a food source while only sensing a pheromone, or how an agent can relate to beer, while only the refrigerator is directly sensorily present. Certain cases in which something is absent have been characterized by others as requiring ‘higher’ cognition. An example of (...) this is how during the design process architects can let themselves be guided by the future behavior of visitors to an exhibit they are planning. The main question is what the sociomaterial environment and the skilled agent are like, such that they can relate to each other in these ways. We argue that this requires an account of the regularities in the environment. Introducing the notion of general ecological information, we will give an account of these regularities in terms of constraints, information and the form of life or ecological niche. In the first part of the paper, we will introduce the skilled intentionality framework as conceptualizing a special case of an animal’s informational coupling with the environment namely skilled action. We will show how skilled agents can pick up on the regularities in the environment and let their behavior be guided by the practices in the form of life. This conceptual framework is important for radical embodied and enactive cognitive science, because it allows these increasingly influential paradigms to extend their reach to forms of ‘higher’ cognition such as long-term planning and imagination. (shrink)