Have we (really) done enough? Strengthening “outcome responsibility” in assessing moral duties toward refugees of protracted crises

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This article seeks to advance the discussions on our moral obligations towards refugees of protracted crises by proposing a nuanced application of outcome responsibility. Differentiating causal and outcome responsibility through intention, involvement, and side-taking principles has both symbolic and practical significance in assigning reparative and remedial duties. The framework utilizes domestic analogies to help explain the refined version of these two responsibility types. It examines the Syrian crisis within this paradigm to offer a clearer understanding of the actors that are ‘morally obligated and more likely’ to help. This argument addresses political communities instead of their states, emphasizing their pivotal role as bearers of the consequences of state decisions. Employing an outcome responsibility-based sense of ethical duty (ORSED) can foster more inclusive and welcoming environments, mitigating resentment regardless of border controls or burden allocation.

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References found in this work

Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens.Simon Caney - 2014 - Journal of Political Philosophy 22 (2):125-149.
Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens.Simon Caney - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (4):125-149.
Who is a refugee?Andrew E. Shacknove - 1985 - Ethics 95 (2):274-284.
Refugees and justice between states.Matthew J. Gibney - 2015 - European Journal of Political Theory 14 (4):448-463.

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