That We See That Some Diagrammatic Proofs Are Perfectly Rigorous

Philosophia Mathematica 21 (3):323-338 (2013)
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Abstract

Mistaken reasons for thinking diagrammatic proofs aren't rigorous are explored. The main result is that a confusion between the contents of a proof procedure (what's expressed by the referential elements in a proof procedure) and the unarticulated mathematical aspects of a proof procedure (how that proof procedure is enabled) gives the impression that diagrammatic proofs are less rigorous than language proofs. An additional (and independent) factor is treating the impossibility of naturally generalizing a diagrammatic proof procedure as an indication of lack of rigor

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Author's Profile

Jody Azzouni
Tufts University

References found in this work

The Euclidean Diagram.Kenneth Manders - 2008 - In Paolo Mancosu (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 80--133.
Proofs, pictures, and Euclid.John Mumma - 2010 - Synthese 175 (2):255 - 287.
Diagram-Based Geometric Practice.Kenneth Manders - 2008 - In Paolo Mancosu (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 65--79.

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