Much Ado about Nothing: The Discarded Representations Revisited

In Zsuzsanna Kondor (ed.), Enacting Images. Representation Revisited. Cologne, Germany: Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag. pp. 47-66 (2013)
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Abstract

Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part we provide an overall picture of the concept of the Cartesian mind. In the second, we outline some of the crucial tenets of the theory of the embodied mind and the main objections it makes to the concept of the Cartesian mind. In the third part, we take aim at the heart of the theory of the embodied mind; we present three examples which show that the thesis of embodiment of the subjective perspective is an untenable position. However, everything these examples testify to can be accommodated and explained by our non-embodied or Cartesian view.

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Author Profiles

János Tőzsér
Research Centre for The Humanities, Budapest, Hungary
Zsuzsanna Balogh
Central European University (PhD)

References found in this work

Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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