About this topic
Summary

Embodied and situated approaches have become increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognition. They tend to be scientifically informed responses to the cognitivism predominant in mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy of mind and psychology. Cognitivism in philosophy assumed - either explicitly or implicitly - that the non-neural body and the environment in which we live and act are best factored out in our investigations of mind and cognition. Embodied and situated approaches along with other related responses to philosophical cognitivism have collectively come to be known as “4EA”: Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective. While 4EA approaches are united in rejecting the conception of mind and cognition as supervenient only upon internal brain processes they each take a slightly different focus on the reasons why internalism should be rejected and the positions may be held independently. For example, what we might think of as orthodox embodied cognitive science makes little or no mention of the affective domain and it does not imply biological enactivism, which - by its very nature - is itself an inherently embodied approach to cognition. In a similar vein, some of these approaches may be thought to be extensions to twentieth century functionalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science, while in others there is a strong historical connection to the Phenomenologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (in particular Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) and/or the American Pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey. 

Key works

Clark 1981 captured the imagination of a generation of researchers in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences by drawing on research from robotics to argue that the mind is embodied and embedded in important ways. Gallagher 2005 integrates phenomenology and neuroscience with artificial cognitive systems research to argue that the body shapes the mind. Haugeland 1993 is an early - but classic - paper introducing embodiment and situatedness to philosophy of mind, and Brooks 1991 is the key reference from robotics in the field. Hutchins 1995 is the go-to book on embeddedness, and Dreyfus 1972 still stands as one of the main critiques of traditional artificial intelligence approaches. Enactivism was introduced to the world through Varela et al 1991, developed in detail in regard to what might be thought of as ‘biological’ enactivism in Thompson 2007, in regard to ‘perceptual’ enactivism in Noë 2004, and in regard to perception, agency and consciousness in Hurley 1998. Affective cognition is still underrepresented in the embodiment paradigm but Damasio 1994 and Damasio 1999 have been strong influences on philosophers in this area, Griffiths & Scarantino 2008 presents a strongly situated theory of emotions, and Colombetti 2013 provides an in-depth consideration of affective and emotional embodiment.

Introductions

An overview of most of the 4E approaches is presented in the second edition of Clark's Mindware, an introductory textbook for the philosophy of cognitive science. Clark's Natural Born Cyborgs is a very readable lay-introduction to embodiment and the extended mind, but for a more thorough investigation see Supersizing the Mind. A scientifically informed introduction to the phenomenological approach to these issues is presented in Gallagher and Zahavi's The Phenomenological Mind and Noe's Out of our Heads provides an accessible introduction to perceptual enactivism. A thorough consideration of embodied approaches and their relevance to philosophy of mind can be found in Shapiro's Embodied Cognition and his (2014) edited collection The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition collates cutting-edge articles from many of the key players in the discipline.

Related

Contents
1941 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 1941
  1. On Hostile and Oppressive Affective Technologies.David Spurrett - 2024 - Topoi 43 (3):821-832.
    4E approaches to affective technology tend to focus on how ‘users’ manage their situated affectivity, analogously to how they help themselves cognitively through epistemic actions or using artefacts and scaffolding. Here I focus on cases where the function of affective technology is to exploit or manipulate the agent engaging with it. My opening example is the cigarette, where technological refinements have harmfully transformed the affective process of consuming nicotine. I proceed to develop case studies of two very different but also (...)
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  2. How the Brain Makes Up the Mind: a heuristic approach to the hard problem of consciousness.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub- agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future (...)
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  3. Walking in the Shoes of the Brain: an "agent" approach to phenomenality and the problem of consciousness.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    Abstract: Given an embodied evolutionary context, the (conscious) organism creates phenomenality and establishes a first-person point of view with its own agency, through intentional relations made by its own acts of fiat, in the same way that human observers create meaning in language.
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  4. The Intention of Intention.Ramón Casares - manuscript
    For Putnam in "Representation and Reality", there cannot be any intentional science, thus dooming cognitive science. His argument is that intentional concepts are functional, and that functionalism cannot explain anything because "everything has every functional organization", providing a proof. Analyzing his proof, we find that Putnam is assuming an ideal interpreting subject who can compute effortlessly and who is not intentional. But the subject doing science is a human being, and we are not that way. Therefore, in order to save (...)
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  5. Using Exemplars for Holistic Character Education: With Evidence about Embodiment and Learning from Neuroscience and Computer Science.Hyemin Han - manuscript
    In this chapter, I will discuss employing exemplars in moral and character education promoting virtue development with the involvement of embodiment. Virtue ethicists propose two phases of virtue development: early virtue habituation and later phronesis cultivation. I will overview prior research on the mechanism of habituation at the biological and neural levels to examine why embodiment is fundamental during the first phase, virtue habituation. Then, I will review recent philosophical and psychological studies about the nature of phronesis, i.e., practical wisdom, (...)
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  6. Anchoring empathy in receptivity.Seisuke Hayakawa & Katsunori Miyahara - manuscript
    In one sense of the term, empathy refers to the act of sharing in another person’s experience of and perspective on the world. According to simulation accounts of empathy, we achieve this by replicating the other’s mind in our imagination. We explore a form of empathy, empathic perspective-taking, that is not adequately captured by existing simulationist approaches. We begin by pointing out that we often achieve empathy (or share in another’s perspective) by listening to the other person. This form of (...)
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  7. Individual Consciousness.Roderick Malcolm MacLeod - manuscript
    If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately (...)
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  8. Extended Cognition, Extended Selection, and Developmental Systems Theory.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    I respond to Karola Stotz's criticisms of my previously published challenges to the inference from developmental systems theory to an extended view of cognition.
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  9. Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This is a long-abandoned draft, written in 2013, of what was supposed to be a paper for an edited collection (one that, in the end, didn't come together). The paper "Group Minds and Natural Kinds" descends from it.
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  10. Keeping HEC in CHEC.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC, hereafter), human cognitive processing extends beyond the boundary of the human organism.1 As I understand HEC, it is a claim in the..
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  11. Evolution, embodiment and the nature of the mind.Michael Anderson - manuscript
    In: B. Hardy-Vallee & N. Payette, eds. Beyond the brain: embodied, situated & distributed cognition. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar’s Press), in press. Abstract: In this article, I do three main things: 1. First, I introduce an approach to the mind motivated primarily by evolutionary considerations. I do that by laying out four principles for the study of the mind from an evolutionary perspective, and four predictions that they suggest. This evolutionary perspective is completely compatible with, although broader than, the embodied cognition (...)
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  12. Evolution, embodiment and the nature of the mind.Author unknown - manuscript
    In: B. Hardy-Vallee & N. Payette, eds. Beyond the brain: embodied, situated & distributed cognition. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar’s Press), in press. Abstract: In this article, I do three main things: 1. First, I introduce an approach to the mind motivated primarily by evolutionary considerations. I do that by laying out four principles for the study of the mind from an evolutionary perspective, and four predictions that they suggest. This evolutionary perspective is completely compatible with, although broader than, the embodied cognition (...)
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  13. Embodied cognition and linguistic understanding.Daniel A. Weiskopf - manuscript
    Traditionally, the language faculty was supposed to be a device that maps linguistic inputs to semantic or conceptual representations. These representations themselves were supposed to be distinct from the representations manipulated by the hearer.s perceptual and motor systems. Recently this view of language has been challenged by advocates of embodied cognition. Drawing on empirical studies of linguistic comprehension, they have proposed that the language faculty reuses the very representations and processes deployed in perceiving and acting. I review some of the (...)
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  14. Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  15. Away from Home: The Ethics of Hostile Affective Scaffolding.Alfred Archer & Catherine Robb - forthcoming - Topoi:1-12.
    During live sporting events, fans often create intense atmospheres in stadiums, expressing support for their own local players and discouragement for the opposition. Crowd hostility directed at opposition players surprisingly elicits contrasting reactions across different sports. Tennis players, for example, have reported that hostile crowds are hurtful and disrespectful, whereas footballers often praise and encourage such hostility. What explains this tension? Why are hostile atmospheres considered wrong for some athletes, and not for others? We argue that creating hostile atmospheres for (...)
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  16. How Not to Argue About the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition.Yavuz Recep Başoğlu - forthcoming - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu.
    In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Processing, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to posits they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomena, it has been repeatedly argued that they are in fact compatible. As one may expect, these arguments mostly end up contending either that Predictive Processing is actually nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. In this paper, I will (...)
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  17. Rhythm in social interaction – Introduction.Chiara Bassetti & Emanuele Bottazzi - forthcoming - Rhuthmos.
    This text is the introduction of the special issue “Rhythm in social interaction” edited by Chiara Bassetti and Emanuele Bottazzi in Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa, vol. 8, n. 3, December 2015. We thank Chiara Bassetti, Emanuele Bottazzi and the journal Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa for the permission to republish it. But, friend, when you grasp the number and nature of the intervals of sound, from high to low, and the boundaries of those intervals, and how many scales arise from them, (...)
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  18. A Pluralist Approach to Merleau-Pontian Cognitive Science.Beyza Çavuş & Jeff Yoshimi - forthcoming - Paradigmi.
    Representational and embodied approaches to cognitive science are often presented in opposition to one another, with Merleau-Ponty serving as a historical precursor to embodied approaches. We argue that the two approaches are compatible and complementary, and that both can be used to interpret Merleau-Ponty's (and Husserl's) work. To support our arguments, we describe two forms of representation associated with two distinct processes. Motor intentionality is a process of direct embodied interaction (reflexes, habits, skilled behaviors) which use mediating representations to bind (...)
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  19. 9th Embodied and Situated Language Processing Conference.Ciencia Cognitiva - forthcoming - Ciencia Cognitiva.
    Ernesto Guerra, Macarena Silva, Edmundo Kronmüller Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile Universidad de Chile, … Read More →.
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  20. Call-for-Papers: Third special issue in the series Cognition and Technology: Mechanicism and autonomy: What can robotics teach us about human cognition and action?Maria Eunice Q. Gonzalez, Willem Ed Haselager & Itiel Ed Dror - forthcoming - Pragmatics and Cognition.
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  21. Meta-learning Contributes to Cultivation of Wisdom in Moral Domains: Implications of Recent Artificial Intelligence Research and Educational Considerations.Hyemin Han - forthcoming - International Journal of Ethics Education:1-23.
    Meta-learning is learning to learn, which includes the development of capacities to transfer what people learned in one specific domain to other domains. It facilitates finetuning learning parameters and setting priors for effective and optimal learning in novel contexts and situations. Recent advances in research on artificial intelligence have reported meta-learning is essential in improving and optimizing the performance of trained models across different domains. In this paper, I suggest that meta-learning plays fundamental roles in practical wisdom and its cultivation (...)
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  22. Philosophy of the Social Mind.Julian Kiverstein (ed.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
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  23. Watsuji's phenomenology of aidagara: An interpretation and application to psychopathology.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Krueger Joel, Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy. Springer. pp. 165-181.
    I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role (...)
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  24. Enseigner loral en interaction: Percevoir, écouter.E. Lhote - forthcoming - Comprendre.
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  25. Environmental Microaggressions in Medicine.Shen-yi Liao - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    Oppressed people face microaggressions in medicine. Extant discussions of microaggressions in medicine primarily focus on verbal and behavioral microaggressions, which typically have perpetrators. For example, in clinical medicine, acts of verbal and behavioral microaggressions can arise from patient-provider interactions, with healthcare providers such as physicians and nurses as perpetrators. However, in clinical medicine, patients can also be victims to environmental microaggressions, which typically are not acts and do not have perpetrators. My goal is to call attention to the existence of (...)
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  26. [no title].Victor Loughlin - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
  27. Facing Life: The messy bodies of enactive cognitive science.Marek McGann - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive (...)
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  28. The interaction theory of social cognition–a critique.John Michael - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
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  29. Embodied anticipation in neurocomputational cognitive architectures for robotic agents.Alberto Montebelli, Robert Lowe & Tom Ziemke - forthcoming - The Swedish Ai Society Workshop May 27-28, 2009 Ida, Linköping University.
  30. Do Sensorimotor Dynamics Extend the Conscious Mind?Ken Pepper - forthcoming - Adaptive Behavior.
    According to the extended conscious mind thesis (ECM), the physical basis of consciousness is not confined exclusively to the brain, but extends beyond it via sensorimotor dynamics. ECM is enjoying growing support among philosophers inspired by developments in enactive and embodied cognitive science. ECM has obvious parallels with the extended mind thesis (EM), according to which the physical basis of cognition is likewise not confined to the brain. However, EM’s originator and most prominent defender, Andy Clark, argues that EM theorists (...)
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  31. Embodied Agency and Habitual Selves.Nancy Nyquist Potter - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):75-80.
  32. Group Minds and Natural Kinds.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups are claimed to instantiate the same (...)
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  33. Lectures on perspective An ecological approach.Miguel Segundo-Ortin - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
  34. Not thinking about the same thing. Enactivism, pragmatism and intentionality.Pierre Steiner - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some (...)
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  35. The structure of intentionality. Insights and challenges for enactivism.Pierre Steiner - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The purpose of the paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying and developing an important tension within enactivism concerning the relations between intentionality and content, once representationalism has been abandoned. In which sense(s) do enactivists (still) say that intentionality is contentful and not contentful? Secondly, it puts this tension in perspective with two paradigmatic ways of defining the relations between intentional states and their objects: Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, and Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotics.
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  36. Normativity and 4E cognition: having stock and going forward.Pierre Steiner - forthcoming - In Mark-Oliver Casper & Giuseppe Flavio Artese, Methodology of Situated Cognition Research. Springer - Studies in Brain and Mind.
    In this chapter, I pursue two aims. Firstly, I propose an original survey and analysis of the way proponents of 4E cognition have until now defined the re-lations between normativity and cognitive science. A first distinction is made between making normativity an explanandum of 4E cognitive science, and turning normativity into a property or part of the explanantia of 4E cognitive science. Inside of the latter option, one must distinguish between methodolog-ical, ontological and semantic claims on the value of normativity (...)
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  37. Variable Value Alignment by Design; averting risks with robot religion.Jeffrey White - forthcoming - Embodied Intelligence 2023.
    Abstract: One approach to alignment with human values in AI and robotics is to engineer artiTicial systems isomorphic with human beings. The idea is that robots so designed may autonomously align with human values through similar developmental processes, to realize project ideal conditions through iterative interaction with social and object environments just as humans do, such as are expressed in narratives and life stories. One persistent problem with human value orientation is that different human beings champion different values as ideal, (...)
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  38. Automata, man-machines and embodiment: deflating or inflating Life?Charles T. Wolfe - forthcoming - In A. Radman & H. Sohn, Critical and Clinical Cartographies: Architecture, Robotics, Medicine, Philosophy. Edinburgh University Press.
    Early modern automata, understood as efforts to ‘model’ life, to grasp its singular properties and/or to unveil and demystify its seeming inaccessibility and mystery, are not just fascinating liminal, boundary, hybrid, crossover or go-between objects, while they are all of those of course. They also pose a direct challenge to some of our common conceptions about mechanism and embodiment. They challenge the simplicity of the distinction between a purported ‘mechanistic’ worldpicture, its ontology and its goals, and on the other hand (...)
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  39. Beauty Filters in Self-Perception: The Distorted Mirror Gazing Hypothesis.Gloria Andrada - 2025 - Topoi:1-12.
    Beauty filters are automated photo editing tools that use artificial intelligence and computer vision to detect facial features and modify them, allegedly improving a face’s physical appearance and attractiveness. Widespread use of these filters has raised concern due to their potentially damaging psychological effects. In this paper, I offer an account that examines the effect that interacting with such filters has on self-perception. I argue that when looking at digitally-beautified versions of themselves, individuals are looking at AI-curated distorted mirrors. This (...)
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  40. Mind-Technology Problems for Know-How Anti-Intellectualism.Gloria Andrada & J. Adam Carter - 2025 - Social Epistemology:1-15.
    Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito (2021) describe the Mind-Technology Problem as a new constellation of philosophical problems about the nature of mind generated by advances in technology we increasingly rely on to meet both theoretical and practical aims. We agree with Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito that the problems they identify frame a timely and worthwhile new research programme. We aim to contribute to this research programme by motivating and canvassing the key contours of four different Mind-Technology problems that arise for, and (...)
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  41. Scaffolding and Individuality in Early Childhood Development.Víctor Carranza-Pinedo & Laura Diprossimo - 2025 - Topoi.
    Scaffolding interactions are typically portrayed optimistically within 4E frameworks of cognition. In this paper, we argue that this “dogma of harmony” has also influenced research on scaffolding interactions during development. Specifically, we show how some scaffolding interactions aimed at supporting task execution and skill acquisition in early childhood can inadvertently lead to detrimental effects on learners’ wellbeing, understood in terms of what individuals are capable of achieving rather than through the resources they possess. To characterise these effects, we propose a (...)
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  42. Bridging the explanatory gap with theories of Embodiment.Emma Cohen-Edmonds - 2025 - Qualia Magazine 2025 (February 2025).
    David Chalmers distinguishes an explanatory gap between consciousness and standard functional properties, intuitively, what we experience differs from how we experience. This essay explores how the explanatory gap can be bridged with embodied understandings of function. Embodiment suggests that what we experience can end in how we experience. According to developments by Thomas Fuchs, through Embodied Cognition, the gap does not explicitly make explaining consciousness a distinctively hard task. Embodiment poses a solution, suggesting that consciousness “is not confined to the (...)
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  43. Cognition and the Arts: From Naturalized Aesthetics to the Cognitive Humanities.Timothy Justus - 2025 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    How does the mind lend itself to artistic creation and appreciation? How should we study minds and arts in ways that transform our understanding of both? This book examines the concepts of art and cognition from the complementary perspectives of philosophy, the empirical sciences, and the humanities. Central chapters combine examples of visual art, music, literature, and film with the properties of cognition that they illuminate, including 4E cognition, predictive processing, and theories of affect and emotion. These aspects of cognition (...)
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  44. Complicating Objectification in the Medical Encounter: Embodied Experiences in the ICU during COVID-19.Allan Køster, Anthony Vincent Fernandez & Lars Peter Kloster Andersen - 2025 - Journal of Medical Humanities 46 (1):75-90.
    Illness and injury are often accompanied by experiences of bodily objectification. Medical treatments intended to restore the structure or function of the body may amplify these experiences of objectification by recasting the patient’s body as a biomedical object—something to be examined, measured, and manipulated. In this article, we contribute to the phenomenology of embodiment in illness and medicine by reexamining the results of a qualitative study of the experiences of nurses and patients isolated in an intensive care unit during the (...)
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  45. (1 other version)Pragmatic Realism: Towards a Reconciliation of Enactivism and Realism.Catherine Legg & André Sant’Anna - 2025 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 24 (1).
    This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13(3), 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that (...)
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  46. Unfulfilled habits: on the affective consequences of turning down affordances for social interaction.Carlos Vara Sánchez - 2025 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 24 (1).
    Many pragmatist and non-representational approaches to cognition, such as the enactivist, have focused on the relations between actions, affectivity, and habits from an intersubjective perspective. For those adopting such approaches, all these aspects are inextricably connected; however, many questions remain open regarding the dynamics by which they unfold and shape each other over time. This paper addresses a specific topic that has not received much attention: the impact on future behavior of not fulfilling possibilities for social interaction even though their (...)
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  47. Transformative Embodied Cognition.Dave Ward - 2025 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 12.
    How should accounts that stress the embodied, embedded and engaged character of human minds accommodate the role of rationality in human subjectivity? Drawing on Matthew Boyle’s contrast between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ conceptions of rationality, I argue that contemporary work on embodied cognition tends towards a problematic ‘additivism’ about how mature human capacities to think and act for reasons stand to sensorimotor capacities to skillfully engage with salient features of the environment. Additivists view rational capacities to reason and reflect as a (...)
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  48. Where There Is Life There Is Mind… And Free Energy Minimisation?Juan Diego Bogotá - 2024 - In Ana Cuevas-Badallo, Mariano Martín-Villuendas & Juan Gefaell, Life and Mind: Theoretical and Applied Issues in Contemporary Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Sciences. Springer. pp. 171-200.
    This chapter explores the possibility of integrating the enactive and the Free Energy Principle’s (FEP) approaches to life and mind. Both frameworks have been linked to the life-mind continuity thesis, but recent debates challenge their potential integration. Critics argue that the enactive approach, rooted in autopoiesis theory, has an internalist view of life and a contentful view of cognition, making it challenging to account for adaptive behavior and minimal cognition. Similarly, some find the FEP’s stationary view of life biologically implausible. (...)
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  49. Life, sense-making, and subjectivity. Why the enactive conception of life and mind requires phenomenology.Juan Diego Bogotá - 2024 - Synthese 204 (3):1-27.
    One of the ideas that characterises the enactive approach to cognition is that life and mind are deeply continuous, which means that both phenomena share the same basic set of organisational and phenomenological properties. The appeal to phenomenology to address life and basic cognition is controversial. It has been argued that, because of its reliance on phenomenological categories, enactivism may implicitly subscribe to a form of anthropomorphism incompatible with the modern scientific framework. These worries are a result of a lack (...)
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  50. What could come before time? Intertwining affectivity and temporality at the basis of intentionality.Juan Diego Bogotá - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2024:1-21.
    The enactive approach to cognition and the phenomenological tradition have in common a wide conception of ‘intentionality’. Within these frameworks, intentionality is understood as a general openness to the world. For classical phenomenologists, the most basic subjective structure that allows for such openness is time-consciousness. Some enactivists, while inspired by the phenomenological tradition, have nevertheless argued that affectivity is more basic, being that which gives rise to the temporal flow of consciousness. In this paper, I assess the relationship between temporality (...)
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