Metaphysics of Virtual Reality

According to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is somehow shallow and lacking in reality. For all we knwo, the intuition goes, we could be living in a cave facing shadows, in a dream or even in a computer simulation, This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it (...) seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the "problem of reality." At the turn of the nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on the study of these patients to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453- 486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell & Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal (...) fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, argu- ing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evalu- ate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are. (shrink)

Este artículo examina en profundidad el impacto de la digitalización en la sociedad contemporánea, centrándose específicamente en los ámbitos del trabajo y la educación. Se analizan las diversas perspectivas filosóficas sobre cómo la tecnología remota ha alterado significativamente las dinámicas laborales y educativas, desplazando gradualmente la necesidad de interacciones presenciales hacia un entorno virtual. Se destaca la obra de varios autores, como Marcuse, Heidegger y Baudrillard, que exploran los efectos de esta transformación en la experiencia humana y en la esfera (...) social en general. Por un lado, se discute cómo la digitalización ha llevado a una mayor eficiencia en la producción laboral, por otro come ha planteado preocupaciones sobre la alienación del individuo y la pérdida de la conexión emocional en las interacciones humanas. Se enfatiza la importancia del diálogo cara a cara y la colaboración en la preservación de la empatía y la autenticidad en un mundo cada vez más dominado por la tecnología. Además, se aborda el tema de la "nueva alienación" y la "mercantilización de la cultura" en el contexto de la sociedad digital, donde la persona se encuentra cada vez más alejada de su ser auténtico y se convierte en un mero consumidor de imágenes y representaciones digitales. Se exploran los riesgos y desafíos que surgen de esta transformación, así como las posibles estrategias para mitigar sus efectos negativos en la vida social y laboral. En resumen, este artículo proporciona una visión integral de cómo la digitalización está remodelando fundamentalmente nuestra forma de trabajar, aprender y relacionarnos, y plantea importantes cuestiones éticas y sociales que requieren una cuidadosa consideración en el desarrollo futuro de la tecnología y la sociedad. (shrink)

This contribution addresses the topic of the metaphysics of linguistic tokens as they are used in communication in virtual reality. It is argued that some of these linguistic tokens differ in ontological status from those that are normally used in communication, while others do not. The contribution discusses recent work on virtual reality by David Chalmers in which he claims that virtual objects are real objects because they are, or supervene on, digital objects with causal powers. This approach is extended (...) by employing an ontology that was put forward by Jerrold J. Katz to explain the nature of linguistic tokens. The ontology is applied to the objects of virtual reality, taking into account their dual nature as computational objects, and helps to provide a metaphysical account of linguistic tokens as used in communication in virtual reality. This allows for a distinction between some forms of communication in virtual reality and corresponding non-virtual forms of communication, such as sign language produced by the virtual body of an avatar and sign language produced by a flesh and blood body. Such distinctions treat both forms of communication as real, but draw a distinction between them based on whether they contain concrete or composite components. (shrink)

David Chalmers argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality. In one of its readings, this “virtual realism” states that virtual entities ontologically depend on real digital entities. This article explores that suggestion and offers a novel account of the dependence of the virtual on the digital. Drawing on Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution, we contend that virtual objects should be seen as constituted by digital objects, when these are placed in certain favourable circumstances. We explore the (...) rationale and implications of this view, which we see as a promising form of virtual realism. (shrink)

According to David Chalmers, the virtual entities found in Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) environments instantiate virtual properties of a specific kind. It has recently been objected that such a view (i) can’t extend to all types of properties; (ii) leads to a proliferation of property-types; (iii) implausibly ascribes massive errors to VR and AR users; and (iv) faces an analogue of Jackson’s “many-property problem”. My first objective here is to show that advocates of virtual properties can deal (...) with each of these objections. The other goal of this paper is to examine the consequences of Chalmers’ theory in the particular case of AR. If we countenance virtual properties, AR highlights that non-virtual objects can possess both non-virtual and virtual properties. With AR, it also appears that a same non-virtual object can have different and even incompatible properties across augmented environments. Lastly, considering properties in light of AR highlights the risk of an “augmented solipsism”, and calls forth interesting questions about the persistence conditions of non-virtual objects in AR environments. (shrink)

The paper discusses the thesis of virtual realism presented by David Chalmers in his paper “The Virtual and the Real” (2017). Here, I suggest an even stronger version of the claim that I call “virtual physicalism”. According to this view, virtual objects are not only real but physical as they are identical to the physical states of computers that run VR software. I suggest that virtual objects should have a similar ontological status to toys—they should be treated as models or (...) simplifications of ordinary objects. Just like toys, virtual objects can sometimes be good enough to be used instead of their ordinary counterparts. In these cases, virtual objects start to be treated as instantiations of the same kind. In the last part of the paper, I use Johan Huizinga’s notion of a “magic circle” to suggest how different objects could be successfully “virtualized”, that is, moved into a digital realm while remaining objects of the same kind as their non-virtual counterparts. I suggest this will happen once virtual reality becomes permanent and causally connected with non-virtual reality. I finish the paper by looking at examples of natural kind objects and individuals, which seem to be the hardest cases for successful virtualization. (shrink)

Today with the advent of ever-increasing scientific advances, we are on the threshold of better understanding why consciousness evolved and how it works. This became apparent when the computational semblance of the mind faltered when neuroscientists and philosophers realized that awareness was not merely digital. However, with virtual reality (VR), augmented reality, and mixed reality (MR), our models of how consciousness functions are becoming much clearer to grasp since we now have the ability to simulate in four dimensions an all-encompassing (...) environment artificially. Consciousness is a forging mechanism, which by its attentional posturing enables it to fully immerse in a world of its own making, even as it remains mostly unaware of how such a magical performance occurs. Using VR and MR as touchstones allows us to better appreciate how our brains construct the world around us. By exploring manufactured VR accouterments and the varied vistas they can create, we have––perhaps for the first time in our history––the necessary tools to synthetically reconstruct how the brain perceives and interacts with reality. This essay is an examination of how the advent of virtual reality changes our understanding of human consciousness and how future researches will benefit by employing its many iterations. (shrink)

This paper defends virtual veridicalism, according to which many perceptual experiences in virtual reality are veridical. My argument centers on perceptual variation, the phenomenon in which perceptual experience appears all the same while being reliably generated by different properties under different circumstances. It consists of three stages. The first stage argues that perceptual variation can occur in color perception without involving misperception. The second stage extends the argument to perceptual variation of space, arguing that it is possible for individuals to (...) perceive distinct physical spaces as having the same experiential space without suffering from systematic misperception. The final stage proceeds to argue that perceptual variation without misperception in color and spatial perception can occur across virtual and ordinary environments. In that sense, given that ordinary experiences are presumably veridical, experiences in virtual reality are also veridical. (shrink)

The distinction between the first-person perspective (1PP) and the third-person perspective (3PP) has been widely regarded as fundamental and rigid, and many researchers hold that genuine bodily illusions can only be experienced from the 1PP. We applied VR technology to investigate whether this mainstream view is correct. In our experiments, the participants were immersed in a VR environment in which they saw a life-sized virtual body either from the 1PP or from the 3PP. They either passively received tactile stimulations and/or (...) actively interacted with a virtual soccer ball. Our VR system created novel visuo-motor-tactile correlations between the real and the virtual world: when the participant interacted with a real plastic soccer ball, he/she would feel corresponding tactile sensations and see the avatar performing the exact same movements. We found that a clear sense of ownership over the avatar was induced not only in the 1PP condition but also in the Passive-3PP and the Active-3PP conditions. We also observed evidence suggesting that it is possible to experience one’s body-location, 1PP-location, as well as self-location, both from the 1PP and from the 3PP. Together, we demonstrate that there is in fact no fundamental gap between embodied 1PP and embodied 3PP in the virtual world. (shrink)

Snake encountersin human-populated and wildlife areas pose significant threats to public safety and biodiversity. Each year, many incidents result in snakebites, often leading to serious injuries or fatalities, and frequently result in harm to snakes due to fear-driven responses. Traditional methods forsnake detection, such as visual observation, are typically slow and can lead to delayed or inaccurate responses, increasing the risks associated with human-snake encounters. This study presents a Real-Time Snake Detection and Alert System that employs advanced artificial intelligence (AI) (...) and machine learning (ML) techniques, specifically using YOLO (You Only Look Once), to accurately identify the presence ofsnakes in pre-recorded videos or static images. Oursystem processes these visual inputs to determine if a snake is present, providing an immediate, automated alarm to alert individuals nearby if a snake is detected. This system isintended to be a rapid-response solution for detecting snakesin images or video files, enhancing safety in snake-prone areas by increasing awareness of potential threats without requiring constant live monitoring or additional notifications to authorities. (shrink)

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to (...) X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

The author of this paper discusses the theme of the "simulated body", that is the sense of "being there” in a body that is not one's own, or that does not exist in the way one perceives it. He addresses this issue by comparing Immersive Virtual Reality technology, the phenomenological approach, and Gerald Edelman's theory of Neural Darwinism. Virtual Reality has been used to throw light on some phenomena that cannot be studied experimentally in real life, and the results of (...) its simulations enrich the phenomenological discourse on the lived body. Virtual “Reality” seems to replicate—at least in part—the simulation mechanisms of our mind, thus favoring developments in the field of philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The following paper attempts to look at virtual reality technologies—and the (dis)embodiment affected by them—through a phenomenological lens. Specifically, augmenting traditional discussions of virtual reality as a purely technical problem, this paper seeks to bring Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology into the discussion to try to make sense of both what body we leave behind and what body we gain as we enter virtual worlds. To do this, I look both at historical examples of virtual reality technologies and their methods of (...) (dis)integrating the body and speculative future examples of virtual reality where the corporeal body is fully sidelined through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema, noting that habituation is an ever present factor that must be considered in virtual environments. Ultimately, I conclude that even in a scenario of one-to-one mind-computer transference, the virtual world will, like the physical world we currently inhabit, solicit a ‘phantom body’ thus forcing us to act and live in accordance with a mutual interplay between self and virtual world. (shrink)

In his article ‘The Metaverse: Surveillant Physics, Virtual Realist Governance, and the Missing Commons,’ Andrew McStay addresses an entwinement of ethical, political, and metaphysical concerns surrounding the Metaverse, arguing that the Metaverse is not being designed to further the public good but is instead being created to serve the plutocratic ends of technology corporations. He advances the notion of ‘surveillant physics’ to capture this insight and introduces the concept of ‘virtual realist governance’ as a theoretical framework that ought to guide (...) Metaverse design and regulation. This commentary article primarily serves as a supplementary piece rather than a direct critique of McStay’s work. First, I flag certain understated or overlooked nuances in McStay’s discussion. Then, I extend McStay’s discussion by juxtaposing a Lockean inspired argument supporting the property rights of Metaverse creators with an opposing argument advocating for a Metaverse user's ‘right to virtual abundance,’ informed by the potential of virtual reality technology to eliminate scarcity in virtual worlds. Contrasting these arguments highlights the tension between corporate rights and social justice in the governance of virtual worlds and bears directly on McStay’s assertion that there is a problem of the missing commons in the early design of the Metaverse. (shrink)

As much as reality itself, its reflections and appearances have taken a significant place in philosophical discussions. While Plato's Allegory of the Cave is one of the first of these discussions, the philosophy of the virtual shows the final state of these discussions today. The virtual cave is the modern-day version of Plato's cave. Appearances in Plato's cave have their own mode of existence, and likewise, virtual objects in the virtual cave have their own mode of existence. There are many (...) philosophical similarities between the ancient cave and the virtual cave. So much so that, according to the first, the shadows in the cave are a different view of reality, while according to the second, the virtual images in the virtual cave are another view of reality. The philosophy of the ancient cave and virtual cave essentially point to the debates about what the nature of reality is. The ontological and epistemic dimensions of appearance and virtual image lead us to the discussion about the nature and whatness of reality. The most common and advanced virtual cave today is the metaverse. Metaverse consists of virtual communities that combine the reality of the physical world with the reality of the virtual world and are open to all kinds of manipulations. (shrink)

A leading philosopher takes a mind-bending journey through virtual worlds, illuminating the nature of reality and our place within it. Virtual reality is genuine reality; that's the central thesis of Reality+. In a highly original work of "technophilosophy," David J. Chalmers gives a compelling analysis of our technological future. He argues that virtual worlds are not second-class worlds, and that we can live a meaningful life in virtual reality. We may even be in a virtual world already. Along the way, (...) Chalmers conducts a grand tour of big ideas in philosophy and science. He uses virtual reality technology to offer a new perspective on long-established philosophical questions. How do we know that there's an external world? Is there a god? What is the nature of reality? What's the relation between mind and body? How can we lead a good life? All of these questions are illuminated or transformed by Chalmers' mind-bending analysis. Studded with illustrations that bring philosophical issues to life, Reality+ is a major statement that will shape discussion of philosophy, science, and technology for years to come. (shrink)

David Chalmers a récemment soutenu que la réalité virtuelle est réelle, plutôt que fictionnelle. Dans cet article, j’examine les implications ontologiques de ce « réalisme virtuel ». Comme je le suggère, cette position s’associe naturellement à une ontologie algorithmique, qui identifie les objets virtuels à des structures de données comprises de manière fonctionnelle. Je présente ensuite plusieurs objections à cette ontologie algorithmique. Tant que celles-ci ne sont pas réglées, la question de l’identité des mondes et des objets virtuels reste encore (...) en suspens. (shrink)

El objetivo de esta investigación es presentar una propuesta para reivindicar el cuerpo retomando las reflexiones filosóficas sobre la técnica de José Ortega y Gasset. Si bien el filósofo español no lo abordó dentro de su quehacer filosófico, es relevante ponerlo a dialogar con debates contemporáneos sobre tecnología para ver si hay alguna respuesta novedosa que se pueda obtener. La propuesta esbozada en esta investigación se sitúa en el marco del debate entre transhumanistas y bioconservadores al respecto de las tecnologías (...) que descorporizan, tomando como ejemplos principales el mind-uploading y la realidad virtual. De igual manera, ubica al cuerpo dentro del giro que trajo consigo el surgimiento y desarrollo de la cibernética. Para llevar a cabo tal reivindicación, propongo el argumento del proyecto vital —retomando terminología orteguiana— para sostener la tesis de que la realización tecnológica de las fantasías sobre el cuerpo no sólo depende del acceso a los materiales, sino del proyecto vital de una determinada época. Es así como, a través de uno de los autores canónicos de la filosofía de la tecnología, se puede repensar la importancia del cuerpo dentro del desarrollo e impacto de la tecnología contemporánea, así como poner a dialogar su propuesta con proyectos contemporáneos como el transhumanismo. Esto último con la intención de proporcionar otra lectura a problemas que son de interés para el debate entre transhumanistas y bioconservadores. -/- This research paper aims to present a proposal for reclaiming the body using José Ortega y Gasset’s philosophical reflections on technique. Although the Spanish philosopher does not address this issue directly in his philosophical work, it is relevant to establish a dialogue between these ideas and current discussions on technology. This paper’s proposal is situated within the framework of the debate between transhumanists and bioconservatives regarding technologies that “disembody”, such as mind-uploading and virtual reality. Likewise, this paper places the body in the context of the emergence and development of cybernetics. To support such a claim, I use the concept of the vital project taken from Orteguian terminology- to argue that the technological realization of fantasies about the body does not only depend on the access to materials, but also on the vital project of a given era. Thus, through the work of one of the main authors of the philosophy of technology, it is possible to rethink the importance of the body in the development and impact of contemporary technology and connect this proposal to contemporary projects such as transhumanism,. (shrink)

You sit in your office and put on the latest pair of virtual reality (VR) goggles. Suddenly, you stand in the middle of Times Square. A car almost hits you. You.

As David J. Chalmers claims, “virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality, virtual objects are real objects, and what goes on in virtual reality is truly real.” In this paper, I will suggest that the philosophical hypothesis that we might live in a simulation can be considered to be the last and most nihilistic episode in the series of narrations about the true and apparent worlds that Nietzsche sketched in The Twilight of the Idols. I will argue that Nietzsche’s (...) prediction about the obliteration of the apparent world has actually been fulfilled by Chalmers, and I will show why his theory must be considered one of the many fables that humans have been producing in order to organise the world according to their own ends. (shrink)

The conscious experiences we have during sleep have the potential to improve our empathetic response to those who experience delusions and psychosis by supplying a virtual reality simulation of mental illness. Empathy for those with mental illness is lacking and there has been little improvement in the last decades despite efforts made to increase awareness. Our lack of empathy, in this case, may be due to an inability to accurately mentally simulate what it’s like to have a particular cognitive disorder. (...) Dreaming can help mitigate these deficits by placing the dreamer directly into a realistic virtual simulation and thus increase their capacity for empathy. Increasing empathy would go some way towards reducing the stigma and discrimination faced by people in this group. Recent work suggests that virtual reality can increase empathy towards a variety of marginalised groups, however, this technology is limited in its ability to simulate mental illnesses such as delusions. Dreams, however, are at times virtual reality delusion simulators. They can replicate, to a reasonable degree, delusions and psychosis, and through these experiences, we can learn ‘what it’s like’ to have these conditions. It is essential that we recognise these experiences for what they are, attempt to remember and reflect on them. Instead of disregarding dreams due to their unusualness and bizarreness, we can learn from these experiences and expand our understanding of the human condition and its many forms. (shrink)

How does the integration of mixed reality devices into our cognitive practices impact the mind from a metaphysical and epistemological perspective? In his innovative and interdisciplinary article, “Minds in the Metaverse: Extended Cognition Meets Mixed Reality” (2022), Paul Smart addresses this underexplored question, arguing that the use of a hypothetical application of the Microsoft HoloLens called “the HoloFoldit” represents a technologically high-grade form of extended cognizing from the perspective of neo-mechanical philosophy. This short commentary aims to (1) carve up the (...) conceptual landscape of possible objections to Smart’s argument and (2) elaborate on the possibility of hologrammatically extended cognition, which is supposed to be one of the features of the HoloFoldit case that distinguishes it from more primitive forms of cognitive extension. In tackling (1), I do not mean to suggest that Smart does not consider or have sufficient answers to these objections. In addressing (2), the goal is not to argue for or against the possibility of hologrammatically extended cognition but to reveal some issues in the metaphysics of virtual reality upon which this possibility hinges. I construct an argument in favor of hologrammatically extended cognition based on the veracity of virtual realism (Chalmers, 2017) and an argument against it based on the veracity of virtual fctionalism (McDonnell and Wildman, 2019). (shrink)

Objects appear to causally interact with one another in virtual worlds, such as video games, virtual reality, and training simulations. Is this causation real or is it illusory? In this paper I argue that virtual causation is as real as physical causation. I achieve this in two steps: firstly, I show how virtual causation has all the important hallmarks of relations that are causal, as opposed to merely accidental, and secondly, I show how virtual causation is genuine according to one (...) influential metaphysical theory of causation: the mechanistic approach. (shrink)

Technology is answering our deepest questions about ‘reality.’ This is because Nature continually tokenizes an underlying, omnipresent, continually conserved, circular-linear relationship. Thus, zero and one (modern) is yin and yang (ancient) tying modern and ancient ideas about 'reality' together, and proving tokenization produces a cryptic 'reality.' Explaining science, and the 'search' for answers (perpetually).

What’s presented in our normal waking perceptual visual experiences feels present to us, while what we “see” in pictures and imagine does not. What about dreams? Does what we “see” in a dream feel present? Jennifer Windt has argued for an affirmative answer, for all dreams. But the dreams which flow from the brain’s registration of myoclonic twitches present a challenge to this answer. During these dreams motion-guiding vision is shut off, and, as Mohan Matthen has argued, motion-guiding vision seems (...) to be a key mechanism underlying the feeling of presence. I propose that the feeling of presence in fact involves two components: the feeling of immersion, and the feeling of availability for action. I suggest that only the feeling of availability for action derives from motion-guiding vision, and, hence, hypothesize that body-driven dreams lack this component to the feeling of presence. Finally, the distinction between these two varieties of presence has implications for measures of presence in virtual environments, as these measures can diverge over which of the two varieties they track. (shrink)

This paper considers the medium of videogames from a goodmanian standpoint. After some preliminary clarifications and definitions, I examine the ontological status of videogames. Against several existing accounts, I hold that what grounds their identity qua work types is code. The rest of the paper is dedicated to the epistemology of videogaming. Drawing on Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin's works, I suggest that the best model to defend videogame cognitivism appeals to the notion of understanding.

How can you steal something that doesn’t exist? This question confronts those of us who take an irrealist view of virtual objects and agree with the Supreme Court of the Netherlands that robbery took place when two boys used non-virtual violence to coerce a third boy into relinquishing his virtual amulet and mask. Here we outline this Puzzle of Virtual Theft, along with the closely related Puzzle of Virtual Value. After demonstrating how these puzzles are deeply problematic for the irrealist, (...) we go on to sketch a solution that not only circumscribes the puzzles but also offers a framework by which legal scholars can make sense within existing legal codes of the new phenomenon of virtual theft. (shrink)

What is the status of a cat in a virtual reality environment? Is it a real object? Or part of a fiction? Virtual realism, as defended by D. J. Chalmers, takes it to be a virtual object that really exists, that has properties and is involved in real events. His preferred specification of virtual realism identifies the cat with a digital object. The project of this paper is to use a comparison between virtual reality environments and scientific computer simulations to (...) critically engage with Chalmers’s position. I first argue that, if it is sound, his virtual realism should also be applied to objects that figure in scientific computer simulations, e.g. to simulated galaxies. This leads to a slippery slope because it implies an unreasonable proliferation of digital objects. A philosophical analysis of scientific computer simulations suggests an alternative picture: The cat and the galaxies are parts of fictional models for which the computer provides model descriptions. This result motivates a deeper analysis of the way in which Chalmers builds up his realism. I argue that he buys realism too cheap. For instance, he does not really specify what virtual objects are supposed to be. As a result, rhetoric aside, his virtual realism isn’t far from a sort of fictionalism. (shrink)

I reply to seven commentaries on “The Virtual and the Real”. In response to Claus Beisbart, Jesper Juul, Peter Ludlow, and Neil McDonnell and Nathan Wildman, I clarify and develop my view that virtual are digital objects, with special attention to the nature of digital objects and data structures. In response to Alyssa Ney and Eric Schwitzgebel, I clarify and defend my spatial functionalism, with special attention to the connections between space and consciousness. In response to Marc Silcox, I clarify (...) and develop my view of the value of virtual worlds, with special attention to the case where we experience these worlds as virtual. (shrink)

Death across human history is codified and controlled by religion, dogma, or social￾political circumstances. However, it is possible to take death out of these realms, instead dying how one wishes. One can design their own death. I will argue that human trans-death can be an intentional performance by persons and that this intentional performance can be combined with the newest and most novel methods of preserving a consciousness. This thesis opens possibilities for future exhibitions and live performances combining art and (...) innovative post-life, post-mortem (what I call “trans-death”) technologies. Possible performances or exhibitions combining art and innovative trans-death technologies include: people doing staged-performances while in their last years of life about their deanimation; public display of cryonically suspended (vitrified) bodies; and if consciousness is ever able to be digitized, the possibilities expand to any number of scenarios explored in anime shows and sci-fi literature or movies. The ethical and political implications of permissibility, freedom, and societal consequences of such artistic and technological expressions are not detailed, but some positions are outlined. A case study is utilized: the last years of life of famous and controversial Timothy Leary (1920-1996) and his struggle with prostate cancer. My analysis of the life and work of Timothy Leary - especially the text he mostly wrote Design for Dying (1997), it was edited by R.U. Sirius - is my theoretical foundation. (shrink)

Are virtual objects real? I will claim that the question sets us up for the wrong type of conclusion: Chalmers (2017) argues that a virtual calculator (like other entities) is a real calculator when it is “organizationally invariant” with its non-virtual counterpart—when it performs calculation. However, virtual reality and games are defined by the fact that they always selectively implement their source material. Even the most detailed virtual car will still have an infinite range of details which are missing (gas, (...) engines, pistons, fuel, chemical reactions, molecules, atoms). This means that even the most detailed virtual object will still have fictional aspects. Rather than argue that virtual objects are, or aren’t, real, it is preferable to think of overlaps and continuities between the fictional and the real, where even the most painstakingly detailed virtual reality implementation of a non-virtual object is still art: a human process of selection and interpretation. Virtual reality should therefore not be philosophically understood just as a technological implementation on a trajectory to perfection, but as a cultural artifact which derives its value in part from its simplification and difference from its source material. (shrink)

David Chalmers argues that virtual objects exist in the form of data structures that have causal powers. I argue that there is a large class of virtual objects that are social objects and that do not depend upon data structures for their existence. I also argue that data structures are themselves fundamentally social objects. Thus, virtual objects are fundamentally social objects.

Are the objects and events that take place in Virtual Reality genuinely real? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are realists, and those who answer in the negative are irrealists. In this paper we argue against the realist position, as given by Chalmers (2017), and present our own preferred irrealist account of the virtual. We start by disambiguating two potential versions of the realist position—weak and strong— and then go on to argue that neither is plausible. We then (...) introduce a Waltonian variety of ictionalism about the virtual, arguing that this sort of irrealist approach avoids the problems of the realist positions, fits with a unifying theory of representational works, and offers a better account of the phenomenology of engaging in virtual experiences. (shrink)

This paper draws on the notion of the ‘project,’ as developed in the existential philosophy of Heidegger and Sartre, to articulate an understanding of the existential structure of engagement with virtual worlds. By this philosophical understanding, the individual’s orientation towards a project structures a mechanism of self-determination, meaning that the project is understood essentially as the project to make oneself into a certain kind of being. Drawing on existing research from an existential-philosophical perspective on subjectivity in digital game environments, the (...) notion of a ‘virtual subjectivity’ is proposed to refer to the subjective sense of being-in-the-virtual-world. The paper proposes an understanding of virtual subjectivity as standing in a nested relation to the individual’s subjectivity in the actual world, and argues that it is this relation that allows virtual world experience to gain significance in the light of the individual’s projectual existence. The arguments advanced in this paper pave the way for a comprehensive understanding of the transformative, self-transformative, and therapeutic possibilities and advantages afforded by virtual worlds. (shrink)

This paper develops a taxonomy of kinds of actions that can be seen in group agency, human–machine interactions, and virtual realities. These kinds of actions are special in that they are not embodied in the ordinary sense. I begin by analysing the notion of embodiment into three separate assumptions that together comprise what I call the Embodiment View. Although this view may find support in paradigmatic cases of agency, I suggest that each of its assumptions can be relaxed. With each (...) assumption that is given up, a different kind of disembodied action becomes available. The taxonomy gives a systematic overview and suggests that disembodied actions have the same theoretical relevance as the actions of any ordinarily embodied human. (shrink)

I argue that virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality. In particular, I argue for virtual digitalism, on which virtual objects are real digital objects, and against virtual fictionalism, on which virtual objects are fictional objects. I also argue that perception in virtual reality need not be illusory, and that life in virtual worlds can have roughly the same sort of value as life in non-virtual worlds.

The Web, in particular real-time interactions in three-dimensional virtual environments (virtual worlds), comes with a set of unique characteristics that leave our traditional frameworks inapplicable. The present article illustrates this by arguing that the notion of “technology relations,” as put forward by Ihde and Verbeek, becomes inapplicable when it comes to the Internet, and this inapplicability shows why these phenomena require new philosophical frameworks. Against this background, and more constructively, the article proposes a fundamental distinction between “intravirtual” and “extravirtual” consequences—a (...) distinction that allows us to understand and conceptualize real-time interactions online more accurately. By relating this distinction to Searle's notion of “condition of satisfaction,” the article also shows its implications for judging real-time, online interactions in virtual worlds as irrational and/or immoral. The ultimate purpose is to illustrate how new philosophical concepts and frameworks can allow us to better account for the unique characteristics of the Internet. (shrink)

What is an avatar -- More than just another pretty face : the avatar effect -- Interview with the virtual cannibal -- Virtual presence -- X-reality, a conclusion.

In this paper, I deal with a striking phenomenon that often occurs when we explore the virtual environment of, for example, a video game. Suppose a friend sees me playing a video game and asks ‘Where are you?’ There are two possible answers to this question. I can either refer to my actual location (‘I am in my room’), but I can also refer to my location in the virtual world (‘I am in a space-ship’). Although my friend is probably (...) after this second reply, the first one is not false. At first sight, this gives rise to a tension. On the one hand both claims – ‘I am in my room’ and ‘I am in a space-ship’ – seem true. But on the other hand they also seem mutually exclusive as bilocation, i.e. being in two places at the same time, is impossible. I am either in London or in Paris, in the bathroom or in the kitchen, in a space-ship or in my room. How can I claim to be in two places at once? In the following, I discuss two ways to dissolve this tension:. (shrink)

본 논문의 목적은 롤플레잉게임이라는 가상세계에 대해 인도 이원론의 관점에서 이해하고자 하는 것이다. 인도 이원론은 순수정신인 푸루샤와 순수물질인 프라크리티라는 두 원리를 완전히 다른 영역으로 분리하고 이 둘은 절대 혼합될 수 없다고 하면서도 푸루샤는 붓디라는 물질을 매개로 물질세계를 경험할 수 있다고 설명한다. 이러한 이론은 컴퓨터 속 가상세계와 현상적 물질세계가 완전히 다름에도 불구하고 현실세계의 인간이 가상세계의 게임캐릭터를 경험하는 것과 유사하다고 보인다. 현실세계의 게임 플레이어는 캐릭터에게 지성을 조명하는 푸루샤이자 직접 인식과 판단을 행하는 붓디이다. 플레이어는 캐릭터에게 지성을 부여하고 그 행위 결과를 감수한다. 그리고 그는 이 (...) 모든 작용과 상관없는 현실세계의 주체이지만, 게임을 하는 동안에는 자신과 동일시된 캐릭터의 기쁨과 분노, 슬픔을 향수한다. (shrink)

This article raises the question of how the ontological status of virtual objects bears on their intrinsic value. If virtual objects are unreal or less real than physical objects, does it mean that they will have less intrinsic value? If they have intrinsic value, what are the explanations for this value, and how do they relate to the ontological status of the virtual objects? First, the article reviews recent work concerning the ontological status of virtual reality and virtual objects. Second, (...) it argues that in some cases the ontological status of virtual objects does undermine the value placed in them, in that the objects can fail to have the properties that ground the value attributions made to them, while in other cases their ontological status is not important. Finally, the article relates the grounding of value attributions to philosophical theories of value, in particular, perfectionism and hedonism. (shrink)

The Matrix presents a version of an old philosophical fable: the brain in a vat. A disembodied brain is floating in a vat, inside a scientist’s laboratory. The scientist has arranged that the brain will be stimulated with the same sort of inputs that a normal embodied brain receives. To do this, the brain is connected to a giant computer simulation of a world. The simulation determines which inputs the brain receives. When the brain produces outputs, these are fed back (...) into the simulation. The internal state of the brain is just like that of a normal brain, despite the fact that it lacks a body. From the brain’s point of view, things seem very much as they seem to you and me. (shrink)

This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is (...) false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed. (shrink)

I argue that at least one of the following propositions is true: the human species is very likely to become extinct before reaching a ’posthuman’ stage; any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of its evolutionary history ; we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we shall one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living (...) in a simulation. I discuss some consequences of this result. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Introduction Virtual Reality Virtual Metaphysics Virtual Identity Economic Reality.