Summary |
Virtual Reality (VR) is a relatively recent topic in philosophy, with most work emerging from the 1990s onwards. Though there is no single accepted definition of VR, plausibly whatever definition we accept must include what we experience when using modern virtual reality devices - like the HTC Vive, Meta Quest, or Playstation VR - as paradigmatic instances. Currently there are at least two major philosophical accounts of VR. The first, provided by David Chalmers (2017, 2019, 2022), maintains that VR is computer-generated, interactive, and immersive. The second, provided by Grant Tavinor (2021), construes virtualization as the process of instantiating an item’s structure and function in a novel or unfamiliar medium, and VR technology as a new medium that seeks to virtualize experience. While VR is new, it is related to a number of traditional and recent philosophical topics. Traditional topics include skepticism, envattment, illusions and hallucinations, and what we value. More recent topics includes video games, digital artifacts, computer simulations, and the simulation hypothesis. This is reflected in the wide range of philosophical debates around VR. These include issues about the nature of VR and VR technology; knowledge, ethics, and politics in VR; perception, memory, and other psychological states in VR; the aesthetics of VR; and VR’s relation to other technologies, in particular video games, augmented reality, and the Metaverse. |