Edmund Husserl

In this paper, I analyze several recent attempts to marry (cognitive) science and (classical) phenomenology. I argue that some of the most prominent proposals of such marriage are based on a conflation of two fundamentally different claims about experience that require different theoretical commitments. The _weak claim_ is that experience is important for science and cannot be neglected; the _strong claim_ is that experience is foundational for science. In my view, this conflation is mostly based on a misinterpretation of the (...) methods and goals of phenomenological philosophy in its original Husserlian form. I further argue that, if Husserl is right, this conflation may be detrimental to both phenomenology and science as it suppresses the value of the transcendental-phenomenological enterprise and disorients the objective-scientific approach. To set the stage for my argument I examine Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, and Evan Thompson’s 2024 book _The Blind Spot_ reading it back-to-back with Husserl’s _Crisis_. (shrink)

The paper proposes a systematic reconstruction of Oskar Becker’s interpretation of Husserl’s principle of transcendental idealism. Three phases will be distinguished in Becker’s approach. After a first attempt at understanding the principle exclusively on the basis of Ideas I, Becker tries to combine Husserl’s transcendental idealism with Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein. Finally, a third phase can be identified in which the picture that results from such combination is used by Becker to sketch an interpretation of the development of Husserl’s philosophy (...) as a whole. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an important, yet hitherto neglected, development within Husserl’s phenomenological formal ontology. The first sixteen paragraphs of Ideas 1 serve as the point of departure for my presentation. In these paragraphs, Husserl presents the category of “concretum”, or concrete individual, as the cornerstone of his whole formal-ontological framework. The aim of this paper is to present and discuss a revision of the account of the concrete individual Husserl develops in his Ideas 1 in 1918 in a (...) text that is now published as text 11 in Husserliana 41. I will also draw out some further implications from a text of the same year published as Appendix XVII of Husserliana 41. No adequate treatment of the 1918 account of “concrete individual” has been provided so far, however, and my paper aims at filling this gap in the scholarship. The relevance of the 1918 revision is phenomenological and philosophical, rather than just historical. In that text Husserl solves some ambiguities in the Ideas 1 treatment of concrete individuals, and, in doing so, he introduces an original distinction between two types of genera, self-individuating and other-individuating. He also provides elements to a phenomenological doctrine of the principle of individuation and takes a stance on the question of the individuation of essence. (shrink)

In a late manuscript, Husserl explicitly addresses the problem of depersonalization. Depersonalization is described as a rupture in a certain layer of experience, which, however, does not touch the fundamental unity of the underlying genesis. After a brief recapitulation of historical approaches to depersonalization, I’ll come to comment on this passage. To assess Husserl’s contribution to the clinical understanding, and more specifically to the phenomenology of depersonalization, it is essential to understand his concept of personhood. In Husserl’s account of personhood, (...) we can identify a tension between the unity and continuity of the transcendental genesis of the personal _ego_ and the self-alienation and de-presentation at play in this genesis. Drawing on the French reception of Husserl’s phenomenology and Eugen Fink’s notion of de-presentation, I suggest that transcendental temporalization not only cannot function as a fail-safe in the case of depersonalization but may even be at the core of the loss of the sense of personhood. To account for the fact of personalization, one must re-evaluate the notion of empathy in the relation of the self to itself. (shrink)

This paper is meant as a contribution to the longstanding debate among Husserl scholars regarding the relationship between time-consciousness and the I. From a genetic-phenomenological perspective, the I lives in the tension between passivity and activity. Exploring how the I relates to time-consciousness thus involves thematizing the interplay of passivity and activity at the most fundamental level of constitution. Specifically, it is necessary to determine whether there is an active form of temporalization. Acknowledging the ambiguities in Husserl’s late manuscripts on (...) time, this paper takes an indirect approach to this question. Relying primarily on Husserl’s analysis of active synthesis in his transcendental logic, I argue that being intellectually active requires an active form of temporalization, which establishes the specific rhythm of egoic activity. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology aims to obtain knowledge about the essential structure of consciousness and its various subtypes, and how different types of objects appear in consciousness. On a classic reading, such knowledge requires adequate evidence and apodictic evidence, which are absolutely certain or infallible. However, a trend has emerged to question this classic reading and to embrace a radically fallibilist reading of Husserl’s theory of evidence instead. A core component of this reading is that adequate evidence and apodictic evidence are either (...) non-actual, or, even if they exist, are fallible. This paper aims to resist this radical fallibilist reading and reaffirm the classic reading. In this paper, I criticize two main arguments for the radical fallibilist reading. I also examine frequently cited texts that seem to strongly favor the fallibilist reading and show that they do not serve the intended purpose. I further show that although Husserl later has refined his earlier theory of evidence, he never reversed his earlier basic position. For Husserl, adequate evidence and apodictic evidence can be difficult to achieve. However, they can be sometimes achieved in immanent perception and eidetic analysis; when achieved, they are infallible. (shrink)

Husserl investigated the topic of childhood in a small number of research manuscripts, produced around the 1930s. This essay first presents its rationale for addressing the issue – which was essentially to examine more closely the phenomenon of _Einfühlung_ in the context of his inquiry into intersubjectivity – and illustrates the method of _Rückfrage_ that guided his research. It then offers a reading of Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of childhood and the related conceptual distinctions, organizing them under the following headings: a. (...) second childhood (_das wirkliche Kind_); b. _Urkindheit_, or primal childhood which, in turn is subdivided into: b1. first childhood outside the womb and b2. intrauterine life; c. procreation or generation (_Zeugung_), from the _UrIch_ to the _VorIch_. Throughout this reverse reconstruction, a particular focus is given to the importance of the notion of _Paarung_ (coupling or pairing) at all levels of the ego's constitution. The self-constitution of the ego (_Ich_) always implies a relationship – which differs as a function of the child's specific stage of development – with all that is alien to the ego (_Ichfremdes_), right back to the unattainable, yet constitutive alterity of birth. (shrink)

McDowell shares with phenomenology the idea that experience is open to the world and that the relation between mind and world is normative. While he claims that conceptual capacities are already passively involved in experience, passive synthesis in Husserl has its own intentional constitution, which originally has a rational and normative character in a primitive sense, yet doesn’t depend on conceptual and linguistic capacities. In my analysis, McDowell’s notion of conceptual capacities enables the formation of experience in two ways: by (...) providing conceptual content, and by building up awareness that is later linked with self-critical reflection. I argue that in Husserl’s phenomenology, experience already has structural content without relying on concepts and that attention already displays a pre-reflective exercise of rationality without relying on self-critical reflection. Husserl’s rationality is not to be linked with conceptual capacities, reflection, or spontaneity. Moreover, Husserl’s notion of experience is broader than McDowell’s. McDowell denies that some second nature could count as conceptualized experience, since it is accomplished without explicit awareness. In contrast, Husserl would admit the rationality of second nature even though it lies beneath attentive awareness at the level of receptivity, because there is a deeper pre-reflective, affective participation of the I in the passive motivation that contributes to the horizonality of experience in an implicit mode. Thus rationality and normativity penetrate more deeply into second nature than McDowell thinks. In comparison to McDowell, Husserl shows how a notion of rationality in a much broader sense is involved in experience. (shrink)

Husserl investigated the topic of childhood in a small number of research manuscripts, produced around the 1930s. This essay first presents its rationale for addressing the issue – which was essentially to examine more closely the phenomenon of Einfühlung in the context of his inquiry into intersubjectivity – and illustrates the method of Rückfrage that guided his research. It then offers a reading of Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of childhood and the related conceptual distinctions, organizing them under the following headings: a. (...) second childhood (das wirkliche Kind); b. Urkindheit, or primal childhood which, in turn is subdivided into: b1. first childhood outside the womb and b2. intrauterine life; c. procreation or generation (Zeugung), from the UrIch to the VorIch. Throughout this reverse reconstruction, a particular focus is given to the importance of the notion of Paarung (coupling or pairing) at all levels of the ego's constitution. The self-constitution of the ego (Ich) always implies a relationship – which differs as a function of the child's specific stage of development – with all that is alien to the ego (Ichfremdes), right back to the unattainable, yet constitutive alterity of birth. (shrink)

In a late manuscript, Husserl explicitly addresses the problem of depersonalization. Depersonalization is described as a rupture in a certain layer of experience, which, however, does not touch the fundamental unity of the underlying genesis. After a brief recapitulation of historical approaches to depersonalization, I’ll come to comment on this passage. To assess Husserl’s contribution to the clinical understanding, and more specifically to the phenomenology of depersonalization, it is essential to understand his concept of personhood. In Husserl’s account of personhood, (...) we can identify a tension between the unity and continuity of the transcendental genesis of the personal ego and the self-alienation and de-presentation at play in this genesis. Drawing on the French reception of Husserl’s phenomenology and Eugen Fink’s notion of de-presentation, I suggest that transcendental temporalization not only cannot function as a fail-safe in the case of depersonalization but may even be at the core of the loss of the sense of personhood. To account for the fact of personalization, one must re-evaluate the notion of empathy in the relation of the self to itself. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology aims to obtain knowledge about the essential structure of consciousness and its various subtypes, and how different types of objects appear in consciousness. On a classic reading, such knowledge requires adequate evidence and apodictic evidence, which are absolutely certain or infallible. However, a trend has emerged to question this classic reading and to embrace a radically fallibilist reading of Husserl’s theory of evidence instead. A core component of this reading is that adequate evidence and apodictic evidence are either (...) non-actual, or, even if they exist, are fallible. This paper aims to resist this radical fallibilist reading and reaffirm the classic reading. In this paper, I criticize two main arguments for the radical fallibilist reading. I also examine frequently cited texts that seem to strongly favor the fallibilist reading and show that they do not serve the intended purpose. I further show that although Husserl later has refined his earlier theory of evidence, he never reversed his earlier basic position. For Husserl, adequate evidence and apodictic evidence can be difficult to achieve. However, they can be sometimes achieved in immanent perception and eidetic analysis; when achieved, they are infallible. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an important, yet hitherto neglected, development within Husserl’s phenomenological formal ontology. The first sixteen paragraphs of Ideas 1 serve as the point of departure for my presentation. In these paragraphs, Husserl presents the category of “concretum”, or concrete individual, as the cornerstone of his whole formal-ontological framework. The aim of this paper is to present and discuss a revision of the account of the concrete individual Husserl develops in his Ideas 1 in 1918 in a (...) text that is now published as text 11 in Husserliana 41. I will also draw out some further implications from a text of the same year published as Appendix XVII of Husserliana 41. No adequate treatment of the 1918 account of “concrete individual” has been provided so far, however, and my paper aims at filling this gap in the scholarship. The relevance of the 1918 revision is phenomenological and philosophical, rather than just historical. In that text Husserl solves some ambiguities in the Ideas 1 treatment of concrete individuals, and, in doing so, he introduces an original distinction between two types of genera, self-individuating and other-individuating. He also provides elements to a phenomenological doctrine of the principle of individuation and takes a stance on the question of the individuation of essence. (shrink)

As a fervent rationalist, Husserl placed considerable emphasis on the delineation of the different levels of reason. Its highest form, he contends, is position-taking (Stellungnahme) understood as a critical stance towards a positional act P. Specifically, such a Stellungnahme is a three-step procedure: the subject, possibly motivated by a passive discordance, starts by questioning P (active doubt); she then seeks to validate P by returning to its originary fulfillment (active search for evidence); finally, she ratifies such a fulfillment in an (...) act of acknowledgment (active decision), thereby making P a permanent personal conviction. In the literature, the role of position-taking in the formation of persons has been aptly emphasized, but insufficient attention has been paid to its intrinsic structure and concrete functioning; furthermore, the few existing studies on this topic are limited to the theoretical domain. The aim of this paper is to fill this twofold gap by providing a comprehensive account of critical Stellungnahme in both the intellectual and the axiological spheres, drawing especially on the manuscripts from the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. The first part examines Stellungnahme in the theoretical realm, underscoring its teleological orientation towards justification and the active role played by the subject in it. The second part shows how this procedure can be extended to rationalize value-experiences, by elucidating the nature of affective evidence and approval (Billigung). Finally, the third part demonstrates how a particular value, that of knowledge, can concretely pass the axiological position-taking and thus be recognized as an actual value. (shrink)

A phenomenologically based theory of occurrent thinking called TMDOT was developed and a portion of it will be presented here because it appears to lend validation to, clarify, explicate, and further distinguish between two forms of Husserlian intentionality critical to the constitution of objects, both of which are posited as existing during occurrent thoughts. For Husserl, there is an intentionality occurring in the _substratum_ of meaning generation through intentional acts of consciousness, one that is directly linked to another _stratum_, the (...) purpose of which is to express that meaning. The theory focuses on the phenomenological differences between these two forms of intentionality, their different cognitive functions, and the phenomenally based ways in which they connect to each other to facilitate their respective roles. TMDOT appears to support Husserl’s phenomenological observations and descriptions of two types of intentional acts and how they experientially and temporally connect to each other during the occurrent thought process. In turn, his views about the nature of such acts appear to lend credence to said theory. Cognitive and neuroscientific research results incorporated into TMDOT are presented, ones which seem to support and expand upon Husserl’s understanding of the nature of intentional acts utilized in the constitution of objects and upon his beliefs about the existence and functioning of an Ego-pole in conscious experiencing. (shrink)

A book review of 'Europe, Phenomenology, and Politics in Husserl and Patočka', by Lorenzo Girardi (Rowman & Littlefield, 2024).

Husserl’s thesis of absolute individuation consists of two ideas: (1) unlike experiences and mundane entities, which are individuated via spatiotemporal position, the subject has its own principle of individuation and (2) even for non-subjects, the ultimate principle of individuation is their relationship with the subject. Absolute individuation is sometimes qualitatively interpreted (even by Husserl): owing to habituation, a subject’s personal character cannot be reinstantiated elsewhere. I argue against the qualitative interpretation for two reasons. The first is its inconsistency with Husserl’s (...) account of the individuation of non-subjects. Maximally specific universals cannot individuate a non-subject because they can be multiply instantiated, at least in different phantasies. If multiple instantiation is also possible for personal characters, then this poses a problem for the qualitative interpretation. The second reason is that the qualitative interpretation cannot explain the subjective contribution to the individuation of non-subjects. I consequently propose an extra-qualitative interpretation: The relevant subject should be defined as one-off sic et simpliciter. It has no other determinations than one-offness and is, thus, pre-spatiotemporal. This can explain what individuates instances of maximally specific spatiotemporal universals, thereby addressing (2) above. It also highlights the need to recognize the respective contributions made by multiple notions of the subject. Husserl’s context-dependent distinction between constitutive determinations and principia individuationis may shed light on the qualitative/non-qualitative difference in contemporary metaphysics. The hierarchical model of individuation can also illuminate the debate around possible worlds and haecceitism. (shrink)

In this article, I give a systematic exposition of Edmund Husserl’s account of Hingabe, a phenomenological concept that has only recently received attention. I contend that the concept of Hingabe phenomenologically reveals that the ego of the intentional correlation ego-cogito-cogitatum is not an empty pole and more than a mere ‘datum of manifestation,’ but is active, engaging itself at various depths in experience. I trace the concept in the three types of experience in which Hingabe appears in Husserl’s work. First, (...) in interested attention, the tension of interest is not a one-sided attraction of the object, but the ego is active “giving itself over” to interested objects of attention that makes possible interested engagement with an object. Second, in value experience, Hingabe refers to a way in which the ego contributes to registering genuine value in an ‘originary’ experience. In such experience, the ego opens itself and allows for the value object to impose its weight on the ego, thereby registering the value, yet Hingabe can also be a source of error in evaluation. Finally, Hingabe concerns the love for vocational objects that are at the core of the person and play out in everyday life. In these analyses, we see a way in which the subject is active in the appearing of the world. (shrink)

The primary aim of this research was to investigate the intricate relationship between the structural elements of experiences and their essential role in meaning formation. The analysis focused on understanding the nature of mental representations and the subjective, phenomenal qualities that emerge within experiences. To achieve this, an integrated approach, combining cognitive semantics with phenomenological analysis, was employed to examine the compositional complexities of the dynamic interaction between a priori and immediate experiences and their significance in meaning formation. The study (...) highlights the interconnectivity of structural elements within experience as a critical factor in shaping the phenomenal qualities of mental representations. Another key contribution of this study is the introduction of the “fulfiller” concept, which underscores the importance of absent qualities in meaning formation-an often-overlooked aspect in traditional models that focus solely on present attributes. The “fulfiller” concept emphasizes how absence, in addition to presence, influences meaning assignment. This inclusion enhances our understanding of meaning formation by considering both the tangible and intangible dimensions of the experiential-intentional process, offering a more comprehensive framework for understanding how meaning emerges from the complex interaction of present and absent qualities. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the act of consciousness called empathy, as proposed by Husserl in Ideas II. By applying Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, I evidence three moments that constitute empathy: first, to recognize the other Ego; second, to open myself up to the other Ego; and third, to feel with the other Ego. I investigate these eidetic universalities [Wesenallgemeinheiten] within the limits of pure intuition (HUA III, 146). To recognize the other Ego is an involuntary act that happens in consciousness (...) when I come face-to-face with another human being. To open myself up to the other Ego is a spiritual act derived from freedom. I can decide whether or not to open myself up. If I do not, empathy is interrupted, incomplete, and I can react either affectionately or distressfully, or I can make a hasty judgement and decide either to distance myself from the other or to act. If I open myself up to the other Ego, I can react affectionately or distressfully, without much information. Another possibility is to comprehend, reflect, judge, agree or disagree, and decide either to distance myself from the other or to act in either a compassionate or a confrontational way. In this regard, empathy does not imply agreeing or acting compassionately. In short, I present a mental map of this reasoning and conclude by pointing out the need to develop empathy and the importance of having time to empathise appropriately. (shrink)

Body as a radical reality in human activity is a common thesis in the phenomenological thought, from its origin in the work of Edmund Husserl, in those of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry, to post-phenomenological currents, including Don Ihde and the American school. As a complementary thesis, they highlight the presence of the body in technologies: its deep interaction and integration, generating a certain bodily extension that makes the user-device an environment of intentional feedback through which flows the matter of (...) the experienced. Through the synthesis of previous techniques, digital media have deepened this capacity for integration: through embodiment and representation, hardware and software, multiple forms of bodily extension are experimentable. From the construction of these alternative corporealities emerges the narrative of a digital body as a 'real body', controlled by us, fully equivalent and similar to our own bodies. In this text we propose a brief analysis of digital corporeality based on phenomenological reflections, especially those around tactile self-perception, as a foundation for a criterion of bodily identity applicable to these technologies and which reclaims the original and carnal experience of the user. (shrink)

The meaning of academy given in Athens in antiquity is connected with the aim of the journal Theology and Philosophy of Education. This text explains the journal's conceptual roots with methodological distinctions. Both the role of the phenomenological approach and key persons are mentioned.

This article-based dissertation studies the question whether Husserl could be understood as an internalist or an externalist about meaning or content. In this context, internalism and externalism represent different answers to the question whether things external to the subject, namely features of the subject’s social and physical environment, may individuate the content of the subject’s intentional states (e.g., judgments, beliefs, perceptions). Where internalism maintains that content can only be individuated by internal factors, externalism claims that content can also be individuated (...) by external factors. Husserl has traditionally been interpreted as an internalist, but in the past few decades this interpretation has been challenged. Yet, scholars continue to disagree whether Husserl is then better understood as an externalist or as a philosopher who cannot be positioned within the internalism-externalism debate in the first place. The main results of this dissertation are that the internalism-externalism framework remains meaningful within the transcendental framework of Husserl’s philosophy and that Husserl is better understood as an externalist. These results emerge from three original research articles, which are presented and discussed in an introductory chapter. -/- The first article analyses the argument that Husserl cannot be understood within the internalism-externalism framework because Husserl renounces a distinction between internality and externality. The article demonstrates that Husserl rejects the internal-external divide only in the spatial sense in which it is usually understood and suggests that if the internal-external divide is understood in relation to the subject’s point of view, the internal-external divide can be rendered applicable to the transcendental framework of Husserl’s philosophy. The second article evaluates the interpretational dispute about Husserl’s concept of the noema in relation to the internalism-externalism debate. The article proposes a reconciliation between two opposing interpretations of the noema by claiming that both interpretations can be correct in two separate areas of phenomenological investigation. Reconciling these two noema interpretations, the article then shows that these interpretations do not, unlike it has been previously presumed, have any direct implications for the question whether Husserl is an internalist or an externalist. The answer to this question rather hinges on what the correct way is to understand the individuation of meaning, which is not settled by either noema interpretation. The third article outlines an answer to this question. The article studies a research manuscript in which Husserl deals with the question about the identity of meaning which is associated with the philosophical problem in the internalism-externalism debate about the individuation of meaning. The article assesses different internalist interpretations of Husserl’s manuscript and proposes an externalist reading of it instead. The article develops an externalist interpretation of Husserl that reconciles the realism of externalism and the transcendental standpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology by synthesizing an asymmetrical view of individuation with Husserl’s view of the correlation between consciousness and the world. (shrink)

An active area of research in the philosophy of mind concerns the relation between the two marks of the mental: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. One position that has recently gained in popularity is the _phenomenal intentionality theory_, according to which intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. Proponents of the phenomenal intentionality theory recognize Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology as a precedent, but little work has been done to locate Husserl within the contemporary landscape of views on the relation between the marks of the (...) mental. My aim is to do just that. I start by arguing that Husserl qualifies as an _inseparatist_: he holds that original intentionality and phenomenal consciousness necessarily co-vary. I then give a Husserlian critique of a notable and radical version of the phenomenal intentionality theory defended by Angela Mendelovici, focusing on her accounts of color perception and thought. Finally, I sketch a Husserlian version of the phenomenal intentionality theory that I think ought to be a serious contender in the contemporary scene. (shrink)

This book discusses the ethics of engaging with the paradigm of lived experience, particularly through an interest in the spatiotemporal constructs of such experiences via a comparative conceptual map across Husserlian phenomenology and Nishida’s moral philosophy. The overall commitment of the book is towards the vision of a ‘better life’ through insights into two themes, that of time and intimacy.

In this article, we present the structuring of the unity of the stream of consciousness (Bewusstseinsfluss) and its continuum through the analysis of retentive consciousness, longitudinal intentionality (Längsintentionalität), and temporal perception in Husserl, based on § 39 of the Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Internal Time-Consciousness. Our hypothesis is that these elements play fundamental roles in the ordering of temporal conscious experience, since retentive consciousness, as delineated by Husserl, not only retains the past but actively constitutes the continuous unity (...) of the stream of consciousness, seamlessly integrating past experiences with the temporal now (Jetzt). This capacity is facilitated by the double intentionality of retention (doppelte Intentionalität der Retention), which allows consciousness to structure its temporal experiences in a continuous and cohesive manner. Additionally, longitudinal intentionality operates in the transformation of proto-sensations into more complex retentional structures, contributing decisively to the structuring of the temporal continuity of conscious experience. We also explore temporal perception in Husserlian phenomenology, highlighting how the interaction between the constitution of immanent (transcendental) time and the quasi-temporal insertion (quasi-zeitlich) of the phases of the stream of consciousness promotes a unified and continuous perception of time. We argue that this dynamic explains temporality in human experience and underscores the importance of the self-appearance (Selbsterscheinung) of the stream of consciousness for the cohesion of conscious life in Husserlian phenomenology. (shrink)

Husserl's proposed method for knowing the essences of universals, which he calls “free variation,” has been widely criticized for involving viciously circular reasoning. In this paper, I review existing attempts to resolve this problem, and I argue that they all fail. I then show that extant accounts are all guilty of a common mistake: they assume that circularity is inevitable as long as the exercise of free variation presupposes the ability to identify the universal whose essence is in question, that (...) is, the ability to recognize entities as instances of it. I reject this assumption: I argue on both Husserlian and independent philosophical grounds that knowledge of a universal's essence is not required for identifying it, but only for re‐identifying it at every possible world in which it is instantiated. I then defend a reading on which free variation's purpose is to move its practitioner from non‐essentialistic knowledge of a universal's identity (its actual instantiation‐pattern) to essentialistic knowledge of its transworld identity (its instantiation‐pattern in every possible world in which it is present). And I show that such a transformation is a non‐circular progression from non‐modal to modal knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl’s analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his critical reflections on Shaftesbury’s theory of affections in his lecture course Einleitung in die Ethik. The sections of this course devoted to Shaftesbury are the only place in Husserl’s later philosophical production where he addresses the need to clarify the nature of (...) approval from a phenomenological point of view and provides precise indications about the role that such emotions play in our life. I thereby examine Husserl’s criticisms of Shaftesbury’s account of reflective emotions, and I compare these criticisms with Husserl’s account of approval in the texts from the Konvolut über Billigung collected in the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I argue that, according to Husserl, approval is an essential but not sufficient component in the pursuit of virtue. The upshot is that crucial parts of Husserl’s ethics come from a radical and original reworking of central notions of the early modern sentimentalist tradition. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is a distinctly philosophical approach that emphasizes the significance of direct observation and the description of conscious experience. Unlike traditional approaches that concentrate on abstract concepts and theories, phenomenology seeks to understand the concrete and immediate nature of experience. The concept of intentionality, which refers to how consciousness is directed towards an object or phenomenon, is a key feature of Husserl's phenomenology. The notion of intentionality carries profound implications for how we comprehend perception, as it suggests that (...) perception is not a mere passive process, but rather an active and engaged interaction with the world around us. By emphasizing the significance of lived experiences, Husserl's thoughts provide a nuanced and profound understanding of the complexities of human consciousness. Phenomenology sheds light on the finer details and subtleties of our subjective reality by careful analysis and reflection on these experienced experiences. This paper delves into the emphasis on present consciousness, offering a potent prism through which to examine the intricate interplay between the subject and the outside world, all while considering the notion of intentionality. (shrink)

This article considers the contribution of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology to the scientific realism debate by thematizing the problem of dubitability. After first considering the rigorous standards for apodictic evidence in phenomenology, particularly in terms of the intuitive givenness of evidence, I consider how scientific theory is open, in principle, to doubt. I argue that phenomenology has both a critical and descriptive function for scientific theory: it clarifies what scientific theory can or cannot tell us about the world, both possibly and (...) necessarily; and it describes the meaningfulness that scientific theory can have for us in our experience of the world—that is, in the living flow of conscious experience that is indubitably real. As such, I explain how phenomenology can take scientific theory as a serious field of investigation. (shrink)

If you have enjoyed any of the 7 (seven) other books I have published over 20 years, including literally thousands of pages of mathematical and topological concepts, Python programs and conceptually expanding papers, please consider buying this book for $20.00 on google play books. -/- Introduction: -/- Though the following pages provide extensive exposition and dedicated descriptions of the phenomenological velocity formulas, theory and mystery, I thought it appropriate to write this introduction as a partial explanation for what phenomenal velocity (...) is, and describe, briefly its theory and applications. Phenomenological Velocity is a method for solving for something that ought cancel out with itself, but there are specific implicit forms for this thing that, “ought cancel out with itself,” namely the Lorentz coefficient ought cancel out with itself when applied to the height of a cone derived from the difference between the circumferences of two circles applied to the Pythagorean Theorem, or, more generally, the height implied by application of the Pythagorean theorem to the difference between two arc lengths’ equaling a third arc length. These difference equations are essential to conceptualizing differentiation, and in these further chapters, I demonstrate that the phenomenological velocity is, indeed the conditional derivative in the chapter, “Conditional Integral of Phenomenological Velocity.” The phenomenological velocity algebraic solution to the velocity within the Lorentz coefficient when applied to the height function in such a way that it ought cancel out with itself is both constructive mathematics and it employs the concept of, “bracketing,” - first introduced by Edmund Husserl in his writings on the phenomenological reduction. Phenomenological Velocity’s algebraic solution from the difference between two arc lengths applied to the Pythagorean Theorem to solve for a theoretical height (which is a projected distance in space), employs bracketing, because we, “set aside,” the existence of an undefined solution, namely due to the presence of necessitated complex analytical forms by the architecture of the equation, or the “mathetecture,” of the algebraic form. -/- With respect to theology, the phenomenological velocity is somehow symbolic of the creation itself; symbolic of creation due to the fact that we find the canceling out of the Lorentz coefficient as, “impotent,” non-existent or non-effecting to the mathetecture of the height function. However, via the modus-ponens work around to phenomenological velocity, which in itself does not require the complex field, but embeds implied complex field solutions to the equation while maintaining logical consistency, we find existence from non-existence. This is directly linguistically applicable to the concept of the big-bang, the resurrection of Yeshua the Messiah, and opens analogies for us to draw relationships between the, “fall,” of Adam and Eve as the generation of error, or the introduction of paradox, as we see the phallus representing paradox topologically. -/- The phenomenological velocity is a gestalt concept, relevant to cosmology, because we find that it is the perfect language-form for discussing dark matter. It does, however, require the reader to re-conceive or re-frame rather, some of the fundamental aspects of assumed physical reality like time, experience, solidity of dark matter, etc. We find the hidden dimension of phenomenological velocity to have been an overlooked aspect of mathematical physics by the researchers of Bell’s theorem and undoubtedly a host of other theorems. Thus, raising awareness about the real existence and necessitated reality of phenomenological velocity is in no way an endeavor deserving further procrastination by the scientific community, for doing so would be intellectually dishonest and further the propagation of incomplete or misleading theories on reality. -/- This work details how the Lorentz coefficient, when applied to the height of a cone in such a way as to cancel out with itself, permits the velocity variable to have a solution to it anyway, even though it ought cancel out with itself. This mathe-tecture, so to speak has consequences for complex analysis, and pave the way for, "transcendental relativity," building an adaptive framework for consciousness and physical reality. (shrink)

Why do we need a theory of constitution? -- The history of the notion of constitution : two case studies -- Towards a theory of constitution -- The social foundation of the mind -- Constitution and idealism.

We recall, "a priori," numeric energy expression: -/- Energy Numbers -/- $\begin{gathered}\mathcal{V}=\left\{f \mid \exists\left\{e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n\right\} \in E \cup R\right\} \\ \mathcal{V}=\left\{f \mid \exists\left\{e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n\right\} \in E, \text { and }: E \mapsto r \in R\right\} \\ \mathcal{V}=\left\{E \mid \exists\left\{a_1, \ldots, a_n\right\} \in E, E \not \neg r \in R\right\}\end{gathered}$ -/- We now introduce the set of optimized energy numbers: -/- ($H_a \in \mathcal{H}$ or $P^n = NP$ or $(P,\mathcal{L},F) = NP$). -/- Based on our formulation of (...) the bi-objective optimization task, we can make the following mathematical inferences: -/- 1. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is equal to the original energy numbers set $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H = \mathcal{E}$, then the maximum optimization score is achieved, i.e. the bi-objective optimization task is solved. This implies that there exists at least one solution to the optimization problem and $H_a \in \mathcal{H}$, where $H_a$ is the hypothesis that states the existence of an efficient algorithm to solve the problem. -/- 2. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is a subset of the original energy numbers set $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H \subset \mathcal{E}$, then the optimization score is less than the maximum score. This indicates that there may exist more efficient algorithms to solve the problem, and the hypothesis $H_a$ is still possible. -/- 3. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is a superset of the original energy numbers set $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H \supset \mathcal{E}$, then the optimization score is higher than the maximum score. This implies that the optimization problem may be easier than initially thought, and $P^n = NP$, or at least some form of $NP$-completeness. -/- 4. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is a strict subset of the original energy numbers set $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H \subsetneq \mathcal{E}$, and $P^n \neq NP$, then it can be concluded that the optimization problem is complex but there may exist algorithms that can efficiently approximate the solution. -/- 5. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is empty, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H = \emptyset$, then it can be inferred that the optimization problem is infeasible, i.e. no efficient algorithm exists to solve it, and $H_a$ is false. -/- 6. Comparing the two objectives in the bi-objective optimization task, we can make the following statements: -/- - The first objective, $\frac{\delta_{v(f)}(\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w_{max}})} {\langle \mathbf{v_f}, \mathbf{1_f}\rangle}$, measures the efficiency of the algorithm and its ability to find low energy numbers. - The second objective, $\rho(\mathcal{N}_H)$, measures the accuracy of the algorithm in terms of loss and perplexity on the HyperLanguageModel. - Therefore, by optimizing both objectives simultaneously, we aim to find an efficient algorithm that also minimizes the loss and perplexities on the HyperLanguageModel. - If the optimization task is successfully solved, then the algorithm achieves both high efficiency and high accuracy. This would imply that the algorithm is able to find low energy numbers effectively and also generalize well on the HyperLanguageModel. -/- The optimized energy numbers aim to find a set of numbers $\mathbf{v}$ that maximize the bi-objective optimization task, while also minimizing the loss and perplexity of the HyperLanguageModel. This is achieved by finding the set of numbers that have the highest delta value and the lowest perplexity, resulting in a more optimized and efficient set of energy numbers. -/- By comparing the optimized energy numbers to the original set, we can see that the optimized set may have a higher delta value and a lower perplexity, indicating that it is a better set of numbers for the given task. This shows that the optimized energy numbers have successfully achieved their goal of maximizing efficiency while minimizing loss and perplexity. (shrink)

In this article I will use Husserlian tools in order to elaborate a phenomenology of ludic experience. Following Fink, my aim here is to present what Husserl could have elaborated in a more systematic manner concerning the specificity of what he calls the ludic praxis (Spielpraxis) and the ludic construct (Spielgebilde). Firstly, I analyze the temporality of ludic experience. Play has a dilative temporal structure: it involves a momentary captivation in the present and a momentary suspension of the architectonic goals (...) of the agent. Secondly, play has its own artifacts. I begin by analyzing what I call the impermanent construct, i.e., the object whose elaboration is motivated by a self-referential interest of the poietic subject. Thirdly, play does not only erect singular entities, but also ludic worlds as a whole. My objective is to scrutinize the mode of being of these normative spaces. I conclude with a description of the ludic object par excellence, namely the toy (Spielzeug). (shrink)

In this paper, we provide an overview of the main stages in the development of Edmund Husserl’s conception of metaphysics, highlighting its most significant characteristics. We propose that Husserl’s views on metaphysics traversed three main stages: (1) from the early 1890s until his so-called “transcendental turn” around 1906/07; (2) from his transcendental turn until the late 1920s, and (3) the metaphysical conceptualization during the 1930s, aptly characterized as—following the interpretation of László Tengelyi—a “metaphysics of primal facts” (Urfakta, Urtatsache). We further (...) demonstrate that Husserl’s considerations concerning metaphysics—throughout his entire opus—span three essential levels: (1) the epistemological level, in particular, phenomenological preparations to establish a foundation for metaphysics; (2) a level concerning metaphysics as the universal and ultimate science of reality, and (3) a level addressing metaphysics as a proper field of phenomenological investigations into the highest and ultimate questions (such as God and immortality). We argue in detail that Husserl attempted to render this field—which radically transcends the domain of possible intuitions (Anschauungen) and direct experience—accessible to a legitimate phenomenological treatment via the method of phenomenological constructions, prior to the efforts of Eugen Fink. (shrink)

In the texts collected in the second volume of the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, Husserl extensively discusses experiences of joy (Freude). By considering Husserl’s examples related to joy not as mere illustrations, but as a guiding thread for the identification of experiential structures, this article shows how these examples are not only significant for the general theory of intentionality of affective and emotional non-objectifying acts, but also provide valuable insights into the specific phenomenon of joy itself. Specifically, the article (...) demonstrates how the distinction between joy, sensory pleasure, and liking provides insights into the intentional structure of joy as a responsive affect. On the basis of these distinctions, the article raises the normative question about the appropriateness of affective and emotional responses. It argues that the appropriateness of joy should be assessed from two perspectives: in relation to the value that justifies an affective response and in relation to a personal motivational nexus. From the former perspective, joy can be normatively assessed. However, when only considering the latter perspective, joy cannot be assessed according to objective normative standards. Finally, building on these findings, the article explores how the phenomenology of joy and motivation may be connected to the specific experience of depth and discusses the role of joy for a phenomenological investigation of the personal self. (shrink)

This article investigates Husserl’s arguments for the constitutive role of memory in producing the awareness of objective time. Husserl explicitly connects his thoughts on time and memory to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, while developing an original understanding of the syntheses of recognition and reproduction. This offers a novel avenue for considering what is transcendental about Husserl’s phenomenology of memory. I contend that Husserl developed three transcendental functions of memory with a quasi-Kantian cast in writings from 1917 to 1926. These (...) three functions concern the re-identifiability of objects over time, the objectuality (Gegenständlichkeit) of moments in time, and the rigidity of the relations between moments. An exposition of these three transcendental functions and a comparison with Kant’s critical philosophy of time establish what sort of legitimacy objective time had for Husserl and how memory served as its subjective condition of possibility. This article also offers an account of the connection between individuation and memory and a novel comparison between Husserl and Kant on the topic of memory in transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

In the vast landscape of Edmund Husserl’s investigations, the theme of attention has long been neglected: the dispersal of his treatment of the topic across works from various years, the use of a diversified lexicon, and an intrinsic difficulty in identifying the attentional phenomenon itself have all contributed to the long-standing underestimation of this theme. Following a line of study that – especially after the publication of volume XXXVIII of the Husserliana (Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit) – has renewed interest in this (...) topic, this article aims to contribute to the historical as well as theoretical reconstruction of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of attention. In particular, we will focus on the contribution of a figure who had a crucial impact on Husserl’s development and the framing of the phenomenological method itself, namely Carl Stumpf, concentrating especially on the engagement that the father of phenomenology had with him, starting from the treatment of attention through the concept of interest. This debate will be reconstructed from the examination of (1) part of the Göttingen Lectures of 1904-05, explicitly dedicated to attention; (2) a very early but theoretically significant Husserlian manuscript, “Noten zur Lehre von Aufmerksamkeit und Interesse” (1893); and (3) Stumpf’s own work, particularly Tonpsychologie, where the interpretation of attention as “Lust am Bemerken” is formulated and with which Husserl engages in a rigorous critical dialogue. On the basis of this confrontation, we will highlight from an original perspective Husserl’s significant debt to the psychology of the time, from which he not only borrowed certain themes and a general interest in the simplest levels of experience, but also the basic outlines of notions that would serve as the foundation for the development of some crucial concepts of transcendental phenomenology such as that of intentionality. Moreover, it is through the examination of attention that the profound continuity of Husserl’s reflection becomes apparent, evidenced by the extraordinarily early emergence of crucial and typical notions of his later phase (known as “genetic phenomenology”) during these formative years, even before the phenomenological method was fully developed. (shrink)

The phenomenological notion of attitude has gained new traction in recent years, as it proliferates beyond its initial distinction between natural and phenomenological attitudes, notably to describe multiple meanings to critique and reflection. In this paper, I present an account of the concept of an ethical attitude in Husserlian phenomenology. First, I argue that the ethical attitude is best understood as a practical orientation toward personal life as a whole: someone strives to become the best possible person through self-reflection, self-variation, (...) the renewal of values and ends, and resolve. Second, I interpret Husserl’s accounts of the ethical reduction and the practical neutrality modification through the notion of the ethical attitude. This allows me to elaborate on questions of motivation for striving to be a good person, even if the world seems inhospitable to that effort. The question of the motivation for the ethical attitude reveals that Husserl grappled with existential and theological issues, including the valuelessness of existence, the problem of contingency, and the idea of God. Ultimately, interpreting Husserl’s ethical writings through the notion of the ethical attitude brings together several aspects of his ethics, thereby clarifying the many senses of critique and reflection at play in ethical and social life. (shrink)

Known as the founder of the phenomenological movement, this book examines Husserl's various phases of phenomenology during his realist, transcendental, static, genetic, and post-Crisis (of European Sciences) periods. Consisting of ten carefully researched and thoroughly examined essays, this book describes Husserl's concepts and ideas through numerous examples and diagrammatic representations, in a bid to elucidate the nuances of phenomenology for its readers. Valuable insights into Husserl's realist phase are made in the chapter on Meaning, and the chapters on Natural Attitude, (...) Epoché and Phenomenological Reduction, while the chapter on Noesis & Noema symbolizes the transcendental phase. Thomas points out Husserl's transition from static to genetic phenomenology in the chapter on Lived Body, with the chapters on Lifeworld, and the Notion of the Other, later focusing on this perspective. Husserl's entire phenomenological space, including his pre-phenomenological period, are covered in the chapter on Lived Time. However, the chapters on Phenomenology: The Study of Self and Beyond, and Consciousness and Intentionality are the fulcrums upon which the edifice of phenomenology turns. The final chapter on Presuppositionlessness in phenomenology expresses Thomas' personal enquiries into Husserl's contention that phenomenology is a presuppositionless science. This book will be of particular interest to research scholars and post-graduate students in the areas of Philosophy and Social Sciences, as well as those interested in contemporary Western Philosophy, and the history and development of Ideas. (shrink)

Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy, Second Edition contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has more than 600 cross-referenced entries on his key concepts and major writings as well as entries on his most important predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.