Abstract

A phenomenologically based theory of occurrent thinking called TMDOT was developed and a portion of it will be presented here because it appears to lend validation to, clarify, explicate, and further distinguish between two forms of Husserlian intentionality critical to the constitution of objects, both of which are posited as existing during occurrent thoughts. For Husserl, there is an intentionality occurring in the _substratum_ of meaning generation through intentional acts of consciousness, one that is directly linked to another _stratum_, the purpose of which is to express that meaning. The theory focuses on the phenomenological differences between these two forms of intentionality, their different cognitive functions, and the phenomenally based ways in which they connect to each other to facilitate their respective roles. TMDOT appears to support Husserl’s phenomenological observations and descriptions of two types of intentional acts and how they experientially and temporally connect to each other during the occurrent thought process. In turn, his views about the nature of such acts appear to lend credence to said theory. Cognitive and neuroscientific research results incorporated into TMDOT are presented, ones which seem to support and expand upon Husserl’s understanding of the nature of intentional acts utilized in the constitution of objects and upon his beliefs about the existence and functioning of an Ego-pole in conscious experiencing.