Abstract

What fixes the referents of episodic memories? While developed theories are lacking, it is generally assumed that the causal production of a memory, via memory traces, determines its referent. Recently, it has been pointed out that the “promiscuity” of memory traces poses a problem for this approach. Proposed solutions focus on finding some nonpromiscuous causal link. In this paper, I refine the problem posed by promiscuous memory traces and show that these solutions fail. By developing the question of mnemonic episodic reference within the framework of informational signs, I argue that no pure “producer-side” theory of reference will work. The only solution, I argue, is to abandon pure producer-side theories for theories which appeal to consumer-side factors, i.e., factors concerning how referring signs are used. Once it is admitted that mnemonic episodic reference depends on consumer-side factors, the natural question is whether producer-side factors (i.e., causal production) play any role at all in mnemonic episodic reference. I conclude by outlining two possible pure consumer-side theories for mnemonic episodic reference, one based on the work of Imogen Dickie and one based on the work of Ruth Millikan. Both theories explain how the referents of episodic memories are fixed without any appeal to a causal link, and, hence, are compatible with “post-causal” theories of memory, like simulationism.