Governance and Corporate Philanthropy

Business and Society 41 (3):319-344 (2002)
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Abstract

Although corporate decision makers may justify charitable contributions on strategic grounds, extremely large corporate philanthropic contributions may beperceived by shareholders as unnecessary. If stockholders attempt to limit corporate philanthropy, then governance mechanisms should put a cap on giving amounts. Using a matched-paired sample to control for industry and company size, theauthors compared big givers and small givers. The authors find that blockholders and institutional owners limit corporate philanthropy. This suggests that high levels of corporate philanthropy may be perceived as excessive by influentialstockholders, and some governance mechanisms act to curtail it.

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Governance and Corporate Philanthropy.B. Barktus, S. Morris & B. Seifert - 2002 - Business and Society 41:319-44.
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