Abstract

In Chapter One I spell out the main purpose of this study, viz. to show that no presently plausible theory of reference logically prevents theists from singling out an incorporeal God. After opening Chapter Two by explaining what I mean by "incorporeality," I argue that there are no compelling reasons against belief in a permanently embodied being who has God's personal perfections. Thus, even if we could not individuate an incorporeal deity, it doesn't follow that we could not single out an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being. After assuming for the sake of argument that God is essentially incorporeal, I argue in Chapter Three that if the referent of a given use of a term is the object which satisfies a set of descriptions that a speaker associates with that term, then it is possible to single out God. In Chapter Four I consider whether it is possible to refer to a nonexistent God. Many have thought that nonactual objects cannot be individuated; I contend that is is premature, and support my contention by arguing that at most one possible being could have a conjunction of seven divine attributes. Therefore--barring cogent general arguments against quantifying over mere possibilia--we are at liberty to believe that at least one nonactual object could be identified. Moreover, since traditional theistic standards of perfection require that God possess these attributes essentially, and since these attributes are purely qualitative, we are at liberty to believe that God has a purely qualitative individual essence--a "nature." I conclude Chapter Four by pointing out that its main argument casts further doubt upon certain standard arguments against the coherence of the concept of an incorporeal person. In Chapter Five I consider whether Trinitarian Christianity is compatible with the claim that God has a nature. Though it seems not, I argue to the contrary that at least one version of orthodox Trinitarianism entails that God the Father has a nature. Finally, in Chapter Six I ask whether God could satisfy a causal requirement for singular reference. I disucuss six arguments designed to show that an incorporeal Deity could not stand in an "appropriate" causal relation to a human namer; I conclude that none of these arguments is persuasive