Abstract

In this dissertation I defend the traditional claim that everyone ought to believe in God. In chapter one I limit the "everyone" to all normal adults, and the "ought" is said to be epistemic. "To believe in God" is taken to mean to believe that he exists and has a certain set of attributes. ;In chapter two I defend the notion of epistemic obligation. Beginning with our twin epistemic goals to believe truths and reject falsehoods, I suggest that a positive normative term like an epistemic ought is needed. Justification is found to be inadequate to express the intent of the positive goal and obligation to gain truths. Two types of epistemic obligation are presented: basic and non-basic. ;In chapter three I consider and set aside the objection that no one could be obliged to believe in God because we are not doxastic agents who can just decide to believe at will. I suggest that belief in God is either indirectly subject to the will; or it is directly subject to the will in that we can sometimes either accede to or hinder our experienced tendencies to believe. I discuss several generally neglected problems with the popular notion that our believings are indirectly subject to our wills. ;In chapter four I consider whether there might be available an inferential defense of the traditional claim. I examine some leading contemporary expressions of the traditional theistic arguments , concluding that while each may obligate some people none of them can--as presented--defend the traditional claim. I conclude that the prospects for an inferential defense appear to be dim. ;In chapter five I present an argument from divine fairness which shows why some theists have reason to expect God to make knowledge of his existence available to everyone. I then offer adaptations of Swinburne's views on religious experience and Plantinga's on proper basicality as suggestions of how God could be making his existence known to all. I offer two possible reasons why, if these suggestions are true, not everyone believes: sin and self-deception