Ethics, Suffering and Necessity

Abstract

This paper explores the moral imperatives that shape ethical behavior, emphasizing the necessity of ethical conduct for both societal cohesion and personal well-being. Drawing on classical and contemporary philosophical thought, the paper critiques systemic injustices—particularly the exploitation of the working class under capitalism—and the ways in which power structures manipulate societal conflict to obscure their role in sustaining inequality. The study introduces the “Principle of Ethical Necessity,” a multi-staged ethical framework that accounts for causality, proportionality, unavoidability, and systemic impact in ethical decision-making. The argument asserts that while there is no objective morality, a rigorous ethical methodology can guide moral actions, particularly in complex scenarios such as the trolley problem, medical ethics, and justifiable revolution. The paper further develops the concept of “Semi-Objective Suffering” (SOS), which distinguishes between imposed subjective suffering and collectively acknowledged suffering, providing a more reliable ethical metric. The work also considers the moral legitimacy of revolutionary actions, proposing a framework where systemic overhauls are justified only under strict conditions, such as the failure of peaceful alternatives, the integrity of revolutionary motives, and the proportionality of harm to long-term benefits. The conclusion reinforces the idea that ethical action requires discernment, integrity, and accountability—both in personal decision-making and in the pursuit of justice. The consequences of unethical action, it argues, are not just societal but deeply personal, shaping the individual’s moral self-conception.

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