Lotteries and Prefaces

In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-176 (2017)
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Abstract

The lottery and preface paradoxes pose puzzles in epistemology concerning how to think about the norms of reasonable or permissible belief. Contextualists in epistemology have focused on knowledge ascriptions, attempting to capture a set of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and denials in a variety of contexts (including those involving lottery beliefs and the principles of closure). This article surveys some contextualist approaches to handling issues raised by the lottery and preface, while also considering some of the difficulties encountered by those approaches.

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Matthew A. Benton
Seattle Pacific University

Citations of this work

Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.
The Case Against Closure.Fred I. Dretske - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 13--25.
Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.

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