Σ01 soundness isn’t enough: Number theoretic indeterminacy’s unsavory physical commitments

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (2):469-484 (2023)
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Abstract

It’s sometimes suggested that we can (in a sense) settle the truth-value of some statements in the language of number theory by stipulation, adopting either φ or ¬φ as an additional axiom. For example, in Clarke-Doane (2020b) and a series of recent APA presentations, Clarke-Doane suggests that any Σ01 sound expansion of our current arithmetical practice would express a truth. In this paper, I’ll argue that (given a certain popular assumption about the model-theoretic representability of languages like ours) we can’t know ourselves to have any such freedom.

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Sharon Berry
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

Physical Possibility and Determinate Number Theory.Sharon Berry - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (3):299-317.

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References found in this work

Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Models and reality.Hilary Putnam - 1980 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.

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