Williams contextualism as a critique of epistemological realism

Theoria: Beograd 62 (1):91-102 (2019)
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Abstract

Although Williams’ contextual thesis is above all a critique of one way of interpreting contextualism in epistemology, viz., simple conversational contextualisam, I will argue that this thesis has also been a very successful means for the critique of a standpoint on which that interpretation, and the entire traditional epistemology rests - epistemological realism. Accordingly, in spite of certain weaknesses in Williams’ position pointed out by his critiques, in this paper I will try to show that, by interpreting the problem of scepticism as first and foremost a methodological necessity of epistemological realism, Williams succeeds in offering an enlightening diagnosis of the sceptical paradox problem which is at the centre of epistemology traditionally construed.

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Milos Bogdanovic
University of Belgrade (PhD)

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References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contextualism, externalism and epistemic standards.Michael Williams - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (1):1 - 23.
Two forms of epistemological contextualism.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):19-55.

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