Hinges, Prejudices, and Radical Doubters

Wittgenstein-Studien 10 (1):165-181 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper makes use of the Wittgenstein-inspired perspective of hinge epistemology in connection with research on epistemic injustice. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges and prejudices, by focusing on the role of the “radical doubter” in epistemic practices.

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Anna Boncompagni
University of California, Irvine

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